Tuesday, January 5, 2010

American Assassins on the loose worldwide



American Assassins on the loose worldwide


According to the Chinese calendar, 2010 is the Year of the Tiger. The United States does not name its years, but if it did, this one might prospectively be called the Year of the Assassin.

Americans think of themselves as something like the peaceable kingdom. After all, the shock of September 11, 2001, was that "war" came to "the homeland", a mighty blow delivered against the very symbols of the US's economic, military and - had Flight 93 not gone down in a field in Pennsylvania - political power.

Since that day, however, war has been a stranger in our land. With the rarest of exceptions, like US Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Hasan's massacre at Fort Hood, Texas, this country has
remained a world without war or any kind of mobilization for war. No other major terrorist attacks, not even victory gardens, scrap-metal collecting, or rationing. And certainly no war tax to pay for the post-9/11 trillion-dollar "expeditionary forces" sent into battle abroad. Had we the foresight to name them, the last few years domestically might have reflected a different kind of carnage - 2006, the Year of the Subprime Mortgage; 2007, the Year of the Bonus; 2008, the Year of the Meltdown; 2009, the Year of the Bailout. And perhaps some would want to label 2010, prematurely or not, the Year of Recovery.

Although our country delivers war regularly to distant lands in the name of our "safety", we don't really consider ourselves at war (despite the endless talk of "supporting our troops"), and the money that has simply poured into Pentagon coffers, and then into weaponry and conflicts is, with rare exceptions, never linked to economic distress in this country. And yet, if we are no nation of warriors, from the point of view of the rest of the world we are certainly the planet's foremost war-makers. If money talks, then war may be what we care most about as a society and fund above all else, with the least possible discussion or debate.

In fact, according to a military expert, William Hartung, the Pentagon budget has risen in every year of the new century, an unprecedented run in our history. We dominate the global arms trade, monopolizing almost 70% of the arms business in 2008, with Italy coming in a vanishingly distant second. We put more money into the funding of war, our armed forces, and the weaponry of war than the next 25 countries combined (and that's without even including Iraq and Afghan war costs). We garrison the planet in a way no empire or nation in history has ever done. And we plan for the future, for "the next war" - on the ground, on the seas and in space - in a way that is surely unique. If our two major wars of the 21st century in Iraq and Afghanistan are any measure, we also get less bang for our buck than any nation in recent history.

So, let's pause a moment as the New Year begins and take stock of ourselves as what we truly are: the pre-eminent war-making machine on planet Earth. Let's peer into the future, and consider just what the American way of war might have in store for us in 2010. Here are 10 questions, the answers to which might offer reasonable hints as to just how much US war efforts are likely to intensify in the Greater Middle East, as well as Central and South Asia, in the year to come.

1. How busted will the largest defense budget in history be in 2010?
Strange, isn't it, that the debate about hundreds of billions of dollars in health-care costs in the US Congress can last almost a year, filled with turmoil and daily headlines, while a US$636 billion defense budget can pass in a few days, as it did in late December, essentially without discussion and with nary a headline in sight? And in case you think that $636 billion is an honest figure, think again - and not just because funding for the US nuclear arsenal and actual "homeland defense", among other things most countries would chalk up as military costs, wasn't included.

If you want to put a finger to the winds of war in 2010, keep your eye on something else not included in that budget: the Barack Obama administration's upcoming supplemental funding request for the Afghan surge. In his West Point speech announcing his surge decision, the president spoke of sending 30,000 new troops to Afghanistan in 2010 at a cost of $30 billion. In news reports, that figure quickly morphed into "$30-$40 billion", none of it in the just-passed Pentagon budget.

To fund his widening war, sometime in the first months of the new year, the president will have to submit a supplemental budget to congress - something the George W Bush administration did repeatedly to pay for its wars, and something this president, while still a candidate, swore he wouldn't do. Nonetheless, it will happen. So keep your eye on that $30 billion figure. Even that distinctly low-ball number is going to cause discomfort and opposition in the president's party - and yet there's no way it will fully fund this year's striking escalation of the war. The question is: How high will it go or, if the president doesn't dare ask this congress for more all at once, how will the extra funds be found? Keep your eye out, then, for hints of future supplemental budgets, because fighting the Afghan war (forget Iraq) over the next decade could prove a near trillion-dollar prospect.

Neither battles won nor al-Qaeda and Taliban commanders killed will be the true measure of victory or defeat in the Afghan war. For Americans at home, even victory as modestly defined by this administration - blunting the Taliban's version of a surge - could prove disastrous in terms of our financial capabilities. Guns and butter? That's going to be a surefire no-go. So keep watching and asking: How busted could the US be by 2011?

2. Will the US Air Force be the final piece in the Afghan surge?
As 2010 begins, almost everything is in surge mode in Afghanistan, including rising numbers of US troops, private contractors, US State Department employees, and new bases. In this period, only the US Air Force (drones excepted) has stood down. Under orders from Afghan war commander, General Stanley McChrystal, based on the new make-nice counter-insurgency strategy he's implementing, air power is anything but surging.

The use of the air force, even in close support of US troops in situations in which Afghan civilians are anywhere nearby, has been severely restricted. There has already been grumbling about this in and around the military. If things don't go well - and quickly - in the expanding war, expect frustration to grow and the pressure to rise to bring air power to bear.

Already, unnamed intelligence officials are leaking warnings that, with the Taliban insurgency expanding its reach, "time is running out". Counter-insurgency strategies are notorious for how long they take to bear fruit (if they do at all). When Americans are dying, maintaining a surge without a surge of air power is sure to be a test of will and patience (neither of which is an American strong suit). So keep your eye on the air force next year. If the planes start to fly more regularly and destructively, you'll know that things aren't looking up for McChrystal and his campaign.

3. How big will the American presence in Pakistan be as 2010 ends?
Let's start with the fact that it's already bigger than most of us imagine. Thanks to Nation magazine reporter, Jeremy Scahill, we know that, from a base in Pakistan's largest city, Karachi, officers of the US Joint Special Operations Command, with the help of hired hands from the notorious private security contractor Xe (formerly Blackwater), "plan targeted assassinations of suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives, 'snatch and grabs' of high-value targets and other sensitive action inside and outside Pakistan."

Small numbers of US Special Forces operatives have also reportedly been sent in to train Pakistan's special forces. US spies are in the country. US missile- and bomb-armed drones, both Central Intelligence Agency- and air force-controlled, have been conducting escalating operations in the country's tribal borderlands.

US Special Operations forces have conducted at least four cross-border raids into Pakistan's tribal borderlands unsanctioned by the Pakistani government or military (only one of which was publicly reported in the US). And the CIA and the State Department have been attempting (against some Pakistani resistance) to build up their personnel and facilities in-country. This, mind you, is only what we know in a situation in which secrecy is the order of the day and rumors fly.

In the meantime, the Obama administration has been threatening to widen its drone war (and possibly other operations) to the powder-keg province of Balochistan, where most of the Afghan Taliban's leadership reportedly resides (evidently under Pakistani protection) and to the fighters of the Haqqani network, linked to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda, in the Pakistani border province of North Waziristan.

Right now, these threats from Washington are clearly meant to motivate the Pakistani military to do the job instead. But as that is unlikely - both groups are seen by its military as key players in the country's future anti-Indian policies in Afghanistan - they may not remain mere threats for long. Any such US moves are only likely to widen the Af-Pak war and further destabilize nuclear-armed Pakistan. In addition, the Pakistani military is not powerless vis-a-vis the US. For one thing, as Robert Dreyfuss of the Nation's Dreyfuss Report recently pointed out, it has a potential stranglehold on the tortuous US supply lines into Afghanistan, already under attack by Taliban militants, that make the war there possible.

Pakistan is the Catch-22 of Obama's surge. As in the Vietnam War years, sanctuaries across the border ensure limited success in any escalating war effort, but going after those sanctuaries in a major way would be a war-widening move of genuine desperation. As with the air force in Afghanistan, watch Pakistan not just for spreading drone operations, but for the use of US troops. If by year's end, special operations forces or US troops are periodically on the ground in that country, don't be shocked. However, it may be explained, this will represent a dangerous failure of the first order.

4. How much smaller will the American presence in Iraq be?
Obama swept into office, in part, on a pledge to end the US war in Iraq. Almost a year after he entered the White House, more than 100,000 US troops are still deployed in that country (about the same number as in February 2004). Still, plans developed at the end of the Bush presidency, and later confirmed by Obama, have set the US on an apparent path of withdrawal. On this the president has been unambiguous.

"Let me say this as plainly as I can," he told a military audience in February 2009. "By August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end ... I intend to remove all US troops from Iraq by the end of 2011."

However, Robert Gates, his secretary of defense, has not been so unequivocal. While recently visiting Iraq, he disclosed that the US Air Force would likely continue to operate in that country well into the future. He also said: "I wouldn't be a bit surprised to see agreements between ourselves and the Iraqis that continues a train, equip and advise role beyond the end of 2011."

For 2010, expect platitudes about withdrawal from the president and other administration spokespeople, while Defense Department officials and military commanders offer more "pragmatic" (and realistic) assessments. Keep an eye out for signs this year of a coming non-withdrawal withdrawal in 2011.

5. What will the year mean for the Pentagon's
base-building plans in war zones?

As the US war in Afghanistan ramps up, look for American bases there to continue along last year's path, becoming bigger, harder, more numerous and more permanent-looking. As estimates of the time it will take to get the president's extra boots on the ground in Afghanistan increase, look as well for the construction of more helipads, fuel pits, taxiways and tarmac space on the forward operating bases sprouting especially across the southern parts of that country. These will be meant to speed the movement of surge troops into rural battle zones, while eschewing increasingly dangerous ground routes.

In Iraq, expect the further consolidation of a small number of US mega-bases as American troops pull back to ever-fewer sites offering an ever-lower profile in that country. Keep your eyes, in particular, on giant Balad Air Base and on Camp Victory outside Baghdad. These were built for the long term. If Washington doesn't begin preparing to turn them over to the Iraqis, then start thinking 2012 and beyond. Elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region, look for the US military to continue upgrading its many bases,

while militarily working to strengthen the security forces of country after autocratic country, from Saudi Arabia to Qatar, in part to continue to rattle Iran's cage. If those bases keep growing, don't imagine the US drawing down in the region any time soon.

6. Will the US and Israel thwart the Iranian insurgency?
Iran has long been under siege. A founding member of Bush's "axis of evil", the Islamic Republic was long on his administration's hit list. It also found itself in the unenviable position of watching the American military occupy and garrison two bordering countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, while also building
or bolstering bases in nearby Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.

The Obama administration is now poised to increase key military aid to Iran's nemesis, Israel, and the Pentagon has flooded allied regimes in the region with advanced weaponry. Years of saber-rattling and sanctions, encirclement and threats nonetheless seemed to have little palpable effect. In 2009, however, a disputed election brought Iranians into the streets and, months later, they're still there.

What foreign militarism couldn't do, ordinary Iranians themselves now threaten to accomplish. In earlier street protests, young middle-class activists in Tehran chanting "Where is our vote?" were beaten and martyred by security forces. Today, the protests continue and oppositional Iranians from all social strata are refusing to retreat while, when provoked, sometimes fighting back against the police or the regime's fearsome Basiji militia, even inducing some of them to step aside or switch sides.

A continuing cycle of ever-spreading arrests, protests and violence in 2010 threatens to further destabilize the regime. How Washington reacts could, however, deeply affect what happens. The memory of the CIA's toppling of Iranian prime minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 is still alive in Iran. Any perceived US interference could have grave results for the Iranian insurgency, as could Israeli actions.

Recently, Obama, evidently trying to bring the Chinese into line on the question of imposing fiercer sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, reportedly told China's president that the United States could not restrain Israel from attacking Iran's nuclear facilities much longer. Such an Israeli attack would certainly strengthen the current Iranian regime; so, undoubtedly, would pressure to increase potentially crippling sanctions on that country. Either or both would help further cement the current tumultuous status quo in the Middle East.

7. Will Yemen become a fourth front?
Bush unabashedly proclaimed himself a "war president". Obama seems to be taking up the same mantle. Right now, the Obama administration's war fronts include the inherited wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a not-so-covert war in Pakistan, and a potential new war in Yemen. (There are also rarely commented on ongoing military actions in the Philippines and a US-aided drug war in Colombia, as well as periodic strikes in Somalia.) Though the surge in Afghanistan and Pakistan was supposed to contain al-Qaeda there, the US now finds itself focusing on yet another country and another of that organization's morphing offspring.

In 2002, a USA Today article about a targeted assassination in Yemen began: "Opening up a visible new front in the war on terror, US forces launched a pinpoint missile strike in Yemen ..." Just over seven years later, following multiple US cruise missiles launched into the country and targeted air strikes by the air force of the US-aided Yemeni regime against "suspected hide-outs of al-Qaeda", the New York Times announced, "In the midst of two unfinished major wars, the United States has quietly opened a third, largely covert front against al-Qaeda in Yemen."

In the wake of a botched airplane terror attack by a single young Nigerian Muslim, and credit-taking by a group calling itself al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the usual cheery crew of US war advocates are lining up behind the next potential front in the "war on terror". (Senator Joseph Lieberman: "Iraq was yesterday's war. Afghanistan is today's war. If we don't act preemptively, Yemen will be tomorrow's war.") What began as a one-off Bush assassination effort now threatens to become another of Obama's wars.

The US has not only sent special forces teams into the country, but is now pouring tens of millions of dollars into Yemen's security forces in a dramatic move to significantly arm yet another Middle Eastern country. At the same time, US-backed Saudi Arabia - whose alliance with Washington ignited the current war with al-Qaeda - is aiding the Yemeni forces in a war against Houthi rebels there.

This is a witch's brew of trouble. Keep your eye on Yemen (with an occasional side glance at Somalia, the failed state across the Gulf of Aden). Expect more funding, more trainers, more proxy warfare, and possibly a whole new conflict for 2010.

8. How brutal will the American way of war be in 2010?
When it comes to war, American-style, the key word of 2009 was "counter-insurgency" or COIN. Think of it as the kindly version of war the American way, a strategy based on "clearing and holding" territory and "protecting" the civilian population. Its value, as expounded by Afghan war commander McChrystal, lies not in killing the enemy but in winning over "the people". On paper, it sounds good, like a kinder, gentler version of war, but historically counter-insurgency operations have almost invariably gone into the ditch of brutality. So here's one word you should keep your eyes out for in 2010: "counter-terrorism." Consider it the dark underside of counter-insurgency. Instead of boots on the ground, it's bullets to the head.

McChrystal was, until recently, a counter-terrorism guy. He ran the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in Iraq and Afghanistan. His operatives were referred to, more or less politely, as "manhunters". Think: assassins. With McChrystal, a general who credits his large-scale assassination program for a great deal of the Iraq surge's success in 2007, it was just a matter of time before counter-terrorism - which is just terrorism put in uniform and given an anodyne name - was ramped up in Afghanistan (and undoubtedly Pakistan as well). Though the planes may still be grounded, the special ops guys who kick in doors in the middle of the night and have often been responsible for grievous civilian casualties will evidently be going at it full tilt.

As 2009 ended, the news that black-ops forces were being loosed in a significant way was just hitting the press. So watch for that word "counter-terrorism". If it proliferates, you'll know that the expanding Afghan war is getting down and dirty in a big way. For Americans, 2010 could be the year of the assassin.

9. Where will the drones go in 2010?
If there's one thing to keep your eye on in the coming year, it might be the unmanned aerial vehicles - drones - flown secretly, in the case of the air force, from distant al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar and, in the case of the CIA, even more distantly out of Langley, Virginia. American drones are already in a widening air war in the Pakistani tribal borderlands, while Washington threatens to create an even wider one. Think of these robotic planes as the leading edge of global war, American-style. While "hot pursuit" into Pakistan may still be forbidden to US troops in Afghanistan, the drones have long had a kind of hot-pursuit carte blanche in Pakistan's tribal borderlands.

Perhaps more important, they can, to steal a Star Trek line, boldly go where no man has gone before. Since the first drone assassination attack of the "war on terror" - in Yemen in 2002 - in which several men, reputedly al-Qaeda militants, were incinerated inside a car, drones have been taking war into new territory. They have already struck in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and possibly Somalia. As the first robot terminators of our age, they symbolize the loosing of American war-making powers from the oversight of congress and the American people. In principle, they have made borders (hence national sovereignty) increasingly insignificant as assassination attacks can be launched 24/7 against those we deem our enemies, on the basis of unknown intelligence or evidence.

With our drones, there is little price to be paid if, as has regularly enough been the case, those enemies turn out not to be in the right place at the right time and others die in their stead. Globally, we have become the world's leading state assassins - a judge, jury and executioner beyond the bounds of all accountability. In essence, those pilot-less planes turn us into a law of war unto ourselves. It's a chilling development. Watch for it to spread in 2010, and keep an eye out for which countries, fielding their own drones, follow down the path we're pioneering, for in our age all war-making developments invariably proliferate - and fast.

The element of surprise
We know one thing: 2010 will be another year of war for the United States and, from assassination campaigns to new fronts in what is no longer called the "war on terror" but is no less global or based on terror, it could get a lot uglier. The Obama administration may, from time to time, talk withdrawal, but across the Middle East and Central Asia, the Pentagon and its contractors are digging in. In the meantime, more money, not less, is being put into preparations and planning for future wars. As Hartung points out, "if the government's current plans are carried out, there will be yearly increases in military spending for at least another decade."

When it comes to war, the only questions are: How wide? How much? Not: How long? Washington's answer to that question has already been given, not in public pronouncements, but in that Pentagon budget and the planning that goes with it: forever and a day.

Of course, only diamonds are forever. Sooner or later, like great imperial powers of the past, we, too, will find that the stress of fighting a continuous string of wars in distant lands in inhospitable climes tells on us. Whether we "win" or not in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and now Yemen, we lose.

Which brings us to our last question:

10. What will surprise us in 2010?
It would be the height of hubris to imagine that we can truly see into the future, especially when it comes to war. It is, in fact, Washington's hubris to believe itself in control of its own war-making destiny, whether via shock-and-awe tactics that are certain to work, a netcentric military-lite that can't fail, or most recently, a force dedicated to a "hearts and minds" counter-insurgency war in Afghanistan and, in the future, globally (under the ominous new acronym GCOIN).

The essence of war is surprise. So, despite all those billions of dollars and the high-tech weaponry, and the nine areas discussed above, keep your eyes open for the unexpected and confounding, and in the meantime, welcome to the grim spectacle of war American-style as the second decade of the 21st century begins in turmoil.

Saturday, January 2, 2010

The Central Asian dawn


The Central Asian dawn....

http://www.thetrumpet.com/index.php?q=6872.5382.0.0

The politics of the vast deserts and steppes of Central Asia will significantly determine the contours of any durable Afghan settlement. The implications for South Asia’s security will be far-reaching, too.

Ibn Battuta, the 14th-century traveller, described the Hindu Kush ranges as the “slayer of the Indians,” as people from the “land of India” mostly perished in the snowy heights of extreme cold. The ranges that run through Afghanistan did indeed split the Indian historical consciousness about that country.

http://specials.rediff.com/news/2008/apr/07sld01.htm

When policymakers in New Delhi grappled with the Mujaheddin takeover in Afghanistan, it suddenly dawned on them how little they knew about the tribes that inhabited the northern side of the Hindu Kush. It was those tribes who won the tight race for Kabul against the Pashtun Mujahideen groups during the dramatic “transfer of power” in 1992 by the communist regime headed by Najibullah, and New Delhi had on its hands the unenviable “post-Soviet” task of establishing a narrative suitable for a new dawn in the region’s ancient history.

http://pd.cpim.org/2006/0716/07162006_nilotpal.htm

The point is, the geopolitics of Afghanistan always had two halves. Which, of course, posed a major challenge to U.S. President Barack Obama when he crafted the new Afghan strategy. Equally, for regional powers like India or Uzbekistan, the dichotomy came in the way of creating a common space that would open the vistas of a regional initiative. Viewed from Delhi and Tashkent, the “great game” in the Hindu Kush mountains assumed different shades. Some things do not easily change in life — even for an aspiring regional power. Even today, Indian discourses on Afghanistan run a predictable course. Has the U.S. administration finally woken up to the harsh reality of the Pakistani military’s doublespeak in the fight against terrorism? If so, will it turn the screw on its single most crucial partner in the fight? Period.


From this point, the angst deepens somewhat. Will the U.S. finally abandon the willing suspension of disbelief about the Pakistani military’s passion for its strategic asset, the Taliban, and realise instead that New Delhi is Washington’s sole “natural ally” in the region in the fight against terrorism? And, therefore, will the U.S. allow itself the privilege of India’s cooperation in “stabilising” Pakistan? This range of issues more or less hogs the quaint Indian approach toward the Afghan problem in the seminar circuits in Delhi where one hears the thesis being rolled out ad nauseam like a repeatedly-vulcanised rubber tyre not possessing its original tensile strength any more.
http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/2009/10/one-tribe-at-a-time-4-the-full-document-at-last/

Meanwhile, the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush leading to the vast Central Asia are preparing for a new dawn in the region’s history. To be sure, the politics of the vast deserts and steppes of Central Asia that span the space between the Caucasus in the west and Xinjiang in the east will significantly determine the contours of any durable Afghan settlement. The downstream implications for South Asian security will be far-reaching too.

Three aspects to the emergent Central Asian security are of interest to India.

One, China is venturing out as a provider of regional security and stability — supplementing Russia’s traditional role. The opening of the 1,833-km gas pipeline on December 14 connecting the energy fields in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Xinjiang with an annual capacity of 40 billion cubic metres resets not only China but also the world community’s terms of engagement with the region. The pipeline becomes part of China’s 7,000-km long East-West trunk route that feeds its booming centres of production on the eastern seaboard and will provide half of China’s present gas consumption.


Such a vital economic lifeline requires security guarantee and China is going about that task in its usual way by creating “win-win” situations with its Central Asian partners. In sharp contrast to the predatory instincts of western companies that zero in on the region’s huge untapped mineral resources and rare earths, China is stepping in with a comprehensive engagement plan based on equity and mutual trust and partnership that promises uplift of the Central Asian economies from their post-Soviet trough.


From Beijing’s perspective, the security of Central Asia (and Afghanistan) becomes integral to Xinjiang’s stability, apart from China’s overall energy security, which heavily depends at present on the extended supply routes via the U.S-controlled Malacca Straits that can prove a choke point. Flush with surplus capital, China, therefore, is showing the will to invest in Central Asia’s prosperity and stability and thereby create a matrix of mutual dependence. The West cannot cope with this audacity. The London-based Economist Intelligence Unit estimates an 8 per cent growth rate for China’s economy, whereas overall contractions of 2 and 4 per cent are forecast for the U.S. and the eurozone economies.


Two, the West would have ideally liked a clash of interests between China and Russia in Central Asia. But the emerging paradigm is instead pointing in the direction of a convergence of mutual interests. With the global downturn and the deep economic recession plus the sharp fall in energy export revenues, Moscow is accepting China’s investments as the only realistic way out for the development of the vast Russian Far East and Siberia as well as Central Asia. In May, President Dmitry Medvedev openly called for a tandem approach by Moscow and Beijing to the RFE and Siberia’s development, on the one hand, and the resuscitation of China’s dilapidated northeastern industrial base, on the other.

Russia is pleased that Central Asia has no pressing need for alternative U.S.-backed gas pipelines headed for Europe. Russia and China have a shared interest in keeping the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the U.S. out of Central Asia. Both harbour misgivings about a hidden U.S. agenda of keeping open-ended military presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan and of manipulating Islamist elements as instruments of geopolitics. Both search for ways to influence a swift “Afghanisation” of the war that paves the way for the vacation of foreign occupation.


Three, a U.S. attempt to draw the Central Asian states into the AfPak is indeed apparent. The day after the commissioning of China’s Central Asia pipeline, the U.S. State department stated in a testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “The [Central Asian] region is at the fulcrum of key U.S. security, economic, and political interests. It demands attention and respect and our most diligent efforts … any examination of U.S. policy towards Central Asia must start with the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan … We [the Obama administration] have begun to establish high-level mechanisms with each country in Central Asia, featuring a structured annual dialogue to strengthen ties and build practical cooperation.”


Never before has the U.S. Central Asia policy been framed in such priority terms. It doesn’t need much ingenuity to estimate that the U.S. “surge” on Kandahar, which is projected in terms of the Taliban challenge, can be seen in a broader perspective. A recent study by the influential Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington says: “Kandahar is the key road connection between the new Pakistani port of Gwadar and Afghanistan and, beyond that, all Central Asia, Europe, and much of the Middle East. Pakistan began the development of Gwadar with aid from China and has now engaged Singapore for the second phase of work … On Gwadar, the interests of the U.S, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are aligned … With Kandahar now in its eye, the U.S. should plan to build on future success there by making the opening to Gwadar a high priority … Pentagon officials estimate the cost of upgrading this connection at about $1 billion.” Obviously, any U.S. contingency plan would need to overcome the regional powers’ “more specific interests and competitive inclinations that obstruct” the U.S. grand design. The CSIS report names China, India, Iran and Russia and flags the “sustained insecurity in Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Kashmir, and other parts of Eurasia” as the challenge to the overall U.S. strategy.


Clearly, these new templates in regional security underscore that India’s normalisation with China increasingly assumes a regional dimension. This needs to be seriously factored in as the two countries sit down for the next phase of relations. As the distinguished former Indian diplomat and respected China scholar, Ambassador C.V. Ranganathan, put it recently, “Our shared neighbourhood should come on the agenda of serious discussions extending to concentric circles of expanding the dialogue to include all the primary parties affected by the situation in the AfPak region.”


China has remarkably transformed in the past quarter century. All indications are that it has no inclination to fish in the troubled India-Pakistan waters. On the contrary, as a Xinhua commentary pointed out last week, “For solving the dispute over the Mumbai attacks [of 26 November 2008], India and Pakistan should count on bilateral efforts to reduce tension rather than allow the situation being further complicated by other issues such as the U.S.-led Afghan War.” Plainly put, the China discourses of our strategic community are caught in a time warp. Stereotyped thinking should not impede new pathways from being opened in strengthening regional security.

Friday, January 1, 2010

USA's raging wars throughout the globe


USA's raging wars throughout the globe




January 1 will usher in the last year of the first decade of a new millennium and ten consecutive years of the United States conducting war in the Greater Middle East....
The Yemen Hidden Agenda: Behind the Al-Qaeda Scenarios, A Strategic Oil Transit Chokepoint
Beginning with the October 7, 2001 missile and bomb attacks on Afghanistan, American combat operations abroad have not ceased for a year, a month, a week or a day in the 21st century.

The Afghan war, the U.S.'s first air and ground conflict in Asia since the disastrous wars in Vietnam and Cambodia in the 1960s and early 1970s and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's first land war and Asian campaign, began during the end of the 2001 war in Macedonia launched from NATO-occupied Kosovo, one in which the role of U.S. military personnel is still to be properly exposed [1] and addressed and which led to the displacement of almost 10 percent of the nation's population.

In the first case Washington invaded a nation in the name of combating terrorism; in the second it abetted cross-border terrorism. Similarly, in 1991 the U.S. and its Western allies attacked Iraqi forces in Kuwait and launched devastating and deadly cruise missile attacks and bombing sorties inside Iraq in the name of preserving the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kuwait, and in 1999 waged a 78-day bombing assault against Yugoslavia to override and fatally undermine the principles of territorial integrity and national sovereignty in the name of the casus belli of the day, so-called humanitarian intervention.

Two years later humanitarian war, as abhorrent an oxymoron as the world has ever witnessed, gave way to the global war on terror(ism), with the U.S. and its NATO allies again reversing course but continuing to wage wars of aggression and "wars of opportunity" as they saw fit, contradictions and logic, precedents and international law notwithstanding.

Several never fully acknowledged counterinsurgency campaigns, some ongoing - Colombia - and some new - Yemen - later, the U.S. invaded Iraq in March of 2003 with a "coalition of the willing" comprised mainly of Eastern European NATO candidate nations (now almost all full members of the world's only military bloc as a result of their service).

The Pentagon has also deployed special forces and other troops to the Philippines and launched naval, helicopter and missile attacks inside Somalia as well as assisting the Ethiopian invasion of that nation in 2006. Washington also arms, trains and supports the armed forces of Djibouti in their border war with Eritrea. In fact Djibouti hosts the U.S.'s only permanent military installation in Africa to date [2], Camp Lemonier, a United States Naval Expeditionary Base and home to the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), placed under the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) when it was launched on October 1, 2008. The area of responsibility of the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa takes in the nations of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen and as "areas of interest" the Comoros, Mauritius and Madagascar.

That is, much of the western shores of the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, among the most geostrategically important parts of the world. [3]

U.S. troops, aerial drones, warships, planes and helicopters are active throughout that vast tract of land and water.

With senator and once almost vice president Joseph Lieberman's threat on December 27 that "Yemen will be tomorrow's war" [4] and former Southern Command chief and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe Wesley Clark's two days later that "Maybe we need to put some boots on the ground there," [5] it is evident that America's new war for the new year has already been identified. In fact in mid-December U.S. warplanes participated in the bombing of a village in northern Yemen that cost the lives of 120 civilians as well as wounding 44 more [6] and a week later "A US fighter jet...carried out multiple airstrikes on the home of a senior official in Yemen's northern rugged province of Sa'ada...." [7]

The pretext for undertaking a war in Yemen in earnest is currently the serio-comic "attempted terrorist attack" by a young Nigerian national on a passenger airliner outside of Detroit on Christmas Day. The deadly U.S. bombing of the Yemeni village mentioned above occurred ten days earlier and moreover was in the north of the nation, although Washington claims al-Qaeda cells are operating in the other end of the country. [8]

Asia, Africa and the Middle East are not the only battlegrounds where the Pentagon is active. On October 30 of 2009 the U.S. signed an agreement with the government of Colombia to acquire the essentially unlimited and unrestricted use of seven new military bases in the South American nation, including sites within immediate striking distance of both Venezuela and Ecuador. [9] American intelligence, special forces and other personnel will be complicit in ongoing counterinsurgency operations against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the nation's south as well as in rendering assistance to Washington's Colombian proxy for attacks inside Ecuador and Venezuela that will be portrayed as aimed at FARC forces in the two states.

Targeting two linchpins of and ultimately the entire Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), Washington is laying the groundwork for a potential military conflagration in South and Central America and the Caribbean. After the U.S.-supported coup in Honduras on June 28, that nation has announced it will be the first ALBA member state to ever withdraw from the Alliance and the Pentagon will retain, perhaps expand, its military presence at the Soto Cano Air Base there.

A few days ago "The Colombian government...announced it is building a new military base on its border with Venezuela and has activated six new airborne battalions" [10] and shortly afterward Dutch member of parliament Harry van Bommel "claimed that US spy planes are using an airbase on the Netherlands Antilles island of CuraƧao" [11] off the Venezuelan coast.

In October a U.S. armed forces publication revealed that the Pentagon will spend $110 million to modernize and expand seven new military bases in Bulgaria and Romania, across the Black Sea from Russia, where it will station initial contingents of over 4,000 troops. [12]

In early December the U.S. signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Poland, which borders the Russian Kaliningrad territory, that "allows for the United States military to station American troops and military equipment on Polish territory." [13] The U.S. military forces will operate Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) batteries as part of the Pentagon's global interceptor missile system.

At approximately the same time President Obama pressured Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to base missile shield components in his country. "We discussed the continuing role that we can play as NATO allies in strengthening Turkey's profile within NATO and coordinating more effectively on critical issues like missile defense," [14] in the American leader's words.

"Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has hinted his government does not view Tehran [Iran] as a potential missile threat for Turkey at this point. But analysts say if a joint NATO missile shield is developed, such a move could force Ankara to join the mechanism." [15]

2010 will see the first foreign troops deployed to Poland since the breakup of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 and the installation of the U.S's "stronger, swifter and smarter" (also Obama's words) interceptor missiles and radar facilities in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the South Caucasus. [16]

U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan, site of the longest and most wide-scale war in the world, will top 100,000 early in 2010 and with another 50,000 plus troops from other NATO nations and assorted "vassals and tributaries" (Zbigniew Brzezinski) will represent the largest military deployment in any war zone in the world.

American and NATO drone missile and helicopter gunship attacks in Pakistan will also increase, as will U.S. counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines and Somalia along with those in Yemen where CIA and Army special forces are already involved.

U.S. military websites recently announced that there have been 3.3 million deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 with 2 million U.S. service members sent to the two war zones. [17]

In this still young millennium American soldiers have also deployed in the hundreds of thousands to new bases and conflict and post-conflict zones in Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Colombia, Djibouti, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Mali, the Philippines, Romania, Uganda and Uzbekistan.

In 2010 they will be sent abroad in even larger numbers to man airbases and missile sites, supervise and participate in counterinsurgency operations throughout the world against disparate rebel groups, many of them secular, and wage combat operations in South Asia and elsewhere. They will be stationed on warships and submarines equipped with cruise and long-range nuclear missiles and with aircraft carrier strike groups prowling the world's seas and oceans.

They will construct and expand bases from Europe to Central and South Asia, Africa to South America, the Middle East to Oceania. With the exception of Guam and Vicenza in Italy, where the Pentagon is massively expanding existing installations, all the facilities in question are in nations and even regions of the world where the U.S. military has never before ensconced itself. Practically all the new encampments will be forward bases used for operations "down range," generally to the east and south of NATO-dominated Europe.

U.S. military personnel will be assigned to the new Global Strike Command and for expanded patrols and war games in the Arctic Circle. They will serve under the Missile Defense Agency to consolidate a worldwide interceptor missile network that will facilitate a nuclear first strike capability and will extend that system into space, the final frontier in the drive to achieve military full spectrum dominance.

American troops will continue to fan out to most all parts of the world. Everywhere, that is, except to their own nation's borders.

Monday, December 28, 2009

Violent Change, fragmentation and proxy wars are being attempted in Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, with India & China down the line





http://www.apakistannews.com/india%E2%80%99s-shattered-hope-of-war-155975

Bernard Lewis, and the fate of Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and China


http://aangirfan.blogspot.com/2009/12/david-headley-and-jews.html


It looks as if the CIA is going to bring about big changes in Iran....?

http://www.rieas.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1080

Iran contains Persians, Arabs, Azeris, Kurds, Turkmens, Baluchies and others.

It looks as if Iran is to be broken up, to make it easier to control.

Professor Bernard Lewis, at the Bilderberg Meeting in Baden, Austria, on April 27-29, 1979[i] [ii] "proposed the fragmentation and balkanization of Iran along regional, ethnic and linguistic lines." (PART VI: GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS & PETROLEUM DIPLOMACY )

The CIA puts leaders into power and then topples them when they become too independent minded. (SUHARTO / Saddam worked for the CIA / The Shah of Iran was toppled by the CIA and MI6?)

Apparently, the CIA put the Ayatollahs into power in Iran. (The Ayatollahs and the CIA)

The Shah was becoming too powerful and was not cooperating on oil prices, heroin or nuclear power.

The CIA hoped that the Ayatollahs would keep Iran backward, feudal and easy to control.

Robert Dreyfuss, in 'Hostage to Khomeini', in 1975, wrote about Western 'plans for reversing the Shah’s industrialization program and for turning Iran into a model dark ages regime.' (The USA's alliance with Iran)

The CIA hoped that an Islamic Iran could be used against Soviet Russia, just as the Islamists in Afghanistan were used to weaken Soviet Russia.

Then there was the heroin trade, which is alleged to benefit the CIA. "It has been said that the ubiquitous Rafsanjani family and also Ayatollah Vaez-Tabasi ... are deeply involved in the drug trade..." (Opium, Brown Sugar & Mullahs in Iran « Plateau of Iran )

The US government poured weaons into Iran, after the Ayatollahs came to power, and that was good for the military-industrial complex.


And the eventual plan is the break up of Iran, and other Moslem countries,along ethnic and religious lines.

Iran, and its neighbours, will be easier to control when they are broken up.

Reportedly, the Bernard Lewis Plan (Bernard Lewis: one of the secret rulers of the world?) is to encourage nationalistic minorities, such as the the Kurds, the Baluchis and the Azerbaijani Turks. Brzezinski believes that US global dominance depends on US control of the oil-rich parts of the world, such as Iran. (The USA's alliance with Iran)

So, now the CIA wants to topple Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, because he is not being a CIA puppet, and because Iran is too powerful in its present state.

Former Pakistani Army General Mirza Aslam Beig claims the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has distributed 400 million dollars inside Iran to evoke a revolution. (CIA has Distributed 400 Million Dollars Inside Iran.)

Hossein Shariatmadari, a close pal of Khamenei, wrote in an editorial: "It has to be asked whether the actions of (the opposition leader Mousavi and his supporters) are in response to instructions of American authorities." (Ayatollah's aide accuses Iran opposition leader of being US agent)


On 28 December 2009, we read that at least 15 people have been killed in Tehran street battles

Among the dead was a nephew of Mir Hossein Mousavi, Iran’s opposition leader.

Reportedly there has been "mobile telephone footage of ... jubilant demonstrators attacking riot police and Basij militiamen, protesters gleefully setting light to a police station, Basiji building and motorbikes being captured from the security forces, detained protesters being freed from a police van..."

According to Ali Ansari, Professor of Iranian Studies at the University of St Andrews: "No one can now doubt that change is coming."

http://www.iran-press-service.com/ips/articles-2007/october-2007/iran-leader-to-consider-russian-presidents-win-win.shtml

On 27 December 2009, SELIG S. HARRISON, at the new York Times, wrote about Tehran's Biggest Fear.

According to Harrison, the biggest threat to the ruling ayatollahs and generals in Iran comes from the separatist groups in Kurdish, Baluch, Azeri and Arab ethnic minority regions that make up some 44 percent of Iran's population.

During the Bush administration, the plan was "limited covert action carried out by proxy, in the case of the Baluch, through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate or, I.S.I., and in the case of the Kurds by the C.I.A. in cooperation with Israel’s Mossad."

The C.I.A. provided weapons aid and training to the main Kurdish rebel group in Iran, according to U.S. journalists, Jon Lee Anderson and Seymour Hersh of the New Yorker and Borzou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times.

The Arab separatists live in a province which produces 80 percent of Iran's crude oil revenue.

Iran's biggest challenge


Iran's biggest challenge

The biggest threat to the ruling ayatollahs and generals in multi-ethnic Iran does not come from the embattled democratic opposition movement struggling to reform the Islamic Republic. It comes from increasingly aggressive separatist groups in Kurdish, Baluch, Azeri and Arab ethnic minority regions that collectively make up some 44 percent of Persian-dominated Iran’s population.

Working together, the democratic reform movement and the ethnic insurgents could seriously undermine the republic. But the reform movement, like most of the clerical, military and business establishment, is dominated by an entrenched Persian elite and has so far refused to support minority demands.

What the minorities want is greatly increased economic development spending in the non-Persian regions, a bigger share of the profits from oil and other natural resources in their areas, the unfettered use of non-Persian languages in education and politics and freedom from religious persecution. Some minority leaders believe these goals can be achieved through regional autonomy under the existing Constitution, but most of them want to reconstitute Iran as a loose confederation or to declare independence.

Should the United States give money and weapons aid to the ethnic insurgents?

During the Bush administration, a debate raged between White House advocates of “regime change” in Tehran, who favored large-scale covert action to break up the country, and State Department moderates who argued that all-out support of the minorities would complicate negotiations on a nuclear deal with the dominant Persians.

The result was a compromise: limited covert action carried out by proxy, in the case of the Baluch, through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate or, I.S.I., and in the case of the Kurds by the C.I.A. in cooperation with Israel’s Mossad. My knowledge of the I.S.I.’s role is based on first-hand Pakistani sources, including Baluch leaders. Evidence of the C.I.A. role in providing weapons aid and training to Pejak, the principal Kurdish rebel group in Iran, has been spelled out by three U.S. journalists, Jon Lee Anderson and Seymour Hersh of the New Yorker and Borzou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times, who have interviewed a variety of Pejak leaders.

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, speaking in the Kurdish city of Bijar, charged on May 12 that the Obama administration had not reversed the Bush policy. “Unfortunately, money, arms and organization are being used by the Americans directly across our western borders in order to fight the Islamic Republic’s system,” he declared. “The Americans are busy making a conspiracy.”

Mossad has long-standing contacts with Kurdish groups in Iran and Iraq established when the United States and Israel wanted to destabilize the Kurdish areas of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. But now the United States wants a united Iraq in which Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis cooperate. Iran, too, wants a united Iraq because it fears cooperation among its own Kurds and those in Iraq and Turkey to create an independent Kurdistan. So aiding Pejak would hamper future Iran-U.S. cooperation in Baghdad in addition to complicating the nuclear negotiations.

Both the Baluch and the Kurds are Sunni Muslims. They are fighting vicious Shiite religious repression in addition to cultural and economic discrimination. By contrast, the biggest of the minorities, the Turkic-speaking Azeris, are Shiites, and Ayatollah Khamenei himself is an Azeri. His selection as the supreme leader was in part a gesture to the Azeris designed to cement their allegiance to Iran and to blunt a covert campaign by ethnic kinsmen in adjacent Azerbaijan to annex them. The Azeris in Iran are better off economically than the other minorities but feel that the Persians look down on them. Prolonged rioting erupted for days after a Tehran newspaper published a cartoon in May 2006, depicting an Azeri-speaking cockroach.

The Arabs in the southwestern province of Khuzestan, who are also Shiites, pose the most dangerous potential separatist threat to Tehran because the province produces 80 percent of Iran’s crude oil revenue. So far the divided Arab separatist factions have not created a militia but they periodically raid government security installations, bomb oil production facilities and broadcast propaganda in Arabic on satellite TV channels from shifting locations outside Iran.

The most serious military clashes between the Revolutionary Guards and separatist groups have come on the Kurdish border, where Iran repeatedly bombarded Pejak hideouts in September 2007, and in Baluchistan, where the Guards frequently suffers heavy casualties in clashes with militias of the Jundullah movement operating out of camps just across the border in the Baluch areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Compared to the massive protests in the streets of Tehran and Qum, the uncoordinated harassment of the regime by ethnic insurgents may seem like a sideshow. But if the ethnic insurgents could unite and if the democratic opposition could forge a united front with the minorities, the prospects for reforming or toppling the Islamic Republic, now dismal, would brighten.

For the present, the Obama administration should tread with the utmost care in dealing with this sensitive issue, guided by a recognition that support for separatism and engagement with the present regime are completely incompatible.

Wednesday, December 23, 2009

China competes with gas that could go westward....


China competes with gas that could go westward....

Nursultan Nazarbayev has a way of drawing lines in the sand. The president of Kazakhstan recently told global oil and metal majors that new laws would allow only those foreign investors that cooperate with his industrialization program to tap his nation's mineral resources.

"We will work only with those who propose projects helping diversification of the economy," he said at a December 4 investment conference in Astana, the Kazakh capital, which was attended by ArcelorMittal, Chevron, Total, ENRC and other investors. To any unwilling to collaborate, he said: "We will look for new partners, offer them favorable conditions and resources to fulfill projects."

For good measure, he added that Beijing has asked Kazakhstan - a country the size of Europe but with just 16 million people - to allow Chinese farmers to use one million hectares of Kazakh land to cultivate crops such as soya and rape seed.

Pro-Western elements in Kazakh politics have since taken to the streets. On December 17, addressing a rally in Almaty, Bolat Abilov, co-chairman of the opposition party Azat [United Social Democratic Party] drew an apocalyptic scenario: "If we tomorrow give, or distribute, one million hectares of land, it would mean 15 people working per hectare. That means 15 million people would be brought from China. If one of those 15 people were to give birth each year, that would be the end. In 50 years, there would be 50 million Chinese [in Kazakhstan]."

A rally was held outside the Chinese consulate in Almaty with placards reading, "Mr Hu Jintao, we will not give up Kazakh land!"



A pipeline to the heart of Asia ...

Nazarbayev's message was direct: Western investors could keep their money if interested only in exploiting Kazakhstan's mineral wealth. The president was speaking as a momentous event in the history and politics of Central Asia was resetting the terms of engagement for foreigners in the region: the development of an ambitious 7,000 kilometer pipeline to link the region's gas fields to cities on China's eastern seaboard.

Ten days after Nazarbayev spoke, Hu arrived on a Central Asian tour for the formal commissioning of the 1,833-kilometer pipeline connecting gas fields in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (and possibly Russia) to China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region.

Turkmenistan says it alone can supply 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas a year through the pipeline for three decades once it reaches full capacity. That is about half China's current annual consumption.

Uzbekistan signed an agreement with China in November last year to export up to 10 bcm gas a year. (A 2006 estimate put Uzbekistan's gas reserves at 1.8 trillion cubic meters.) A branch line of the Turkmen-China trunk pipeline passes through the town of Gazli, in the Bukhara region, where the Uzbek gas can be fed into it. China has invested in the Uzbek gas fields in the region. The Uzbek reserves are primarily concentrated in the Qashqadaryo province and near Bukhara alongside which the Chinese pipeline passes.

Kazakhstan is set to export another 10 bcm gas through another branch pipeline connection. China, which is preparing for a massive increase in consumption, wants natural gas to account for 10% of its energy mix by 2020, from 3% in 2005. China consumed 77.8 bcm of natural gas last year, a little more than its domestic output of 77.5 bcm. However, the nation faces a natural gas shortage of 70-110 bcm by 2020, according to the 2009 Energy Development Report published by the Chinese Academy of Social Science, an official think-tank. All China's gas imports are currently in the form of LNG and it is separately raising its LNG import capacity to 15 million to 18 million tons by the end of next year.

There was widespread skepticism among observers whether the Central Asia pipeline project would see the light of day. Indeed, China pushed ahead against Western views that last year's renewed unrest in Xinjiang put it at risk. "China is putting a lot of eggs in one basket,'' one British expert said. "An awful lot of oil and gas is coming through a small region. Looking now at trends in Xinjiang, you could ask whether a route from Central Asia is actually more secure than routes through Southeast Asia or the South China Sea."

The implication was obvious: that China's Central Asian pipeline could become a sitting duck for terrorists. As Robert Ebel, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, put it, security could be impossible if the pipelines become targets as they pass through vast stretches of sparsely populated areas in Central Asia and Xinjiang. "There is no way you can protect a pipeline along its entire length. It just can't be done", Ebel, a security expert, maintained. Unrest in Xinjiang, particularly, threatens the Central Asian pipeline, he added. "I'm sure it's causing grey hairs on the people in Beijing," he said.

... sends shock waves to Washington

The American experts have drawn a doomsday scenario for the Chinese pipeline. Writing in the Central Asia & Caucasus Institute Analyst of Johns Hopkins University in October last year, Stephen Blank of the US War College branded Xinjiang as a "pressure cooker" which Beijing is nowhere near controlling.

Growing nervousness in Washington about the Chinese pipeline was quite palpable. The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a rare hearing in July regarding China's geopolitical thrust into the Central Asian region. Testifying at the hearing, Richard Morningstar, the US special envoy for energy, underlined that the US needed to develop strategies to compete with China for energy in Central Asia.

This was perhaps the first time that a senior US official has openly flagged China as the US's rival in the energy politics of Central Asia. US experts usually have focused attention on Russian dominance of the region's energy scene and worked for diminishing the Russian presence in the post-Soviet space by canvassing support for Trans-Caspian projects that bypassed Russian territory. In fact, some American experts on the region even argued that China was a potential US ally for isolating Russia.

Certainly, 2009 was a turning point in American discourses on Chinese policies in Central Asia. As China's Turkmen gas pipeline got closer to completion, US disquiet began to surface.

"China is having increasing and heavy influence in Central Asia,'' Morningstar said. ``It is hard for us [the US] to compete with China in some of these countries. It's easy for Turkmenistan to make a deal with China when China comes in and says, 'Hey, we're going to write a check for X amount of money, we're going to build a pipeline'. That's not a hard deal to accept, and we [US] can't compete in that way."

Morningstar put forward two suggestions. One, "to develop a strategy to deal with that [Chinese policy] and encourage the US companies to negotiate creatively with Turkmenistan". Two, Washington should also think about whether it makes sense for US companies to cooperate with China in such countries.

Scope for US-China cooperation over Central Asian energy resources is very limited. In geopolitical terms, there is a conflict of interest between the two countries. One principal objective of China is to lock in energy sources that are not dependent on supply routes passing through the Malacca Straits, which the US controls and could prove a choke point in the event of a US-China confrontation.

Besides, Morningstar himself put his finger on the crux of the problem. While it was good for China's energy-hungry economy to get "clean energy" such as natural gas, the "gas that goes to China competes with gas that could go westward".

Beijing raises the stakes ...

However, the US realizes that devising a counterstrategy to China's is easier said than done. China's presence in the Central Asian energy scene was not a single day's happening. Painstaking diplomacy spread over years went behind it. It was back in 1997 that Kazakhstan and China agreed to build a 3,000 km crude oil pipeline and would later double capacity to 20 million tonnes a year.

In 2005, CNPC International paid almost $4 billion for a 33% stake in PetroKazakhstan. The following year China bought up Kazakh oil assets worth nearly $2 billion in the Karazhanba oil and gas fields (which has proven reserves of more than 340 million barrels), agreed to purchase 30 bcm gas from Turkmenistan ((later increasing this to 40 bcm), and committed $210 million to look for oil and gas in Uzbekistan over the next five years.

In 2008, Kazakhstan and China agreed on jointly developing oil and gas reserves on the continental shelf of the Caspian Sea, while China's Guangdong Nuclear Power Co and Kazakhstan's state nuclear firm Kazatomprom agreed on boosting uranium output in their joint venture.

In April 2009, China made the mother of all energy deals by agreeing to lend Kazakhstan $10 billion in an unprecedented "loan-for-oil" deal and also agreed with state-owned KazMunaiGas to jointly buy oil producer MangistauMunaiGas for $3.3 billion.

In 2009, China also agreed to issue a $3 billion loan for developing the Central Asian state's largest gas field, South Iolotan, which is estimated to contain anywhere between 4 trillion and 14 trillion cubic meters of gas, according to Britain's Gaffney, Cline and Associates - making it one of the world's five largest gas deposits.
By the time the US woke up to China having a clear energy strategy for Central Asia, the strategy was already working. Western calculations went awry in two directions. First, they estimated that, in the ultimate analysis, Central Asian states would be wary of dealing with their giant neighbor and prefer Russia and the West. Second, they blindly assumed that Russia in any case was bound to perceive the Chinese gains as a threat to its own strategic interests and would therefore resist and checkmate Beijing at some stage, indirectly serving Western interests.

To the dismay of the West, not only have the Central Asian states warmed to Chinese overtures, but they are basking in all the Chinese attention and relishing the harder bargains they are able
to strike in negotiating prices and contracts with Western companies.

Again, China's engagement in Central Asia has been comprehensive and not confined to oil and gas. Central Asians have been seeking precisely such input from foreign countries as Nazarbayev voiced in Astana. Speaking to Chinese media in Ashgabat on the eve of Hu's arrival for the commissioning of the gas pipeline on December 14, Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov highlighted repeatedly how his country's relations with China have become "multi-faceted".

"They now cover all major areas - politics, economy, trade, culture, science, education,'' Berdymukhamedov said. "And, so, of course, there are a lot of topics for discussion during our meeting with the president of China. The main thing is that they all have a positive context, the very favorable background as the basis for negotiations, and their starting position on both sides favors complete mutual understanding and trust, equality and respect, unity of views on key issues of world politics and bilateral relations."

Western experts often speak in a dismissive tone that the Central Asians prefer the Chinese because they never raise difficult issues such as democracy and human rights. But this is far too simplistic a reading. Central Asian countries see Western discourse on democracy and human rights as doublespeak from countries that pander to authoritarian regimes without scruples when it suits their business interests.

Central Asian countries draw satisfaction that eventually Washington is no more trampling on the region's sensitivities and ethos. The fashion in which Uzbekistan taught an enduring lesson to the European Union and the US regarding mutual respect and equitable relationship was widely noted in the region's capitals.

But that is only part of the story. The main thing is that China has reset the terms of the West's engagement with Central Asia. Western countries need to negotiate hard with Central Asian interlocutors squarely. Secondly, while they are under compulsion to abandon the cherry-picking approach they once took - touching the region's precious minerals and shying away from any further involvement such as in the manufacturing sector or agriculture - the ground rules of engagement that Nazarbayev spelt out at the investors' forum in Astana give a foretaste of what is to come.

China's track record in Turkmenistan displays the new standards for the west. China-Turkmenistan trade has jumped 40 times since 2000; 35 enterprises are working in Turkmenistan today with Chinese capital. Chinese companies are active in sectors of the Turkmen economy as diverse as oil and gas, telecommunications, transport, agriculture, textile, chemical and food industries, healthcare and construction.

From Ashgabat's point of view, China's interest in comprehensive engagement with the Turkmen political economy stands in contrast with the predatory instincts of the Western companies that zero in on the mineral industry with maniacal zeal. Certainly, in the process, China also ends up taking a big share of the Turkmen energy sector.

... but reassures Moscow

The second aspect to be noted is that with the commencement of China's Central Asia pipeline, Russia's post-Soviet control of gas exports from Central Asia has ended. The American commentators have tried to propagate this in terms of China's gain turning out to be Russia's loss. But it isn't quite a zero-sum game in that sense. Beijing has been unusually forthright in discussing the delicate issue of whether China is locked into competition with Russia over Central Asia's energy.

"China is pursuing diversification of energy imports, while the Central Asian countries are pursuing diversification of exports,'' said Zhang Xiyuan, the Chinese foreign ministry official briefing the press on Hu's visit to Ashgabat. "This kind of cooperation will naturally continue and has room to develop."

In other words, China's cooperation with Central Asia rests on a convergence of mutual interests. Chinese commentaries have stressed that "export diversification" as a strategic option has became necessary for Central Asian countries after the financial crisis and as European countries' demand for the region's natural gas has decreased.

Pan Guang, director of the Shanghai Center for International Studies and a prominent scholar, says China's "huge foreign-exchange purchasing capacity and advantageous geographical position is extremely attractive" to the gas exporters of Central Asia. China's energy cooperation will also promote development of non-energy industries in the region such as chemical, agricultural, transport infrastructure construction and light industries, according to the Chinese analysts. Russia's security interests would also be served, as unemployment, a root of instability, will be cut, they said.

Taking all factors into account, therefore, the People's Daily newspaper concluded that the Chinese pipeline was an opportunity for Russia.

"Some people in Russia are concerned and media agencies have exaggerated the event to attract public attention, asserting that China will become Russia's major strategic competitor in the Central Asian energy industry,'' the newspaper said. "In fact, it is not the case.

"Experts believe that the pipeline can transport natural gas produced both in Turkmenistan and in Russia ... [the] China-Russia pipeline mainly transports oil and natural gas produced in the eastern Siberian region. It is difficult to transport natural gas produced in both the western Siberian region and Russia's European part, so the China-Central Asia natural gas pipeline will perhaps act as a 'key' to addressing the issue.

"In addition, the natural gas cooperation between China and Central Asia is open and non-exclusive, and does not seize Russia's market or compete with Russia for resources," the People's Daily said.

In essence, the Chinese argument is that while the Turkmen-Uzbek-Kazakh pipeline possibly makes inroads into Europe's energy options it won't hurt Russia's interests. The argument is well founded. With the commissioning of the Turkmen gas pipeline, there is no doubt that US and European energy diplomacy in Central Asia has been rendered a lethal body blow.

Through one mega project, Beijing has what Moscow has been striving for over a decade with a piecemeal approach. The European Union's chances of winning Turkmen supplies for its US-backed Nabucco pipeline project (connecting the Caspian with southern Europe) now seem severely diminished. Moscow can heave a sigh of relief, as the Nabucco project planned to cut Russia out of Europe's direct gas trade with the Caspian.

Therefore, if there is a zero-sum game, it is like this: China's gain is Europe's loss, which in turn can be Russia's gain since Russian gas is now certain to remain Europe's main energy source for the foreseeable future. Needless to say, Europe's continued dependence on Russian energy constitutes a vital chip for Moscow in its efforts to forge partnerships with major European countries.

Indeed, Russia can now advance its ambitious North Stream and South Stream gas pipelines to Europe without constantly having to look over its shoulder for competition from rival US-backed Trans-Caspian pipelines such as Nabucco.

Again, the US and Europe couldn't have missed the Chinese warning that Beijing intends to make a serious bid at some time for the Russian gas produced in its western Siberian region as well as its European part (which are at present the principal sources of supply for Europe). In effect, China has projected itself as a competing consumer of Russian gas.

All in all, the Chinese pipeline considerably strengthens Russia's stance. This probably explains the quiet satisfaction in Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's voice when he was asked about the implications of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline.

"The commissioning of the Turkmenistan-China pipeline is not going to affect our plans to expand our own pipeline network, which could possibly also reach China,'' Putin said. "I am referring to China's growing consumption of primary energy resources. We maintain regular, close contact with our Chinese colleagues on this issue. We know how fast the demand is growing there, and they too are closely monitoring the situation. The gas link to Turkmenistan will not undermine our plans."

Most important, the "loss" of Turkmen gas for Nabucco means that the project itself now critically depends on sourcing Iranian gas. In other words, Iran figures prominently in any serious European plans (strongly backed by the US) to diversify its gas imports so as to cut down dependence on Russian energy supplies.

US draws Central Asia into AfPak ...

To be sure, 2009 will be noted by historians as a landmark year for Central Asian security. For the first time in the post-Soviet period, a truly regional project has taken shape in Central Asia. It is a novel experience for a region torn asunder by numerous intra-regional tensions, irritants and misunderstandings - be it over water-sharing, Islamists, the environment or the "great game". This was underscored by the presence of the presidents of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan at the ceremony launching the Turkmen gas pipeline project.

It cannot be lost on the Central Asian elites that China has made such a high level of regional cooperation possible. Hu in his speech at the ceremony cited the Turkmen pipeline as a model of regional cooperation. China is reaping the benefit of some 15 years of patient, painstaking diplomacy. It will now be a Herculean task for the West to whip up Sinophobia among the Central Asians.

At the same time, China is assuming an enormous responsibility in the region as at no time previously. The gas pipeline makes China a "stakeholder" in Central Asian security. The bond now goes far beyond fighting the three forces of "terrorism, separatism and extremism", which was how China focused its phenomenally successful diplomacy in the mid-1990s.

Looking ahead, the coming year will see the US intensify efforts to counter China's influence in Central Asia. The alarm bells are ringing in Washington. At the US Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee special hearing on Central Asia on December 15, George Krol, the deputy assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, said: "This administration does not consider Central Asia a forgotten backwater, peripheral to US interests. The region is at the fulcrum of key US security, economic, and political interests. It demands attention and respect and our most diligent efforts and the Obama administration [is committed] to this very approach." [Emphasis added.]

Never before has an American official stated US intentions towards post-Soviet Central Asia in such strong words. Indeed, there is an implied warning to Beijing that the US is watching its forays into the region closely and will not let them pass without challenge.

From present indications, the US attempt is to widen the gyre of its AfPak strategy so as to draw the Central Asian region into it. In empirical terms, a case already exists for including the region in the AfPak strategy. For one thing, the Northern Corridor for supply of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) contingents in Afghanistan and the sourcing of materials from the region for Afghan reconstruction already make the regional governments important collaborators in the war effort.

The increased presence of NATO troops in Afghanistan can only lead to a bigger role for Central Asian countries that is bound to bring them into a closer working relationship. There is also reason to believe that the Afghan war has already spilt over to Central Asia. The exact background to this remains open to interpretation but the fact is that there has been a spurt in militant activities in Central Asia (and Xinjiang).

Deputy Assistant Secretary Krol framed it diplomatically by underlining that a policy priority of the US will be "to expand cooperation with the Central Asian states to assist coalition efforts to defeat extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan and bring stability and prosperity to the region". This goes hand in hand with the effort to "increase the development and diversification of the region's energy resources and supply routes".

Potential threats that could come from Central Asia, apart from the possibility of "state failure" would compel the US to pay close attention to the region, Krol said. He also invoked archetypal fears about terrorists getting hold of weapons of mass destruction, which has proved a useful argument for substantiating US intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"While these [Central Asian] countries voluntarily relinquished their nuclear arsenals after the fall of the Soviet Union, today the region is still engaged in activities relevant to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, namely, uranium mining, plutonium production and the fabrication and testing of biological and chemical weapons," Krol said.

In a measure of US determination to place itself in a lead role in Central Asia, the Obama administration has announced the constitution of a new framework of annual high-level bilateral dialogue with each of the region's countries.

... as it runs out of options

US interests would have been best served if Russia and China were at loggerheads in Central Asia. But that does not seem to be the way things are happening.

Moscow looks favorably on China's investments in Central Asia, according to Stephen Blank of the US War College. "By opening the RFE [Russian Far East] to Chinese investment and blessing similar investments in Central Asia, Moscow is reversing its policies toward both the Far East and Central Asia,'' Blank wrote in August. "In effect, this and other similar deals open the door to a huge expansion - with Moscow's assent - of China's strategic profile in both regions. The creation of a new regional order in the RFE and Central Asia is beginning to take shape and China is set to become the region's security manager, ensuring foremost that its portfolio investments are safe and secure."

The shift in the Kremlin's traditional policy with regard to the RFE has been necessitated largely by the downturn in the Russian economy following the global economic crisis and the sharp drop in oil revenue. Moscow was pursuing a policy aimed at developing the RFE and eastern Siberia almost exclusively through revenues from energy exports to Europe. But with the slackening energy demand in the European market and sharply reduced income from exports, the Kremlin cannot sustain the pursuit of such a dogged policy option anymore. It has been compelled to rethink.

This was evident in May when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev admitted that the development of the RFE needed to be coordinated with Beijing's regional strategy of rejuvenating northeast China's dilapidated industrial base. Unsurprisingly, the Russian policy shift also implies the jettisoning of any attempt to prevent Chinese economic penetration of Central Asia.

Secondly, Moscow faces difficulty in underwriting the security and stability of the Central Asian region on its own steam. This is despite the region's direct impact on Russia's national security interests. At the same time, Moscow has a congruence of interests with China in forestalling NATO's expansion into the Central Asia's security. The interplay of these factors encourages Moscow to regard favorably the stepping up of Chinese involvement in Central Asia.

Of course, writings appear in the Russian media occasionally about China's economic "conquest" of Central Asia, but official policy does not seem to encourage such a perspective. The new thinking in Moscow with regard to Chinese investments in RFE and Central Asia may have already begun to pay off. Medvedev claimed during a visit by Hu to Moscow in June that Russia and China had clinched deals worth $100 billion by a "special mechanism" facilitating massive Chinese investments in regional projects. It is going to be very difficult for the US to disrupt these plans. As Blank put it: "For all those who are watching for the emergence of China as a dominant economic and political player in Asia, these new deals with Russia have a profound significance that we overlook at our peril."

China has the huge advantage of financial muscle. It can simply outspend the US or European countries. Short of stoking the fires of militancy and ethnic unrest in Xinjiang, the US may have run out of options to disrupt China's emerging leadership in Central Asia. On its part, Beijing knows that the stability of Xinjiang is crucial for China's Central Asia policy - and vice versa. The two have become inextricably linked in the Chinese regional strategy.

Beijing knows that "foreign devils on the Silk Road" - militant groups with foreign backers - can harass China by blowing up long stretches of the pipelines which are impractical for Beijing to protect in Xinjiang's vast mountains and deserts. That is one solid reason why Beijing has not been taken in by the US overtures for cooperation in Afghanistan nor is enamored by Obama's standing invitation to step into South Asia as the arbiter of peace and regional security.

Beijing is extremely wary of the hidden intentions behind the Afghan strategy Obama recently unveiled. In fact, Chinese criticism of the US troop surge in Afghanistan has become quite forceful lately. Last Thursday, the People's Daily wrote:
Yes, sometimes history does recur ... The shadow of the Vietnam War even now still hovers ... what unfolds is replicating the model in Iraq, and further back, in Vietnam.

The war-torn Afghan population will not side with the slumbering Karzai government nor will they welcome the US presence. On the other hand, the bigger footprint made by the enhanced US troops and its NATO allies only help fuel the insurgency and trigger more fierce resistance ... Taliban dies hard.

The predicament facing the US and the one-year old Obama administration is that at the time, there seems no policy that can reverse the undoing in Afghanistan, even with more troops and better-placed tactics. But the young president will try whatever he can to steer clear of the pitfall that would turn the superpower into an occupying power.
China (and Russia) have reason to be on guard that Obama's Afghan surge and the new strategy as a whole essentially aim at pursuing longstanding US strategic interests of controlling Central Asia and containing Russia and China through "soft power" - methods different from those of the previous US administrations. Clearly, the Russian-Chinese cooperation in Central Asia factors in the US game plan in the Hindu Kush, which is shrouded in mystery. Having said that, China will also find it worrisome that Russia tends to speak in two voices at times about its ties with NATO within the "reset" of relations with the US.

The specter of an open-ended US military presence in the region haunts China. After all, China was the US's accomplice against the Soviet Union in the Afghan jihad in the 1980s and should know that Washington has myriad ways to make use of radical and extremist elements as instruments of geopolitics. China can see right in front of its eyes the horrible example of its "all-weather friend" Pakistan, which by associating with US strategy in Afghanistan has been dragged into the vortex of instability and become the target of religious extremists and militants.

China plays Pipelineistan

BEIJING - For all the rhapsodies on the advent of the New Silk Road, it may have come into effect for good last week, when China and Central Asia got together to open a crucial Pipelineistan node linking Turkmenistan to China's Xinjiang.

By 2013, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Hong Kong will be cruising to ever more dizzying heights courtesy of gas supplied by the 1,833-kilometer Central Asia Pipeline from Turkmenistan - operating at full capacity. The pipeline will even help China achieve its goals in terms of curbing carbon emissions.

And in a few years China's big cities will also be cruising courtesy of oil from Iraq. (See Iraq's oil auction hits the jackpot Asia Times Online, December 16.)

China needs Iraqi oil. But instead of spending more than US$2
trillion on an illegal war, Chinese companies got some of the oil they needed from Iraq by bidding in a legal Iraqi oil auction. And in the New Great Game in Eurasia, instead of getting bogged down in Afghanistan, they made a direct deal with Turkmenistan, built a pipeline, profited from Turkmenistan's disagreements with Moscow (Gazprom stopped buying Turkmen gas last April, which cost the Central Asian "stan" $1 billion a month), and will get most of the gas they need.

The running myth is that China is addicted to oil. Coal would be more like it. The No 1 global emitter of greenhouse gases, China still produces more than 70% of its energy from coal. Beijing will inevitably get deeper into biogas or solar energy, but in the short term most of the "factory of the world" runs on coal. Of its verified energy reserves, 96% are coal.

This does not imply that China's shortage of raw materials such as oil and iron ore does not have the possibility of materializing Beijing's planners' worst nightmare - making the country a hostage to foreign raw-material producers (iron ore plays a significant part in China's strategic relationship with Brazil). But diversifying oil supplies is a matter of extreme national security. When oil reached $150 a barrel in 2008 - before the US-unleashed financial crisis - China's media accused foreign Big Oil of being "international petroleum crocodiles", and insinuated that the West's hidden agenda was ultimately to stop China's relentless development dead in its tracks.



Have sanctions won't travel

Twenty-eight percent of the world's total proven oil reserves are in the Arab world. China badly needs this oil - with its factories churning out everything from sneakers to laptops, its car market booming like there's no tomorrow (last month alone it produced 1.34 million vehicles), and Beijing constantly increasing its strategic oil reserves.

Few may know that China is actually the world's fifth-largest oil producer, at 3.7 million barrels per day (bpd), just below Iran and slightly over Mexico. In 1980, China consumed only 3% of the world's oil. Now it's already around 10% - the world's second-largest consumer, overtaking Japan but still way behind the US at 27%.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China will account for more than 40% of the increase in global oil demand up to 2030. And this assumes that China's gross domestic product will grow at "only" 6%. In 2009, even with the global financial crisis, China's GDP is expected to have grown 8%.

Saudi Arabia controls 13% of the world's oil production. It is the only swing producer capable of substantially increasing output. Not by accident, until recently it was China's main supplier - with 500,000 bpd.

China will get increasingly more oil from Iraq starting from 2013 or 2014. So from now on China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) will be very well positioned. But it's the Iranian equation that's really complex.

Chinese companies committed to investing no less than a staggering $120 billion in Iran's energy sector over the past five years. Iran is already China's No 2 oil supplier. Sinopec has just signed another memorandum of understanding with the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Co to invest an additional $6.5 billion to build oil refineries in Iran. Despite sanctions, trade between China and Iran grew 35% in 2009, to $27 billion.

Saudi Arabia - harboring extreme paranoia about the Iranian nuclear program - has offered to supply the Chinese the same amount of oil it currently imports from Iran, at much lower prices. Beijing scotched the deal. Then US President Barack Obama warned President Hu Jintao during his November visit to Beijing that the US would not be able to keep Israel from attacking Iran - as a tactic to persuade Beijing to agree to harsher sanctions.

Arguably nothing will happen in January, when China takes over the presidency of the United Nations Security Council. No matter what's spun in the US, Russia as well as China won't agree to more sanctions against Iran. But France takes over in February, and will definitely press the council to be harsher.

So many escape routes

From Beijing's point of view, both the US vs Iran conflict and the simmering US vs China strategic competition boil down to what could be called "escape from Hormuz and Malacca".

The Strait of Hormuz - the only entry to the Persian Gulf - at its narrowest is only 36km wide, with Iran to the north and Oman to the south. Roughly 20% of China's oil imports travel through it. Beijing frets at the sight of US aircraft carriers patrolling nearby.

The Strait of Malacca - very busy and very dangerous - at its narrowest is only 2.8km wide, with Singapore to the north and Indonesia to the south. As much as 80% of China's oil imports may travel through it.

The "escape" logic explains China's foray into Africa. China went to Africa because that continent is home to the few oilfields not owned by foreign Big Oil. When Chinese state oil companies buy equity stakes in African oilfields, they are protecting China from increases in oil prices, with the added bonus of no hassle - as happened in 2005 when China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) tried to buy Unocal in the US.

Hu Jintao goes to Africa every single year. Angola even overtook Saudi Arabia as China's main oil supplier in 2006. CNPC is extremely active in Sudan, owning equity in a number of oilfields. There are no fewer than 10,000 Chinese workers in Sudan building refineries and pipelines to the Red Sea. Beijing showers Khartoum with loans to build infrastructure. Sudan already is China's sixth oil supplier, responsible for about 6% of oil imports.

There are problems, of course. China's refineries deal mainly with low-sulfur sweet crude (predominant in African oilfields) rather than high-sulfur sour crude (predominant in Saudi Arabia). So more Chinese demand at first glance would mean the necessity to import more African oil. But that will change in time. China is building new refineries to process sour crude, some even financed by Saudi Arabia.

The road goes on forever

China's Central Asia strategy could be summed up as bye-bye Hormuz, bye-bye Malacca, and welcome to the New Silk Road.

Kazakhstan has 3% of the world's proven oil reserves. Its largest oilfields are not far from the Chinese border. China sees Kazakhstan as a key alternative oil supplier - with Pipelineistan linking Kazakh oilfields to Chinese refineries.

CNPC financed the Kazakh-China pipeline in 2005 (with a capacity of 400,000 bpd) and bought two-thirds of formerly Canadian PetroKazakhstan, which controls the Kumkol fields in the Turgai basin (the other third is owned by the Kazakh government) for $4.18 billion. And China Investment Corp, a sovereign wealth fund, bought 11% of KazMunaiGas Exploration Production (KMG), the oil-production subsidiary of the national energy company, for $1 billion.

China's first transnational Pipelineistan adventure was the China-Kazakhstan oil link. But this does not detract at all from China-Russia Pipelineistan - in both oil and gas. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin recently sealed more than $5 billion in deals with China, mostly on energy, advancing the agreement on a gas pipeline that will deliver up to 70 billion cubic meters of gas a year from Russia to China, according to Gazprom's Aleksey Miller.

But the Russia vs China chapter of Pipelineistan may be very tricky. Russia can at times behave as a strategic competitor. For example, the Kazakhstan-China pipeline operates with no hassle only for seven months a year. In winter the crude oil must be mixed with less viscous oils so it won't freeze. Russia supplies them. But Transneft delayed delivery of these additives in the winter of 2006, arguing that its own pipeline was already operating at the limit. CNPC was forced to transport the additives by rail from another part of Kazakhstan for a lot of money.

Central Asia - via Turkmenistan - will definitely be China's major supplier of gas, but on the oil front, it's much more complex. Even if all the "stans" sold China every barrel of oil they currently pump, the total would be less than half of China's daily needs.

This means that ultimately only the Middle East can placate China's thirst for oil. According to the International Energy Agency, China's oil demand will rise to 11.3 million barrels a day by 2015, even with its domestic production peaking. Compare that with what some of China's alternative suppliers are producing: Angola at 1.4 million bpd, Kazakhstan at 1.4 million as well, and Sudan at 400,000.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia produces 10.9 million bpd, the United Arab Emirates 3.0 million, Kuwait 2.7 million - and then there's Iraq, bound to reach 4 million by 2015. But Beijing is still not convinced - not with all those US "forward operating sites" in the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman, plus a naval battle group in the Persian Gulf.

China may also count on a South Asia option. China spent $200 million on the first phase of construction of the deepwater port of Gwadar in Balochistan. It wanted - and it got from Islamabad - "sovereign guarantees to the port's facilities". Gwadar is only 400km from Hormuz. From Gwadar, China can easily monitor traffic in the strait.

But Gwadar is infinitely more crucial as the pivot of the virtual Pipelineistan war between TAPI and IPI. TAPI is the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline, which will never be built as long as a US/NATO foreign occupation is fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. IPI is the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, also known as the “peace pipeline” (TAPI would be the "war pipeline" then?). Iran and Pakistan have already agreed to build it, much to Washington's distress.

In this case, Gwadar will be a key node. And if India pulls out, China already has made it clear it wants in; China would build another Pipelineistan node from Gwadar across the Karakoram highway toward Xinjiang. That would be a classic case of close energy cooperation among Iran, Pakistan and China - and a major strategic Pentagon defeat in the New Great Game in Eurasia.

An additional complicating factor is that India harbors infinite suspicion about a Chinese "string of pearls" - ports along China's key oil-supply routes, from Pakistan to Myanmar. Washington still believes that if TAPI is built, India will refrain from breaking the US-enforced embargo on Iran. But for India it would be a much safer - and strategically sounder - deal to align with IPI than with TAPI.

A Maoist drenched in oil

For China there's also an "escape to South America" option. In the Venezuelan overall strategy it's essential to sell more oil to China so as to lower its heavy dependence on the US market. According to the existing terms of the China-Venezuela partnership, four tankers and at least two refineries will be built - one in the immensely oil-rich Orinoco Belt in Venezuela and the other in Guangdong. State-owned Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) will be responsible for shipping the oil to China.

The Venezuelan target is to export 500,000bpd in 2009 - already reached - and 1 million by 2012. President Hugo Chavez - who in typical colorful manner described himself as a "Maoist" during his last visit to China - wants Venezuela to be no less than China's top oil supplier. China's energy analysts take this partnership extremely seriously; it means that Venezuela could replace Angola. Currently, according to China's Ministry of Commerce, Angola, Saudi Arabia and Iran are its top three oil suppliers.

Meanwhile, China has retrofitted many of its coal-fired plants in the past few years, and is accelerating moves to bypass high-intensity carbon-emitting technology, rebuilding its steel and cement industries. The country spends $9 billion a month on clean energy. There are plenty of wind farms across the countryside. A Shenzhen company is the world leader in lithium-ion battery technology. The first affordable, global electric car is bound to be made in China.

According to the China Greentech Initiative, the potential green market in China could reach a staggering $1 trillion a year by 2013 - that is, 15% of China's gross domestic product by then.

But for the moment, Beijing's strategic priority has been to develop an extremely meticulous energy-supply policy - with sources in Russia, the South China Sea, Central Asia, the East China Sea, the Middle East, Africa and South America.

As masterly as China may be able to play Pipelineistan, it will stride ever more confidently into a green future.