Monday, May 23, 2011

Catching American spies makes very good politics....



Catching American CIA, DIA, NSA, OSP spies makes very good politics....

The announcement in Tehran Saturday that the "skillful and faithful forces of the Intelligence Ministry have arrested 30 American spies in a strong confrontation with the CIA agents" has an ominous ring about it.

The statement said: "Due to the massive intelligence and counter-intelligence work by Iranian intelligence agents, a complex espionage and sabotage network linked to America's spy organization was uncovered and dismantled. Elite agents of the intelligence ministry in their confrontation with the CIA elements were able to arrest 30 America-linked spies through numerous intelligence and counter-intelligence operations. The network used a wide range of data bases and U.S. embassies and consulates in several countries, specially in the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia and Turkey, to collect information on Iran's scientific, research and academic institutions in the fields of nuclear energy, air and defense industries and biotechnology." Fars news agency subsequently quoted 'sources' that the detainees included government officials and top executives of state-owned companies.

Spy trials in Iran often get intertwined with the Byzantine politics in the corridors of power in Tehran and Qom. Influential politicians from the Majlis (parliament) have rushed to congratulate the Intelligence Ministry.

The Majlis is fast emerging as a counterpoint to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's authority. What lends piquancy is also that the Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi, a senior cleric, is himself the focal point of what appears to be a grim power struggle within the regime. Ahmadinejad sacked him last month as part of government infighting, but the minister was immediately reinstated by supreme leader Ali Khamenei. A cat-and-mouse game ensued with Ahmadinejad boycotting Cabinet sessions and Khamenei’s loyalists warning Ahmadinejad he was skating on thin ice by challenging the ruling system dominated by the religious establishment. Moslehi used to be Khamenei's representative to the Basij, Iran's 13-million strong volunteer army.

And catching the American spies brings Moslehi into limelight as a faithful guardian of the regime. The political implication is at once obvious. The conservatives and hardliners of the regime have turned against Ahmadinejad and in a series of moves, the religious establishment has launched pinpoint strikes at the president with the intent of weakening him before next year’s parliamentary elections and the vote for his successor in 2013.

This has been a rough Saturday for Ahmedinejad. His trusted vice-president Hamid Baqaei was removed from office by the constitutional court. Another of his closest aides was arrested. The Guardian Council ruled on Saturday that Ahmadnejad was not empowered to hold charge of the oil ministry, which is a treasure house of perks and patronage (and a vast cesspool of corruption and sleaze). Evidently, the clerics want to regain control of the oil ministry from where the president systematically ousted them during the past 4-5 year period.

At least 25 people loyal to Ahmadinejad, including his close confidant Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei (who is also the president's chief of staff), have been arrested in recent weeks and half a dozen websites allied to them have been blocked. Mashaei and Baqaei have been summoned for questioning twice in recent days by Iran’s intelligence services to respond to questions on financial and security matters. Hardliners and conservative clergy have been campaigning in recent months that Ahmadinejad has a master plan to weaken the the ruling Islamic system - Velayat-e Faqih - and shape politics on secular lines. Earlier this week, an ultraconservative publication urged Mashaei’s arrest.

Now, it is against a turbulent backdrop of political infighting that the spy trial will take place. The night of the long knives may be beginning all over again. At the root of it all lies the paradox that Ahmadinejad is Iran's first non-cleric as president. But the roots of the schism run deep and can be traced to the early days of the revolution in 1979.

Ahmadinejad is a follower of Ali Shariati, the brilliant non-cleric Iranian revolutionary and sociologist who propagated “red Shi’ism” in the tumultuous years leading to the revolution in 1979 – a curious amalgam of Marxism, Third Worldism and Islamic puritanism – which opposed the unrevolutionary “black Shi’ism” or Savafid Shi’ism of the Iranian religious establishment. Shariati who was trained in Sorbonne and was a friend of Jean-Paul Sartre, was murdered in 1975 under mysterious circumstances, most likely by the Shah's intelligence, when he was undergoing medical treatment in UK. Indeed, Shariati was the true ideologue of the Iranian revolution who fired up the Iranian youth (like Ahmadinejad) with his emphasis on social justice and egalitarianism and his progressive analysis of the problems of Muslim societies with the tools of modern sociology and philosophy. It was his name that the multitude of Iranian students pouring out into the heaving streets of Tehran chanted in unison in those chaotic weeks leading to the revolution. But in the event, with his early death (at the age of 42), the Iranian clerics in league with the bazaar hijacked the revolution from its leftist moorings.

Without doubt, the power struggle in Tehran will have profound significance for both Iranian and regional politics. Ahmadinejad instinctively warmed up to the revolution in Egypt. The conservatives and hardliners, on the other hand, would feel more comfortable with the Saudi regime. But at the end of the day, ideology becomes secondary to the lure of power and privileges and the Shi'ite clergy is notorious for intriguing. Don't be surprised if tomorrow we wake up hearing that the spy ring that Moslehi unraveled has since exposed that the government headed by Ahmadinejad secretly worked for the Americans and "Zionists".



Decoding Barack Obama's Bahrain puzzle....


Decoding Barack Obama's Bahrain puzzle....
By M K Bhadrakumar

The address by United States President Barack Obama on Thursday regarding the Middle East situation was a mixed bag of certainties and ambiguities, although Obama did bring US regional policy frankly and squarely behind the Arab Spring.

On the other hand, the speech was a last-ditch attempt to define a new narrative and a desperate gamble to regain the initiative. There is indeed a fundamental contradiction insofar as any political order that is born out of the Arab Spring, which is representative or sensitive to popular Arab opinion will, by definition, find it difficult to forge strategic cooperation with America.

Cairo has opted for normalization of relations with Iran; begun whittling down security cooperation with Israel; and in a stunning

move reconciled the Palestinian groups and is probably encouraging them to seek United Nations recognition for Palestinian statehood. Washington is barely coping.

Unsurprisingly, Obama was highly selective when he contemplated changes in the Middle East; he just couldn't bring himself to mention Saudi Arabia. He didn't know what to say. The great puzzle is Bahrain. Obama said with certainty:
Bahrain is a longstanding partner, and we are committed to its security. We recognize that Iran has tried to take advantage of the turmoil there, and that the Bahraini government has a legitimate interest in the rule of law.

Nevertheless, we have insisted both publicly and privately that mass arrests and brute forced are at odds with the universal rights of Bahrain's citizens, and we will - and such steps will not make legitimate calls for reform go away. The only way forward is for the government and opposition to engage in a dialogue, and you can't have a real dialogue when parts of the peaceful opposition are in jail. [Applause] The government must create the conditions for dialogue, and the opposition must participate to forge a just future for all Bahrainis.
This can be viewed almost as a reprimand of King Hamad Khalifa, a close ally, and a rejection of the violent crackdown on Bahraini protesters. Obama would know that changes in Bahrain would inevitably affect Saudi Arabia. Yet, he never mentioned Saudi Arabia and the US is also "quietly expanding on a vast scale" the US's defense ties with Saudi Arabia.

An Associated Press analysis with a Washington dateline on the same day as Obama spoke reported a "historic expansion of a 66-year-old relationship that is built on America's oil appetite, sustained by Saudi reliance on US military reach".

Apart from the recent US$60 billion Saudi-US arms deal, AP reports on a top-secret US project to develop an elite 35,000-strong Saudi force trained and equipped by the US under the supervision of Central Command specifically geared to protect Saudi oil infrastructure and other sensitive establishments.

Equally, something appears very odd in what Obama said about Bahrain since he continued in the same breath to draw a parallel with Iraq, of all places: "Indeed, one of the broader lessons to be drawn from this period is that sectarian divides need not lead to conflict. In Iraq, we see the promise of a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian democracy. The Iraqi people have rejected the perils of political violence in favor of a democratic process."

Najaf versus Qom
Obama's Bahrain puzzle needs decoding. On second thoughts, Bahrain and Iraq have similarities. In both places, democracy is all about Shi'ite empowerment. Clearly, the US pins hopes on the "reformist" crown prince of Bahrain to accommodate the demands of the Shi'ite opposition, while the prime minister, who is apparently a hardliner, is setting the pace for repression - and he is supported by the Saudis.

The US sees the alchemy of Shi'ite empowerment in Bahrain very differently from the Saudis. For one thing, Bahraini Shi'ite protesters aren't (so far) "anti-American" and the continuance of the US base for its Fifth Fleet is not in jeopardy. Again, Sheikh Issa Qassem, the spiritual leader of Bahraini Shi'ites, is prepared to settle for a constitutional monarchy and is not demanding an overthrow of the Sunni monarchy.

What Bahraini Shi'ites are demanding is power-sharing rather than a capture of power.

More important, the US doesn't subscribe to the conspiracy theory that the Iranians are going to be the "winners" if the Shi'ite majority gets a share of power in Manama. Iran, too, seems to realize its limitations. On the other hand, Bahraini Shi'ites do not want an Iran-type clerical regime - Velayat e-Faqih.

From the religious perspective, too, they draw inspiration from Najaf in Iraq rather than Qom in Iran. This last point becomes extremely important for comprehending the thinking behind Obama's remarks on Bahrain.

It is often overlooked that Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the spiritual leader of Iraqi Shi'ites based in Najaf, has consistently avoided supporting strict conceptual interpretation of Velayat-e Faqih. He is neither openly dismissive of some of the underlying doctrinal ideas nor does he explicitly offer any substantive affirmation of the Faqih framework. In short, Sistani remains reluctant about getting involved in politics, although as prominent US scholar and academic Vali Nasr (who, incidentally, advises Obama on the Muslim Middle East) points out, he "never tried to promote rivalry" between his doctrinal ideas and those of the Iranian clerics in Qom.

What it all adds up to is that a friendly Bahraini Shi'ite nation could turn out to be a strategic asset for the US to build bridges to Najaf - and that holds immense significance for the overall configuration of American influence in Iraqi politics, which today Iran (vainly) tries to dominate.

Any redefining of Shi'ite empowerment away from the traditional stranglehold of the clerical establishment (and the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih) and the shepherding of Bahraini Shi'ites toward a genuinely democratic, "secular" way of life holds interesting geopolitical possibilities for US regional policies, as such a progression would be completely antithetical to what the Iranian regime (or Hezbollah in Lebanon) represents.

That is to say, the cumulative impact of "democratic" Shi'ite empowerment in Iraq and Bahrain could at some point come to a "fusion" that poses an ideological headache for the Islamic regime in Iran. Thus, reform in Bahrain holds the potential to kick-start an engrossing shadow play within the world of Shi'ism in the Muslim Middle East. If Bahrain can be finessed to follow the "secular" democratic route of Shi'ite empowerment and be conjoined with Iraq politically, it may hasten the demand for democratic change within Iran itself.

A schism erupts ...
Iran's clerics, who have their political antennae out, may be sensing trouble and that may partly explain the grim power struggle that has erupted between the religious establishment and President Mahmud Ahmadinejad (who is incidentally the first non-cleric to occupy the position of head of state since the 1979 revolution). Conventional wisdom so far has been that Supreme Leader Ali Khameini solidly backed Ahmadinejad and that the president himself was the representative of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

The thesis has been, finally, blown away by the past few weeks of dramatic happenings in Tehran. We are witnessing instead the Iranian religious establishment circling its wagons. The Majlis (parliament), top IRGC commanders, Friday Prayer speakers and even the Guardian Council - important organs of the religious establishment - are queuing up to criticize or put down Ahmadinejad.

They are taunting the president - inflicting scores of cuts on him that are bound to bleed at some point. The political stakes are high. It was none other than Khamenei who gave the green signal for the assault on Ahmadinejad when he took the decision last month to reinstate Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi (a senior cleric who was previously the supreme leader's adviser to the Basij, Iran's equivalent of a "people's liberation army"), who was sacked by the president.

Interestingly, this was preceded by a smear campaign for months in Tehran that Ahmadinejad was systematically promoting "non-clerical" figures into positions of power and was pushing a secret plan to have another non-cleric succeed him as president in the next election in 2013. Furthermore, that he was working on a master plan to marginalize the religious establishment.

Ahmadinejad is a staunch follower of Ali Shariati, the brilliant non-cleric Iranian revolutionary and sociologist who propagated "red Shi'ism" in the tumultuous years leading up to the revolution in 1979 - a curious amalgam of Marxism, Third Worldism and Islamic puritanism - which opposed the unrevolutionary "black Shi'ism" or Savafid Shi'ism of the Iranian religious establishment. Shariati was trained in Sorbonne in France and was a friend of philosopher and author Jean-Paul Sartre; he was murdered in 1975 and in the event the clerics hijacked the revolution from its Marxian moorings.

The latest political controversy in Tehran over control of the Oil Ministry is also related to the broader power struggle, as powerful elites within the corrupt and decadent religious establishment have traditionally controlled and enjoyed this milk cow of the Iranian economy in league with the bazaar, and they cannot brook Ahmadinejad's move to assume direct charge of the portfolio.

The Guardian Council, the constitutional watchdog dominated by the religious establishment, stepped in last week to censure Ahmadinejad's executive decision to take charge of the Oil Ministry.

Again, Iran's administrative court, which is under the thumb of the religious establishment, has come up with a case against the head of the presidential administration, Hamid Baqaei, who is the right-hand man of Ahmadinejad and has the rank of vice president, banning him from working in state bodies for the next four years.

On Sunday, in a dramatic development, Ahmadinejad's key aide Kazem Kiapasha, who was touted in recent months as the president's favorite candidate for the 2013 election, was arrested.

Unshuttered balcony
According to the Tehran grapevine, many people loyal to Ahmadinejad, including his close confidant Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei (who is also the president's chief of staff), have been taken in for questioning and websites allied to them have been blocked.

Mashaei and Baqaei have been summoned for questioning by Iran's intelligence services. Hardliners and conservative clergy have been campaigning in recent months that Ahmadinejad has a master plan to weaken the Velayat-e Faqih system. Evidently, the hydra-headed Iranian religious establishment is imposing itself on an assertive non-clerical head of state.

This schism within the Iranian regime and the enveloping revolutionary fervor imparted by the Arab Spring could stir up the moribund democratic movement within Iran. The Iranian religious establishment is not a pushover and it will fight tooth and nail to defend its untrammeled political power. But then, the Iranian religious establishment is also lately a divided house.

This is where democratic reforms in Bahrain leading to Shi'ite empowerment could act as a catalyst for an "implosion" within Iran.

Actually, Obama has been surprisingly mild in his rhetoric on Iran - as if he were keenly following events there. Such an approach makes sense, as any manifest attempt to muddy the waters of the power struggle in Iran could be counter-productive.

The growing disarray within the Iranian regime and contradictions in Iran's political economy are best exploited if Bahrain emerges at this juncture as another democratic society (like Iraq) where Shi'ites are empowered but have opted for a modern, forward-looking society seeking integration with the West in the present era of globalization.

Obama's approach is diametrically opposite the Manichean vision of the Saudi establishment, which is frantically rallying the Sunni Arab world. Obama distanced himself more than once from the Saudi tirade against Iran stoking the fires of Sunni sectarian passions.

He would rather prise open the 30-year-old house that Iran's Shi'ite clerics built by climbing through an unshuttered balcony window that Bahraini Shi'ites could hold open for him in the dead of the night.

Will it work? The hope is audacious since there is the real risk that persecuted Shi'ites in Saudi Arabia will also clamor for the empowerment that the Bahraini Shi'ites may secure under Obama's watch. If that happens, a reluctant Obama may come face to face with the imperative of reforms in Saudi Arabia, which would be the mother of all reforms....



Friday, May 20, 2011

The Royal Anti-Shia Alliance An Expanded thuggish Wahhabi Gulf Cooperation Council...

Nervous about their futures, Gulf Arab rulers look to Jordan and Morocco to boost Sunni power in the Middle East.
The Royal Anti-Shia Alliance, An Expanded thuggish Wahhabi Gulf Cooperation Council...

DANIEL R. DEPETRIS

In a surprise announcement by Gulf Arab leaders last week, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) welcomed proposals by Jordan and Morocco to enter into the alliance. The GCC, consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, has been wracked by internal protest against monarchial rule since the Arab spring began in Tunisia last January.

The Al Khalifa Sunni ruling family of Bahrain is still experiencing its most extensive period of civil unrest since earlier in the decade when Shiites rose up against the monarchy for an extension of political rights.

http://www.montrealgazette.com/life/Still+waiting+Egyptian+revolution/4794255/story.html


Saudi Arabia, the most powerful thuggish crypto-Zionist state in the GCC, continues to dispatch police to its restive Eastern Province where the bulk of its oil reserves are located, in order to crackdown on Shī’ah protests there. UAE authorities have launched arrest raids against human rights defenders and civil society activists, most of whom come from the emirates’ wealthy clientele. Oman under Sultan Qaboos bin Said has been relatively peaceful compared to demonstrations that have turned violent elsewhere yet residents in the quiet Gulf sultanate are taking to the streets. Oil rich Kuwait is dragging its feet on providing citizenship to thousands of people who, although not Kuwaiti in origin, have moved to the small Gulf state to improve their lives.

The monarchies of the Persian Gulf are thus nervous about the type of political developments occurring around them, and in some cases, within their own borders. Saudis and emirates, who are preferably on the side of regional stability, have already acted in concert with the GCC to quell Bahrain’s protest movement. The offering of a GCC bid to Jordan and Morocco could be another tact to add new members and defend the alliance.

Why Jordan and Morocco? Like the GCC overall, both are pro-Western regimes boasting strong intelligence and military relationships with the United States. Both are indeed monarchies, which would suit them well in a club that is composed exclusively of kings and sultans. Both also happen to be countries with large Sunni populations, which would undoubtedly help Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners unite the region’s Sunni community against encroaching Iranian influence.

But if Jordan and Morocco are welcomed to join, why not Egypt, Iraq or Yemen? Geographically speaking, Iraq and Yemen would be far more preferable than Jordan, which is not even considered a Persian Gulf nation to begin with. Iraq also happens to sit atop the region’s second largest pool of oil, a product which would fill the pockets of the GCC with billions of dollars more in revenue.

While Yemen’s oil production is scheduled to dry out completely in the next decade, Yemenis still possess more oil than the Jordanians, who rely almost completely on foreign aid to sustain their infrastructure and fund their government.

Post-Mubarak Egypt, still in its infant stage of democracy and trying to reassert itself as an independent power, was notably absent as well, straining ties between Egypt and its traditional Gulf backers. Yemen, with all of its domestic problems and a nationwide protest movement of its own, remains the ugly sister on the outside looking in.

The Jordanian and Moroccan bids should therefore be seen as a political strategy rather than an example of economic unification. Surrounded by an ascending Shī’ah Government in Iraq and the loss of a strategic ally in Hosni Mubarak, Gulf royals are nervous.

How the United States and Europe fit into this equation is still to be determined. Indeed, it is important to remember that just because Jordan and Morocco are encouraged to apply doesn’t mean that both will find a new home in the GCC. Yet if their applications are accepted, the regional balance of power will be tilted more towards the Sunni states....

Obumbler, the well-wisher of democracy but the hand holder of utter autocracy...


Obumbler, the well-wisher of democracy but the hand holder of utter autocracy...


Public declarations of statesman can convey belief and intention. Often, one must strain to discern them as they are hedged by qualifications and contingent references. At other times, the overriding purpose is obfuscation. That becomes the goal when a leader temporizes, is indecisive and disinclined to make decisions on matters that entail risks and costs - be they diplomatic or domestic. Such was the nature of Barack Obama's address on the Middle East last Thursday. Trying to discern in his remarks the contours of a coherent foreign policy is futile. For the elucidation of a strategic design was not the purpose. Nor was the purpose to stake out a firm position that would be the pivot for future actions re. Palestine, reform movements in those countries where they are being repressed, or Iran. The aim was political – in two senses.

The first, primary consideration was to create favorable impressions among the American public - especially the political class – of Obama’s stewardship and the country’s exalted standing in the world. Israel's supporters above all.

The secondary objective, I believe, was to shape perceptions of the United States as a sober, responsible and ‘humane’ power whose leadership in the Middle East is indispensable. Toward that end, Obama took a dual approach. The first element was casting the discourse at a high level of abstraction: "our enduring values and principles," the imperative of economic development, the necessary reconciliation of stability with progressive change. The pronouncement of American commitment to a 'two state' formula to resolve the Palestinian impasse was also abstract even if it had a specific referent. Obama gave no indication of a readiness to alter the servile attitude of the United States toward the willful, unbending Israeli leadership. Words about settlements ring hollow when there is no evident readiness to twist the Israelis’ arms or impose serious sanctions. Reference to a renewed 'peace process' for the umpteenth time is meaningless when there is no plan to include Hamas or even favorable notation of its reconciliation with Fatah. Similarly, a vague passing allusion to Bahrain carries no sign of a shift in priorities that until now has heavily favored reassuring the Gulf autocrats of America's continuing devotion to their partnership.

The other element in Obama's address was stylistic. Rather than formulate an integrated strategy that was politically and intellectually coherent, Obama chose to present a sort of collage or, perhaps more accurately, a modernistic painting a la Kandinsky. That involved displaying on the canvas (the minds of his audience) arresting images in various shapes and splashes of color along with stray lines, vaguely connected to each other, that commented upon the bright passages. All the components were chosen with care to evoke certain impressions and images. Bows to the greatness of the Arab past; conjuring in vivid terms the specter of endless war that must be exorcised; pious allusion to the Divine spark and our eternal longing to comport with our better angels; presenting America in its Sunday best – the virtuous power with the means and will to promote the enlightened interests of everyone in the Middle East.

In short, America under the leadership of Barack Obama is the one best hope of Muslims, Jews and Christians alike. These unoriginal materials were speckled throughout the speech, suitably attired for the grand occasion. They give tone and were meant to be felt as tokens of earnestness while creating a mood of uplift. We have heard all of this before - in Cairo, at the Nobel ceremony in Oslo. The overall composition, as well as its individual ingredients, is designed to play on feeling rather than to engage thought. Certainly not critical cognition. These are not dots, data points, encouraging you to connect them by your own applied intellect. They are an invitation to see reality in the speaker’s terms without the audience’s sensing the artist’s guiding hand. This is the way non-representational art works, when there is intelligent intent behind its creation.

The tangible recognizable bits (Egypt, Tunisia, a visionary Israel/Palestine) are interspersed throughout not for the purpose of instruction. Rather, they are intended to ensure that your thoughts/feelings about them should be made favorable by the composition of evocative symbols that surrounds them. Oratory of this nature is meant to leave a lasting impression. An impression of the person and his conduct whose afterglow will cast in a becoming light all else that will (or will not) emanate from him. It burnishes his persona. It is but a highlight in a campaign – a campaign to make of a virtual reality to which there is no commitment to make actual, seem genuine.

This is vintage Obama. He sets himself tests not of tangible accomplishment but of rhetorical creation. Gratification comes from assembling the pieces so that seem to hang together- that they make the desired impression, that they punctuate the moment and shape political imagery in the future long enough, and with a deep enough impression, to fend off the critical judgments of initiatives that never come, of half-measures that are never completed, of goals that fade further into the horizon. This time, it will not work. For those in the vanguard of Middle East reform, we have shown ourselves the well-wisher of democracy but the hand holder of autocracy. We embrace freedom when it is cheap and easy. We speak of self determination, but Palestinians are denied succor except for the stale words that catch in the throat. We pronounce the desire to put the war on terror in perspective, yet we prosecute war unrelentingly in Afghanistan and elsewhere while clumsily intervening in the combustible affairs of Pakistan. We paint pictures of a new era of cooperation, yet balk at even considering possible engagement of the Iranians on anything but our own terms. We speak of regional harmony, while contributing directly and indirectly to a looming war of Armageddon between Sunnis and Shi’ites. The past five months has seen events of historic importance: the upheavals of the Arab Spring whose repercussions continue to register; the Hamas-Fatah political reconciliation; and the Osama bin-Laden affair. All of American strategy is challenged thereby, its premises undermined, its aims misaligned with new realities, its tactics losing viability, America's standing losing credibility. Yet nothing in Washington's mentality changes. That is confirmed by Obama’s high-minded and high sounding speech that uses the lexicon of change, of resetting, but instead leaves all the essentials in place.

Apparently Bibi said planeside in Israel that he "expected" Obama to walk back what he said in the speech. I take it that means that he confirms my expectation that he has come to discipline Obama. I hear that there is a major split in the Jewish-American community over whether or not an Israeli PM should be tolerated in such speech. Isn't the reality bad enough?

Obama is trying vainly to square a circle: He wants to promote peace and appease Israel. Impossible. If you are a rational Israeli policy planner and you know that Obama says US support is "unbreakable" and Obama is silent when you shoot unarmed protesters, why would you stop building settlements? Obama lacks the guts to punish Israel. Netanyahu has taken the measure of the man and slated more settlement units for construction. The Palestinians need to move forward with unilateral recognition. The US will never, ever deliver anything.

Jewish ethno-religious tribalism aka Zionism has such a death grip (maybe literally for both parties) on the US that US support for anything other than everything the tribalists want is impossible. I should add that the other side is not much more reasonable. If the Palestinians wish to be clever about this let Hamas recognize Israel.

Is the PLA Now Driving China's Foreign Policy?


http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/blogs/iskander-rehman/military-now-driving-chinas-foreign-policy

To the bewildered outside observer, attempting to fathom the sources, foundations and architecture of China’s foreign policy can seem like peering over the top of a very high, and dangerously slippery wall. And indeed, China’s great wall has provided in the eyes of some informed China watchers such as Ian Buruma, author of a detailed study of China’s democratic movements, an apt metaphor for the opacity of Chinese elite politics, “with its rulers’ enduring preoccupation with controlling an enclosed, secretive, autarchic universe, a walled kingdom in the middle of the world.”

It is this very opacity of Chinese politics which renders the precise nature of civil-military relations at the senior level incredibly challenging to ascertain. China hands thus frequently have to resort to indirect sources and conjecture when speculating about PLA/CCP interactions. Conventional wisdom over the years has been to define the relationship as being symbiotic rather than transactional or competitive in nature. The PLA is, after all, the army of the party, not of the state, and Hu Jintao, the Chinese President, heads the Central Military Commission, the highest military command structure. The Politburo Standing Committee, or PSC, China’s highest ranking political body, has not hosted a member of the military since the recently deceased Admiral Liu Huaqing, the visionary founder of the modern Chinese Navy, left the organization in 1997.

Nevertheless, certain recent events, such as the “surprise” unveiling of the new Chinese J-20 stealth fighter during Secretary of Defense Robert Gate’s recent visit to Beijing, which President Hu Jintao claimed to not have been notified of, have sent out ripples of unease in the strategic community. Indeed, it would seem that over the past few years there have been an increasing number of incidents in which assertive actions by the PLA at the tactical level have appeared to surprise or preempt China’s formal foreign policy establishment. For instance, when in 2001 Sino-US relations were rocked by the collision in-between a US EP-3E reconnaissance plane and a Chinese J-8II interceptor fighter jet, which resulted in the tragic death of the Chinese fighter pilot and an emergency landing of the EP-3 on the island of Hainan; it was revealed that the PLA withheld critical information from the central government with the goal of driving it to take a more assertive stance. Likewise, it was noted that after the 2007 Anti-Satellite Test, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed almost as taken aback as the US State Department. This, of course, could be a form of refined ploy or elaborate strategy of “plausible deniability”, which would allow China’s political establishment to distance themselves from forceful military posturing while tacitly egging them on from the sidelines. It does seem, after all, somewhat difficult to believe that the ever cryptic President Hu Jintao had no idea of what was unfolding on the tarmac of Chengdu.

There have, however, been other troubling trends which have given pause to China observers. The heightened attempts by the PLA to influence the public debate, whether by allowing its officers to serve as jingoistic television commentators, or by publicly diffusing articles and briefings by PLA Research Institutions are one such trend. In the spring of 2010, I found, to my surprise, that one of my recent articles detailing India’s aircraft carrier acquisition plans had been translated and posted on the China’s Daily website the day following its publication. Six months later, while in Beijing with the Transatlantic Academy, I was informed that the ‘naval lobby’ in the PLA had undoubtedly pushed for its translation and publication, in order to justify its own aircraft carrier ambitions.

The Chinese Navy’s truculent muscle-flexing in the South and East China Seas is another major source of concern. Several times over the past decade, tense international incidents have been sparked by the increasingly predatory behavior displayed by Chinese vessels, whether it be via the mass capture and detention of Vietnamese fishermen off the disputed Spratlys and Paracels, the illegal entry of submerged Chinese submarines into Japanese territorial waters, or the more recent harassment of the USNS Impeccable in the South China Sea. Some of these actions, such as the helicopter buzzing of a Japanese destroyer in early 2010, or the sudden surfacing of a Chinese Song Class submarine in the middle of the USS Kitty Hawk task force three years prior seem needlessly provocative, reckless even. This has raised the question of the extent of Chinese civilian oversight over individual military actions. In the US, a clear and strict chain of command ensures that every American naval maneuver in “sensitive areas” is carefully vetted by the NSC in order to prevent an isolated event from spiraling out of control. Judging by the PLAN’s recent actions, this does not seem to be the case in China. And this, combined with the fact that there the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (or MMCA)currently in effect in-between Washington and Beijing contains no provision for real-time vessel-to-vessel tactical communication in the evident of an incident, is hardly reassuring.

One must proceed with caution, however, when examining the PLA/PRC relationship. In the past, China watchers have made the mistake of overstating the PLA’s latent influence over politics. For example, few thought that the decision by the political leadership in 1998 to divest the PLA of the bulk of its commercial activities would go down as smoothly as was the case. At the time, analysts had envisioned that in the face of Army opposition, the political leadership would be compelled to delve into the state coffers and dish out massive payoffs, or enter into a transactional, rather than a symbiotic rapport with the military. In fact, it was shown that the decision to engage in divestiture was conducted in concordance, rather than in opposition to the military elite, as they wished to preserve the PLA’s institutional image and foster speedier professionalization and modernization rather than drift towards a Pakistan-style military kleptocracy.

In reality, the PLA’s seemingly increased clout can be in large part explained by two phenomena. The first is that is has been shown empirically that in times of intra-leadership conflict or competition, the PLA is sucked into China’s labyrinthine elite politics and wields greater influence. The Chinese leadership is at present in the turmoil of a leadership transition, prior to the 2012 18th Party Congress, and no aspiring Chinese political grandee wishes to appear weak or subservient to the US and its allies during this fraught period. The PLA therefore has greater latitude to push its hawkish agenda.

Secondly, Chinese foreign policy is becoming, as a whole, more omnidirectional in nature, with a multiplicity of voices, policy advocates and foreign policy actors, ranging from banks to state owned multinationals to China’s increasingly vociferous community of netizens conspiring to render China’s foreign policy increasingly complex in nature. To the point of which, as former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft recently stated, “There is a remarkable amount of chaos in the system.”

It is these troubled waters that the US foreign policy establishment will have to gradually learn to navigate, in the hope that the 2012 leadership transition will lend a greater degree of unity, and, let us pray, a heftier dose of restraint to Chinese foreign policy.



Here is a link to an Asia-Pacific Bulletin I recently penned for the East-West Center here in DC:



For those interested here is the abstract featured on their website:


In March 1996, the waters of the Taiwan Strait were roiled by Chinese live missile firings and massive military exercises. Washington answered Beijing's blunt demonstration of coercive military diplomacy by promptly dispatching two aircraft carriers to the scene. This event set the stage for a changing tactical environment in the Western Pacific. Iskander Rehman argues that the ensuing US response of radically reconsidering its doctrine and force posture in the Western Pacific may result in greater tactical advantage but deteriorating strategic stability.


NATO, like Nazi Germany, invokes a Drang nach Osten.



May , 2011 -- Dubai -- NATO Middle Eastward?


The "North Atlantic" Treaty Organization (NATO), the Cold War-era military pact construct that the United States has been using to put an international veneer on its military intervention abroad, has taken a major step into establishing a permanent footprint in the Middle East.

During a visit to Poland, United Arab Emirates Foreign minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahayan, inked a deal with Poland's neocon and American Enterprise Institute-trained Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, that the UAE will become the first Arab nation to accredit an ambassador to NATO.The move comes after fighter aircraft from the UAE and Qatar joined NATO forces in the bloc's attack on Libya.

NATO's attempt to extend its umbrella to the Middle East began in 2004 with the establishment of NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which opened up NATO's foyer to Middle East nations that
"subscribe to the aim and content of this initiative, including the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." The purpose of the ICI was clearly aimed at Iran, in addition to cementing NATO's military ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Members of the ICI are the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia and Oman are members of the GCC but they opted out of the ICI.

After the United States, France, and Britain, the major NATO countries that backed military action against Libya, failed to achieve a solid endorsement from the Arab League for military action, the Obama administration is attempting to replace the Arab League as the premier regional organization representing the Arab nations, with a military-oriented grouping that is linked to NATO.

With the decline of influence of Arab League power houses members like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, NATO is hoping to replace the Arab League with something the United States, and, by default, Israel, can find easier to manipulate and control. The GCC, which acts as a surrogate for U.S. interests in the Middle East, is now copying NATO by offering membership to nations outside of its base region, including Morocco and Jordan, two other close U.S. allies in the region. Morocco and Jordan have established links to NATO via NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue. NATO has been discussing membership with nations far removed from the North Atlantic, including Ukraine and Georgia.

Other Mediterranean Dialogue members are Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Mauritania, and, more ominously, Israel, a nation that craves NATO membership and which has been using its powerful lobby in Washington to urge U.S. backing for the Tel Aviv regime taking a seat at the NATO roundtable in Brussels.

With NATO's backing for the Libyan rebels, the probability that a post-Qaddafi Libya will become part of NATO's network in North Africa is real. Similarly, the GCC has been discussing membership for Yemen after President Ali Abdullah Saleh steps down, a move that the GCC has been negotiating with little success to date. There have also been preliminary membership discussions between the GCC and Iraq.

In its move to put its own imprimatur on the "Arab Spring," the Obama administration seems to be more interested in expanding NATO's influence into the Middle East and North Africa through contrivances like the ISI and Mediterranean Dialogue. Both constructs appear to have arised from the bowels of neocon think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, not to mention Israeli lobbying mills like the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA).

The Obama administration, rather than looking ahead in the new Middle East, is looking behind, to 1955, and the creation of the anti-Soviet axis called the Baghdad Pact, a military alliance of Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. After Iraq withdrew in 1959, the alliance became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), an eastward extension of NATO in America's "containment" policy designed to stop the expansion of the Soviet bloc.

Today, the Obama administration continues the policies of its predecessor in seeking to expand NATO with a new CENTO taking shape. However, unlike CENTO, "NATO Middle East" appears to have two primary targets: Iran and Pakistan, both if which were, ironically, members of CENTO when the Soviet Union was America's top bogeyman in the region.

Pentagon deploying an elite force to protect the kingdom’s oil riches and future nuclear sites....

Future Saudi Nuclear sites...!


Defense Secretary Robert Gates, left, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia James Smith, center, and Maj. Gen. Robert Catalanotti, right, walk across the tarmac in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Despite their deepening political divide, the United States and Saudi Arabia are quietly expanding defense ties on a vast scale, led by a little-known project to develop an elite force to protect the crazy Saudi Wahhabi kingdom’s oil riches and future nuclear sites....




http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hI84j38Kn1p436iTBMuVzmRRv7zQ?docId=f88f3f427d9349e2aaa18a7aa2ec271a


....

What Obushma could not possibly say about Bahrain and the Wahhabi Crazies of KSA...
By Pepe Escobar

Facts on the ground will decide whether the United States really "values the dignity of the street vendor in Tunisia more than the raw power of the dictator".

So let's start with a fact. For US President Barack Obama, Saudi Arabia is not in the Middle East. Maybe the House of Saud has relocated the deserts and the oil to Oceania without telling anyone. In his major speech on Thursday from where the opening quote comes, and where, according to the Reuters gospel, he would "lay out a new US strategy toward a skeptical Arab world", the skeptical Arabs, and the whole world for that matter, never
heard these fateful two words, "Saudi" and "Arabia". Even India, Indonesia and Brazil were mentioned.

That goes a long way to explain how the US, once again according to the Reuters gospel, plans to "shape the outcome of popular uprisings"; by not even naming the Middle Eastern power behind the ongoing counter-revolution against the great 2011 Arab revolt.

Obama tried to shape what Clintonites define as "ambitious realism". It was more like ambitious fiction. By insisting on America's set of "principles" and not so subtly trying once again to monopolize the moral high ground - issuing dispensations on regime change from Muammar Gaddafi (already gone) to Syria's Bashar al-Assad (reform or go), Obama tried to rewrite history by inscribing Washington at the heart of the Arab-wide push for democracy. It may fool Americans. It didn't fool the Arab street.

It took three long months for Obama to finally deal with the al-Khalifa dynasty in Bahrain - without ever mentioning their masters Saudi Arabia. He let the Bahraini rulers off the hook with a State Department-issued velvet glove, at the same time deviating into a Riyadh/Tel Aviv-approved script blaming the evil of all evils Iran; "We recognize that Iran has tried to take advantage of the turmoil there, and that the Bahraini government has a legitimate interest in the rule of law. Nevertheless, we have insisted publicly and privately that mass arrests and brute force are at odds with the universal rights of Bahrain's citizens, and will not make legitimate calls for reform go away."

It's much more Orwellian than mere "brute force"; it's the University of Bahrain, for instance, forcing students to sign a pledge of allegiance to the government, promising not to defy the monarchy; otherwise they'll be expelled.

So to make a story short, here's a concise New Middle East Obama policy. We support "our" bastards (dictators) who are sophisticated enough to beat, arrest and kill their own people in the low hundreds (Bahrain). We get slightly annoyed by "our" war on terror collaborators who crudely beat, arrest and kill their own people also in the low hundreds (Yemen). We're strongly inclined to ditch our support for unreliable, Iran-aligned dictators who beat, arrest and kill their own people in the high hundreds (Syria).

We unleash war - via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a weaponized arm of the United Nations - over unreliable oil-wealthy dictators who beat, arrest and kill their own people in alleged thousands (Libya). And we remain absolute mute about "our" monarchical bastards who pre-empt the possibility of democratic protests (Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia) or invade their neighbors to smash ongoing peaceful protests (Saudi Arabia).

'Final solution' or bust
On the absolutely central issue for the Arab word, Obama seemed to demonstrate sound judgment by supporting a two-state solution for Israel/Palestine, based on the 1967 borders, "with permanent Palestinian borders with Israel, Jordan and Egypt, and permanent Israeli borders with Palestine". There's the initial rub to end all rubs; no Israeli government will ever accept this - provided, as Obama hinted, it decides what percentage it wants to keep from those stolen lands.

Israel never defined its own borders. Since - and even before - 1948 Zionists dream of an Eretz Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates rivers. As the Euphrates was, and now more than ever is not in the market, Zionists settled for the whole, former Palestine mandate. That's the (invisible) meaning of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insisting Palestinians must recognize Israel as "the Jewish state".

If they did, 1.5 million Palestinians - already infra-citizens in Israel - would be instantly denationalized and expelled en masse to the Palestinian Bantustan configured as the "final solution" to the Zionist "demographic problem".

Obama's set of conditions for the Palestinians sounded like a press release from Tel Aviv; against the reunion between Hamas and Fatah, against the planned Palestinian bid for statehood during the UN General Assembly in September. Nothing on sprawling, already existing settlements in the West Bank, just a call for Israel to cease "settlement activity" (what's that? A cousin of "kinetic military activity"?) No wonder Israeli media is spinning all this as a Netanyahu victory.

And when Obama stressed that "endless delay" won't "make the problem go away" he totally missed the point; it's by employing "endless delay" tactics that every Israeli government has kept settlement-building on overdrive and totally encircled East Jerusalem, while relentlessly applying a "divide and rule" strategy (pitting Fatah against Hamas) to crush Palestinian morale.

No flowery rhetoric can conceal that this is all about - what else - "protecting" Israel (mentioned 28 times in the speech). Further factual confirmation this weekend, when Obama addresses the annual American Israel Public Affairs Committee bash, and next Monday, when Netanyahu addresses that Tel Aviv talk shop known as the US Congress.

For the moment, the Arab street says he totally blew it. And a furious Israel said no, no, no to any concession.

Blame the Shi'ite crescent
How could Obama's dodgy rhetoric possibly jeopardize the oil-for-security US/Saudi pact with the devil? (Which side the devil is on is open to debate). Especially when the House of Saud - and US weapons manufacturers - are smacking their lips about a monster $60 billion deal involving dozens of F-15 jet fighters which will prevail against "existential threat" Iran (oops, wasn't that an Israeli excuse? Well, they're one and the same anyway).

How could Obama's leadership possibly admit live, to the whole world, that a US-Saudi-Israeli counter-revolution has been on since late February to smash the great 2011 Arab revolt - as Asia Times Online has been reporting?

How could Obama possibly admit that the weapon of choice of the counter-revolution is the anti-Shi'ite card - against Persian Shi'ites in Iran as well as Arab Shi'ites in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon, Oman and Syria; and that makes it, in a tragic but predictable sense, an al-Qaeda strategy at heart?

How could Obama possibly admit that Abdullah II, the Playstation King of Jordan, invented the idea of the "Shi'ite crescent" way back in 2004, and now it's been dusted off, hopefully with more success?

How could Obama possibly admit that Washington's demented obsession with Iran - with Tel Aviv adding fuel to the fire non-stop - is now being graphically exposed as an US/Saudi/Israeli sectarian prejudice against Shi'ism? (Quite a feat for Shi'ites to be simultaneously discriminated against by a Christian/Jewish/Wahhabi Muslim "coalition of the willing").

How could Obama possibly admit, as professor of Arab politics at Columbia Joseph Massad has been one of a few to point out, that "the US-supported repression in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, and in the United Arab Emirates goes hand in hand with the Euro-American-Qatari intervention in Libya to safeguard the oil wells for Western companies once a new government is in place"?

And how could Obama possibly admit that the defining struggle of these times is the great 2011 Arab revolt against the US/Saudi/Israeli counter-revolution?

The chattering classes in Washington dubbed Obama's speech "Cairo II", a reset of his original 2009 Cairo speech "selling" democracy to the Arab world. They've bought it - wholesale.

Cairo itself has much more to say about it than Obama's rhetorical change we can believe in. Watch out if Cairo and the rest of Egypt elect a truly sovereign, truly independent government. Only then the real Arab revolution will start. We're all Egyptians now.


Thursday, May 19, 2011

The Naval Balance of Power: The South China Sea


The Naval Balance of Power: The US is fishing for trouble in the South China Sea...

Frederik Van Lokeren
Thursday, 12 May 2011

The South China Sea is an important area in the maritime world of today. Many important trade routes run through this sea. The most important trade routes are the ones that supply the economies of China, Japan and Taiwan of essential raw materials. Other trade routes in the area support the distribution and export of finished products to and from markets in the European Union, the Middle East and India. Apart from these trade routes the South China Sea also possesses important reserves of crude oil and gas that are especially important to China in relation to the sustainment of its economy in the future....


http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ME21Df01.html


An important point of conflict in the South China Sea is China’s urge to claim the totality of the South China Sea as territorial waters or, at the very least as its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in which national (Chinese) maritime power and law dominate instead of international law. This causes a dispute with the United States because the US Navy requires freedom of navigation to connect the 7th fleet with the 5th fleet as well as freedom of operations in case the US Navy is required to respond to emergencies in the South China Sea.

Taiwan:

Taiwan is located at the northern entrance of the South China Sea. The Taiwanese navy possesses an enormous green water navy capacity of four Kidd class destroyers, eight Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates, eight Knox class frigates, six La Fayette class frigates, two Zwaardvis class submarines and two older Tench class submarines. Apart from these Taiwan also deploys a large fleet of fast attack missile crafts and patrol boats. The Taiwanese navy also has a very limited amphibian capability based on a single Anchorage dock landing ship and two Newport class tank landing ships.

When looking at these crude numbers it can be concluded that Taiwan is a potentially strong player in the South China Sea. The Taiwanese navy is, however, dedicated mostly to the defense of the main island of Taiwan and is concentrated in the Taiwan Strait as a counterweight to a potential Chinese invasion. It is plausible that in case of a threat Taiwan would deploy its fleet its fleet in the South China Sea to protect the supply lines that run through the sea.

Taiwan also claims several of the Spraty islands. Taiwan has recently increased the defense of these islands by stationing extra coastguard troops on the. These troops stationed in the Spratly islands are meant to be trained to carry out sea combat and to prevent amphibious attacks, including landings by other countries forces. This is the first time since the year 2000 that Taiwan has expressed a want to deploy combat-ready troops in the islands. This demonstrates how Taiwant takes the defense of its territories against a Chinese invasion seriously. It remains doubtable, however, whether Taiwan would be willing to commit the bulk of its fleet in the event of a Chinese invasion of the Spratly islands.

Philippines:

The navy of the Philippines is mainly built from aged American warships from the Second World War era. The Philippines have one frigate, the BRP Rajah Humabon, a former Second World War escort destroyer that was taken into service by the Philippines in the seventies. Apart from this the Philippines also have some seriously aged corvettes. The Jacinto class of corvettes, the former British Peacock class, was handed down to the Philippines in 1997. The Rizal class of minesweepers dates back to the former Second World War United States Auk class. The Second World War United States Admirable class of minesweepers is now the Philippine Miguel Malvar class. The Philippine navy also uses a large number of smaller patrol ships that are mainly deployed in coastal waters to combat smuggling and piracy. On top of these ships a small number of amphibious assault ships that date back to the Second World War are also found in the Philippine navy. These ships, however, are useless to execute an amphibious assault outside of the Philippines due to the distinct lack of naval aviation assets which suggests these ships to be useful only for internal security operations instead of power projection. An emergency in the Spratly islands, which are also claimed by the Philippines, could however call for an exception in the use of this amphibious capability.

Towards the future the Philippine navy is planning to purchase a Hamilton class cutter from the United States Coast Guard. At this time only the sale of the USCGC Hamilton is being contemplated, most likely to replace the aging frigate BRP Rajah Humabon, but there is a chance that several ships of the same class will be purchased. Overall, the Philippine navy is a small naval force built from aging components. Due to the many islands that make up the Philippines their primary mission is patrolling against smuggling, piracy and trafficking of drugs. There is a limited power projection capability that stems from the few amphibious ships that could be used in the Spratly islands but are more likely to be used mainly within Philippine territory.

Malaysia:

The Malaysian navy is made up of two Lekiu class frigates that were built in the United Kingdom. Both ships entered service at the end of the nineties. The Kasturi class of ships, of which the Malaysian navy owns two, was built in Germany in the eighties. Malaysia also deploys two classes of corvettes; the Laksamana class that was built in the eighties and six ships of the Kedah class which are a variant of the German MEKO 100 corvette. The latter were taken into service after the year 2000. The Malaysian navy also fields four Combattante II class missile boats that were purchased in the seventies and eighties. On top of this Malaysia also has a submarine capability based on two Scorpene class diesel-electric submarines.

Little is known about the future plans of the Malaysian navy. There was discussion of the construction of two new Lekiu frigates, but this deal was blown off due to limited funds. Malaysia operates on both sides of the South China Sea and shares a coastline with the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean. As a consequence, the Malaysian navy is spread thin across the area and it could prove difficult to mass the Malaysian naval assets in a single area without leaving other areas unprotected.

Brunei:

The Bruneian navy is a small navy that is completely aimed at coastal defense and protection of the offshore oil industry. The navy is mainly made up of patrol boats. Brunei does own four LCM’s (Landing Craft Mechanized) which grants it a modest amphibious capability. Just like the other countries around the South China Sea, Brunei is currently caught up in the modernization of its fleet. This included, among other things, the construction of three variants of the modern F2000 class of corvettes. Brunei, however, refused to accept the ships because according to them they did not meet the demanded requirements. The vessels were sold on to Algeria in 2008.

Indonesia:

The Indonesian navy is able to fall back on a large amount of ships. There are six frigates of the Ahmad Yani class in the navy, these frigates are the Dutch Van Speijk class of frigates that were built in the sixties and sold to Indonesia in the eighties. The Indonesian navy also ordered a SIGMA 10514 class frigate with the Damen shipyard in the Netherlands. Right now only this one frigate is being built for Indonesia, it is expected to enter service in 2014. Indonesia also possesses many corvettes. Three of these corvettes, the Fatahillah class, were built halfway the seventies in the Netherlands. Indonesia also operates the four Diponegoro class corvettes that are known in the west as SIGMA corvettes, also built by Damen in the Netherlands. The bulk of the corvettes are sixteen Kapitan Patimura class corvettes, better known as the Parchim class, that were built in the eighties by East Germany. In 1993 these ships were sold to Indonesia.

Indonesia also has a submarine capability made up of two Charka class submarines. These are two diesel-electric submarines of the German Type 209 class. Indonesia was also planning to buy two Russian Kilo class submarines but postponed the purchase to a later date. Of course Indonesia also operates a large amount of patrol boats, minesweepers and attack boats. It also adopted a couple of LST’s (Landing Ship tank) from the United States which grant it a limited amphibious capability.

Just like the Philippines, Indonesia includes hundreds of islands. The main focus of its naval force is also on patrolling against smuggling operations. Indonesia is also responsible for security in the Strait of Malacca, where up to several years ago piracy was a serious problem. Apart from this, Indonesia also has a long coastline along the Indian Ocean. All of this makes Indonesia unable to play a big part in the South China Sea because its attention is already divided between internal duties and the security of the Strait of Malacca.

Singapore:

Just like Indonesia, Singapore is located slightly off the South China Sea and carries responsibility for the security in the Strait of Malacca. Singapore operates two different kinds of submarine classes. The Chalanger class was purchased from Swede during the nineties, where these vessels were known as the Sjöormen class. These submarines are, however, more than 40 years old and were purchased to gain some limited experience in the deployment of submarines. Five years ago Singapore bought two submarines of the Swedish Västergötland class that were equipped with AIP (Air Independent Propulsion). The Singapore navy also operates six frigates of the Formidable class, a variant of the French La Fayette class that was taken into service after the year 2000. Singapore also has six Victory class corvettes that were constructed in Germany by the end of the eighties and taken into service in the early nineties. By the end of the nineties Singapore also started operating twelve patrol boats. As part of its amphibious capability Singapore operates four Endurance class LPD’s (Landing Platform Dock). These ships already saw action in the Persian Gulf where they patrolled and executed logistics support operations. They also took part in the humanitarian aid effort after the 2004 Tsunami.

Thailand:

Thailand is currently the only regional country able to deploy an aircraft carrier in the South China Sea. The HTMS Charki Naruebet is a smaller version of the Spanish carrier Principe de Asturias and entered service in 1997. Thailand also operates ten frigates; two United States Knox class frigates, two Chinese Jianghu class type IV frigates, four Jianghu class frigates, one United States Second World War Cannon class destroyer and one British Yarrow class frigate. Thailand also operates seven corvettes from three different classes constructed during the seventies and eighties. The Thai navy also has a number of patrol boats and amphibious assault vessels.

Thailand is planning the future purchase of an LPS ship that is being constructed in Singapore. This ship will be similar to Singapore’s Endurance class. This will grant Thailand a limited logistical and amphibious capability. When the Asian financial crisis hit in 1997, Thailand did not have the financial means to keep its aircraft carrier operational or to install the defensive weapons systems. As a consequence this ship is only operational for training during one day a month. Because of this Thailand lacks the necessary experience to deploy aircraft carriers and the ship does not present a threat in the region.

Cambodia:

The Cambodian navy is made up of about fifteen patrol boats and about 170 motorized canoes. This navy is aimed only at the protection of Cambodia’s own coastline and has no means at all to operate beyond Cambodia’s littoral waters. In 2005 China offered six patrol boats to Cambodia to help it fight piracy, transnational crime and smuggling. Because of this, in 2007 Comabodia was able to triple its naval personnel to 3000 and was able to raise a marine force of 2000 men.

Vietnam:

The Vietnamese navy operates two Russian frigates of the Gepard class, of which Vietnam desires to build two more under a license, and five frigates of the Petya class built in the sixties by the former Soviet Union. Vietnam also ordered six improved Kilo class submarines from Russia. These submarines are to be delivered to Vietnam between 2012 and 2016. Vietnam also operates several patrol boats for coastal defense that were all built by the Soviet Union and Russia.

Most of the Spratly islands are in Vietnamese territory and this is directly disputed and threatened by China. The fact that Vietnam is near the Chinese island of Hainan, the PLAN’s most important naval base near the South China Sea, forces Vietnam to maintain the most powerful and most modernized navy possible. Modern frigates and submarines are to serve as a counterweight to the growing strength of the PLAN.

China:

The number of ships operated by China, accompanied by their separate description, would make this analysis too large in size but we can safely say that China possesses a vast arsenal of modern frigates, destroyers and submarines that continue to grow in numbers. China, due to its geopolitical situation, is forced to spread its fleet over three areas. In the north China is forced to counter the United States 7th fleet and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, in the central region China needs to counter the navy of Taiwan. In the south, however, the PLAN is taking an aggressive stance in order to claim the South China Sea as territorial waters as seen on the map below. This would allow China to exploit the enormous oil and gas reserves that are located in the Spratly islands and that could serve to supply the Chinese economy with energy.

Conclusion:

The South China Sea is an important economic area. First of all it is an area in which many important trade routes connecting China, Taiwan and Japan with the rest of the world are located, apart from that it is also an area that contains important energy reserves located around the Spratly islands.

Large parts of the sea are claimed by China as a territorial sea. If China succeeds in forcing this on the countries surrounding the South China Sea, mainly Chinese law will be applied in the area. This will affect the sea mostly through the freedom of navigation and the control over oil and gas fields in the Spratly islands. This, of course, fits perfectly into China’s plan. By controlling the South China Sea and obtaining freedom of navigation and thus being able to control access of foreign warships in the sea, China could use the sea as a buffer for its coastal area where the most important centers of the Chinese economy are located. China attempts to claim this area in different ways, but mostly through showing its military power. This spurs other countries to expand and modernize their navies as far as they are capable.

When taking a look at the other countries in the area it is clear to see that the Philippines and Indonesia are mostly concerned with countering smuggling operations and piracy in between the hundreds of islands that comprise both nations. Malaysia’s naval forces are spread too thin between the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. With its small navy Malaysia only counts as a small factor of power plays in this area.

Taiwan operates a more modern navy, but commits it completely to the protection of its mainland from a potential Chinese invasion. The question remains whether Taiwanese ships will appear in the South China Sea if China were to cut off Taiwan’s trade routes running through that area. If, however, Taiwan would deploy ships to the South China Sea in such a scenario, this would substantially weaken Taiwan’s deterrent against a Chinese amphibious assault and for that reason Taiwan is unlikely to play a determining role in the South China Sea.

Cambodia lacks all financial means to construct a navy and is only to maintain its small coastal navy through Chinese donations. The reason for China’s support to the Cambodian navy is officially based on the fight against smuggle operations and piracy, but is more likely to be based on the reasoning that a strengthened Cambodian navy would be able to tie up Vietnamese naval units in the event of a conflict, which in return would virtually weaken Vietnam’s naval stance against China. As is the case with Cambodia, Thailand also lacks the funds to become an important factor in the South China Sea. Although Thailand has the necessary frigates to form a carrier action group based on the carrier HTMS Charki Naruebet, Thailand lacks the financial means to keep the aircraft carrier itself operational at a decent level. On paper Thailand possesses the ability to be a powerful maritime player in the South China Sea, but this strength is limited to paper representations of power.

The two most important players in the South China Sea apart from China are Vietnam and Singapore. Singapore operates modern frigates and corvettes and already has the necessary experience to operate diesel-electric submarines. Its attention, however, is mainly focused on the Strait of Malacca and combating piracy that was rampant in the area up to recent years. Vietnam operates a couple of modern ships that would be able to counter the PLAN. At this point in time the Vietnamese navy is occupied with receiving the improved Kilo class submarine that would present a realistic threat to the PLAN. The Vietnamese navy is too small to be considered a serious challenge to the PLAN but these modern submarines would force China to take into account their presence in the region.

The wagers of the power struggle in the South China Sea are the Spratly islands that are claimed by different countries as shown in the map above. The important energy reserves in the area are wanted by all surrounding countries. Vietnam currently occupies the largest part of the islands but China, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines also claim the Spratly islands or parts of them. A conflict in this area could escalate quickly, mostly due to the previous aggressiveness of China in the eighties involving the construction of military bases and a short skirmish between China and Vietnam near the Jonson reef, but also due to the presence of amphibious capabilities in the countries around the islands which could be used to quickly deploy troops to the islands in case of a crisis.

The South China Sea is also an important transit zone to the United States Navy. It forms the connection between the US 7th Fleet in Japan and the US 5th fleet in the Indian Ocean. On top of this the US Navy uses the South China Sea to collect intelligence on PLAN capabilities and activities. This is an important operation for the United States, especially the collection of sonar profiles of Chinese ships, most importantly Chinese submarines. An important example of this type of activity was the incident between United States surveillance ships, the USS Victorious and the USS Impeccable, and Chinese trawlers operated by the Chinese navy in 2009. If China were to claim the South Chinese Sea as territorial waters this could seriously hamper the freedom of navigation of warships and the freedom of operation, which according to the US Navy is considered synonym with freedom of navigation, and effectively lock the United States Navy out of the South China Sea while disrupting the connection between the 5th and 7th Fleet in the process.




Tuesday, May 17, 2011

US flexes muscle in the Black Sea....

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US flexes muscle in the Black Sea...

http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/05/20/50511250.html

By M K Bhadrakumar

The Black Sea is about to lose its historical exclusivity as a Russian-Turkish preserve. A visit by the USA-TRANSCOM commander General Duncan McNabb to Bucharest has sealed the fate of the Black Sea as the latest entry into the chronicles of the "new great game".

The US had requested to use Romania's two military infrastructures as transit place for the carriage of troops and military hardware to and from Iraq and Afghanistan to Europe. On May 2, Romania's Supreme Council for National Defense (CSAT) approved the use of the Mihail Kogalniceanu Airport and the Port of Constanta for transit. McNabb swiftly descended on Bucharest on Thursday to seal the deal.

The rapid flow of events in US-Romanian strategic ties needs to
be carefully noted. The emerging cooperation goes far beyond logistical support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. On May 3, Romania also announced that the two countries agreed to deploy American missile interceptors at Deveselu air base in southern Romania as part of US anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense shield.
A pattern is emerging - security of US deployments of components of its missile defense systems in Poland and Romania provide the raison d'etre for US military presence on their territories, over and above what is already available to them from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Thus, on May 3 the United States and Romania also inaugurated the deployment location in an official ceremony attended by State Secretary of Romania's Foreign Ministry Bogdan Aurescu and the visiting US Under-Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher. "This choice contributes to the security of Romania, the US and NATO allies, substantiating the strategic partnership between Romania and the US," Aurescu said, adding that it is a very important contribution to strengthening Romania's profile in world security.

Tauscher said Romania is a close friend and a valued NATO ally and Tuesday's ceremony "marks an extremely important moment for Romania, the United States and NATO". She added, "Romania will play a major role in the new NATO missile defense capability."

Russia promptly took exception to the ABM deployment in Romania. In a May 4 statement, the Foreign Ministry said, "Russia is following the development of the situation most closely, taking into account that, according to our estimates, the planned missile defense system may pose risks for Russian strategic nuclear deterrence forces in the future. In this situation the necessity of legal guarantees from the US that its missile defense system will not be aimed against Russia's strategic nuclear forces becomes even more crucial."

Romania welcomes ABM deployment ...
The Barack Obama administration, however, chose to press ahead with the establishment of US military presence in Romania. The costs for deploying the ABM interceptors at Deveselu is estimated at US$400 million plus $20 million each year for maintenance, which Washington will incur as running costs. Additionally, 200 US troops will be stationed at the Deveselu base and the size might increase up to 500, under "special circumstances".

A Romanian Foreign Ministry statement of May 5 announced that the agreement on the deployment of a US missile defense system in Romania had been finalized. The statement highlighted that rapid progress was possible in negotiating the agreement due to "high political will" on the part of the two countries and their "constructive approach ... motivated by awareness of the importance of this strategic project" for Romania, US and NATO. Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Baconschi said "the agreement must be validated by policymakers and we hope to sign it this fall."

The all-round expansion of US-Romanian strategic ties is likely to cast a shadow on Washington's reset with the Kremlin. The Russian strategic community is up in arms. Admiral Viktor Kravchenko, former Russian navy chief of staff, estimated that the new US anti-missile defense base in Romania would break the power balance in the Black Sea area and Russia should strengthen the "combat potential" of its Black Sea Fleet.

The ABM deployment in Romania might not pose immediate security threat to Russia. However, Konstantin Sivkov, vice president of Russian Academy of Geopolitical Problems, might have echoed the widely held belief in Moscow that the Romanian anti-missile base targeted at Moscow is of a piece with the US strategy of putting together a string of military bases surrounding Russia. Moscow wears a look of resignation that something is happening on expected lines. Arguably, it could have a Plan B to reduce the risks to its security.

The expert-level negotiations to reach agreement with the United States or to join the European missile defense system isn't progressing well and if the talks break down on issues over Poland and Romania, the United States-Russia reset would suffer a lethal blow. Moscow has threatened to take counter-measures if the talks fail and is reportedly developing a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile to cope with the future global missile defense system.

... and allows US military bases
Meanwhile, the two US bases in Romania will impact on the geopolitics of the Black Sea region The littoral states - Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine - would see them as a "strategic balancer" to Russia. The US bases in Romania may well induce a paradigm shift in Russian-Turkish cooperation in the Black Sea region. Again, the US is setting up shop right on the path of Russia's burgeoning energy ties with Western Europe and the Balkans.

The "transit hubs" in Romania will stimulate the US efforts to build a transit route to Afghanistan via Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, bypassing Russia. Such a route will reduce US dependence on the Northern Distribution Network (which runs through Russian territory). It can also become a new Silk Route connecting Central Asia.

What concerns Moscow most is that the US naval and air presence in the Black Sea region "hems in" the Russian fleet in Sevastpol. With the turmoil in Syria putting question marks on the future of the Russian naval base there, Russia's capacity to influence events in the Middle East is coming under stress. In essence, therefore, what we are witnessing with the "unburdening" of the Iraqi and Afghan wars in sight is the US is returning to global strategies that took a back seat. Russia and China certainly watch the US strategy to dominate the Middle East with disquiet.

Speaking in Almaty last week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned the West against a Libyan-like intervention in Syria. He challenged the legitimacy of the contact group set up by Western powers to calibrate the intervention in Libya. Equally, Beijing took strong exception to the taunt by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that Beijing was "worried" of a Middle-East type upheaval and is "trying to stop history, which is a fool's errand."

Russia plays Iraqi card
Significantly, Lavrov paid a two-day visit to Baghdad last week. At a joint press conference with his Iraqi counterpart Hoshyar Zebari, Lavrov claimed that Russia and Iraq have a "common stand" on the Middle East situation. He elaborated:
It is unacceptable to tackle such disputes by the use of brute force, especially against civilians; it is unacceptable to impose governing or political arrangement recipes on specific countries from outside.

A solution needs to be sought via a responsible dialogue among all political forces in the states by peaceful means and within a legal field through national consensus. Russia has always advocated that the issues facing this region should be tackled by its countries themselves.
Moscow has also challenged US supremacy in Iraqi security by offering Baghdad military cooperation. The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman confirmed that "ways to promote military-technical cooperation" between Russia and Iraq as well as "measures to step up cooperation between the concerned security agencies "including the Interior Ministry" were on Lavrov's agenda.

Russia is virtually reviving the Soviet-era "mutually beneficial partnership" with Iraq across the board, "based on decades-old traditions of friendly communications and close cooperation". This has been the first visit by the Russian foreign minister to Iraq ever since the US invasion in 2003.

The timing is significant. Russia is challenging US plans to prolong its military presence in Iraq beyond end-2011 at a time when the US is setting up bases in the Black Sea region and is covertly destabilizing the regime in Syria (where Russia has a Soviet-era naval base).

Lavrov might have intentionally drawn attention to the nature of his mission to Iraq when he joked at the press conference with Zebari that he hoped the letter he delivered to Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki from President Dmitry Medvedev wouldn't "find itself at WikiLeaks".