Friday, August 27, 2010

Next stop, Tehran?

.....http://cryptome.org/eyeball/tnrc/tnrc-eyeball.htm

The sad thing - the American people are not at all at war with the devil.... The devil is riding us and got us declaring war against the world plus our own people and ourselves in his name.... The capricious beast demands expensive sacrifices of us and tells us it is for our own salvation..... And we are too mind-controlled to see it.....


http://criminalstate.com/2010/09/when-will-we-see-the-next-mass-murder/

Next stop, Tehran? NO, hard negotiations with Tehran full steam ahead soon....?


ISRAEL ORDERS MASSIVE MILITARY FUEL STOCKS FAR IN EXCESS OF THAT REQUIRED FOR NORMAL OPERATIONS



** Based on discussions with several senior intelligence officials in Washington and elsewhere...., it appears that the majority consensus among U.S. and many other national security policymakers, regarding the Iran situation, can be summarized as follows....

1. Iran is still well-over a year away from any substantial progress towards weaponization. There are serious glitches in the Iran program and there is effective and coordinated sabotage and disruption involving the United States, Russia, Germany and others. There is no imminent deadline for military action, and the Israelis perfectly well know this, too.

2. The U.S. is resolved to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. So, while there is time for diplomacy, there is a deadline, and the military option is truly on the table. Just not during 2010. Revisit the question after March 2011.

3. Unlike the Bush Administration, the policy of the national security team under Obama is NOT to attempt regime change. Let the volatile internal dynamics play out, with only very clandestine support for opposition reform factions. The view is that any factional realignment further postpones the Iranian nuclear weaponization program.


4. U.S. has congratulated Russia (Hillary to Lavrov) for starting up Bushehr. This is an important milestone event. Even Iran is given blessings for moving forward with civilian nuclear power--under international proper supervision.

5. Israel and American neocons are pushing the button vis. attacking Iran for broader geopolitical reasons. If Iran gets the bomb, this fundamentally changes the political alignment in the region, and neutralizes Israel's nuclear capability. Israel's overkill nuclear weapons arsenal was part of the NATO second strike capability versus the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. Why else would Israel have such a vast arsenal? Needless for deterrent or even offensive use against Arab countries. As a deterrent, it has been pretty successful. No Middle East war against Israel since 1973--the point that Israel verifiably had a deliverable nuclear weapons capability. Now Israel is a liability for the U.S. in the eyes of a growing number of American strategists. Even Gen. Petraeus testified at the U.S. Senate that Israel's behavior is making life more difficult for U.S. military forces in the Arab and Muslim world. The game is changing, gradually, and the power of the Israeli Lobby is diminishing.

6. War, therefore, is neither imminent nor unthinkable. 2011 is the crucial time frame, and in the interim, there is an enormous amount of wiggle-room for negotiations. Iran is a potential vital ally for U.S. safe and credible withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. But diplomacy is a two-way street, and the frustration with Iran's diplomatic zig-zags is deep, in Washington AND Moscow. Beijing is also coming to see the difficulties in relying on Iran keeping their word, or responding to pressure from true allies.

If it does come down to a war, there will be plenty of blame to go around. War can and must be avoided, and that will take competent, sustained, patient diplomacy over the next nine months. Pay special close attention to the negotiations now underway, leading into the September talks in Vienna, hosted by the IAEA. Those talks will offer the next best opportunity to blunt the momentum for war, via a deal to restrict secondary enrichment by Iran, and to exchange a portion of their existing stockpile of low enriched uranium for the isotope fuel rods needed for their medical reactor. Turkey is playing a back channel role in this, but there are literally a dozen or more direct U.S. negotiating channels with Iranian officials.

The only thing missing from this analysis is domestic U.S. economic woes. At some point might not U.S. elites determine that the only way out of a double-dip recession (plus deflation) is war?

Of course the Iranians are going to zig and zag, and zag and zig, again and again. What needs to be on the table is not war but our willingness to trade our something big for their something big. We have been engaging in preliminaries. Real negotiations have yet to begin. When I see the real horses we are willing to trade, not the nags we've been parading, then I'll know we are starting to get serious.



looks like next stop Tehran. I heard from a merc I've known for a while, this one works in the private Uncle Sam camp. He normally works the whole Afghanistan-Green Zone corridor. He says they are all on standby for Tehran. They absolutely expect it to go down soon. I've learned long ago to watch the global merc migration patterns. They are like groundhogs, their appearance foreshadowing coming events. Iran will happen soon....
Repent -- The End Is Near

...We are ruled by a political class that lacks ethics, integrity, and ability. We are lied to daily. We are not in an economic recovery. The financial crisis is not over. The reality is that the economy and financial system are in worse trouble today than they were two years ago. We have not seen anything yet compared to what lies ahead!

Optimistic, IMO......
Who Actually Owns BP?

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=20708] U.S. US Military Intervention in Africa: The New Blueprint for Global Domination
(Keep your eyes on the coming rape of Africa and what they are going to do with Africom 'peace-keepers" and IMF and UN in tow after they stir up civil and puppet wars in strategic resource-rich nations. They did not build Africom for nuthin'.

India to order large number of Javelin anti-tank missiles from US
What for, s'il vous plaƮt?


Obama draws line on Iran policy
By Gareth Porter

WASHINGTON - United States President Barack Obama's refusal in a White House briefing this month to announce a "red line" in regard to Iran's nuclear program represented another in a series of rebuffs of pressure from Defense Secretary Robert Gates for a statement that the US will not accept its existing stocks of low enriched uranium.

The Obama rebuff climaxed a months-long internal debate between Obama and Gates over the "breakout capability" issue that surfaced in the news media last April.

Gates has been arguing that Iran could turn its existing stock of low-enriched uranium (LEU) into a capability to build a nuclear
weapon secretly by using covert enrichment sites and undeclared sources of uranium.

That Gates argument implies that the only way to prevent Iran having enough bomb-grade uranium for nuclear weapons is to insist that Iran must give up most of its existing stock of LEU, which could be converted into enough bomb-grade uranium for one bomb.

But Obama has publicly rejected the idea that Iran's existing stock of LEU represents a breakout capability on more than one occasion. He has stated that Iran would have to make an overt move to have a "breakout capability" that would signal its intention to have a nuclear weapon.

Obama's most recent rebuff of the Gates position came in the briefing he gave to a select group of journalists on August 4.

Peter David of The Economist, who attended the briefing, was the only journalist to note that Obama indicated that he was not ready to lay down any public red lines "at this point". Instead, Obama said it was important to set out for the Iranians a clear set of steps that the US would accept as proof that the regime was not pursuing a bomb.

Obama appeared to suggest that there are ways for Iran to demonstrate its intent not to build a nuclear bomb other than ending all enrichment and reducing its stock of low enriched uranium to a desired level.

Iran denies any intention of making nuclear weapons, but has made no secret that it wants to have enough low enriched uranium to convince potential adversaries that it has that option.

At a 2005 dinner in Tehran, Hassan Rowhani, then secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, told George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that Iran didn't need a nuclear weapon, as long as it had the "mastery of the fuel cycle" as a deterrent to external aggression.

Gates raised the issue of the Iranian ability to achieve a breakout capability in a three-page memorandum addressed to national security adviser Jim Jones in January 2010, as first reported in the New York Times on April 18.

In reporting the Gates memo, David E Sanger of the New York Times wrote, "Mr Gates's memo appears to reflect concerns in the upper echelons of the Pentagon and the military that the White House did not have a well-prepared series of alternatives in place in case all the diplomatic steps finally failed."

In the statement issued on the memo on April 18, Gates said it "identified next steps in our defense planning process where further interagency discussion and policy decisions would be needed in the months and weeks ahead".

The Sanger article appeared eight days after differences between Obama and Gates over the Iranian breakout capability issue had surfaced publicly in April.

Obama used an April 1 interview with CBS News to distinguish between Iran's "trying to develop the capacity to develop nuclear weapons" from a decision to actually possess nuclear weapons.

"They might decide that, once they have that capacity that they'd hold off right at the edge - in order not to incur more sanctions," he observed. Obama talked about a new round of international sanctions as his response to that problem.

Hardliners in Washington wanted Obama to go further. David E Sanger of the New York Times invited Obama in an April 5 interview to draw the US red line at an Iranian breakout capability, Obama refused to do so.

Sanger asked Obama whether the United States could "live with an Iran that runs right up to the edge" - precisely the scenario Obama had suggested as a distinct possibility four days earlier.

Obama's answer made it clear that he understood that Sanger was pushing the Gates line that there is no obvious firebreak between Iran's low enriched uranium stocks and a breakout capability.

"North Korea was said to be simply a nuclear-capable state until it kicked out the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and became a self-professed nuclear state," said Obama.

But Gates went public a few days later with a sharply different position on the issue.

When David Gregory of interviewed both US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Gates on NBC's Meet the Press on April 9, he had apparently been informed about differences of view within the administration on the issue of an Iranian "nuclear capability".

Gregory asked Clinton, "Is a nuclear-capable Iran as dangerous as a nuclear state of Iran?" to which Clinton answered, "Well, clearly weapons are more dangerous than potential."

Gregory then asked Gates whether a nuclear-capable Iran is "just as dangerous as being a nuclear state to your mind?"

Gates answered, "Only in this respect: how you differentiate how far, how far have they gone? If they - if their policy is to go to the threshold but not assemble a nuclear weapon, how do you tell that they have not assembled?"

Gates said he didn't know "how you would verify that".

That exchange would have confused anyone who was not an insider to the Washington policy debate on Iran. The real issue was not whether the United States could "tell that they have not assembled" but whether Iran could turn its stock of low enriched uranium into weapons-grade uranium without kicking out international inspectors first and signaling their intentions.

Israel and extreme alarmists in the United States have long argued that Iran could use covert enrichment sites to enrich uranium to bomb-grade levels and might have access to undeclared uranium stocks. But a source familiar with the issue told Inter Press Service that the Defense Department had not been claiming that there is any intelligence indicating secret Iranian sites or uranium supplies.

Gates appears to have been trying to maneuver Obama into adopting a policy under which the United States would have a reason for threatening Iran unless it agreed to divest itself of its low enriched uranium stocks and end enrichment.

Although he has opposed an attack on Iran in both the George W Bush and Obama administrations, Gates has also been the primary advocate of creating "leverage" over Iran as well as over Russia and China in regard to tougher sanctions.

In an interview with Sanger in early 2008, quoted in Sanger's book, The Inheritance, Gates said the main problem he had with the 2007 national intelligence estimate on Iran was that it "made our effort to strengthen sanctions more difficult, because people figured, well the military option is now off the table".

Thus far the Obama administration has not given emphasis to the threat of US attack on Iran. Instead it has sought to use the threat of an Israeli attack on Iran as leverage, even as it warns the Israelis privately not to attempt such an attack.....

Iran debates talks with Uncle Sam....
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi

"The friendship of Iran is much better than its hostility."
Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad

Iran's ruling establishment is embroiled in heated debate on which course of action to take with the United States, with various political factions seeking to gain capital by touching on issues of war and peace and the economic well-being of Iran.

Ultimately, the decision on whether or not Tehran engages in a new round of bilateral or multilateral dialogue with Washington rests on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is deeply untrusting of US President Barack Obama's so-called Iran
engagement policy that has turned into tough sanctions and warmongering rhetoric.

As in the past, Khamenei's final decision will be a byproduct of multiple intertwined factors: Khamenei's own assessment of Washington's behavior and the feelers sent by the White House, factional balances, inter-agency discussions and deliberations, above all within the Supreme National Security Council, and the weight of public opinion.

The outcome of a complex interactive process rather than the (whimsical) decision of the top leader, the next move the Islamic Republic makes in its policy toward the US is highly critical. It has the potential to backfire at home if it does not meet the challenge of Iran's foreign and domestic priorities, which is why the decision has turned out to be both exceedingly complex and agonizing.

"Part of the problem is the lack of adequate information about the Obama administration and its motives," said a Tehran University political science professor who specializes in Iran's foreign relations. Obama has sent many "contradictory signals" toward Iran that "have convinced many in Iran that he may prove to be a war president instead of peace president vis-a-vis Iran," according to the professor, who declined to be identified.

A number of Tehran analysts maintain a modicum of faith in the Obama administration, hoping that it could still prove different from its predecessors and introduce a meaningful, if not highly significant, change in the US's approach toward Iran, despite the recent rounds of US-led sanctions slapped on Iran.

The Gordian knot of US-Iran hostility cannot be undone unilaterally, however. If there is to be a breakthrough then certain initiatives and reciprocities are necessary, serving as incremental bricks in rebuilding the breakdown in mutual trust.

"Unfortunately, there is a correlation between the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan on the one hand and Iran on the other,'' the professor said. ''Whenever the White House feels the pinch of a deteriorating situation in those places, it eases its hostility toward Iran, but the moment it feels confident on its ongoing wars, it ups the ante against us."

The professor hinted at another dimension of complexity in current US-Iran relations; the fact that Tehran and Washington must constantly adjust their policies based on data from the troubled neighbors of Iran in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention Pakistan, which is now distracted with the disaster caused by flooding.

Little wonder that the recent spate of bad news from both Kabul and Baghdad - for example the well-coordinated country-wide bombings in Iraq - actually serves as good news in terms of staving off and diminishing the chances of a worsening crisis with Iran, within certain limits.

The same "quagmire" also gives Iran a cushion of comfort that dampens any major incentive to compromise for the sake of rapprochement with the US. Instead of rapprochement, a dreaded word in Tehran nowadays, expectations are much lower and focus instead on thorny questions of limited dialogue on issues such as Iran's nuclear program and regional security.

From the vantage point of the proponents of direct talks with the US, this is in Iran's national interests since a nuclear fuel-swap deal for a Tehran reactor may never materialize in the absence of such dialogue.

A new round of multilateral nuclear talks is therefore necessary to hammer out differences that remain about the swap deal, which could potentially act as a catalyst for broader agreements. This is in light of economic sanctions that have hurt Iran's economy, particularly in an energy sector in dire need of billions of dollars in foreign investment.

Tehran's main concern is not to enter the ring with heavyweights looking defensive and weak, thus the importance of timing and the right atmosphere. Iran wants to avoid giving the impression in the near future that, as a result of heated debate in Tehran, its negotiators represent a house divided, thus robbing the Iranian negotiators of the necessary confidence to stand up to global "bullying powers".

However, opponents of direct talks with the US may be gaining the upper hand, in light of the successful completion of the Russian-built power plant in Bushehr and the indifference if not outright hostility of several nations (including Turkey and China) toward economic sanctions against Iran.

The prospects for Iran to weather the sanctions, albeit at some cost, are also a factor, though difficult to measure given the inadequate data on the net impact of various sanctions against Iran. A clearer picture on this may emerge by the end of the year, but for the moment the only tentative conclusions that can be drawn are that the effect of sanctions on the economy falls short of the desired "crippling".

"There are many countries - China, India, etc - that are Iran's trade partners with a long history of Western sanctions and none of them buckled under pressure, so why should Iran? It's a question of national pride and identity that can be harmed if Iran forfeits its nuclear policy as a result of sanctions," the Tehran professor said.
The only problem with such comparisons is that unlike China and India, Iran has consistently denied that it has any intention to build nuclear weapons. Irrespective of such differences, what seems to matter more to Tehran analysts and politicians is the sanctity of the nation's external image; an image that could be imperiled if it appeared that Tehran had been pressured into another round of nuclear talks.

This is all the more reason why at this point Tehran may be more amenable to comprehensive dialogue instead of nuclear-focused talks, where the other side's points of weakness, or "co-dependency" (on security in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example) would compensate for Iran's areas of vulnerability.

On the positive side, Washington's decision not to make a lot of fuss about Bushehr's opening, its war-avoidance signals to Israel, Obama's recent hint at seeking Iran's assistance over Afghanistan, the US Navy's rescue of some Iranian fishermen, have seemingly struck a cord in Tehran. There has thus been an announcement that the inquiry regarding three Americans being held in Iran is about to end, a hopeful sign that they may be released, perhaps as part of a "double swap" (see US-Iran double swap points to peace Asia Times Online, August 10, 2010).

Setting the stage for Ahmadinejad's New York visit in September to attend a United Nations General Assembly meeting, Iran's foreign policymakers are keen to cultivate elements of public diplomacy that would benefit Iran. At such a testy time, Iran must play its cards to perfection to avoid courting disaster.

Ahmadinejad is likely to repeat his call of last year for a debate with Obama, even though he was ignored then and will likely be ignored again. Yet the advantage of such a move for him is that it puts the ball in the US's court, showing that Washington and not Tehran is rebuffing an offer of friendship.

Still, above and beyond such tactics, the big question of strategic relations between the US and Iran looms large. The fractious response that this elicits in Tehran runs the risk of holding foreign policy interests and priorities hostage to a net of domestic considerations.

The issue of strategic relations is one threat to Iran's national interests to which Iranian politicians cannot possibly remain indifferent, much as they may wish to exploit the issue for factional interests.

To talk or not to talk to Uncle Sam, the riddle remains fully wrapped in suspense. After several rounds of bilateral and multilateral talks, another round is not "mission impossible" [1] but rather mission difficult. A more vigorous sign of Washington's readiness to engage Iran is called for that could enhance the political fortunes of those politicians in Tehran who are advocating the option of talks.

Note 1. Mission impossible? True US-Iran dialogue Asia Times Online, April 8, 2006.


Thursday, August 26, 2010

Red alert ;The Russians are coming....

DynCorp: The Creepiest Company You Never Heard Of
Interesting forum thread...

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100830/160392617.html


Red alert ! The Russians are coming!
By Pepe Escobar

Hollywood executives and Washington policymakers are suckers for Russophobia.... Considering the appalling level of political discourse in both these capitals of mass entertainment, certainly one cannot expect their "opinion leaders" to have read Professor Paul Kennedy's recent expose of European history packaged as a crash course to Americans about the inevitable downsizing of the US in the emerging, multipolar new world order.......

Ammo ban.... UN Small Arms Treaty....... Don't worry, it's not about you, just the turbaned guys and maybe the domestic conspiracy........ loonies to safeguard the nice folks..... And then a little full-spectrum dominance to keep the old democracy in tidy order....... Why did they name it "full spectrum dominance" anyway.....? Sounds like something Cheney found on the take-out menu at the DC Madam's place.

UN Small Arms Treaty
Full Spectrum Dominance[


Hollywood Russophobia always emerges as caricature, as in the current, irrepressible humorless Angelina Jolie vehicle Salt - complete with the former KGB kidnapping babies to be turned into super-agents infiltrated into the US as sleeper cells, following a career path and patiently waiting to raise hell and sabotage Western democracy in the form of killing the president of the United States. Jolie is as believable as one of those Slavic super-moles as Central Intelligence Agency-scripted videos of Osama bin Laden.

For its part, Washington Russophobia usually emerges as a US-built Iron Curtain in reverse, which according to the Pentagon's full spectrum dominance doctrine rules that US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military bases will encircle Russia from the Baltic to the Caucasus and Central Asia.

So what's the Russian response? In both Afghanistan and Iran, it carries the mark of the good chess player; discreet, silent, getting down to business, and aiming to hit the jackpot.

All jihads lead to Sheberghan ..... from Quetta to Yemen to Darfur....
In Afghanistan, the leadership in Moscow always knew this was all about the US and NATO trying to establish a new hegemony in Central Asia - full spectrum dominance all over again. But then Moscow found out - following the Chinese example of investing US$3 billion in mines south of Kabul - that the best of possible worlds would be to make money while the West got bogged down in a winless quagmire. Call it the Shanghai Cooperation Organization way of running rings around NATO.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has just been to Moscow to be greeted by President Dmitry Medvedev with a slew of projects to the tune of US$1 billion - from a hydroelectric dam to exploitation of minerals, those same minerals that led the Pentagon to recently re-excavate its hyperbolic predictions of Afghanistan as the Saudi Arabia of lithium.

History has a way to sometimes render reality curioser and curioser. The Afghan mining industry, based in Sheberghan, in remote Jowzjan province, today controlled by General Abdul Rashid Dostum's militias, was no less than a Soviet creation. The Uzbek warrior Dostum, currently a minister in Karzai's government, made his career in the late 1970s pro-Soviet Afghan army before he opportunistically migrated to the mujahideen during the jihad in the 1980s, when he became one of former US president Ronald Reagan's "freedom fighters".

Legend has it that when Dostum visited Texas in the late 1990s he was carrying the treasure map - all the prospection done by the Soviets of Afghanistan's mineral wealth. Talk about perennial positioning; now Dostum is in the exact right place to profit from Russia's largesse. Dr Zbigniew "The Grand Chessboard" Brzezinski may have dealt the Soviet Union a crucial blow - or Vietnam - in the form of the 1980s jihad.

But it's the Russians who may have the last laugh. Afghanistan will always be considered by Moscow as under its sphere of influence. Russia is not only well connected to the Uzbek faction as with the Panjshir faction of the Karzai administration - via General Mohammed Fahim, Afghanistan's vice president and uber-lord of local espionage.

New US Afghan War supremo General David "I'm always positioning myself to 2012" Petraeus' current overdrive to rewrite the AfPak war as the US turning the tide over the Taliban may elicit subdued roars of laughter in Moscow (not to mention in Quetta, where al-Qaeda's leaders sit). But now Moscow can even afford to be magnanimous and let NATO supplies transit in Russian territory. The Russians know that where it matters - where the good business is, in northern Afghanistan - their future couldn't be brighter.

All that is nuclear turns into gold
The Bushehr nuclear power plant - the first in the Middle East - launched jointly last Saturday by Russia and Iran, unmistakably establishes Iran as one of the world's 29 nuclear power generating nations. But it's also a major coup for the Russian nuclear industry, in this case represented by state-run Rosatom.

Six months ago, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said that Rosatom would be able to build 25% of the world's nuclear plants (it currently stands at 16%). Atomstroiexport, Rosatom's civilian construction arm, will build a major plant in Turkey, and has also set sights on Bangladesh and Vietnam. Bushehr, which has cost more than $1 billion, will generate 2% of Iran's electricity. Of the four reactors to be built in Turkey, to the cost of $20 billion, each will produce 20% more energy than Bushehr.

Rosatom's chief executive Sergei Kiriyenko has been spinning that Bushehr is a "big international project" which involved more than 10 European Union (EU) and Asia-Pacific countries. What no one really knows is why this has taken so long, since Russia agreed to take over in 1992 (Bushehr actually started way back in 1974 by German Kraftwerk Union, a merger of Siemens and AEG. Siemens pulled out of Iran in 1980).

Everything has been invoked to justify the non-stop delays - US and UN sanctions, Tehran's suspicions of Moscow, Tehran actually not paying its bills on time. Now this is all water under the bridge. Kiriyenko also has made a point to stress that Bushehr "coincides with Russia's position that any country in the world has the right to nuclear energy for peaceful use" - as long as it is monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
According to the Tehran-Moscow agreement, Russia supplies the nuclear fuel for Bushehr and disposes of the spent rods (so Iran cannot use them to extract plutonium), with everything monitored by the IAEA. Hundreds of Russian engineers will remain working at Bushehr until 2013 before Tehran takes over completely.

In early August, even the US State Department via chief spokesman Philip Crowley, was forced to admit, "Bushehr is designed to provide electricity to Iran. It is not viewed as a proliferation risk because Russia is providing the needed fuel and taking back the spent nuclear fuel, which is the principal source of potential proliferation". What Washington has focused on like a laser is the Natanz uranium-enrichment plant; a second one, under construction, in Qom; and the heavy-water reactor in Arak, also under construction.

The notion that Tehran might build a "secret" bomb factory underneath Bushehr is ludicrous; it would be tracked by multiple spy satellites in a flash. So while strident, armchair warrior US neo-cons parade their ignorance equating an internationally monitored nuclear power plant with a nuclear bomb factory, the Russians merrily use it to cash in on further business opportunities.

Moscow knows that what's really at stake in the whole Iran nuclear dossier is that the US - with its huge nuclear arsenal - and both Britain and France - with their small nuclear arsenals - simply don't want to have yet another country from the developing world (like India and Pakistan) crash into their cozy nuclear weapon club. And neither is Russia interested in contending with an extra strategic challenge, a possibly nuclear-armed Iran (thus Moscow playing a constant game of geopolitical chess). What both the West and Moscow really want is to maintain the current status quo.

And that leads us to the heart of the matter; as long as the US, as well as Britain and France, don't accept Iranian uranium enrichment, there's simply no possibility whatsoever of extracting Iranian cooperation on a global, non-proliferation nuclear agenda. Meanwhile, the Russian nuclear industry will merrily keep cashing in.

Reconceptualising China's String of Pearls: From Strategic Vulnerability to Enduring Tactical Advantage.

http://www.dailypioneer.com/280387/US--India-should-counter-Chinas-maritime-influence.html

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinasStringofPearlsandIndiasEnduringTacticalAdvantage_irehman_080610


http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4768239&c=ASI&s=AIR

Intro:

When in 2003 a team of "Booz CIA Allen" consultants, in a report for the Pentagon, coined the term ‘string of pearls’ in order to describe Beijing’s attempts to gain a strategic foothold in the Indian Ocean, they were in all likelihood little aware of how rapidly their colorful image was to gain currency in turn of the century geopolitical discourse.

Amidst Delhi’s vibrant strategic community, in particular, the expression has come to embody, occasionally more metaphorically than factually, India’s innate, almost visceral fear of maritime encirclement.

What, however, is the reality behind China’s so-called string of pearls? And in what way does it pose such an existential threat to Indian security? It will be argued here that China’s naval positioning in the Indian Ocean is not only legitimate to a certain degree, but also, paradoxically, to Delhi’s tactical advantage in the event of a Sino-Indian conflict. This tactical edge can only be guaranteed, however, by the dogged pursuit of certain diplomatic and military measures.


I) A STRING OF CLOUDED PEARLS:

The term ‘string of pearls’ was implemented in order to describe Beijing’s increasing forays into the Indian Ocean , discernible through its efforts to establish ‘nodes of influence’ in the region, via an assertive diplomacy primarily geared towards strengthening its economic and security ties with countries as diverse as Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. In some cases this firming up of ties has led to joint port construction or enlargement deals, such as with Pakistan at Gwadar, or with Sri Lanka at Hambantota[1].



When evoking its Indian Ocean Policy, Beijing tends to paint it in broader economic and maritime security-related terms. Increasingly dependent on foreign oil, China is to some extent a prisoner of its own geography, as it is positioned far from some of the world’s most strategically salient shipping lanes, where the US and Indian Navies hold sway. It is in order to remedy this ‘Malacca dilemma’, argue Chinese strategists, that Beijing is compelled to venture further afield, and slip into the balmy waters of the Indian Ocean. For India, which has been entrapped in an often tension-fraught relationship with China for over half a century, China’s strategy bears greater resemblance to a noose, woven in order to encircle and constrict India within its own backyard, than a sparkly, peace-imbued constellation of trade linkages. In short, it could be argued that both nations are imprisoned in a textbook security dilemma.

The String of Pearls has become one of the most widely commented subjects in contemporary strategic debate, despite the fact that it also one of the most factually opaque. This paradox is especially blatant in India, where there seems to be an increasing disconnect in-between strategic commentary and official declarations[2], which has been taking great pains to emphasize that China has currently no naval bases in the Indian Ocean. Regularly stories surface in the press that are subsequently disavowed or contested, ranging from the supposed presence of a Chinese submarine base at Marao in the Maldives, to conflicting accounts of the extent of Chinese military presence in the Coco Islands off Burma.



What is clear, however, is that there is no compelling evidence yet to suggest that the PLAN has engaged in basing activities of an overtly military nature. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it has no future intention to do so. Chinese naval commanders have said as much, recently stating that China may also seek to obtain a base in the Gulf of Aden. The deep-sea water port of Gwadar, of which the first phase of construction has been completed, is projected to undergo militarization by the Pakistani Navy, which means that Chinese surface and sub-surface platforms could easily be stationed there. Most of the ports the PRC is helping to develop, whether it be at Hambantota or Chittagong, can have a dual use, by hosting both merchant and military vessels. And the absence as of yet of Chinese warships at berth does not mean that China is not busy conducting naval espionage, whether it be via the alleged SIGINT facilities it is erecting in places such as the Coco Islands, or via discreet hydrographic research.

It seems clear that China’s string of pearl strategy is still very much in a nascent, or even embryonic, phase. If it were to take on an decidedly military nature, however, what would be the security implications for India?


II) WHY CHINA’S STRING OF PEARLS WILL ULTIMATELY BE TO INDIA’S TACTICAL ADVANTAGE:



While many in India lament the supposed military emasculation induced by the presence of permanent Chinese bases in the region, it will be argued here that such a development would actually be to India’s tactical benefit, provided that it took certain preparatory measures, measures that will be detailed further on.

The unresolved land border issue and Tibet, both of which are intrinsically linked, are the focal points of Sino-Indian tension and are likely to remain so in the future. This means that if a conflict in-between both rising powers did occur, it would most likely be a largely land-waged war, most probably in the Himalayan Northeast. As of now, the Indian Navy can only be expected to play a minor role in such a conflict. With the future presence of Chinese naval bases in the region however, this could change, by providing the Indian Navy with a novel warfighting role.

A cursory review of the tactical options available to the Indian fleet in the event of a Sino-Indian war reveals the tactical flexibility on offer:


Tactical Option number 1:

A strategy of commodity denial, either via sea-lane blockade or through the targeted interdiction of Chinese shipping.

This option would require a long, protracted conflict in order to be effective. This effectiveness is likely to take ever longer to attain as China continues to build up its strategic oil reserves over the next decade, until it reaches its avowed goal of six months self-sufficiency[3]. Furthermore, as the recent tragedy off the coast of Gaza starkly brought to light, naval blockades can be messy affairs, resulting in collateral civilian casualties. This risk would be further compounded if Chinese merchant ships started to provide their crew members with small arms in order to fend off Somali pirate attacks. Finally, such a blockade would severely disrupt international trade, and would put into question India’s role as a responsible stakeholder in the international system.


Tactical Option number 2:

An expeditionary force into the South China Sea.

Not only would this escalate the conflict into a full-spectrum war, it would also result in disaster for the Indian fleet. Even if by 2020 the Indian Navy can boast two immediately deployable carrier groups, they would not be able to withstand a sustained aerial assault from Chinese fighters stationed on the mainland or on Hainan, especially when combined with a salvo of DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missiles. In addition to this, the Indian Navy would have to face down the rapidly expanding South China Sea Fleet, as well as the latest Jin class SSBNs and Shang Class SSNs stationed at Sanya.


Tactical Option number 3:

Breaking China’s String of Pearls.

If one looks at a potential naval conflict in-between both powers in the Indian Ocean, it makes no sense to compare each force in its totality ship for ship, missile for missile.

Theatre dominance is all that matters, and in this respect India will display two unalterable advantages:

First of all, by virtue of India’s immense geographical advantages in the region, it is difficult to imagine China ever being able to wield as much military clout in the region as its transhimalayan neighbour.



India’s natural peninsular formation means that it has been described by some as akin to an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” jutting out into the Indian Ocean. Any naval taskforce venturing into the Bay of Bengal with hostile intentions would have to contend with India’s airforce and naval aviation, operating not only from the mainland, but also from the Andaman and Nicobar archipelago in the Andaman Sea, whose airstrips are currently being extended, and which is slated to eventually host Sukhoi squadrons, and possibly MiGs and Mirages.[4]

Secondly, China’s naval presence in the region will be dispersed along the several, often distant, nodal points that constitute its string of pearls. Even if taken together these forces are superior in both quantity to quality to the Indian Navy, which, is all in all most unlikely, India will have the immediate advantage of force concentration and hence superiority if it decides to conduct a rapid strike at an isolated group of Chinese vessels. A direct attack on a naval base would be highly undesirable, as it would trigger a severe crisis with the hosting country. A massive naval deployment outside one such base could have the desired effect however, by compelling the Chinese to deescalate their land assault, much as the Indian Navy’s stationing of its fleet 13 nautical miles outside Karachi during the Kargil War prompted, some claim, the Pakistani Army to accelerate the withdrawal of its forces from the disputed areas[5].


III) NECESSARY PREPARATORY MEASURES:


Reinforcing the ANC:

The Andaman and Nicobar Command, which was inaugurated as India’s first joint command structure in 2001, is of absolutely vital strategic import. Separated from the mainland by almost 1200kms of sea, the island chain, which lies only 18km from the Coco Islands, constitutes India’s first eastern maritime defense perimeter. It has been also been described by certain Chinese analysts as a ‘metal chain’ which could lock China out of the Indian Ocean[6]. It goes without saying that the command will play a first-line role in the event of a Sino-Indian naval clash in the Indian Ocean. Although measures have been taken to strengthen India’s force presence on the islands, most notably by enlarging airstrips for Sukhois, or by announcing the stationing of India’s first full-bodied joint amphibious force and the ramping up of its existing 3000 strong 108 Mountain Brigade to a division level force of 15000 troops, the ANC is still having to making do with an assortment of fast offshore patrol vessels, LSTs and aging Dornier-228 Maritime Patrol Aircraft[7]. More needs to be done to accelerate the strengthening of India’s military deterrent in the Andaman Sea. This can be done by stationing one or two large warships there on a permanent basis, by setting up Brahmos cruise missile silos on some of the larger islands, and by providing the ANC with its own separate budget, so that its platform acquisition efforts no longer fall victim to inter-service turf wars.



Signing an Intelligence Sharing Agreement with the US involving the sharing of maritime satellite-based surveillance:

As the Chinese Navy extends its presence into the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, the region will be witness to a growing strategic congruence in-between both Washington and Delhi in their desire to carefully monitor the PLAN's comings and goings. Both navies already share very strong ties and have begun to display an ever increasing degree of interoperability, in large part thanks to the Malabar bilateral or multilateral exercises held each spring. India and the United States have recently upgraded their intelligence sharing in the field of counter-terrorism. In the future, both states may well find that the surveillance of China’s naval activities in the region is an equally pressing concern.

It would be in India’s interest to press for a maritime intelligence sharing agreement, which would result in the linking of India’s new ocean surveillance satellite with the US’s own satellite-based surveillance system. India could also offer to share radar and sonar data compiled in the Andaman Sea with US Naval Intelligence in exchange for US satellite imagery, thus gifting the Indian Navy’s with a bird’s eye view of everything that goes on in the Indian Ocean. This would be a good stop-gap measure while waiting for India’s own burgeoning satellite-based surveillance system to be capable of covering the entire region in real time. In order to not make the measure appear too overtly directed against China, both countries could ‘sell’ the initiative as being part of their larger effort to ensure maritime security in the region, and help protect maritime shipping from non-traditional threats.



Sustain and Reinforce Indian Maritime Diplomacy in the Indian Ocean Region:

While much has been said of China’s inroads into the Indian Ocean, India’s own charm offensive in the region has also been bearing fruit over the past two to three years, whether it be through the establishment of electronic monitoring systems in Madagascar in 2007, or more recently, in August 2009, in the Maldives. Indian officials have also become more reactive to their Chinese counterparts attempts to woo small but strategically placed nations such as the Seychelles or Mauritius. For example, Delhi reacted to Beijing’s offer of military assistance to the Seychelles by rapidly bestowing on its minute navy one of its own patrol aircraft[8]. This sort of rapid, reactive diplomacy, when combined with more long-term institutionalized efforts such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium launched in 2008, will help sustain the strength and visibility of India’s presence in the region.


Conclusion:

China’s so-called string of pearls strategy, the degree of advancement of which has frequently been overstated, is not likely to immediately put Indian maritime security in jeopardy. Nevertheless, there will inevitably come a time when India will have to face the reality of a Chinese naval presence in its own backyard. Beijing cannot afford for its Achilles heel- i.e. its acute vulnerability to any interruption of its overseas trade-to be bared for much longer.

Only when India’s strategic community grasp that India is already squarely poised over China’s energy jugular, will they be able to break with a deeply ingrained sense of vulnerability. Not only would the presence of Chinese vessels present no real existential threat to Indian naval dominance in the region, it would also, paradoxically , provide the Navy with a far greater degree of tactical flexibility in the event of a future conflict with China, be it on land or sea. This advantage can only be guaranteed however, if India undertakes certain preparatory measures designed to effectively lock down its control of its maritime surroundings, and curb Chinese influence among certain key oceanic ‘swing’ states.

Finally, as China edges its way into the Indian Ocean over the course of the next few decades, both nations would do well to agree to draft a “Sino-Indian Incidents at Sea Agreement”, which could be loosely modeled on the Cold-War era INCSEA, and which helped prevent routine US-Soviet naval encounters from spiraling out of control. The quest for adequate military readiness and tactical flexibility does not, after all, render the prospect of a future Sino-Indian naval conflict any less dire.....


CIA/MOSSAD getting involved... up close and personal at Bab Al-Mandeb/Yemen....


http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/04/somali-pirates200904?currentPage=all


The idea undergirding this comment’s main argument was brought up during a most interesting luncheon with Lt.Col. Peter Garretson of the US Air Force. I would like to thank him here, both for his input and for his strategic acumen....



[1] For an in-depth analysis of China’s String of Pearls Strategy, see Gurpreet S.Khurana, « China’s String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean and its Security Implications. », Strategic Analysis, Vol.32, N°1, January 2008.

[2] « No Chinese Military Bases in the Indian Ocean, says Menon », The Indian Express, Friday September 11th 2009.

[3] « A peek at China’s Strategic Oil Reserves », Global Times, 14th of June 2009.

[4] Rajat Pandit, « Strategically Important A and N Command to receive a boost », The Times of India, 6th of February 2010.

[5] Shyam Parekh, « Indian Navy Celebrates its silent Kargil Victory », http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=12113

[6] Zhang Ming, quoted by Robert D.Kaplan in “Center-Stage for the 21st Century, Power Plays in the Indian Ocean”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009.

[7] « India to plug gaps in security of Andaman and Nicobar Islands », 8th of February 2010, http://www.dnaindia.com/dnaprint910.php?newsid=1345128

[8] Event recounted by Harsh V.Pant, in « India in the Indian Ocean : Growing Mismatch Between Ambitions and Capabilities », Pacific Affairs : Volume 82, N°2 Summer 2009.