Tuesday, January 12, 2010

Pentagon's Full spectrum dominance


Pentagon's Full spectrum dominance

HONG KONG - One's got to hand it to failed underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmuttalab. He is the real Man of the Year. With a single twitch of his lower parts, the now iconic young Nigerian single-handedly not only forced the Barack Obama administration to unleash tight airport security measures, a new virtual striptease craze bound to bolster the fortunes of selected players in the security industry; but he also managed to place no fewer than 675 million Muslims (plus sundry Nigerian and even Cuban Christians) on a Cyclopean terror list of 10 "prone to terrorism countries". [1]

That's quite a feat for an apparently trained-in-Yemen jihadi charged by a US grand jury - no irony intended - with "attempted
use of a weapon of mass destruction". But weren't WMDs supposed to be buried in Iraq?

It's Pearl Harbor time....

http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2010/01/psyop.html

As much as 9/11 was the "Pearl Harbor" dreamed of by the neo-conservatives to unleash the American Eagle - which started with the bombing of Afghanistan and morphed into the disastrous invasion of Iraq - Abdulmuttalab's failed attempt to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day in the skies above Detroit is a godsend mini-Pearl Harbor destined to advance the Pentagon's "full spectrum dominance" doctrine.

Yemen could not be a more strategically mouth-watering proposition - with Saudi Arabia to the north, the Red Sea to the west, the Gulf of Aden to the south leading to the Arabian Sea, and on the other side, in Africa, Somalia.

As far as the Pentagon's "full spectrum dominance" goes, Yemen falls right into the Pentagon net alongside Somali pirates and the new bogeyman, al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula (AQAP), when it comes to the militarization of a key strategic oil chokepoint, the Bab el-Mandab, no matter the avalanche of denials from the Barack Obama administration of any intention to put US boots on the ground in Yemen.

The Strait of Bab el-Mandab between Yemen, Djibouti and Eritrea is a key strategic oil chokepoint between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, linking the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, through which flows at least 3.5 million barrels of oil a day towards the US, Europe and Asia.

Plus, from Washington's point of view, there's the potential of oil reserves lying in Yemen near Saudi Arabia at the Masila Basin and the Shabwa Basin, which could in the not too distant future fall nicely into US Big Oil's lap, unlike Iraq's. (See
Iraq's oil auction hits the jackpot Asia Times Online, December 16, 2009).

So it's no surprise that Obama, on the record, had to expand the never-say-die "war on terror" - the cover narrative for "full spectrum dominance". According to Obama, AfPak is still "the epicenter of al-Qaeda", but the Yemen chapter is a "more serious problem". Thus comes into play still one more rehash of the same old narrative: a fragile dictator, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh (in absolute power since 1978) needs America to defeat the terrorists (AQAP).

In practice, the Obama administration has just wallowed in the mire of an Arab Afghanistan, propping up Saleh against the Southern Movement, an unlikely, popular-based alliance of socialists and Islamic conservatives led by a former jihadi, Tariq al-Fadhli, and now characterized as a full nationalist movement. In addition, the Saleh regime is fighting a Shi'ite rebellion in north Yemen. Saleh is Sunni. The rebels are Shi'ite. Saleh is obviously backed by the Wahhabi Saudi regime. Yemen's current oil, by the way, is crucially in the south.

Saleh predictably will dub all his enemies as "al-Qaeda" and call the cavalry - US Special Forces and legions of counter-intelligence operatives. Not to mention the drones. Few noted that last December 17, Obama ordered the bombing of suspected al-Qaeda positions in Yemen with cruise missiles, an attack in which 49 civilians were reported to have been killed, according to Agence France-Presse. Welcome to yet one more sinister Arab-Afghan amalgam.

United States intelligence admits there are no more than 200 al-Qaeda jihadis in southern Yemen (that certainly beats those 100 in Afghanistan). What AQAP basically wants is to bring down US-propped dictators such as Saleh, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and the House of Saud - a popular agenda across much of the Middle East. So Obama may go to Cairo and talk about democracy in the Muslim world as much as he wants; what the Arab street registers is Obama playing the same old empire game of supporting yet another dictator.

It's the oil ...

"Full spectrum dominance" as applied to Yemen may be - as it always is - about the containment of China, as in threatening China's oil imports (6% of its total) from Port Sudan on the Red Sea, just north of the Bab el-Mandab.

But even if the US eventually controls the port of Aden - the gateway to Asia via the Indian Ocean - China will relentlessly continue to evolve its complex strategy of avoiding chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, or indeed the Bab el-Mandab (See
China plays Pipelineistan Asia Times Online, December 24).

The idea of "full spectrum dominance" is about threatening to cut energy flows not only to China but even to the European Union (EU) or anyone for that matter who crosses Washington's policy makers. And it's as much about Saudi Arabia as about China. As Saudi oil exports also have to negotiate the Bab el-Mandab, US "interest" in Yemen means a graphic warning to the House of Saud: don't even think of trading oil in euros or in a basket of currencies including the Chinese yuan.

It also is about isolating Iran - as in using a Sunni dictator to fight a Shi'ite rebellion and in militarizing a useful battleground alongside ally Saudi Arabia. In Washington's scenario, the winners should be the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency and Israel's Mossad, and the losers should be China, Russia and Iran. The turbulent Yemeni street was not consulted and certainly has ideas of its own.

Obama is packaging his strategy as a "war on al-Qaeda". It's not a war. And even if the counter-insurgency gang in the Pentagon conducts it, it's destined to fail. Meanwhile, there's not the remotest chance in sight of a real US withdrawal from Iraq, the end of the AfPak war, or a viable, non-apartheid Palestinian state.

Now that would be a real, concerted counter-terrorist operation, to finish once and for all with the ghost of all those "al-Qaedas". It won't happen. The name of the game is "full spectrum dominance" and empire reloaded. Fasten your body scanners; the decade promises a bumpy ride.

Friday, January 8, 2010

USA is targeting CHINA through Yemen







USA is targeting CHINA through Yemen

You cannot fight China without occupying Yemen.....

A year ago, Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh made the startling revelation that his country's security forces apprehended a group of Islamists linked to the Israeli intelligence forces. "A terrorist cell was apprehended and will be referred to the courts for its links with the Israeli intelligence services," he promised.

Saleh added, "You will hear about the trial proceedings." Nothing was ever heard and the trail went cold. Welcome to the magical land of Yemen, where in the womb of time the Arabian Nights were played out.

Combine Yemen with the mystique of Islam, Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda and the Israeli intelligence and you get a heady mix. The head of the US Central Command, General David Petraeus, dropped in at the capital, Sana'a, on Saturday and vowed to Saleh
increased American aid to fight al-Qaeda. United States President Barack Obama promptly echoed Petraeus' promise, assuring that the US would step up intelligence-sharing and training of Yemeni forces and perhaps carry out joint attacks against militants in the region.

Another Afghanistan?

Many accounts say that Obama, who is widely regarded as a gifted and intelligent politician, is blundering into a catastrophic mistake by starting another war that could turn out to be as bloody and chaotic and unwinnable as Iraq and Afghanistan. Yes, on the face of it, Obama does seem erratic. The parallels with Afghanistan are striking. There has been an attempt to destroy a US plane by a Nigerian student who says he received training in Yemen. And America wants to go to war.

Yemen, too, is a land of wonderfully beautiful rugged mountains that could be a guerilla paradise. Yemenis are a hospitable lot, like Afghan tribesmen, but as Irish journalist Patrick Cockurn recollects, while they are generous to passing strangers, they "deem the laws of hospitality to lapse when the stranger leaves their tribal territory, at which time he becomes 'a good back to shoot at'." Surely, there is romance in the air - almost like in the Hindu Kush. Fiercely nationalistic, almost every Yemeni has a gun. Yemen is also, like Afghanistan, a land of conflicting authorities, and with foreign intervention, a little civil war is waiting to flare up.



Is Obama so incredibly forgetful of his own December 1 speech outlining his Afghan strategy that he violated his own canons? Certainly not. Obama is a smart man. The intervention in Yemen will go down as one of the smartest moves that he ever made for perpetuating the US's global hegemony. It is America's answer to China's surge.

A cursory look at the map of region will show that Yemen is one of the most strategic lands adjoining waters of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. It flanks Saudi Arabia and Oman, which are vital American protectorates. In effect, Uncle Sam is "marking territory" - like a dog on a lamppost. Russia has been toying with the idea of reopening its Soviet-era base in Aden. Well, the US has pipped Moscow in the race.

The US has signaled that the odyssey doesn't end with Yemen. It is also moving into Somalia and Kenya. With that, the US establishes its military presence in an entire unbroken stretch of real estate all along the Indian Ocean's western rim. Chinese officials have of late spoken of their need to establish a naval base in the region. The US has now foreclosed China's options. The only country with a coastline that is available for China to set up a naval base in the region will be Iran. All other countries have a Western military presence.

The American intervention in Yemen is not going to be on the pattern of Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama will ensure he doesn't receive any body bags of American servicemen serving in Yemen. That is what the American public expects from him. He will only deploy drone aircraft and special forces and "focus on providing intelligence and training to help Yemen counter al-Qaeda militants", according to the US military. Obama's main core objective will be to establish an enduring military presence in Yemen. This serves many purposes.

A new great game begins

First, the US move has to be viewed against the historic backdrop of the Shi'ite awakening in the region. The Shi'ites (mostly of the Zaidi group) have been traditionally suppressed in Yemen. Shi'ite uprisings have been a recurring theme in Yemen's history. There has been a deliberate attempt to minimize the percentage of Shi'ites in Yemen, but they could be anywhere up to 45%.

More importantly, in the northern part of the country, they constitute the majority. What bothers the US and moderate Sunni Arab states - and Israel - is that the Believing Youth Organization led by Hussein Badr al-Houthi, which is entrenched in northern Yemen, is modeled after Hezbollah in Lebanon in all respects - politically, economically, socially and culturally.

Yemenis are an intelligent people and are famous in the Arabian Peninsula for their democratic temperament. The Yemeni Shi'ite empowerment on a Hezbollah-model would have far-reaching regional implications. Next-door Oman, which is a key American base, is predominantly Shi'ite. Even more sensitive is the likelihood of the dangerous idea of Shi'ite empowerment spreading to Saudi Arabia's highly restive Shi'ite regions adjoining Yemen, which on top of it all, also happen to be the reservoir of the country's fabulous oil wealth.

Saudi Arabia is entering a highly sensitive phase of political transition as a new generation is set to take over the leadership in Riyadh, and the palace intrigues and fault lines within the royal family are likely to get exacerbated. To put it mildly, given the vast scale of institutionalized Shi'ite persecution in Saudi Arabia by the Wahhabi establishment, Shi'ite empowerment is a veritable minefield that Riyadh is petrified about at this juncture. Its threshold of patience is wearing thin, as the recent uncharacteristic resort to military power against the north Yemeni Shi'ite communities bordering Saudi Arabia testifies.

The US faces a classic dilemma. It is all right for Obama to highlight the need of reform in Muslim societies - as he did eloquently in his Cairo speech last June. But democratization in the Yemeni context - ironically, in the Arab context - would involve Shi'ite empowerment. After the searing experience in Iraq, Washington is literally perched like a cat on a hot tin roof. It would much rather be aligned with the repressive, autocratic government of Saleh than let the genie of reform out of the bottle in the oil rich-region in which it has profound interests.

Obama has an erudite mind and he is not unaware that what Yemen desperately needs is reform, but he simply doesn't want to think about it. The paradox he faces is that with all its imperfections, Iran happens to be the only "democratic" system operating in that entire region.

Iran's shadow over the Yemeni Shi'ite consciousness worries the US to no end. Simply put, in the ideological struggle going on in the region, Obama finds himself with the ultra-conservative and brutally autocratic oligarchies that constitute the ruling class in the region. Conceivably, he isn't finding it easy. If his own memoirs are to be believed, there could be times when the vague recollections of his childhood in Indonesia and his precious memories of his own mother, who from all accounts was a free-wheeling intellectual and humanist, must be stalking him in the White House corridors.

Israel moves in....

http://grupo19aisp.no.sapo.pt/vanunu/images/mossad_logo.jpg
Mossad motto: 'By Way of Deception, thou shalt do War'
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d1/Yemen-CIA_WFB_Map.png/250px-Yemen-CIA_WFB_Map.png
Mossad's "Islamic Militants" Exposed In Yemen
by Joe Quinn
The arrest in Yemen this week of a group of "Islamist militants" has provided more evidence that the Israeli government and its associated agencies are still hard at work fabricating "Islamic terrorism" for the enthrallment of the 'educated' masses back home and in the 'enlightened' West:

Yemen seizes 'Israel-inked' cell

http://www.sott.net/articles/show/200402-Yemen-seizes-Israel-linked-cell


But Obama is first and foremost a realist. Emotions and personal beliefs drain away and strategic considerations weigh uppermost when he works in the Oval Office. With the military presence in Yemen, the US has tightened the cordon around Iran. In the event of a military attack on Iran, Yemen could be put to use as a springboard by the Israelis. These are weighty considerations for Obama.

The fact is that no one is in control as a Yemeni authority. It is a cakewalk for the formidable Israeli intelligence to carve out a niche in Yemen - just as it did in northern Iraq under somewhat comparable circumstances.

Islamism doesn't deter Israel at all. Saleh couldn't have been far off the mark when he alleged last year that Israeli intelligence had been exposed as having kept links with Yemeni Islamists. The point is, Yemeni Islamists are a highly fragmented lot and no one is sure who owes what sort of allegiance to whom. Israeli intelligence operates marvelously in such twilight zones when the horizon is lacerated with the blood of the vanishing sun.

Israel will find a toehold in Yemen to be a god-sent gift insofar as it registers its presence in the Arabian Peninsula. This is a dream come true for Israel, whose effectiveness as a regional power has always been seriously handicapped by its lack of access to the Persian Gulf region. The overarching US military presence helps


Israel politically to consolidate its Yemeni chapter. Without doubt, Petraeus is moving on Yemen in tandem with Israel (and Britain). But the "pro-West" Arab states with their rentier mentality have no choice except to remain as mute spectators on the sidelines.

Some among them may actually acquiesce with the Israeli security presence in the region as a safer bet than the spread of the dangerous ideas of Shi'ite empowerment emanating out of Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah. Also, at some stage, Israeli intelligence will begin to infiltrate the extremist Sunni outfits in Yemen, which are commonly known as affiliates of al-Qaeda. That is, if it hasn't done that already. Any such link makes Israel an invaluable ally for the US in its fight against al-Qaeda. In sum, infinite possibilities exist in the paradigm that is taking shape in the Muslim world abutting into the strategic Persian Gulf.

It's all about China

Most important, however, for US global strategies will be the massive gain of control of the port of Aden in Yemen. Britain can vouchsafe that Aden is the gateway to Asia. Control of Aden and the Malacca Strait will put the US in an unassailable position in the "great game" of the Indian Ocean. The sea lanes of the Indian Ocean are literally the jugular veins of China's economy. By controlling them, Washington sends a strong message to Beijing that any notions by the latter that the US is a declining power in Asia would be nothing more than an extravagant indulgence in fantasy.

In the Indian Ocean region, China is increasingly coming under pressure. India is a natural ally of the US in the Indian Ocean region. Both disfavor any significant Chinese naval presence. India is mediating a rapprochement between Washington and Colombo that would help roll back Chinese influence in Sri Lanka. The US has taken a u-turn in its Myanmar policy and is engaging the regime there with the primary intent of eroding China's influence with the military rulers. The Chinese strategy aimed at strengthening influence in Sri Lanka and Myanmar so as to open a new transportation route towards the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and Africa, where it has begun contesting traditional Western economic dominance.

China is keen to whittle down its dependence on the Malacca Strait for its commerce with Europe and West Asia. The US, on the contrary, is determined that China remains vulnerable to the choke point between Indonesia and Malaysia.

An engrossing struggle is breaking out. The US is unhappy with China's efforts to reach the warm waters of the Persian Gulf through the Central Asian region and Pakistan. Slowly but steadily, Washington is tightening the noose around the neck of the Pakistani elites - civilian and military - and forcing them to make a strategic choice between the US and China. This will put those elites in an unenviable dilemma. Like their Indian counterparts, they are inherently "pro-Western" (even when they are "anti-American") and if the Chinese connection is important for Islamabad, that is primarily because it balances perceived Indian hegemony.

The existential questions with which the Pakistani elites are grappling are apparent. They are seeking answers from Obama. Can Obama maintain a balanced relationship vis-a-vis Pakistan and India? Or, will Obama lapse back to the George W Bush era strategy of building up India as the pre-eminent power in the Indian Ocean under whose shadow Pakistan will have to learn to live?

US-India-Israel axis

On the other hand, the Indian elites are in no compromising mood. Delhi was on a roll during the Bush days. Now, after the initial misgivings about Obama's political philosophy, Delhi is concluding that he is all but a clone of his illustrious predecessor as regards the broad contours of the US's global strategy - of which containment of China is a core template.

The comfort level is palpably rising in Delhi with regard to the Obama presidency. Delhi takes the surge of the Israeli lobby in Washington as the litmus test for the Obama presidency. The surge suits Delhi, since the Jewish lobby was always a helpful ally in cultivating influence in the US Congress, media and the rabble-rousing think-tankers as well as successive administrations. And all this is happening at a time when the India-Israel security relationship is gaining greater momentum.

United States Defense Secretary Robert Gates is due to visit Delhi in the coming days. The Obama administration is reportedly adopting an increasingly accommodative attitude toward India's longstanding quest for "dual-use" technology from the US. If so, a massive avenue of military cooperation is about to open between the two countries, which will make India a serious challenger to China's growing military prowess. It is a win-win situation as the great Indian arms bazaar offers highly lucrative business for American companies.

Clearly, a cozy three-way US-Israel-India alliance provides the underpinning for all the maneuvering that is going on. It will have significance for the security of the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. Last year, India formalized a naval presence in Oman.

All-in-all, terrorism experts are counting the trees and missing the wood when they analyze the US foray into Yemen in the limited terms of hunting down al-Qaeda. The hard reality is that Obama, whose main plank used to be "change", has careened away and increasingly defaults to the global strategies of the Bush era. The freshness of the Obama magic is dissipating. Traces of the "revisionism" in his foreign policy orientation are beginning to surface. We can see them already with regard to Iran, Afghanistan, the Middle East and the Israel-Palestine problem, Central Asia and towards China and Russia.

Arguably, this sort of "return of the native" by Obama was inevitable. For one thing, he is but a creature of his circumstances. As someone put it brilliantly, Obama's presidency is like driving a train rather than a car: a train cannot be "steered", the driver can at best set its speed, but ultimately, it must run on its tracks.

Besides, history has no instances of a declining world power meekly accepting its destiny and walking into the sunset. The US cannot give up on its global dominance without putting up a real fight. And the reality of all such momentous struggles is that they cannot be fought piece-meal. You cannot fight China without occupying Yemen.

Thursday, January 7, 2010

Russia, China and Iran harmonize their competing interests?


Russia, China and Iran harmonize their competing interests?

http://defensetech.org/2010/01/06/intel-us-shuts-down-arms-shipment-to-georgia/

The inauguration of the Dauletabad-Sarakhs-Khangiran pipeline on Wednesday connecting Iran's northern Caspian region with Turkmenistan's vast gas field may go unnoticed amid the Western media cacophony that it is "apocalypse now" for the Islamic regime in Tehran.

The event sends strong messages for regional security. Within the space of three weeks, Turkmenistan has committed its entire gas exports to China, Russia and Iran. It has no urgent need of the pipelines that the United States and the European Union have been advancing. Are we hearing the faint notes of a Russia-China-Iran symphony?

The 182-kilometer Turkmen-Iranian pipeline starts modestly with
the pumping of 8 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Turkmen gas. But its annual capacity is 20bcm, and that would meet the energy requirements of Iran's Caspian region and enable Tehran to free its own gas production in the southern fields for export. The mutual interest is perfect: Ashgabat gets an assured market next door; northern Iran can consume without fear of winter shortages; Tehran can generate more surplus for exports; Turkmenistan can seek transportation routes to the world market via Iran; and Iran can aspire to take advantage of its excellent geographical location as a hub for the Turkmen exports...
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=4913

We are witnessing a new pattern of energy cooperation at the regional level that dispenses with Big Oil. Russia traditionally takes the lead. China and Iran follow the example. Russia, Iran and Turkmenistan hold respectively the world's largest, second-largest and fourth-largest gas reserves. And China will be consumer par excellence in this century. The matter is of profound consequence to the US global strategy.



The Turkmen-Iranian pipeline mocks the US's Iran policy. The US is threatening Iran with new sanctions and claims Tehran is "increasingly isolated". But Mahmud Ahmadinejad's presidential jet winds its way through a Central Asian tour and lands in Ashgabat for a red-carpet welcome by his Turkmen counterpart, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, and a new economic axis emerges. Washington's coercive diplomacy hasn't worked. Turkmenistan, with a gross domestic product of US$18.3 billion, defied the sole superpower (GDP of $14.2 trillion) - and, worse still, made it look routine..... http://digitaljournal.com/article/285718

There are subplots, too. Tehran claims to have a deal with Ankara to transport Turkmen gas to Turkey via the existing 2,577km pipeline connecting Tabriz in northwestern Iran with Ankara. Indeed, Turkish diplomacy has an independent foreign-policy orientation. Turkey also aspires to be a hub for Europe's energy supplies. Europe may be losing the battle for establishing direct access to the Caspian.

Second, Russia does not seem perturbed by China tapping into Central Asian energy. Europe's need for Russian energy imports has dropped and Central Asian energy-producing countries are tapping China's market. From the Russian point of view, China's imports should not deprive it of energy (for its domestic consumption or exports). Russia has established deep enough presence in the Central Asian and Caspian energy sector to ensure it faces no energy shortage.

What matters most to Russia is that its dominant role as Europe's No 1 energy provider is not eroded. So long as the Central Asian countries have no pressing need for new US-backed trans-Caspian pipelines, Russia is satisfied.

During his recent visit to Ashgabat, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev normalized Russian-Turkmen energy ties. The restoration of ties with Turkmenistan is a major breakthrough for both countries. One, a frozen relationship is being resumed substantially, whereby Turkmenistan will maintain an annual supply of 30bcm to Russia. Two, to quote Medvedev, "For the first time in the history of Russian-Turkmen relations, gas supplies will be carried out based on a price formula that is absolutely in line with European gas market conditions." Russian commentators say Gazprom will find it unprofitable to buy Turkmen gas and if Moscow has chosen to pay a high price, that is primarily because of its resolve not to leave gas that could be used in alternative pipelines, above all in the US-backed Nabucco project.




Third, contrary to Western propaganda, Ashgabat does not see the Chinese pipeline as a substitute for Gazprom. Russia's pricing policy ensures that Ashgabat views Gazprom as an irreplaceable customer. The export price of the Turkmen gas to be sold to China is still under negotiation and the agreed price simply cannot match the Russian offer.

Fourth, Russia and Turkmenistan reiterated their commitment to the Caspian Coastal Pipeline (which will run along the Caspian's east coast toward Russia) with a capacity of 30bcm. Evidently, Russia hopes to cluster additional Central Asian gas from Turkmenistan (and Kazakhstan).

Fifth, Moscow and Ashgabat agreed to build jointly an east-west pipeline connecting all Turkmen gas fields to a single network so that the pipelines leading toward Russia, Iran and China can draw from any of the fields.

Indeed, against the backdrop of the intensification of the US push toward Central Asia, Medvedev's visit to Ashgabat impacted on regional security. At the joint press conference with Medvedev, Berdymukhammedov said the views of Turkmenistan and Russia on the regional processes, particularly in Central Asia and the Caspian region, were generally the same. He underlined that the two countries were of the view that the security of one cannot be achieved at the expense of the other. Medvedev agreed that there was similarity or unanimity between the two countries on issues related to security and confirmed their readiness to work together.
The United States' pipeline diplomacy in the Caspian, which strove to bypass Russia, elbow out China and isolate Iran, has foundered. Russia is now planning to double its intake of Azerbaijani gas, which further cuts into the Western efforts to engage Baku as a supplier for Nabucco. In tandem with Russia, Iran is also emerging as a consumer of Azerbaijani gas. In December, Azerbaijan inked an agreement to deliver gas to Iran through the 1,400km Kazi-Magomed-Astara pipeline.

The "big picture" is that Russia's South Stream and North Stream, which will supply gas to northern and southern Europe, have gained irreversible momentum. The stumbling blocks for North Stream have been cleared as Denmark (in October), Finland and Sweden (in November) and Germany (in December) approved the project from the environmental angle. The pipeline's construction will commence in the spring.

The $12-billion pipeline built jointly by Gazprom, Germany's E.ON Ruhrgas and BASF-Wintershall, and the Dutch gas transportation firm Gasunie bypasses the Soviet-era transit routes via Ukraine, Poland and Belarus and runs from the northwestern Russian port of Vyborg to the German port of Greifswald along a 1,220km route under the Baltic Sea. The first leg of the project with a carrying capacity of 27.5bcm annually will be completed next year and the capacity will double by 2012. North Stream will profoundly affect the geopolitics of Eurasia, trans-Atlantic equations and Russia's ties with Europe.

To be sure, 2009 proved to be a momentous year for the "energy war". The Chinese pipeline inaugurated by President Hu Jintao on December 14; the oil terminal near the port city of Nakhodka in Russia's far east inaugurated by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on December 27 (which will be served by the mammoth $22-billion oil pipeline from the new fields in eastern Siberia leading to China and the Asia-Pacific markets); and the Iranian pipeline inaugurated by Ahmadinejad on January 6 - the energy map of Eurasia and the Caspian has been virtually redrawn.

The year 2010 begins on a fascinating new note: will Russia, China and Iran coordinate future moves or at least harmonize their competing interests?

Focus On CHINA proper.....

Every day that Taiwan remains independent and free is a state of affairs that the Chinese Central Government finds difficult to accept. The reason why is that China is not as unified as the international press and China's Government likes to portray.

Most Westerners view China as one large monolithic state with a billion plus citizens. The reality on the ground is different. China is a country made up of numerous territories and provinces who have always had a certain degree of autonomy ... and antipathy towards Beijing and the Central Government.

This is why the democracy protests at Tienanmen in 1989 had to be put down. The fear is that if the Central Government becomes weak, the provinces and outer regions of China would then ask for autonomy and (in some cases) independence from the Central Government. Even in the heartland of China .... there is a demand for less central power and more provincial responsibility.

Taiwan is just a victim of China's own internal politics, and the US with its military weapons is just a sideshow and excuse to what the Chinese authorities really fear .... the man on the Chinese street who wants more power to run (and be responsible for) his own governance....


Wednesday, January 6, 2010

Underpinning the entire US geo-strategy towards Greater Middle East, Russia and China.


Underpinning the entire US geo-strategy towards Greater Middle East, Russia and China.

The US President Barack Obama threw down the gauntlet at the regional powers with his latest Afghan strategy. The constructive ambiguity in his strategy falls in the Kissingerian tradition of negotiating tactic. In a climate of deeply polarized political opinion, he is free to advance matters of vital US interests, while retaining the prerogative to revisit unresolved questions at a date of his choice.

This leaves major regional powers – Pakistan, Iran, India, China and Russia – in some quandary. Obama taunted them to respond within 58 days when they assemble for the London conference on “Afghanisation” on January 28. That’s a tough call.

To be sure, the regional powers are placed at a disadvantage as their internecine tensions preclude scope of a regional initiative materializing. Obama’s strategy is all that is left, therefore, on the table. Pakistan and India are locked in adversarial embrace and that creates much geopolitical space for the US. No doubt, the US military presence seriously destabilized Pakistan. The latest anti-Shi’ite serial terrorist strikes in Karachi testify that in the name of the Taliban, all sorts of forces are operating inside Pakistan – ranging from the CIA to the Blackwater security firm to Wahhabi elements. Pakistan faces a stark choice – fall in line with the US geo-strategy and earn American goodwill, or face the consequences of recalcitrance.

As for the India, Washington holds out the comfort line that Obama is bent on “stabilizing” Pakistan. Washington’s noble endeavour of cleansing Pakistan of militancy pleases Delhi although there is some ennui. At any rate, Delhi is raring to contribute to the “Afghanisation” of the war. Being a natural ally, there is no choice but to cooperate with Washington’s entreaties. On top of it all, there is the larger preoccupation of “catching up” with China’s surge, which modulates the Indian mind at all hours.

Iran presents a case by itself. The US has succeeded in shaking the foundations of Iran-Russia strategic understanding, which was a historic legacy of Evgeniy Primakov’s astute diplomacy with his Iranian counterpart Ali Akbar Velayati to bring the bloody Tajik civil war to an end. The erosion of Russia-Iran understanding enables Washington to make the brazen attempt at “regime change” in Tehran. The geopolitics of the Greater Middle East hangs in the balance. Of course, Tehran withstood ferocious US assaults in the past and the revolutionary heritage is far from dissipated. Also, China’s continued support impacts on the co-relation of forces.

China’s role is immensely important also with regard to the efficacy of the US policy toward Pakistan. The US ability to “pressure” China is limited and hence Washington’s smart overture for a Sino-American joint venture in South Asia. But China remained reticent, keeping in mind the “big picture” of the security inter-linkages of Xinjiang with Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

America keenly wanted China to wet its toes in the fight against al-Qaeda and Taliban but the latter knew a military involvement could prove to be a dangerous gambit. Pakistan presents itself as a showcase of the “collateral damage” of the US-led war. China, which was an accomplice of the Americans in the great Afghan jihad of the 1980s against the Soviet Union, would also know that the US has incredible methods of “synergizing” militant Islam – and, in the present case, Xinjiang’s stability is involved.

The US is conscious that China (and Russia) does not share its predicament of being in the crosshairs of the Islamists operating in the Hindu Kush. While it got bogged down in a security quagmire, China wisely focused on commerce. Life can be cruel at times. As the doughty scholar on Xinjiang, Frederick Starr told the New York Times, “We [US] do the heavy lifting. And they [China] pick the fruit”.

Thus, in a startling show of “smart power”, the US has presented Taiwan with an invitation to render “non-military” assistance to Afghanistan. It is an invitation that Taipei cannot spurn, as it comes alongside a huge US arms package and in the downstream it holds out the tantalising prospect that Taipei may look a rising star. Arguably, Washington is cocking a snook at Beijing for its refusal to cooperate with Obama’s Afghan (or Iranian) strategy by muddying the waters in the Taiwan Straits.

Russia’s position is equally delicate. Obama’s war is helpful for Russia to the extent that it may arrest the march of Islamism into the heart of Central Asia. Russia has provided supply routes for the NATO countries. Conceivably, Russia regards cooperation in Afghanistan to be helpful for the “reset” of its US ties. Now comes the testy part. Like with China, Washington wants Moscow to wet its toes in the Afghan war. It wants Moscow to supply weapons and to dispatch military advisors to train Afghan armed forces.

However, the fact remains that although the overall atmosphere of ties with the US has improved, the reset as such remains hostage to a range of issues – missile defence, NATO expansion, Moscow’s acquiescence with the containment strategy toward Iran, etc. Meanwhile, in bits and pieces, what emerges is also that far from lapsing into an isolationist policy, the US is searching for a robust geopolitical engagement in the post-Soviet space in Central Asia.

In effect, Washington wants Moscow to help consolidate the US military presence in Afghanistan, which would pave the way for an expansion of American influence in the Greater Middle East, including Central Asia. Unsurprisingly, Russia seems to face a dilemma somewhat similar to China’s but then, Russia-US engagement has a far more complicated history. Obama’s emphasis on “Afghanisation” is welcome. But the medium and long-term US intentions remain obscure. All evidence points toward a long-term – even open-ended – US military presence in Afghanistan. Any lingering doubt was dispelled when in front of the crème de la crème of the American Right, gathered under the canopy of the Heritage Foundation in Washington, DC, Senator McCain openly vowed to be Obama’s “ally in this effort”.

McCain is an indefatigable warrior who leaps out of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s Eurasian chessboard. McCain saw three great virtues in Obama’s Afghan strategy. First, Obama affirmed a “counterinsurgency” (as against “counterterrorist”) strategy, which was what the Pentagon passionately sought. Second, “large numbers of US combat troops will likely remain in Afghanistan long after July 2011”. Three, following from the above, the US will remain the “only actor in the region with the strength and the stake” to “check and counter” external influences that are “unhealthy” and to ensure on a long-term footing that Afghanistan ceases to be “a field of regional competition and proxy battles”.

McCain summed up with total clarity of mind that “our [US’s] regional strategy must turn military gains [in Afghanistan] into diplomatic leverage outside the country”.

In fact, the US strategy of widening the gyre of the Afghan strategy to draw in the Central Asian states, is steadily gaining momentum. A study conducted recently by the influential Center of Strategic and International Studies in Washington titled “The Northern Distribution Network and the Modern Silk Road” (co-authored by Starr)
http://csis.org/files/publication/091217_Kuchins_NorthernDistNet_Web.pdf proposes the coalescing of Central Asia with the AfPak as the crucial underpinning of the entire US geo-strategy towards Greater Middle East, Russia and China.

As diplomats from the regional capitals warily trudge toward the London conference on “Afghanisation”, there will be a lot on their mind. Is “Afghanisation” a genuinely collective effort under UN leadership? Or is it a mere “bear trap” under a new rubric? There hangs a tale. The chilling reality is that Taliban, too, will be watching – having made clear it will look back in anger at foreign powers that associate with the US’s intervention in the three-decade old fratricidal war.

Tuesday, January 5, 2010

American Assassins on the loose worldwide



American Assassins on the loose worldwide


According to the Chinese calendar, 2010 is the Year of the Tiger. The United States does not name its years, but if it did, this one might prospectively be called the Year of the Assassin.

Americans think of themselves as something like the peaceable kingdom. After all, the shock of September 11, 2001, was that "war" came to "the homeland", a mighty blow delivered against the very symbols of the US's economic, military and - had Flight 93 not gone down in a field in Pennsylvania - political power.

Since that day, however, war has been a stranger in our land. With the rarest of exceptions, like US Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Hasan's massacre at Fort Hood, Texas, this country has
remained a world without war or any kind of mobilization for war. No other major terrorist attacks, not even victory gardens, scrap-metal collecting, or rationing. And certainly no war tax to pay for the post-9/11 trillion-dollar "expeditionary forces" sent into battle abroad. Had we the foresight to name them, the last few years domestically might have reflected a different kind of carnage - 2006, the Year of the Subprime Mortgage; 2007, the Year of the Bonus; 2008, the Year of the Meltdown; 2009, the Year of the Bailout. And perhaps some would want to label 2010, prematurely or not, the Year of Recovery.

Although our country delivers war regularly to distant lands in the name of our "safety", we don't really consider ourselves at war (despite the endless talk of "supporting our troops"), and the money that has simply poured into Pentagon coffers, and then into weaponry and conflicts is, with rare exceptions, never linked to economic distress in this country. And yet, if we are no nation of warriors, from the point of view of the rest of the world we are certainly the planet's foremost war-makers. If money talks, then war may be what we care most about as a society and fund above all else, with the least possible discussion or debate.

In fact, according to a military expert, William Hartung, the Pentagon budget has risen in every year of the new century, an unprecedented run in our history. We dominate the global arms trade, monopolizing almost 70% of the arms business in 2008, with Italy coming in a vanishingly distant second. We put more money into the funding of war, our armed forces, and the weaponry of war than the next 25 countries combined (and that's without even including Iraq and Afghan war costs). We garrison the planet in a way no empire or nation in history has ever done. And we plan for the future, for "the next war" - on the ground, on the seas and in space - in a way that is surely unique. If our two major wars of the 21st century in Iraq and Afghanistan are any measure, we also get less bang for our buck than any nation in recent history.

So, let's pause a moment as the New Year begins and take stock of ourselves as what we truly are: the pre-eminent war-making machine on planet Earth. Let's peer into the future, and consider just what the American way of war might have in store for us in 2010. Here are 10 questions, the answers to which might offer reasonable hints as to just how much US war efforts are likely to intensify in the Greater Middle East, as well as Central and South Asia, in the year to come.

1. How busted will the largest defense budget in history be in 2010?
Strange, isn't it, that the debate about hundreds of billions of dollars in health-care costs in the US Congress can last almost a year, filled with turmoil and daily headlines, while a US$636 billion defense budget can pass in a few days, as it did in late December, essentially without discussion and with nary a headline in sight? And in case you think that $636 billion is an honest figure, think again - and not just because funding for the US nuclear arsenal and actual "homeland defense", among other things most countries would chalk up as military costs, wasn't included.

If you want to put a finger to the winds of war in 2010, keep your eye on something else not included in that budget: the Barack Obama administration's upcoming supplemental funding request for the Afghan surge. In his West Point speech announcing his surge decision, the president spoke of sending 30,000 new troops to Afghanistan in 2010 at a cost of $30 billion. In news reports, that figure quickly morphed into "$30-$40 billion", none of it in the just-passed Pentagon budget.

To fund his widening war, sometime in the first months of the new year, the president will have to submit a supplemental budget to congress - something the George W Bush administration did repeatedly to pay for its wars, and something this president, while still a candidate, swore he wouldn't do. Nonetheless, it will happen. So keep your eye on that $30 billion figure. Even that distinctly low-ball number is going to cause discomfort and opposition in the president's party - and yet there's no way it will fully fund this year's striking escalation of the war. The question is: How high will it go or, if the president doesn't dare ask this congress for more all at once, how will the extra funds be found? Keep your eye out, then, for hints of future supplemental budgets, because fighting the Afghan war (forget Iraq) over the next decade could prove a near trillion-dollar prospect.

Neither battles won nor al-Qaeda and Taliban commanders killed will be the true measure of victory or defeat in the Afghan war. For Americans at home, even victory as modestly defined by this administration - blunting the Taliban's version of a surge - could prove disastrous in terms of our financial capabilities. Guns and butter? That's going to be a surefire no-go. So keep watching and asking: How busted could the US be by 2011?

2. Will the US Air Force be the final piece in the Afghan surge?
As 2010 begins, almost everything is in surge mode in Afghanistan, including rising numbers of US troops, private contractors, US State Department employees, and new bases. In this period, only the US Air Force (drones excepted) has stood down. Under orders from Afghan war commander, General Stanley McChrystal, based on the new make-nice counter-insurgency strategy he's implementing, air power is anything but surging.

The use of the air force, even in close support of US troops in situations in which Afghan civilians are anywhere nearby, has been severely restricted. There has already been grumbling about this in and around the military. If things don't go well - and quickly - in the expanding war, expect frustration to grow and the pressure to rise to bring air power to bear.

Already, unnamed intelligence officials are leaking warnings that, with the Taliban insurgency expanding its reach, "time is running out". Counter-insurgency strategies are notorious for how long they take to bear fruit (if they do at all). When Americans are dying, maintaining a surge without a surge of air power is sure to be a test of will and patience (neither of which is an American strong suit). So keep your eye on the air force next year. If the planes start to fly more regularly and destructively, you'll know that things aren't looking up for McChrystal and his campaign.

3. How big will the American presence in Pakistan be as 2010 ends?
Let's start with the fact that it's already bigger than most of us imagine. Thanks to Nation magazine reporter, Jeremy Scahill, we know that, from a base in Pakistan's largest city, Karachi, officers of the US Joint Special Operations Command, with the help of hired hands from the notorious private security contractor Xe (formerly Blackwater), "plan targeted assassinations of suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives, 'snatch and grabs' of high-value targets and other sensitive action inside and outside Pakistan."

Small numbers of US Special Forces operatives have also reportedly been sent in to train Pakistan's special forces. US spies are in the country. US missile- and bomb-armed drones, both Central Intelligence Agency- and air force-controlled, have been conducting escalating operations in the country's tribal borderlands.

US Special Operations forces have conducted at least four cross-border raids into Pakistan's tribal borderlands unsanctioned by the Pakistani government or military (only one of which was publicly reported in the US). And the CIA and the State Department have been attempting (against some Pakistani resistance) to build up their personnel and facilities in-country. This, mind you, is only what we know in a situation in which secrecy is the order of the day and rumors fly.

In the meantime, the Obama administration has been threatening to widen its drone war (and possibly other operations) to the powder-keg province of Balochistan, where most of the Afghan Taliban's leadership reportedly resides (evidently under Pakistani protection) and to the fighters of the Haqqani network, linked to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda, in the Pakistani border province of North Waziristan.

Right now, these threats from Washington are clearly meant to motivate the Pakistani military to do the job instead. But as that is unlikely - both groups are seen by its military as key players in the country's future anti-Indian policies in Afghanistan - they may not remain mere threats for long. Any such US moves are only likely to widen the Af-Pak war and further destabilize nuclear-armed Pakistan. In addition, the Pakistani military is not powerless vis-a-vis the US. For one thing, as Robert Dreyfuss of the Nation's Dreyfuss Report recently pointed out, it has a potential stranglehold on the tortuous US supply lines into Afghanistan, already under attack by Taliban militants, that make the war there possible.

Pakistan is the Catch-22 of Obama's surge. As in the Vietnam War years, sanctuaries across the border ensure limited success in any escalating war effort, but going after those sanctuaries in a major way would be a war-widening move of genuine desperation. As with the air force in Afghanistan, watch Pakistan not just for spreading drone operations, but for the use of US troops. If by year's end, special operations forces or US troops are periodically on the ground in that country, don't be shocked. However, it may be explained, this will represent a dangerous failure of the first order.

4. How much smaller will the American presence in Iraq be?
Obama swept into office, in part, on a pledge to end the US war in Iraq. Almost a year after he entered the White House, more than 100,000 US troops are still deployed in that country (about the same number as in February 2004). Still, plans developed at the end of the Bush presidency, and later confirmed by Obama, have set the US on an apparent path of withdrawal. On this the president has been unambiguous.

"Let me say this as plainly as I can," he told a military audience in February 2009. "By August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end ... I intend to remove all US troops from Iraq by the end of 2011."

However, Robert Gates, his secretary of defense, has not been so unequivocal. While recently visiting Iraq, he disclosed that the US Air Force would likely continue to operate in that country well into the future. He also said: "I wouldn't be a bit surprised to see agreements between ourselves and the Iraqis that continues a train, equip and advise role beyond the end of 2011."

For 2010, expect platitudes about withdrawal from the president and other administration spokespeople, while Defense Department officials and military commanders offer more "pragmatic" (and realistic) assessments. Keep an eye out for signs this year of a coming non-withdrawal withdrawal in 2011.

5. What will the year mean for the Pentagon's
base-building plans in war zones?

As the US war in Afghanistan ramps up, look for American bases there to continue along last year's path, becoming bigger, harder, more numerous and more permanent-looking. As estimates of the time it will take to get the president's extra boots on the ground in Afghanistan increase, look as well for the construction of more helipads, fuel pits, taxiways and tarmac space on the forward operating bases sprouting especially across the southern parts of that country. These will be meant to speed the movement of surge troops into rural battle zones, while eschewing increasingly dangerous ground routes.

In Iraq, expect the further consolidation of a small number of US mega-bases as American troops pull back to ever-fewer sites offering an ever-lower profile in that country. Keep your eyes, in particular, on giant Balad Air Base and on Camp Victory outside Baghdad. These were built for the long term. If Washington doesn't begin preparing to turn them over to the Iraqis, then start thinking 2012 and beyond. Elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region, look for the US military to continue upgrading its many bases,

while militarily working to strengthen the security forces of country after autocratic country, from Saudi Arabia to Qatar, in part to continue to rattle Iran's cage. If those bases keep growing, don't imagine the US drawing down in the region any time soon.

6. Will the US and Israel thwart the Iranian insurgency?
Iran has long been under siege. A founding member of Bush's "axis of evil", the Islamic Republic was long on his administration's hit list. It also found itself in the unenviable position of watching the American military occupy and garrison two bordering countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, while also building
or bolstering bases in nearby Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.

The Obama administration is now poised to increase key military aid to Iran's nemesis, Israel, and the Pentagon has flooded allied regimes in the region with advanced weaponry. Years of saber-rattling and sanctions, encirclement and threats nonetheless seemed to have little palpable effect. In 2009, however, a disputed election brought Iranians into the streets and, months later, they're still there.

What foreign militarism couldn't do, ordinary Iranians themselves now threaten to accomplish. In earlier street protests, young middle-class activists in Tehran chanting "Where is our vote?" were beaten and martyred by security forces. Today, the protests continue and oppositional Iranians from all social strata are refusing to retreat while, when provoked, sometimes fighting back against the police or the regime's fearsome Basiji militia, even inducing some of them to step aside or switch sides.

A continuing cycle of ever-spreading arrests, protests and violence in 2010 threatens to further destabilize the regime. How Washington reacts could, however, deeply affect what happens. The memory of the CIA's toppling of Iranian prime minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 is still alive in Iran. Any perceived US interference could have grave results for the Iranian insurgency, as could Israeli actions.

Recently, Obama, evidently trying to bring the Chinese into line on the question of imposing fiercer sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, reportedly told China's president that the United States could not restrain Israel from attacking Iran's nuclear facilities much longer. Such an Israeli attack would certainly strengthen the current Iranian regime; so, undoubtedly, would pressure to increase potentially crippling sanctions on that country. Either or both would help further cement the current tumultuous status quo in the Middle East.

7. Will Yemen become a fourth front?
Bush unabashedly proclaimed himself a "war president". Obama seems to be taking up the same mantle. Right now, the Obama administration's war fronts include the inherited wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a not-so-covert war in Pakistan, and a potential new war in Yemen. (There are also rarely commented on ongoing military actions in the Philippines and a US-aided drug war in Colombia, as well as periodic strikes in Somalia.) Though the surge in Afghanistan and Pakistan was supposed to contain al-Qaeda there, the US now finds itself focusing on yet another country and another of that organization's morphing offspring.

In 2002, a USA Today article about a targeted assassination in Yemen began: "Opening up a visible new front in the war on terror, US forces launched a pinpoint missile strike in Yemen ..." Just over seven years later, following multiple US cruise missiles launched into the country and targeted air strikes by the air force of the US-aided Yemeni regime against "suspected hide-outs of al-Qaeda", the New York Times announced, "In the midst of two unfinished major wars, the United States has quietly opened a third, largely covert front against al-Qaeda in Yemen."

In the wake of a botched airplane terror attack by a single young Nigerian Muslim, and credit-taking by a group calling itself al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the usual cheery crew of US war advocates are lining up behind the next potential front in the "war on terror". (Senator Joseph Lieberman: "Iraq was yesterday's war. Afghanistan is today's war. If we don't act preemptively, Yemen will be tomorrow's war.") What began as a one-off Bush assassination effort now threatens to become another of Obama's wars.

The US has not only sent special forces teams into the country, but is now pouring tens of millions of dollars into Yemen's security forces in a dramatic move to significantly arm yet another Middle Eastern country. At the same time, US-backed Saudi Arabia - whose alliance with Washington ignited the current war with al-Qaeda - is aiding the Yemeni forces in a war against Houthi rebels there.

This is a witch's brew of trouble. Keep your eye on Yemen (with an occasional side glance at Somalia, the failed state across the Gulf of Aden). Expect more funding, more trainers, more proxy warfare, and possibly a whole new conflict for 2010.

8. How brutal will the American way of war be in 2010?
When it comes to war, American-style, the key word of 2009 was "counter-insurgency" or COIN. Think of it as the kindly version of war the American way, a strategy based on "clearing and holding" territory and "protecting" the civilian population. Its value, as expounded by Afghan war commander McChrystal, lies not in killing the enemy but in winning over "the people". On paper, it sounds good, like a kinder, gentler version of war, but historically counter-insurgency operations have almost invariably gone into the ditch of brutality. So here's one word you should keep your eyes out for in 2010: "counter-terrorism." Consider it the dark underside of counter-insurgency. Instead of boots on the ground, it's bullets to the head.

McChrystal was, until recently, a counter-terrorism guy. He ran the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in Iraq and Afghanistan. His operatives were referred to, more or less politely, as "manhunters". Think: assassins. With McChrystal, a general who credits his large-scale assassination program for a great deal of the Iraq surge's success in 2007, it was just a matter of time before counter-terrorism - which is just terrorism put in uniform and given an anodyne name - was ramped up in Afghanistan (and undoubtedly Pakistan as well). Though the planes may still be grounded, the special ops guys who kick in doors in the middle of the night and have often been responsible for grievous civilian casualties will evidently be going at it full tilt.

As 2009 ended, the news that black-ops forces were being loosed in a significant way was just hitting the press. So watch for that word "counter-terrorism". If it proliferates, you'll know that the expanding Afghan war is getting down and dirty in a big way. For Americans, 2010 could be the year of the assassin.

9. Where will the drones go in 2010?
If there's one thing to keep your eye on in the coming year, it might be the unmanned aerial vehicles - drones - flown secretly, in the case of the air force, from distant al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar and, in the case of the CIA, even more distantly out of Langley, Virginia. American drones are already in a widening air war in the Pakistani tribal borderlands, while Washington threatens to create an even wider one. Think of these robotic planes as the leading edge of global war, American-style. While "hot pursuit" into Pakistan may still be forbidden to US troops in Afghanistan, the drones have long had a kind of hot-pursuit carte blanche in Pakistan's tribal borderlands.

Perhaps more important, they can, to steal a Star Trek line, boldly go where no man has gone before. Since the first drone assassination attack of the "war on terror" - in Yemen in 2002 - in which several men, reputedly al-Qaeda militants, were incinerated inside a car, drones have been taking war into new territory. They have already struck in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and possibly Somalia. As the first robot terminators of our age, they symbolize the loosing of American war-making powers from the oversight of congress and the American people. In principle, they have made borders (hence national sovereignty) increasingly insignificant as assassination attacks can be launched 24/7 against those we deem our enemies, on the basis of unknown intelligence or evidence.

With our drones, there is little price to be paid if, as has regularly enough been the case, those enemies turn out not to be in the right place at the right time and others die in their stead. Globally, we have become the world's leading state assassins - a judge, jury and executioner beyond the bounds of all accountability. In essence, those pilot-less planes turn us into a law of war unto ourselves. It's a chilling development. Watch for it to spread in 2010, and keep an eye out for which countries, fielding their own drones, follow down the path we're pioneering, for in our age all war-making developments invariably proliferate - and fast.

The element of surprise
We know one thing: 2010 will be another year of war for the United States and, from assassination campaigns to new fronts in what is no longer called the "war on terror" but is no less global or based on terror, it could get a lot uglier. The Obama administration may, from time to time, talk withdrawal, but across the Middle East and Central Asia, the Pentagon and its contractors are digging in. In the meantime, more money, not less, is being put into preparations and planning for future wars. As Hartung points out, "if the government's current plans are carried out, there will be yearly increases in military spending for at least another decade."

When it comes to war, the only questions are: How wide? How much? Not: How long? Washington's answer to that question has already been given, not in public pronouncements, but in that Pentagon budget and the planning that goes with it: forever and a day.

Of course, only diamonds are forever. Sooner or later, like great imperial powers of the past, we, too, will find that the stress of fighting a continuous string of wars in distant lands in inhospitable climes tells on us. Whether we "win" or not in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and now Yemen, we lose.

Which brings us to our last question:

10. What will surprise us in 2010?
It would be the height of hubris to imagine that we can truly see into the future, especially when it comes to war. It is, in fact, Washington's hubris to believe itself in control of its own war-making destiny, whether via shock-and-awe tactics that are certain to work, a netcentric military-lite that can't fail, or most recently, a force dedicated to a "hearts and minds" counter-insurgency war in Afghanistan and, in the future, globally (under the ominous new acronym GCOIN).

The essence of war is surprise. So, despite all those billions of dollars and the high-tech weaponry, and the nine areas discussed above, keep your eyes open for the unexpected and confounding, and in the meantime, welcome to the grim spectacle of war American-style as the second decade of the 21st century begins in turmoil.

Saturday, January 2, 2010

The Central Asian dawn


The Central Asian dawn....

http://www.thetrumpet.com/index.php?q=6872.5382.0.0

The politics of the vast deserts and steppes of Central Asia will significantly determine the contours of any durable Afghan settlement. The implications for South Asia’s security will be far-reaching, too.

Ibn Battuta, the 14th-century traveller, described the Hindu Kush ranges as the “slayer of the Indians,” as people from the “land of India” mostly perished in the snowy heights of extreme cold. The ranges that run through Afghanistan did indeed split the Indian historical consciousness about that country.

http://specials.rediff.com/news/2008/apr/07sld01.htm

When policymakers in New Delhi grappled with the Mujaheddin takeover in Afghanistan, it suddenly dawned on them how little they knew about the tribes that inhabited the northern side of the Hindu Kush. It was those tribes who won the tight race for Kabul against the Pashtun Mujahideen groups during the dramatic “transfer of power” in 1992 by the communist regime headed by Najibullah, and New Delhi had on its hands the unenviable “post-Soviet” task of establishing a narrative suitable for a new dawn in the region’s ancient history.

http://pd.cpim.org/2006/0716/07162006_nilotpal.htm

The point is, the geopolitics of Afghanistan always had two halves. Which, of course, posed a major challenge to U.S. President Barack Obama when he crafted the new Afghan strategy. Equally, for regional powers like India or Uzbekistan, the dichotomy came in the way of creating a common space that would open the vistas of a regional initiative. Viewed from Delhi and Tashkent, the “great game” in the Hindu Kush mountains assumed different shades. Some things do not easily change in life — even for an aspiring regional power. Even today, Indian discourses on Afghanistan run a predictable course. Has the U.S. administration finally woken up to the harsh reality of the Pakistani military’s doublespeak in the fight against terrorism? If so, will it turn the screw on its single most crucial partner in the fight? Period.


From this point, the angst deepens somewhat. Will the U.S. finally abandon the willing suspension of disbelief about the Pakistani military’s passion for its strategic asset, the Taliban, and realise instead that New Delhi is Washington’s sole “natural ally” in the region in the fight against terrorism? And, therefore, will the U.S. allow itself the privilege of India’s cooperation in “stabilising” Pakistan? This range of issues more or less hogs the quaint Indian approach toward the Afghan problem in the seminar circuits in Delhi where one hears the thesis being rolled out ad nauseam like a repeatedly-vulcanised rubber tyre not possessing its original tensile strength any more.
http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/2009/10/one-tribe-at-a-time-4-the-full-document-at-last/

Meanwhile, the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush leading to the vast Central Asia are preparing for a new dawn in the region’s history. To be sure, the politics of the vast deserts and steppes of Central Asia that span the space between the Caucasus in the west and Xinjiang in the east will significantly determine the contours of any durable Afghan settlement. The downstream implications for South Asian security will be far-reaching too.

Three aspects to the emergent Central Asian security are of interest to India.

One, China is venturing out as a provider of regional security and stability — supplementing Russia’s traditional role. The opening of the 1,833-km gas pipeline on December 14 connecting the energy fields in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Xinjiang with an annual capacity of 40 billion cubic metres resets not only China but also the world community’s terms of engagement with the region. The pipeline becomes part of China’s 7,000-km long East-West trunk route that feeds its booming centres of production on the eastern seaboard and will provide half of China’s present gas consumption.


Such a vital economic lifeline requires security guarantee and China is going about that task in its usual way by creating “win-win” situations with its Central Asian partners. In sharp contrast to the predatory instincts of western companies that zero in on the region’s huge untapped mineral resources and rare earths, China is stepping in with a comprehensive engagement plan based on equity and mutual trust and partnership that promises uplift of the Central Asian economies from their post-Soviet trough.


From Beijing’s perspective, the security of Central Asia (and Afghanistan) becomes integral to Xinjiang’s stability, apart from China’s overall energy security, which heavily depends at present on the extended supply routes via the U.S-controlled Malacca Straits that can prove a choke point. Flush with surplus capital, China, therefore, is showing the will to invest in Central Asia’s prosperity and stability and thereby create a matrix of mutual dependence. The West cannot cope with this audacity. The London-based Economist Intelligence Unit estimates an 8 per cent growth rate for China’s economy, whereas overall contractions of 2 and 4 per cent are forecast for the U.S. and the eurozone economies.


Two, the West would have ideally liked a clash of interests between China and Russia in Central Asia. But the emerging paradigm is instead pointing in the direction of a convergence of mutual interests. With the global downturn and the deep economic recession plus the sharp fall in energy export revenues, Moscow is accepting China’s investments as the only realistic way out for the development of the vast Russian Far East and Siberia as well as Central Asia. In May, President Dmitry Medvedev openly called for a tandem approach by Moscow and Beijing to the RFE and Siberia’s development, on the one hand, and the resuscitation of China’s dilapidated northeastern industrial base, on the other.

Russia is pleased that Central Asia has no pressing need for alternative U.S.-backed gas pipelines headed for Europe. Russia and China have a shared interest in keeping the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the U.S. out of Central Asia. Both harbour misgivings about a hidden U.S. agenda of keeping open-ended military presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan and of manipulating Islamist elements as instruments of geopolitics. Both search for ways to influence a swift “Afghanisation” of the war that paves the way for the vacation of foreign occupation.


Three, a U.S. attempt to draw the Central Asian states into the AfPak is indeed apparent. The day after the commissioning of China’s Central Asia pipeline, the U.S. State department stated in a testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “The [Central Asian] region is at the fulcrum of key U.S. security, economic, and political interests. It demands attention and respect and our most diligent efforts … any examination of U.S. policy towards Central Asia must start with the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan … We [the Obama administration] have begun to establish high-level mechanisms with each country in Central Asia, featuring a structured annual dialogue to strengthen ties and build practical cooperation.”


Never before has the U.S. Central Asia policy been framed in such priority terms. It doesn’t need much ingenuity to estimate that the U.S. “surge” on Kandahar, which is projected in terms of the Taliban challenge, can be seen in a broader perspective. A recent study by the influential Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington says: “Kandahar is the key road connection between the new Pakistani port of Gwadar and Afghanistan and, beyond that, all Central Asia, Europe, and much of the Middle East. Pakistan began the development of Gwadar with aid from China and has now engaged Singapore for the second phase of work … On Gwadar, the interests of the U.S, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are aligned … With Kandahar now in its eye, the U.S. should plan to build on future success there by making the opening to Gwadar a high priority … Pentagon officials estimate the cost of upgrading this connection at about $1 billion.” Obviously, any U.S. contingency plan would need to overcome the regional powers’ “more specific interests and competitive inclinations that obstruct” the U.S. grand design. The CSIS report names China, India, Iran and Russia and flags the “sustained insecurity in Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Kashmir, and other parts of Eurasia” as the challenge to the overall U.S. strategy.


Clearly, these new templates in regional security underscore that India’s normalisation with China increasingly assumes a regional dimension. This needs to be seriously factored in as the two countries sit down for the next phase of relations. As the distinguished former Indian diplomat and respected China scholar, Ambassador C.V. Ranganathan, put it recently, “Our shared neighbourhood should come on the agenda of serious discussions extending to concentric circles of expanding the dialogue to include all the primary parties affected by the situation in the AfPak region.”


China has remarkably transformed in the past quarter century. All indications are that it has no inclination to fish in the troubled India-Pakistan waters. On the contrary, as a Xinhua commentary pointed out last week, “For solving the dispute over the Mumbai attacks [of 26 November 2008], India and Pakistan should count on bilateral efforts to reduce tension rather than allow the situation being further complicated by other issues such as the U.S.-led Afghan War.” Plainly put, the China discourses of our strategic community are caught in a time warp. Stereotyped thinking should not impede new pathways from being opened in strengthening regional security.

Friday, January 1, 2010

USA's raging wars throughout the globe


USA's raging wars throughout the globe




January 1 will usher in the last year of the first decade of a new millennium and ten consecutive years of the United States conducting war in the Greater Middle East....
The Yemen Hidden Agenda: Behind the Al-Qaeda Scenarios, A Strategic Oil Transit Chokepoint
Beginning with the October 7, 2001 missile and bomb attacks on Afghanistan, American combat operations abroad have not ceased for a year, a month, a week or a day in the 21st century.

The Afghan war, the U.S.'s first air and ground conflict in Asia since the disastrous wars in Vietnam and Cambodia in the 1960s and early 1970s and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's first land war and Asian campaign, began during the end of the 2001 war in Macedonia launched from NATO-occupied Kosovo, one in which the role of U.S. military personnel is still to be properly exposed [1] and addressed and which led to the displacement of almost 10 percent of the nation's population.

In the first case Washington invaded a nation in the name of combating terrorism; in the second it abetted cross-border terrorism. Similarly, in 1991 the U.S. and its Western allies attacked Iraqi forces in Kuwait and launched devastating and deadly cruise missile attacks and bombing sorties inside Iraq in the name of preserving the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kuwait, and in 1999 waged a 78-day bombing assault against Yugoslavia to override and fatally undermine the principles of territorial integrity and national sovereignty in the name of the casus belli of the day, so-called humanitarian intervention.

Two years later humanitarian war, as abhorrent an oxymoron as the world has ever witnessed, gave way to the global war on terror(ism), with the U.S. and its NATO allies again reversing course but continuing to wage wars of aggression and "wars of opportunity" as they saw fit, contradictions and logic, precedents and international law notwithstanding.

Several never fully acknowledged counterinsurgency campaigns, some ongoing - Colombia - and some new - Yemen - later, the U.S. invaded Iraq in March of 2003 with a "coalition of the willing" comprised mainly of Eastern European NATO candidate nations (now almost all full members of the world's only military bloc as a result of their service).

The Pentagon has also deployed special forces and other troops to the Philippines and launched naval, helicopter and missile attacks inside Somalia as well as assisting the Ethiopian invasion of that nation in 2006. Washington also arms, trains and supports the armed forces of Djibouti in their border war with Eritrea. In fact Djibouti hosts the U.S.'s only permanent military installation in Africa to date [2], Camp Lemonier, a United States Naval Expeditionary Base and home to the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), placed under the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) when it was launched on October 1, 2008. The area of responsibility of the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa takes in the nations of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen and as "areas of interest" the Comoros, Mauritius and Madagascar.

That is, much of the western shores of the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, among the most geostrategically important parts of the world. [3]

U.S. troops, aerial drones, warships, planes and helicopters are active throughout that vast tract of land and water.

With senator and once almost vice president Joseph Lieberman's threat on December 27 that "Yemen will be tomorrow's war" [4] and former Southern Command chief and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe Wesley Clark's two days later that "Maybe we need to put some boots on the ground there," [5] it is evident that America's new war for the new year has already been identified. In fact in mid-December U.S. warplanes participated in the bombing of a village in northern Yemen that cost the lives of 120 civilians as well as wounding 44 more [6] and a week later "A US fighter jet...carried out multiple airstrikes on the home of a senior official in Yemen's northern rugged province of Sa'ada...." [7]

The pretext for undertaking a war in Yemen in earnest is currently the serio-comic "attempted terrorist attack" by a young Nigerian national on a passenger airliner outside of Detroit on Christmas Day. The deadly U.S. bombing of the Yemeni village mentioned above occurred ten days earlier and moreover was in the north of the nation, although Washington claims al-Qaeda cells are operating in the other end of the country. [8]

Asia, Africa and the Middle East are not the only battlegrounds where the Pentagon is active. On October 30 of 2009 the U.S. signed an agreement with the government of Colombia to acquire the essentially unlimited and unrestricted use of seven new military bases in the South American nation, including sites within immediate striking distance of both Venezuela and Ecuador. [9] American intelligence, special forces and other personnel will be complicit in ongoing counterinsurgency operations against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the nation's south as well as in rendering assistance to Washington's Colombian proxy for attacks inside Ecuador and Venezuela that will be portrayed as aimed at FARC forces in the two states.

Targeting two linchpins of and ultimately the entire Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), Washington is laying the groundwork for a potential military conflagration in South and Central America and the Caribbean. After the U.S.-supported coup in Honduras on June 28, that nation has announced it will be the first ALBA member state to ever withdraw from the Alliance and the Pentagon will retain, perhaps expand, its military presence at the Soto Cano Air Base there.

A few days ago "The Colombian government...announced it is building a new military base on its border with Venezuela and has activated six new airborne battalions" [10] and shortly afterward Dutch member of parliament Harry van Bommel "claimed that US spy planes are using an airbase on the Netherlands Antilles island of Curaçao" [11] off the Venezuelan coast.

In October a U.S. armed forces publication revealed that the Pentagon will spend $110 million to modernize and expand seven new military bases in Bulgaria and Romania, across the Black Sea from Russia, where it will station initial contingents of over 4,000 troops. [12]

In early December the U.S. signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Poland, which borders the Russian Kaliningrad territory, that "allows for the United States military to station American troops and military equipment on Polish territory." [13] The U.S. military forces will operate Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) batteries as part of the Pentagon's global interceptor missile system.

At approximately the same time President Obama pressured Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to base missile shield components in his country. "We discussed the continuing role that we can play as NATO allies in strengthening Turkey's profile within NATO and coordinating more effectively on critical issues like missile defense," [14] in the American leader's words.

"Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has hinted his government does not view Tehran [Iran] as a potential missile threat for Turkey at this point. But analysts say if a joint NATO missile shield is developed, such a move could force Ankara to join the mechanism." [15]

2010 will see the first foreign troops deployed to Poland since the breakup of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 and the installation of the U.S's "stronger, swifter and smarter" (also Obama's words) interceptor missiles and radar facilities in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the South Caucasus. [16]

U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan, site of the longest and most wide-scale war in the world, will top 100,000 early in 2010 and with another 50,000 plus troops from other NATO nations and assorted "vassals and tributaries" (Zbigniew Brzezinski) will represent the largest military deployment in any war zone in the world.

American and NATO drone missile and helicopter gunship attacks in Pakistan will also increase, as will U.S. counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines and Somalia along with those in Yemen where CIA and Army special forces are already involved.

U.S. military websites recently announced that there have been 3.3 million deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 with 2 million U.S. service members sent to the two war zones. [17]

In this still young millennium American soldiers have also deployed in the hundreds of thousands to new bases and conflict and post-conflict zones in Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Colombia, Djibouti, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Mali, the Philippines, Romania, Uganda and Uzbekistan.

In 2010 they will be sent abroad in even larger numbers to man airbases and missile sites, supervise and participate in counterinsurgency operations throughout the world against disparate rebel groups, many of them secular, and wage combat operations in South Asia and elsewhere. They will be stationed on warships and submarines equipped with cruise and long-range nuclear missiles and with aircraft carrier strike groups prowling the world's seas and oceans.

They will construct and expand bases from Europe to Central and South Asia, Africa to South America, the Middle East to Oceania. With the exception of Guam and Vicenza in Italy, where the Pentagon is massively expanding existing installations, all the facilities in question are in nations and even regions of the world where the U.S. military has never before ensconced itself. Practically all the new encampments will be forward bases used for operations "down range," generally to the east and south of NATO-dominated Europe.

U.S. military personnel will be assigned to the new Global Strike Command and for expanded patrols and war games in the Arctic Circle. They will serve under the Missile Defense Agency to consolidate a worldwide interceptor missile network that will facilitate a nuclear first strike capability and will extend that system into space, the final frontier in the drive to achieve military full spectrum dominance.

American troops will continue to fan out to most all parts of the world. Everywhere, that is, except to their own nation's borders.