Wednesday, May 25, 2011

Middle East rift mars US-Russia 'reset'...


Middle East rift mars US-Russia 'reset'...
By M K Bhadrakumar

The last thing Russian President Dmitry Medvedev did before departing for France to attend this week's Group of Eight summit meeting in Deauville was place a call to Damascus.

Prima facie, one may think the call made sense, since as Reuters reported, "Syria's crackdown on pro-democracy protests" is going to be high on the agenda of the summit. But Medvedev had other thoughts on his mind; he wanted to ostentatiously pick up the thread from his previous conversation with his Syrian counterpart Bashar Assad on April 6.

According to the Kremlin statement, Medvedev on that occasion expressed Moscow's "support for the Syrian leadership's plans to carry out the internal reforms announced by Mr Assad in order to prevent the situation in the country from deteriorating, prevent human casualties, and maintain civil peace".

According to reports, the casualty figure in Syria may since be approaching four digits and civil peace is in serious disarray. During his call on Tuesday, however, Medvedev repeated Moscow's "principled position regarding the events in Syria and around it" and expressed the "hope that the reforms launched by Assad will be implemented by the Syrian leadership dynamically and in a broad dialogue with the Syrian public".

In response, Assad told Medvedev that he was "doing and will continue to do everything that guarantees the peaceful free expression of Syrian citizens' will. At the same time, the Syrian leadership does not intend to allow the activities of radical and fundamentalist groups".

Only last Thursday United President Barack Obama threateningly handed down an existential choice to Assad - preside over a peaceful transition of power in Syria or be ousted from power. Obama didn't exactly say that Assad's fate would be the same as Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, but he likely meant something to that effect.

The point is, Medvedev and Assad have shown Obama the finger. Yet, Medvedev is scheduled to have a face-to-face meeting with Obama on the sidelines of the G-8 gathering on Thursday.

Libyan rebels in Moscow
One could call this tit-for-tat. Medvedev no doubt suffered a blow to his prestige from his decision to abstain during the voting on Libya in the United Nations Security Council, overruling the advice of highly professional Russian diplomats that Resolution 1973 was deeply flawed in many respects and was open to varying interpretations in the downstream. In retrospect, Medvedev gambled on behind-the-scene assurances held out by Western powers, and he lost face.

The Russian strategic community is aghast that the "coalition of willing" under the banner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has since militarily intervened in Libya and is about to bring about regime change. Moscow's protests have been coolly ignored by Western powers.

To rub salt into the wound, France has extended invitation after invitation to Russia to join its contact group ("Friends of Libya"), despite Moscow questioning the legitimacy of such an enterprise that lacks a UN mandate.

Meanwhile, Moscow faces a fait accompli, having to scramble to adjust to the new realities of Western powers forcing a regime change in Tripoli. A representative of the Libyan opposition was received by Lavrov in Moscow on Monday. Following the meeting, Lavrov recognized the Libyan Transitional National Council (TNC) as a "legitimate partner".

The Russian position has consistently been that "all political forces and tribes" should be involved in any future talks. Moscow may be estimating that it is better placed to advocate a peace plan and play a role in the forthcoming transition of power in Tripoli by having contacts with both the Libyan government and the opposition. (Gaddafi's envoys too visited Moscow last week for talks.)

However, the TNC has already begun crowing about Moscow according it "recognition", to which Western chancelleries must be smirking. TNC spokesman Abdel Rahman Shalgham told journalists in Moscow after his meeting with Lavrov: "We [the TNC and Russia] have a mutual understanding on the issue of recognizing the transitional government in Benghazi. The fact that I was received in Moscow by the Russian foreign minister speaks of the role and importance of the council."

He has a point, no doubt. Shalgham also said the opposition would not hold any talks with Gaddafi.

Russia hails Palestinian unity
Evidently, Moscow kept the visit by the TNC official low-key, while it also decided to pay the US back. Even as the TNC man came to the Foreign Ministry in Moscow, Lavrov scheduled yet another meeting with Arab visitors - a composite Palestinian delegation of the leadership of Fatah and Hamas and five other groups that arrived in Moscow over the weekend. Unlike the semi-official session with Shalgham, Lavrov had a structured meeting with the Palestinian leaders.

Lavrov took the occasion to speak at length on the recent unity pact between Fatah and Hamas that was brokered by Egypt and signed in Cairo this month. He said the agreement had "historic significance" and Russia welcomed its content and would be supportive of its implementation.

Russia has taken a position on Fatah-Hamas unity that is diametrically opposed to the views expressed by Obama. Lavrov said the Cairo pact was "designed to establish favorable conditions" for resuming negotiations with Israel and underscored that Russia "actively contributed to the mediation efforts of Egypt". Meanwhile, Russian commentators lost no time in poking fun at Obama's Middle East speech last Thursday.

A seasoned Moscow commentator on the Middle East wrote: "Six months into the Arab Spring, Obama has finally taken the trouble to spell out his country's policy in the Arab world, but he hasn't gone anywhere beyond that. His speech ... was not even close to a Cairo-2. In 2009, he told students at Cairo University he was going to shake up the Middle East, make friends with the Arabs and achieve peace; but none of that came to pass."

The sherpas at the G-8 will have a hard time bringing Russia on board on Libya and Syria. Maybe, on the Palestinian issue Russia could share some common ground with European opinion, which also in principle welcomes Palestinian unity, but it will be interesting to see if the G-8 could bring itself to say something positive about the accord between Fatah and Hamas. Indeed, the US has upheld Israel's strong objections to the accord.

Medvedev's conversation with Assad on Tuesday signifies both an assurance of support to the Syrian leader as well as an early warning to Western powers at the G-8 that Russia would have a problem going along with any threatening noises against Damascus.

Once already - at his press conference in Moscow on May 17 - Medvedev has asserted that he would not allow a UN resolution authorizing sanctions against Syria to pass "even if my friends are going to beg me to". What he meant was that he was prepared to be in a minority of one at Deauville.

These Middle Eastern discords do not provide a conducive setting for Obama and Medvedev to have a fruitful meeting at Deauville. It appears that Moscow has already estimated that Medvedev's meeting with Obama is not going to produce any significant forward movement on the missile defense issue.

Although the Russian president recently declared that a failure to agree on "a model of cooperation in anti-missile defense" would result in "the kind of scenario that would throw us back into the Cold War era", Washington has nothing new to offer to Moscow.

The Deauville meeting will be a turning point. It will reveal whether or not the US-Russia "reset" policy is still holding. Clearly, the two sides are no longer able to build on the "reset". The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty cannot be followed up and breaking the deadlock in arms control involving tactical nuclear weapons is proving difficult because of disagreements over missile defense.

Arguably, US-Russia cooperation over Iran and Afghanistan has also touched an optimal level already and in any case it alone cannot be the locomotive of the "reset".

Overarching all this is the growing perception in the US that the Medvedev era may be drawing to a close by next year, which acts as a disincentive to build on the cooperative momentum of the "reset" and instead simply manage the uncertain partnership.

Anyhow, in immediate terms, Moscow's stance on the Middle East - Libya and Syria in particular - underpins the retreat from "reset"....

A Steamy Tango in the utterly corrupt DC...

United States President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have been involved in an elaborate dance over the past few days, swapping speeches on the Middle East that have ranged from bitter to sweet. Netanyahu dazzled before the US Congress, but the upcoming Palestinian declaration of independence hangs like a Sword of Damocles. Yet if no real progress toward peace follows, Obushma is also to blame....

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service.


NATO- and U.S.-backed thugs get a free pass in ObamaWorld....
Obama a hypocrite when it comes to Georgian revolution.

Georgian Parliament recognizes Circassian genocide. Tbilisi playing with ethnic fire.







Tuesday, May 24, 2011

The Ziocons are forming the basis for a war against Iran again, using the 9/11 Bogey anew...


The Ziocons are forming the basis for a war against Iran again, using the 9/11 Bogey anew...

Arguments Regarding the Collapse of the World Trade Center Evaporate Upon Inspection.

Now that Bin Laden has been confirmed to be dead, it has been established that Saddam Hussein was not behind the obvious False Flag Attacks, the odious Inside Job of 9/11 (one of the main reasons for the Iraq war), and Iran has been accused of having a hand in 9/11 - potentially forming the basis for a war against Iran - it is time to revisit some important, unanswered questions.

This essay does not argue that bombs brought down the Twin Towers or World Trade Building 7, even though many top structural engineers believe that is what happened, and people could easily have planted bombs in the trade centers without anyone noticing and without the conspiracy being discovered.

It simply addresses the frequent argument that fires caused the metal to sag, which brought down the 3 buildings, and that the case is closed....

The Fires at the World Trade Centers Were NOT Very Hot

The government agency in charge of the investigation of why three buildings collapsed on 9/11 - the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) - says that paint tests indicated low steel temperatures -- 480 Fahrenheit -- "despite pre-collapse exposure to fire". NIST also said that microstructure tests showed no steel reached critical (half-strength) values of 600 Celsius (1112 degrees Fahrenheit) for any significant time.

Numerous top fire protection engineers have said that the fires in the World Trade Centers were not that hot. For example:

  • A mechanical engineer with 20 years experience as a Fire Protection Engineer for the U.S. Departments of Energy, Defense, and Veterans Affairs, who is a contributing Subject Matter Expert to the U.S. Department of Energy Fire Protection Engineering Functional Area Qualification Standard for Nuclear Facilities, a board member of the Northern California - Nevada Chapter of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers, currently serving as Fire Protection Engineer for the city of San Jose, California, the 10th largest city in the United States (Edward S. Munyak) says that the fires weren't big enough to bring down Building 7:
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c0QEutd1Unc&feature=player_embedded

In addition, Thomas Eager, a Professor of Materials Engineering and Engineering Systems at MIT and a defender of the official story, concluded that the temperatures in the Twin Towers never exceeded 800 Celsius (1472 degrees Fahrenheit). Eager pointed out that, contrary to popular belief, jet fuel from the planes did not increase the temperature of the fires.

Structural engineer Antonio Artha notes:

Fire and impact were insignificant in all three buildings.

Structural engineer Graham John Inman points out:

The fire on this building [World Trade Building 7] was small & localized therefore what is the cause?
Thermal images also suggest that the temperature of the steel in the north tower at the time of the fire was not much more than 250 degrees Fahrenheit (and see this).

The Argument Evaporates Upon Inspection

Defenders of the "official" version of 9/11 say, in rebuttal, that the fires didn't have to be that hot, because - while not hot enough to melt steel - they were hot enough to cause the metal to sag.

It is irrelevant (and beyond the scope of this post) whether or not their argument is correct. Specifically, since even defenders of official story admit that the fires were not hot enough to melt steel, then it is impossible to explain the huge quantify of molten steel which was observed under Ground Zero for months after the attacks (see next section, below).

Indeed, not only was structural steel somehow melted on 9/11, but it was EVAPORATED. Specifically, as the New York Times reports, an expert stated about World Trade Center building 7:

A combination of an uncontrolled fire and the structural damage might have been able to bring the building down, some engineers said. But that would not explain steel members in the debris pile that appear to have been PARTLY EVAPORATED in extraordinarily high temperatures.

(pay-per-view).

Note that evaporation means conversion from a liquid to a gas; so the steel beams in building 7 were subjected to temperatures high enough to melt and evaporate them.

It is simply impossible that fires from jet fuels and office materials could do that.

Molten Metal Under Ground Zero for MONTHS After Attacks

There was molten metal under ground zero for months after 9/11:

  • See also witness statements at the beginning of this video.

The fact that there was molten steel under ground zero for months after 9/11 is very odd, especially since firefighters sprayed millions of gallons of water on the fires and applied high-tech fire retardants. Specifically, 4 million gallons of water were dropped on Ground Zero within the first 10 days after September 11, according to the U.S. Department of Energy's Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratories:

Approximately three million gallons of water were hosed on site in the fire-fighting efforts, and 1 million gallons fell as rainwater, between 9/11 and 9/21 ....
The spraying continued for months afterward (the 10 day period was simply the timeframe in which the DOE was sampling). Enormous amounts of water were hosed on Ground Zero continuously, day and night:
"firetrucks [sprayed] a nearly constant jet of water on [ground zero]. You couldn't even begin to imagine how much water was pumped in there," said Tom Manley of the Uniformed Firefighters Association, the largest fire department union. "It was like you were creating a giant lake."
This photograph may capture a sense of how wet the ground became due to the constant spraying:


Moreover, the fires were sprayed with thousands of gallons of high tech fire-retardants.

It was not the collapses which caused steel to melt.
Specifically, a professor emeritus of physics has proven that the collapses themselves could not have melted steel. And Brent Blanchard - a recognized expert in controlled demolition - stated in a telephone interview with physicist Steven Jonesv that he has witnessed hundreds of controlled demolitions, but has never seen molten metal at any of the demolition sites.

So how does NIST explain the molten metal? It denies its existence:




Will the Saudi Wahhabi crazies Kill the Arab Spring?


Will the Saudi Wahhabi crazies Kill the Arab Spring?

In his speech last week on the Middle East, President Barack Obama left little doubt that America stands with the people of the region in their demand for change. This puts the U.S. on a collision course with Saudi Arabia.

The kingdom has emerged as the leader of a new rejectionist front that is determined to defeat popular demand for reform. One would have expected Iran to lead such a front, but instead it is America’s closest Arab ally in the region that is seeking to defeat our policy. Though the president made no mention of Saudi Arabia in his speech, in the near term, dealing with the kingdom is the biggest challenge facing the U.S. in the Middle East.

Saudi rulers have made clear that they find U.S. support for democracy naive and dangerous, an existential threat to the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. If the U.S. supports democracy, the Saudis are signaling, it can no longer count on its special bond with Riyadh (read: oil).

The Saudi threat is intended to present U.S. policymakers with a choice between U.S. values and U.S. interests. The idea is that either Washington stays the course, supporting the Arab people’s demands for reform, and risks a rift with Saudi Arabia, or it protects that relationship and loses the rest of the Middle East.

In fact, the choice between U.S. values and interests is a false choice, as the president made clear in his speech. Now, American policy has to reflect this truth. So far, Washington has tried to placate the Saudis. It is time we challenged their words and deeds, instead.

Tectonic Shift

It’s no surprise that the tectonic shift in Arab politics, a popular revolt calling for reform, openness and accountability, worries the Saudi monarchy. The kingdom, like the rest of the Arab world, has a young population that wants jobs, freedom and a say in politics. Thirty-nine percent of Saudis ages 20 to 24 are unemployed. Having watched Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak step down amid protests in which Egyptian youths played a key role, Saudi King Abdullah announced $35 billion in new social benefits to head off demands for reform at home. That bought the monarchy time, but too many dominoes are falling in its direction to allow for complacency. Violent protests on Saudi Arabia’s borders, inside Bahrain and Yemen, have been particularly troubling.

From the outset, Riyadh encouraged every Arab ruler to resist reform. The more Washington embraced the Arab Spring, the more Riyadh worried. Saudi rulers took particular exception to Washington’s call for Mubarak to resign, and when the U.S. urged reform in Bahrain, they saw U.S. policy as a direct threat to them.

Encouraging Dialog

Washington had encouraged Bahrain’s king, Hamad ibn Isa al- Khalifa, to enter into dialog with the opposition there, and American diplomats were directly involved in mediating talks. An agreement was almost at hand when Riyadh took the rare step of undermining U.S. policy. Saudi rulers persuaded Bahrain to scuttle the talks and bring in troops from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to suppress the protests.

The weak excuse for this clumsy crackdown was that Iran was orchestrating the protests and Iranian expansionism had to be stopped in its tracks. A local protest inspired by popular demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt was transformed into a regional conflict. The Saudi strategy was clear: shift the focus from democracy to the bogeyman, Iran.

Emboldened by the outcome in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia has mounted a regional strategy to defeat the Arab Spring. Riyadh has called for expansion of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a group of Arab countries that are oil-producing and sit on the Persian Gulf, to include Jordan and Morocco, which qualify on neither count.

Mollifying Protesters

The expansion would transform the GCC into the Arab world’s club of monarchies. Membership would provide cash-strapped Jordan and Morocco ample financial resources to mollify angry protesters. In return, they would have to abandon reform and be prepared to lend their more serious militaries to put down protests should they erupt again in Gulf states.

Saudi Arabia’s new posture is a serious challenge to U.S. policy. Conceding to Saudi demands will put America on the wrong side of a widely popular historical transformation in the region, and thus will only hurt U.S. interests in the long run. Bahrain’s heavy-handed suppression of protests has already dented American standing in the region.

Having Saudi Arabia deliberately ratchet up tensions with Iran is also risky. The Persian Gulf monarchies don’t have the military muscle to back their aggressive policy toward Iran. Their credibility depends on U.S. support. And if baiting Iran escalates tensions in the Gulf, U.S. interests and the sheer size of its military presence there will inevitably put the U.S. in the middle of the conflict.

Confronting the Challenge

For all these reasons, the U.S. needs to confront the Saudi challenge head-on. Failure to do so will hurt our standing in the region and alienate public opinion there, which will only benefit Iran.

The U.S. should assert its leadership role in the Middle East. It should make clear that, our close ties to Saudi Arabia notwithstanding, we will be as vigilant in pushing for reform in Bahrain as in Libya or Syria. Washington should be prepared to act if the monarchy in Bahrain doesn’t end its crackdown and start a meaningful dialog with the opposition. We should also make clear to Jordan and Morocco that America supports their reform initiatives and won’t look favorably on reversing course.

It’s true that we rely on the GCC for oil, but there will be no interruption in the flow of oil if we disagree with the Gulf states. Their livelihood depends on oil; to profit from it, they must sell it. Moreover, the GCC countries need us to protect their security, as was made amply clear in both wars with Iraq. What should concern us, then, is not the Saudi threats but rather how the people of the Middle East will judge our policies at this critical juncture in their history....



Monday, May 23, 2011

Catching American spies makes very good politics....



Catching American CIA, DIA, NSA, OSP spies makes very good politics....

The announcement in Tehran Saturday that the "skillful and faithful forces of the Intelligence Ministry have arrested 30 American spies in a strong confrontation with the CIA agents" has an ominous ring about it.

The statement said: "Due to the massive intelligence and counter-intelligence work by Iranian intelligence agents, a complex espionage and sabotage network linked to America's spy organization was uncovered and dismantled. Elite agents of the intelligence ministry in their confrontation with the CIA elements were able to arrest 30 America-linked spies through numerous intelligence and counter-intelligence operations. The network used a wide range of data bases and U.S. embassies and consulates in several countries, specially in the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia and Turkey, to collect information on Iran's scientific, research and academic institutions in the fields of nuclear energy, air and defense industries and biotechnology." Fars news agency subsequently quoted 'sources' that the detainees included government officials and top executives of state-owned companies.

Spy trials in Iran often get intertwined with the Byzantine politics in the corridors of power in Tehran and Qom. Influential politicians from the Majlis (parliament) have rushed to congratulate the Intelligence Ministry.

The Majlis is fast emerging as a counterpoint to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's authority. What lends piquancy is also that the Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi, a senior cleric, is himself the focal point of what appears to be a grim power struggle within the regime. Ahmadinejad sacked him last month as part of government infighting, but the minister was immediately reinstated by supreme leader Ali Khamenei. A cat-and-mouse game ensued with Ahmadinejad boycotting Cabinet sessions and Khamenei’s loyalists warning Ahmadinejad he was skating on thin ice by challenging the ruling system dominated by the religious establishment. Moslehi used to be Khamenei's representative to the Basij, Iran's 13-million strong volunteer army.

And catching the American spies brings Moslehi into limelight as a faithful guardian of the regime. The political implication is at once obvious. The conservatives and hardliners of the regime have turned against Ahmadinejad and in a series of moves, the religious establishment has launched pinpoint strikes at the president with the intent of weakening him before next year’s parliamentary elections and the vote for his successor in 2013.

This has been a rough Saturday for Ahmedinejad. His trusted vice-president Hamid Baqaei was removed from office by the constitutional court. Another of his closest aides was arrested. The Guardian Council ruled on Saturday that Ahmadnejad was not empowered to hold charge of the oil ministry, which is a treasure house of perks and patronage (and a vast cesspool of corruption and sleaze). Evidently, the clerics want to regain control of the oil ministry from where the president systematically ousted them during the past 4-5 year period.

At least 25 people loyal to Ahmadinejad, including his close confidant Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei (who is also the president's chief of staff), have been arrested in recent weeks and half a dozen websites allied to them have been blocked. Mashaei and Baqaei have been summoned for questioning twice in recent days by Iran’s intelligence services to respond to questions on financial and security matters. Hardliners and conservative clergy have been campaigning in recent months that Ahmadinejad has a master plan to weaken the the ruling Islamic system - Velayat-e Faqih - and shape politics on secular lines. Earlier this week, an ultraconservative publication urged Mashaei’s arrest.

Now, it is against a turbulent backdrop of political infighting that the spy trial will take place. The night of the long knives may be beginning all over again. At the root of it all lies the paradox that Ahmadinejad is Iran's first non-cleric as president. But the roots of the schism run deep and can be traced to the early days of the revolution in 1979.

Ahmadinejad is a follower of Ali Shariati, the brilliant non-cleric Iranian revolutionary and sociologist who propagated “red Shi’ism” in the tumultuous years leading to the revolution in 1979 – a curious amalgam of Marxism, Third Worldism and Islamic puritanism – which opposed the unrevolutionary “black Shi’ism” or Savafid Shi’ism of the Iranian religious establishment. Shariati who was trained in Sorbonne and was a friend of Jean-Paul Sartre, was murdered in 1975 under mysterious circumstances, most likely by the Shah's intelligence, when he was undergoing medical treatment in UK. Indeed, Shariati was the true ideologue of the Iranian revolution who fired up the Iranian youth (like Ahmadinejad) with his emphasis on social justice and egalitarianism and his progressive analysis of the problems of Muslim societies with the tools of modern sociology and philosophy. It was his name that the multitude of Iranian students pouring out into the heaving streets of Tehran chanted in unison in those chaotic weeks leading to the revolution. But in the event, with his early death (at the age of 42), the Iranian clerics in league with the bazaar hijacked the revolution from its leftist moorings.

Without doubt, the power struggle in Tehran will have profound significance for both Iranian and regional politics. Ahmadinejad instinctively warmed up to the revolution in Egypt. The conservatives and hardliners, on the other hand, would feel more comfortable with the Saudi regime. But at the end of the day, ideology becomes secondary to the lure of power and privileges and the Shi'ite clergy is notorious for intriguing. Don't be surprised if tomorrow we wake up hearing that the spy ring that Moslehi unraveled has since exposed that the government headed by Ahmadinejad secretly worked for the Americans and "Zionists".



Decoding Barack Obama's Bahrain puzzle....


Decoding Barack Obama's Bahrain puzzle....
By M K Bhadrakumar

The address by United States President Barack Obama on Thursday regarding the Middle East situation was a mixed bag of certainties and ambiguities, although Obama did bring US regional policy frankly and squarely behind the Arab Spring.

On the other hand, the speech was a last-ditch attempt to define a new narrative and a desperate gamble to regain the initiative. There is indeed a fundamental contradiction insofar as any political order that is born out of the Arab Spring, which is representative or sensitive to popular Arab opinion will, by definition, find it difficult to forge strategic cooperation with America.

Cairo has opted for normalization of relations with Iran; begun whittling down security cooperation with Israel; and in a stunning

move reconciled the Palestinian groups and is probably encouraging them to seek United Nations recognition for Palestinian statehood. Washington is barely coping.

Unsurprisingly, Obama was highly selective when he contemplated changes in the Middle East; he just couldn't bring himself to mention Saudi Arabia. He didn't know what to say. The great puzzle is Bahrain. Obama said with certainty:
Bahrain is a longstanding partner, and we are committed to its security. We recognize that Iran has tried to take advantage of the turmoil there, and that the Bahraini government has a legitimate interest in the rule of law.

Nevertheless, we have insisted both publicly and privately that mass arrests and brute forced are at odds with the universal rights of Bahrain's citizens, and we will - and such steps will not make legitimate calls for reform go away. The only way forward is for the government and opposition to engage in a dialogue, and you can't have a real dialogue when parts of the peaceful opposition are in jail. [Applause] The government must create the conditions for dialogue, and the opposition must participate to forge a just future for all Bahrainis.
This can be viewed almost as a reprimand of King Hamad Khalifa, a close ally, and a rejection of the violent crackdown on Bahraini protesters. Obama would know that changes in Bahrain would inevitably affect Saudi Arabia. Yet, he never mentioned Saudi Arabia and the US is also "quietly expanding on a vast scale" the US's defense ties with Saudi Arabia.

An Associated Press analysis with a Washington dateline on the same day as Obama spoke reported a "historic expansion of a 66-year-old relationship that is built on America's oil appetite, sustained by Saudi reliance on US military reach".

Apart from the recent US$60 billion Saudi-US arms deal, AP reports on a top-secret US project to develop an elite 35,000-strong Saudi force trained and equipped by the US under the supervision of Central Command specifically geared to protect Saudi oil infrastructure and other sensitive establishments.

Equally, something appears very odd in what Obama said about Bahrain since he continued in the same breath to draw a parallel with Iraq, of all places: "Indeed, one of the broader lessons to be drawn from this period is that sectarian divides need not lead to conflict. In Iraq, we see the promise of a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian democracy. The Iraqi people have rejected the perils of political violence in favor of a democratic process."

Najaf versus Qom
Obama's Bahrain puzzle needs decoding. On second thoughts, Bahrain and Iraq have similarities. In both places, democracy is all about Shi'ite empowerment. Clearly, the US pins hopes on the "reformist" crown prince of Bahrain to accommodate the demands of the Shi'ite opposition, while the prime minister, who is apparently a hardliner, is setting the pace for repression - and he is supported by the Saudis.

The US sees the alchemy of Shi'ite empowerment in Bahrain very differently from the Saudis. For one thing, Bahraini Shi'ite protesters aren't (so far) "anti-American" and the continuance of the US base for its Fifth Fleet is not in jeopardy. Again, Sheikh Issa Qassem, the spiritual leader of Bahraini Shi'ites, is prepared to settle for a constitutional monarchy and is not demanding an overthrow of the Sunni monarchy.

What Bahraini Shi'ites are demanding is power-sharing rather than a capture of power.

More important, the US doesn't subscribe to the conspiracy theory that the Iranians are going to be the "winners" if the Shi'ite majority gets a share of power in Manama. Iran, too, seems to realize its limitations. On the other hand, Bahraini Shi'ites do not want an Iran-type clerical regime - Velayat e-Faqih.

From the religious perspective, too, they draw inspiration from Najaf in Iraq rather than Qom in Iran. This last point becomes extremely important for comprehending the thinking behind Obama's remarks on Bahrain.

It is often overlooked that Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the spiritual leader of Iraqi Shi'ites based in Najaf, has consistently avoided supporting strict conceptual interpretation of Velayat-e Faqih. He is neither openly dismissive of some of the underlying doctrinal ideas nor does he explicitly offer any substantive affirmation of the Faqih framework. In short, Sistani remains reluctant about getting involved in politics, although as prominent US scholar and academic Vali Nasr (who, incidentally, advises Obama on the Muslim Middle East) points out, he "never tried to promote rivalry" between his doctrinal ideas and those of the Iranian clerics in Qom.

What it all adds up to is that a friendly Bahraini Shi'ite nation could turn out to be a strategic asset for the US to build bridges to Najaf - and that holds immense significance for the overall configuration of American influence in Iraqi politics, which today Iran (vainly) tries to dominate.

Any redefining of Shi'ite empowerment away from the traditional stranglehold of the clerical establishment (and the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih) and the shepherding of Bahraini Shi'ites toward a genuinely democratic, "secular" way of life holds interesting geopolitical possibilities for US regional policies, as such a progression would be completely antithetical to what the Iranian regime (or Hezbollah in Lebanon) represents.

That is to say, the cumulative impact of "democratic" Shi'ite empowerment in Iraq and Bahrain could at some point come to a "fusion" that poses an ideological headache for the Islamic regime in Iran. Thus, reform in Bahrain holds the potential to kick-start an engrossing shadow play within the world of Shi'ism in the Muslim Middle East. If Bahrain can be finessed to follow the "secular" democratic route of Shi'ite empowerment and be conjoined with Iraq politically, it may hasten the demand for democratic change within Iran itself.

A schism erupts ...
Iran's clerics, who have their political antennae out, may be sensing trouble and that may partly explain the grim power struggle that has erupted between the religious establishment and President Mahmud Ahmadinejad (who is incidentally the first non-cleric to occupy the position of head of state since the 1979 revolution). Conventional wisdom so far has been that Supreme Leader Ali Khameini solidly backed Ahmadinejad and that the president himself was the representative of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

The thesis has been, finally, blown away by the past few weeks of dramatic happenings in Tehran. We are witnessing instead the Iranian religious establishment circling its wagons. The Majlis (parliament), top IRGC commanders, Friday Prayer speakers and even the Guardian Council - important organs of the religious establishment - are queuing up to criticize or put down Ahmadinejad.

They are taunting the president - inflicting scores of cuts on him that are bound to bleed at some point. The political stakes are high. It was none other than Khamenei who gave the green signal for the assault on Ahmadinejad when he took the decision last month to reinstate Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi (a senior cleric who was previously the supreme leader's adviser to the Basij, Iran's equivalent of a "people's liberation army"), who was sacked by the president.

Interestingly, this was preceded by a smear campaign for months in Tehran that Ahmadinejad was systematically promoting "non-clerical" figures into positions of power and was pushing a secret plan to have another non-cleric succeed him as president in the next election in 2013. Furthermore, that he was working on a master plan to marginalize the religious establishment.

Ahmadinejad is a staunch follower of Ali Shariati, the brilliant non-cleric Iranian revolutionary and sociologist who propagated "red Shi'ism" in the tumultuous years leading up to the revolution in 1979 - a curious amalgam of Marxism, Third Worldism and Islamic puritanism - which opposed the unrevolutionary "black Shi'ism" or Savafid Shi'ism of the Iranian religious establishment. Shariati was trained in Sorbonne in France and was a friend of philosopher and author Jean-Paul Sartre; he was murdered in 1975 and in the event the clerics hijacked the revolution from its Marxian moorings.

The latest political controversy in Tehran over control of the Oil Ministry is also related to the broader power struggle, as powerful elites within the corrupt and decadent religious establishment have traditionally controlled and enjoyed this milk cow of the Iranian economy in league with the bazaar, and they cannot brook Ahmadinejad's move to assume direct charge of the portfolio.

The Guardian Council, the constitutional watchdog dominated by the religious establishment, stepped in last week to censure Ahmadinejad's executive decision to take charge of the Oil Ministry.

Again, Iran's administrative court, which is under the thumb of the religious establishment, has come up with a case against the head of the presidential administration, Hamid Baqaei, who is the right-hand man of Ahmadinejad and has the rank of vice president, banning him from working in state bodies for the next four years.

On Sunday, in a dramatic development, Ahmadinejad's key aide Kazem Kiapasha, who was touted in recent months as the president's favorite candidate for the 2013 election, was arrested.

Unshuttered balcony
According to the Tehran grapevine, many people loyal to Ahmadinejad, including his close confidant Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei (who is also the president's chief of staff), have been taken in for questioning and websites allied to them have been blocked.

Mashaei and Baqaei have been summoned for questioning by Iran's intelligence services. Hardliners and conservative clergy have been campaigning in recent months that Ahmadinejad has a master plan to weaken the Velayat-e Faqih system. Evidently, the hydra-headed Iranian religious establishment is imposing itself on an assertive non-clerical head of state.

This schism within the Iranian regime and the enveloping revolutionary fervor imparted by the Arab Spring could stir up the moribund democratic movement within Iran. The Iranian religious establishment is not a pushover and it will fight tooth and nail to defend its untrammeled political power. But then, the Iranian religious establishment is also lately a divided house.

This is where democratic reforms in Bahrain leading to Shi'ite empowerment could act as a catalyst for an "implosion" within Iran.

Actually, Obama has been surprisingly mild in his rhetoric on Iran - as if he were keenly following events there. Such an approach makes sense, as any manifest attempt to muddy the waters of the power struggle in Iran could be counter-productive.

The growing disarray within the Iranian regime and contradictions in Iran's political economy are best exploited if Bahrain emerges at this juncture as another democratic society (like Iraq) where Shi'ites are empowered but have opted for a modern, forward-looking society seeking integration with the West in the present era of globalization.

Obama's approach is diametrically opposite the Manichean vision of the Saudi establishment, which is frantically rallying the Sunni Arab world. Obama distanced himself more than once from the Saudi tirade against Iran stoking the fires of Sunni sectarian passions.

He would rather prise open the 30-year-old house that Iran's Shi'ite clerics built by climbing through an unshuttered balcony window that Bahraini Shi'ites could hold open for him in the dead of the night.

Will it work? The hope is audacious since there is the real risk that persecuted Shi'ites in Saudi Arabia will also clamor for the empowerment that the Bahraini Shi'ites may secure under Obama's watch. If that happens, a reluctant Obama may come face to face with the imperative of reforms in Saudi Arabia, which would be the mother of all reforms....



Friday, May 20, 2011

The Royal Anti-Shia Alliance An Expanded thuggish Wahhabi Gulf Cooperation Council...

Nervous about their futures, Gulf Arab rulers look to Jordan and Morocco to boost Sunni power in the Middle East.
The Royal Anti-Shia Alliance, An Expanded thuggish Wahhabi Gulf Cooperation Council...

DANIEL R. DEPETRIS

In a surprise announcement by Gulf Arab leaders last week, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) welcomed proposals by Jordan and Morocco to enter into the alliance. The GCC, consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, has been wracked by internal protest against monarchial rule since the Arab spring began in Tunisia last January.

The Al Khalifa Sunni ruling family of Bahrain is still experiencing its most extensive period of civil unrest since earlier in the decade when Shiites rose up against the monarchy for an extension of political rights.

http://www.montrealgazette.com/life/Still+waiting+Egyptian+revolution/4794255/story.html


Saudi Arabia, the most powerful thuggish crypto-Zionist state in the GCC, continues to dispatch police to its restive Eastern Province where the bulk of its oil reserves are located, in order to crackdown on ShÄ«’ah protests there. UAE authorities have launched arrest raids against human rights defenders and civil society activists, most of whom come from the emirates’ wealthy clientele. Oman under Sultan Qaboos bin Said has been relatively peaceful compared to demonstrations that have turned violent elsewhere yet residents in the quiet Gulf sultanate are taking to the streets. Oil rich Kuwait is dragging its feet on providing citizenship to thousands of people who, although not Kuwaiti in origin, have moved to the small Gulf state to improve their lives.

The monarchies of the Persian Gulf are thus nervous about the type of political developments occurring around them, and in some cases, within their own borders. Saudis and emirates, who are preferably on the side of regional stability, have already acted in concert with the GCC to quell Bahrain’s protest movement. The offering of a GCC bid to Jordan and Morocco could be another tact to add new members and defend the alliance.

Why Jordan and Morocco? Like the GCC overall, both are pro-Western regimes boasting strong intelligence and military relationships with the United States. Both are indeed monarchies, which would suit them well in a club that is composed exclusively of kings and sultans. Both also happen to be countries with large Sunni populations, which would undoubtedly help Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners unite the region’s Sunni community against encroaching Iranian influence.

But if Jordan and Morocco are welcomed to join, why not Egypt, Iraq or Yemen? Geographically speaking, Iraq and Yemen would be far more preferable than Jordan, which is not even considered a Persian Gulf nation to begin with. Iraq also happens to sit atop the region’s second largest pool of oil, a product which would fill the pockets of the GCC with billions of dollars more in revenue.

While Yemen’s oil production is scheduled to dry out completely in the next decade, Yemenis still possess more oil than the Jordanians, who rely almost completely on foreign aid to sustain their infrastructure and fund their government.

Post-Mubarak Egypt, still in its infant stage of democracy and trying to reassert itself as an independent power, was notably absent as well, straining ties between Egypt and its traditional Gulf backers. Yemen, with all of its domestic problems and a nationwide protest movement of its own, remains the ugly sister on the outside looking in.

The Jordanian and Moroccan bids should therefore be seen as a political strategy rather than an example of economic unification. Surrounded by an ascending ShÄ«’ah Government in Iraq and the loss of a strategic ally in Hosni Mubarak, Gulf royals are nervous.

How the United States and Europe fit into this equation is still to be determined. Indeed, it is important to remember that just because Jordan and Morocco are encouraged to apply doesn’t mean that both will find a new home in the GCC. Yet if their applications are accepted, the regional balance of power will be tilted more towards the Sunni states....

Obumbler, the well-wisher of democracy but the hand holder of utter autocracy...


Obumbler, the well-wisher of democracy but the hand holder of utter autocracy...


Public declarations of statesman can convey belief and intention. Often, one must strain to discern them as they are hedged by qualifications and contingent references. At other times, the overriding purpose is obfuscation. That becomes the goal when a leader temporizes, is indecisive and disinclined to make decisions on matters that entail risks and costs - be they diplomatic or domestic. Such was the nature of Barack Obama's address on the Middle East last Thursday. Trying to discern in his remarks the contours of a coherent foreign policy is futile. For the elucidation of a strategic design was not the purpose. Nor was the purpose to stake out a firm position that would be the pivot for future actions re. Palestine, reform movements in those countries where they are being repressed, or Iran. The aim was political – in two senses.

The first, primary consideration was to create favorable impressions among the American public - especially the political class – of Obama’s stewardship and the country’s exalted standing in the world. Israel's supporters above all.

The secondary objective, I believe, was to shape perceptions of the United States as a sober, responsible and ‘humane’ power whose leadership in the Middle East is indispensable. Toward that end, Obama took a dual approach. The first element was casting the discourse at a high level of abstraction: "our enduring values and principles," the imperative of economic development, the necessary reconciliation of stability with progressive change. The pronouncement of American commitment to a 'two state' formula to resolve the Palestinian impasse was also abstract even if it had a specific referent. Obama gave no indication of a readiness to alter the servile attitude of the United States toward the willful, unbending Israeli leadership. Words about settlements ring hollow when there is no evident readiness to twist the Israelis’ arms or impose serious sanctions. Reference to a renewed 'peace process' for the umpteenth time is meaningless when there is no plan to include Hamas or even favorable notation of its reconciliation with Fatah. Similarly, a vague passing allusion to Bahrain carries no sign of a shift in priorities that until now has heavily favored reassuring the Gulf autocrats of America's continuing devotion to their partnership.

The other element in Obama's address was stylistic. Rather than formulate an integrated strategy that was politically and intellectually coherent, Obama chose to present a sort of collage or, perhaps more accurately, a modernistic painting a la Kandinsky. That involved displaying on the canvas (the minds of his audience) arresting images in various shapes and splashes of color along with stray lines, vaguely connected to each other, that commented upon the bright passages. All the components were chosen with care to evoke certain impressions and images. Bows to the greatness of the Arab past; conjuring in vivid terms the specter of endless war that must be exorcised; pious allusion to the Divine spark and our eternal longing to comport with our better angels; presenting America in its Sunday best – the virtuous power with the means and will to promote the enlightened interests of everyone in the Middle East.

In short, America under the leadership of Barack Obama is the one best hope of Muslims, Jews and Christians alike. These unoriginal materials were speckled throughout the speech, suitably attired for the grand occasion. They give tone and were meant to be felt as tokens of earnestness while creating a mood of uplift. We have heard all of this before - in Cairo, at the Nobel ceremony in Oslo. The overall composition, as well as its individual ingredients, is designed to play on feeling rather than to engage thought. Certainly not critical cognition. These are not dots, data points, encouraging you to connect them by your own applied intellect. They are an invitation to see reality in the speaker’s terms without the audience’s sensing the artist’s guiding hand. This is the way non-representational art works, when there is intelligent intent behind its creation.

The tangible recognizable bits (Egypt, Tunisia, a visionary Israel/Palestine) are interspersed throughout not for the purpose of instruction. Rather, they are intended to ensure that your thoughts/feelings about them should be made favorable by the composition of evocative symbols that surrounds them. Oratory of this nature is meant to leave a lasting impression. An impression of the person and his conduct whose afterglow will cast in a becoming light all else that will (or will not) emanate from him. It burnishes his persona. It is but a highlight in a campaign – a campaign to make of a virtual reality to which there is no commitment to make actual, seem genuine.

This is vintage Obama. He sets himself tests not of tangible accomplishment but of rhetorical creation. Gratification comes from assembling the pieces so that seem to hang together- that they make the desired impression, that they punctuate the moment and shape political imagery in the future long enough, and with a deep enough impression, to fend off the critical judgments of initiatives that never come, of half-measures that are never completed, of goals that fade further into the horizon. This time, it will not work. For those in the vanguard of Middle East reform, we have shown ourselves the well-wisher of democracy but the hand holder of autocracy. We embrace freedom when it is cheap and easy. We speak of self determination, but Palestinians are denied succor except for the stale words that catch in the throat. We pronounce the desire to put the war on terror in perspective, yet we prosecute war unrelentingly in Afghanistan and elsewhere while clumsily intervening in the combustible affairs of Pakistan. We paint pictures of a new era of cooperation, yet balk at even considering possible engagement of the Iranians on anything but our own terms. We speak of regional harmony, while contributing directly and indirectly to a looming war of Armageddon between Sunnis and Shi’ites. The past five months has seen events of historic importance: the upheavals of the Arab Spring whose repercussions continue to register; the Hamas-Fatah political reconciliation; and the Osama bin-Laden affair. All of American strategy is challenged thereby, its premises undermined, its aims misaligned with new realities, its tactics losing viability, America's standing losing credibility. Yet nothing in Washington's mentality changes. That is confirmed by Obama’s high-minded and high sounding speech that uses the lexicon of change, of resetting, but instead leaves all the essentials in place.

Apparently Bibi said planeside in Israel that he "expected" Obama to walk back what he said in the speech. I take it that means that he confirms my expectation that he has come to discipline Obama. I hear that there is a major split in the Jewish-American community over whether or not an Israeli PM should be tolerated in such speech. Isn't the reality bad enough?

Obama is trying vainly to square a circle: He wants to promote peace and appease Israel. Impossible. If you are a rational Israeli policy planner and you know that Obama says US support is "unbreakable" and Obama is silent when you shoot unarmed protesters, why would you stop building settlements? Obama lacks the guts to punish Israel. Netanyahu has taken the measure of the man and slated more settlement units for construction. The Palestinians need to move forward with unilateral recognition. The US will never, ever deliver anything.

Jewish ethno-religious tribalism aka Zionism has such a death grip (maybe literally for both parties) on the US that US support for anything other than everything the tribalists want is impossible. I should add that the other side is not much more reasonable. If the Palestinians wish to be clever about this let Hamas recognize Israel.

Is the PLA Now Driving China's Foreign Policy?


http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/blogs/iskander-rehman/military-now-driving-chinas-foreign-policy

To the bewildered outside observer, attempting to fathom the sources, foundations and architecture of China’s foreign policy can seem like peering over the top of a very high, and dangerously slippery wall. And indeed, China’s great wall has provided in the eyes of some informed China watchers such as Ian Buruma, author of a detailed study of China’s democratic movements, an apt metaphor for the opacity of Chinese elite politics, “with its rulers’ enduring preoccupation with controlling an enclosed, secretive, autarchic universe, a walled kingdom in the middle of the world.”

It is this very opacity of Chinese politics which renders the precise nature of civil-military relations at the senior level incredibly challenging to ascertain. China hands thus frequently have to resort to indirect sources and conjecture when speculating about PLA/CCP interactions. Conventional wisdom over the years has been to define the relationship as being symbiotic rather than transactional or competitive in nature. The PLA is, after all, the army of the party, not of the state, and Hu Jintao, the Chinese President, heads the Central Military Commission, the highest military command structure. The Politburo Standing Committee, or PSC, China’s highest ranking political body, has not hosted a member of the military since the recently deceased Admiral Liu Huaqing, the visionary founder of the modern Chinese Navy, left the organization in 1997.

Nevertheless, certain recent events, such as the “surprise” unveiling of the new Chinese J-20 stealth fighter during Secretary of Defense Robert Gate’s recent visit to Beijing, which President Hu Jintao claimed to not have been notified of, have sent out ripples of unease in the strategic community. Indeed, it would seem that over the past few years there have been an increasing number of incidents in which assertive actions by the PLA at the tactical level have appeared to surprise or preempt China’s formal foreign policy establishment. For instance, when in 2001 Sino-US relations were rocked by the collision in-between a US EP-3E reconnaissance plane and a Chinese J-8II interceptor fighter jet, which resulted in the tragic death of the Chinese fighter pilot and an emergency landing of the EP-3 on the island of Hainan; it was revealed that the PLA withheld critical information from the central government with the goal of driving it to take a more assertive stance. Likewise, it was noted that after the 2007 Anti-Satellite Test, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed almost as taken aback as the US State Department. This, of course, could be a form of refined ploy or elaborate strategy of “plausible deniability”, which would allow China’s political establishment to distance themselves from forceful military posturing while tacitly egging them on from the sidelines. It does seem, after all, somewhat difficult to believe that the ever cryptic President Hu Jintao had no idea of what was unfolding on the tarmac of Chengdu.

There have, however, been other troubling trends which have given pause to China observers. The heightened attempts by the PLA to influence the public debate, whether by allowing its officers to serve as jingoistic television commentators, or by publicly diffusing articles and briefings by PLA Research Institutions are one such trend. In the spring of 2010, I found, to my surprise, that one of my recent articles detailing India’s aircraft carrier acquisition plans had been translated and posted on the China’s Daily website the day following its publication. Six months later, while in Beijing with the Transatlantic Academy, I was informed that the ‘naval lobby’ in the PLA had undoubtedly pushed for its translation and publication, in order to justify its own aircraft carrier ambitions.

The Chinese Navy’s truculent muscle-flexing in the South and East China Seas is another major source of concern. Several times over the past decade, tense international incidents have been sparked by the increasingly predatory behavior displayed by Chinese vessels, whether it be via the mass capture and detention of Vietnamese fishermen off the disputed Spratlys and Paracels, the illegal entry of submerged Chinese submarines into Japanese territorial waters, or the more recent harassment of the USNS Impeccable in the South China Sea. Some of these actions, such as the helicopter buzzing of a Japanese destroyer in early 2010, or the sudden surfacing of a Chinese Song Class submarine in the middle of the USS Kitty Hawk task force three years prior seem needlessly provocative, reckless even. This has raised the question of the extent of Chinese civilian oversight over individual military actions. In the US, a clear and strict chain of command ensures that every American naval maneuver in “sensitive areas” is carefully vetted by the NSC in order to prevent an isolated event from spiraling out of control. Judging by the PLAN’s recent actions, this does not seem to be the case in China. And this, combined with the fact that there the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (or MMCA)currently in effect in-between Washington and Beijing contains no provision for real-time vessel-to-vessel tactical communication in the evident of an incident, is hardly reassuring.

One must proceed with caution, however, when examining the PLA/PRC relationship. In the past, China watchers have made the mistake of overstating the PLA’s latent influence over politics. For example, few thought that the decision by the political leadership in 1998 to divest the PLA of the bulk of its commercial activities would go down as smoothly as was the case. At the time, analysts had envisioned that in the face of Army opposition, the political leadership would be compelled to delve into the state coffers and dish out massive payoffs, or enter into a transactional, rather than a symbiotic rapport with the military. In fact, it was shown that the decision to engage in divestiture was conducted in concordance, rather than in opposition to the military elite, as they wished to preserve the PLA’s institutional image and foster speedier professionalization and modernization rather than drift towards a Pakistan-style military kleptocracy.

In reality, the PLA’s seemingly increased clout can be in large part explained by two phenomena. The first is that is has been shown empirically that in times of intra-leadership conflict or competition, the PLA is sucked into China’s labyrinthine elite politics and wields greater influence. The Chinese leadership is at present in the turmoil of a leadership transition, prior to the 2012 18th Party Congress, and no aspiring Chinese political grandee wishes to appear weak or subservient to the US and its allies during this fraught period. The PLA therefore has greater latitude to push its hawkish agenda.

Secondly, Chinese foreign policy is becoming, as a whole, more omnidirectional in nature, with a multiplicity of voices, policy advocates and foreign policy actors, ranging from banks to state owned multinationals to China’s increasingly vociferous community of netizens conspiring to render China’s foreign policy increasingly complex in nature. To the point of which, as former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft recently stated, “There is a remarkable amount of chaos in the system.”

It is these troubled waters that the US foreign policy establishment will have to gradually learn to navigate, in the hope that the 2012 leadership transition will lend a greater degree of unity, and, let us pray, a heftier dose of restraint to Chinese foreign policy.



Here is a link to an Asia-Pacific Bulletin I recently penned for the East-West Center here in DC:



For those interested here is the abstract featured on their website:


In March 1996, the waters of the Taiwan Strait were roiled by Chinese live missile firings and massive military exercises. Washington answered Beijing's blunt demonstration of coercive military diplomacy by promptly dispatching two aircraft carriers to the scene. This event set the stage for a changing tactical environment in the Western Pacific. Iskander Rehman argues that the ensuing US response of radically reconsidering its doctrine and force posture in the Western Pacific may result in greater tactical advantage but deteriorating strategic stability.


NATO, like Nazi Germany, invokes a Drang nach Osten.



May , 2011 -- Dubai -- NATO Middle Eastward?


The "North Atlantic" Treaty Organization (NATO), the Cold War-era military pact construct that the United States has been using to put an international veneer on its military intervention abroad, has taken a major step into establishing a permanent footprint in the Middle East.

During a visit to Poland, United Arab Emirates Foreign minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahayan, inked a deal with Poland's neocon and American Enterprise Institute-trained Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, that the UAE will become the first Arab nation to accredit an ambassador to NATO.The move comes after fighter aircraft from the UAE and Qatar joined NATO forces in the bloc's attack on Libya.

NATO's attempt to extend its umbrella to the Middle East began in 2004 with the establishment of NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which opened up NATO's foyer to Middle East nations that
"subscribe to the aim and content of this initiative, including the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." The purpose of the ICI was clearly aimed at Iran, in addition to cementing NATO's military ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Members of the ICI are the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia and Oman are members of the GCC but they opted out of the ICI.

After the United States, France, and Britain, the major NATO countries that backed military action against Libya, failed to achieve a solid endorsement from the Arab League for military action, the Obama administration is attempting to replace the Arab League as the premier regional organization representing the Arab nations, with a military-oriented grouping that is linked to NATO.

With the decline of influence of Arab League power houses members like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, NATO is hoping to replace the Arab League with something the United States, and, by default, Israel, can find easier to manipulate and control. The GCC, which acts as a surrogate for U.S. interests in the Middle East, is now copying NATO by offering membership to nations outside of its base region, including Morocco and Jordan, two other close U.S. allies in the region. Morocco and Jordan have established links to NATO via NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue. NATO has been discussing membership with nations far removed from the North Atlantic, including Ukraine and Georgia.

Other Mediterranean Dialogue members are Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Mauritania, and, more ominously, Israel, a nation that craves NATO membership and which has been using its powerful lobby in Washington to urge U.S. backing for the Tel Aviv regime taking a seat at the NATO roundtable in Brussels.

With NATO's backing for the Libyan rebels, the probability that a post-Qaddafi Libya will become part of NATO's network in North Africa is real. Similarly, the GCC has been discussing membership for Yemen after President Ali Abdullah Saleh steps down, a move that the GCC has been negotiating with little success to date. There have also been preliminary membership discussions between the GCC and Iraq.

In its move to put its own imprimatur on the "Arab Spring," the Obama administration seems to be more interested in expanding NATO's influence into the Middle East and North Africa through contrivances like the ISI and Mediterranean Dialogue. Both constructs appear to have arised from the bowels of neocon think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, not to mention Israeli lobbying mills like the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA).

The Obama administration, rather than looking ahead in the new Middle East, is looking behind, to 1955, and the creation of the anti-Soviet axis called the Baghdad Pact, a military alliance of Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. After Iraq withdrew in 1959, the alliance became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), an eastward extension of NATO in America's "containment" policy designed to stop the expansion of the Soviet bloc.

Today, the Obama administration continues the policies of its predecessor in seeking to expand NATO with a new CENTO taking shape. However, unlike CENTO, "NATO Middle East" appears to have two primary targets: Iran and Pakistan, both if which were, ironically, members of CENTO when the Soviet Union was America's top bogeyman in the region.