China’s historic return to the gulf

http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/02/china_s_historic_return_to_the_gulf

Two Chinese naval warships visited the UAE last week. The warships were refueling and taking on supplies after six months at sea protecting sea lanes from Somali pirates. The visit attracted little attention. But it was the first by the Chinese navy to the Gulf in modern history and, as such, set an important precedent for China's military engagement with the region -- and raises intriguiging questions about the future of the Persian Gulf as an American lake.

Historians will be tempted to draw comparisons with Admiral Zheng He and his visit to the Gulf in the 1400s at the head of a flotilla of treasures ships. Yet, there are important differences. Then, a wealthy and powerful Chinese state was attempting to shock and awe its neighbors. Today's China has far greater insecurities, in spite of its apparent assertiveness.

Oil is obviously a primary concern. China's oil consumption is estimated to grow from 8 to 16 million barrels a day by 2030, and much of the increase will be imported. The gulf is already China's largest oil supplier. But if current trends are sustained, it will supply more one in every three barrels of China's consumption by 2030. It is only natural then that China is increasingly worried about the United States and its strong military grip on the region.

Two recent essays pennned by Chinese Middle East experts illustrate these concerns. Sun Bigan, a former special envoy to the Middle East, wrote in late 2009 that "clashes are unavoidable" between China and the United States in the Middle East. He also worried that if relations between America and Iran were to improve, then American oil companies will "swarm" Iran, and that Iran, in turn, would strive for its "maximum self-interest." Sun is worth listening to. He is a 30-year veteran of the Middle East, a former Ambassador to Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia and, now retired, able to speak his mind more freely.

His worries were echoed by Dai Songyang, an energy journalist writing for the internet-based China Energy Web. He said, "The United States recognizes Yemen's geographic ability to choke China's oil import life lines." He then hints that the United States may bring the war on terror to Yemen, in order to "strangle China's oil imports and its economy." Dai is not an official. But his views are indicative of a popular suspicion that American intervention in the Gulf is deliberately targeting China's economic security.

Yet, while oil is a primary concern, it is certainly not the only concern. Non-oil trade is also at risk. Much of China's trade with Europe travels through the Suez Canal. Somali pirates, for a period, threatened that trade as they hijacked ships. True, pirates don't find container ships easy targets. But the hijackings risked, at the very least, disrupting China's shipments and sending them on a longer, and more expensive journey around Africa. This matters because Europe is now China's largest export market. If China's exports were to slow, as European buyers switched to cheaper or faster suppliers, it would mean factory closures and job losses.

China's commercial relations with the Middle East itself have grown stronger as well -- indeed, in early 2009 China overtook the United States as the world's largest exporter to the Middle East having earlier overtaken Germany and the United Kingdom. It exported around $60 billion worth of goods that year, mainly clothing and home electronics, but also, increasingly, capital equipment.

Certainly China's exports are increasing to most regions of the world. But what makes this trade different is the sheer numbers of people involved. In the small city of Yiwu, a four-hour drive from Shanghai, there is a virtual Arab market. The city receives 200,000 Arab visitors every year. They come to buy the cheap consumer goods so popular with households back home. It helps that China unofficially relaxed its visa policy during the past decade. Whereas many Arab traders found themselves locked out of the West after 2001, they found it relatively easy to visit China. Just a few years ago, it took the average Egyptian trader 18 days to receive a visa to visit the United States. It took just one day to receive a visa to visit China. There are also 200,000 Chinese in Dubai, making it, according to the Chinese press, the largest non-permanent Chinese community abroad. There are fewer found in the rest of the region owing to the restrictions on the ability of foreigners to sell retail in the Middle East. But they are present nonetheless, from Algiers to Sana'a, and are contributing to the rise in trade flows.

Islam also plays a role. China has, officially, 20 million Muslims. While relations between the Uyghur and the Chinese government are poor, the Uyghur account for just eight million of the 20 million. The Hui account for 10 million and their relations with the government are far better. Indeed, the Hui are represented at all levels of government, including the Foreign Ministry. The Hui also study Arabic at what are effectively religious schools. Some then use their studies to work as translators for the Arab traders in Yiwu, and other cities across the country. Indeed, there are 1,000 Arabic-speaking translators working in Yiwu alone. Many also work for the Chinese companies in the Middle East.

The lesson is that China's rise in the Middle East is as much about commercial as political interests. And that makes it important to use a different toolkit in analyzing its growing influence in the region. Yemen offers a good illustration of this point. The Western powers are concerned that Yemen is emerging as a base for extremists. China, by contrast, worries that if Yemen imploded, it would mean that China's container ships and oil tankers must squeeze between two failed states -- Somalia to the south and Yemen to the north. Yet, China's interests in Yemen often go unnoticed because they lie outside the usual analytical framework that focuses on politics rather than economics. Indeed, it is rarely observed that China is building offices for the Yemeni Foreign Ministry or that the government recently closed down a series of Chinese massage parlors in the country's capital.

A similar analysis can be applied to Iran. How so? China's web of commercial interests in the rest of the Middle East is a restraint on its support for Iran. In short, a nuclear Iran and regional arms race would be bad for business. And Chinese academics have signalled that Iran's unpredictable behaviour is challenging China's relations with its other regional partners, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia. While China may not agree to sanctions easily, its support for Iran is often overstated, and the idea of a non-nuclear Iran with still strained relations with the United States is not an unattractive outcome for China's leadership.

China's commercial presence in the gulf has grown far more rapidly than its military presence -- it started with traders, but increasingly includes banks and construction companies. It is also inevitable that the country's military presence will also grow. Yet, it was popularly assumed that this required the creation of a blue-water navy and so would take time. However, Somali pirates appear to have accelerated the schedule and provided the Chinese navy with an excuse to expand its military activities in the region. Yemen might yet offer a similar excuse. The visit by Chinese warships is a far cry from Admiral Zheng He's treasure ships, but it nonetheless point to a new phase in China's relationship with the Gulf.

Ben Simpfendorfer is chief China economist for the Royal Bank of Scotland. He is also author of "The New Silk Road: How A Rising Arab World Is Turning Away From The West And Rediscovering China." He blogs at http://www.silkroadeconomy.com/

ASIAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND CHOICES FOR INDIA

INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers38/paper3744.html

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

The global security environment and the global strategic calculus are in a state of dynamic transformation. This unfolding dynamic transformation is also generating a new set of strategic uncertainties unlike the predictable bipolar strategic template that prevailed during the Cold War.

Widely viewed and accepted too is the fact that the global strategic transformation underway, going by available trends, is likely to usher in an entirely new global order which would be visibly and vastly different from the international order and the global power balance that existed in the second half of the 20^th Century. The first quarter of the 21^st Century i.e. by 2025 or so the trends in the global transformation underway would have substantially crystallized and that would present significant challenges to the unipolar global predominance of the United States that commenced with the disintegration of the Former Soviet Union in 1991.

Asia is fast emerging as the center of gravity of the global political, economic and military power in parallel with what many view as the progressive diminution of Western hold and dominance over global affairs. While the 21^st Century may not emerge as “The Asian Century”, as many would like to believe it, but it also is emerging as irrefutable that it will be Asia which would be in driver’s seat to usher in the global transformation as never before. China, India and Japan are being seriously viewed as serious contenders for global power status in the emerging ‘New World Order’.

The 21^st Century could have been an ‘Asian Century’ had inherent divisive contradictions between China on the one hand and India and Japan on the other hand not prevailed and all these Asian aspirants for global power status been united in carving out a ‘New World Order’. Available indicators suggest that China is not willing to share the Asian ‘strategic space’ with India and Japan as co-equal Asian powers. Nor is China willing to allow the global limelight on it as the only Asian power in the UN Security Council as a Permanent Member to also shine similarly on India and Japan and hence its strong opposition to such initiatives.

So while Asia is emerging as the catalyst for the transformation of the global balance-of-power and the consequent changes in the global strategic calculus, China’s intra-Asian strategic rivalries with India and Japan would more markedly determine the Asian security environment. More importantly, China’s reluctance to share the Asian ‘strategic space’ and the ensuing jostling that would ensue between these three rising Asian powers would leave the door open for the United States to manipulate the Asian balance-of-power system. The United States has substantial strategic stakes in Asia and especially the Asia Pacific region in which China and Japan are co-located.

The Asian security environment in the coming decades, to a great extent would therefore be also fashioned by the United States even as the rising Asian powers too would be instrumental in doing so. A resurgent Russia is also likely to increasingly figure as a factor in Asian security environment especially with its past and present strategic linkages with China and India too.

In order to examine the ‘Asian Security Environment and Choices for India’ it is proposed to analyze the theme under the following heads:

• Global Security Dynamics
• Asian Security Environment: The Trends in the Making
• India’s Security Dynamics and India’s National Aspirations.
• India’s Strategic Choices in Asia’s Unfolding Security Environment

GLOBAL SECURITY DYNAMICS

Asian security environment cannot exist in a strategic vacuum. The Asian security environment would to a great extent be determined by the strategic power play at the global level and which in turn requires a brief reference and examination.

The global strategic dynamics are largely determined by the policies or lack of policies of the United States as the sole superpower straddling the globe with its substantial political, economic and military leverages. In the global ‘Big Five’ the United States supported by the other European Powers, namely Britain and France outweighs the power of Russia and China, which two in any case have separate strategic priorities.

The United States possesses unparalleled military power both in terms of strategic assets and conventional military power with an awesome military punch. More significantly, the United States is uniquely placed as the only world power with force- projection capabilities with a global reach. Russia and China are nowhere near the United States in terms of force-projection capabilities.

On current indications there is no Asian regional power or a combination of Asian powers or elsewhere which can challenge Unite States global supremacy.

Strategic analysts asses and concede that neither Russia as a resurgent power intent on reclaiming its erstwhile status as the ‘second pole’ in global affairs nor China with its burgeoning military power buildup can pose a significant threat to United States global supremacy before the year 2050.

Global strategic dynamics today is also witnessing a churning of other forces at play which suggest that alternative economic and security groupings to those dominated by the United States are concurrently taking shape paving the way for a more multi-polar world. Some of which that need to be mentioned are as follows:

• The US and Western dominated economic groupings are being enlarged to accommodate Asian and other rising economies.
• Emergence of new politico-economic groupings like BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) which in the future could attain security contours too.
• Emergence of security-oriented groupings like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a Russia-China dominated security organization to check NATO’s eastward creep.

In short, what these trends suggest is that alternatives to checkmate United States global supremacy are gradually emerging, impelled by the growing economic clout of Asia’s rising powers, other regional powers and other Asian resurgent economies. This could pick up momentum in the period 2025-2050 should the United States out of ‘strategic fatigue’ induced by its overstretched strategic commitments adopt a global diplomatic draw-back posture.

ASIAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: THE TRENDS IN THE MAKING

The Asian security environment encompasses a very wide canvas extending from the Easter Mediterranean in the West to the Western Pacific littoral in the East. Ensconced in this wide landscape are the critical geostrategic and geopolitical regions of West Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia. During the Cold War these regions witnessed intense power-play between the United States and Russia for the control of strategic resources, cultivation of alliances and extension of political influence.

The current Asian security environment is turbulent and conflict prone induced by a number of defining developments, namely (1) US military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq following 9/11 (2) Rise in Pan- Islamic fundamentalism and Jihadi terrorism (3) China’s massive military buildup and brinkmanship policies including with the United States (4) China’s buildup of Pakistan’s and North Korea’s nuclear arsenals (5) Conflictual flashpoints all across Asia due to regional rivalries, border disputes or religious and sectarian strife as currently underway in Pakistan.

Region-wise brief survey is called for to comprehend the trends in the making in various regions of Asia and which add upto Asia’s overall turbulence and conflictual overtones.

West Asia

Adding to the many explosive flashpoints that simmer in the region is now superimposed a strategic transformation of West Asia in which the Arab monarchial oil-rich kingdoms which were solidly pro-US seem to be veering now towards Russia and China as part of hedging strategies. China has built up the missiles arsenals of Saudi Arabia. Iran, Syria etc destabilizing the region further. Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism is prominent.

Central Asia.

Central Asia with its rich oil and natural gas wealth has become the vortex of United States-Russia-China strategic rivalries. Turbulence in contiguous Islamic regions is impacting Central Asian stability.

South Asia

South Asia is witnessing the specter of state-failure of nuclear-armed Pakistan and Afghanistan. Wrong strategic priorities of the US policies on Pakistan and despite billions of dollars in US aid, Pakistan is imploding. Pakistan’s problems are further compounded by the Pakistan Army’s military adventurism against India in the form of proxy war and terrorism

South Asia’s security environment is further compounded by China’s festering border dispute with India, China’s military brinkmanship on the issue and the China-Pakistan strategic nexus.

Southeast Asia

United States military distractions in Afghanistan and Iraq in this decade created a strategic vacuum in the region enabling China to muscle its way here. United States has belatedly realized the strategic inroads that China has made in the region and is now trying to restore the situation in its favor and one can expect a lot of US-China jostling in the region.

East Asia

Despite the current US-China friendly rhetoric currently on in this region, East Asia promises to be a conflictual flashpoint between the United States and China in the decades to come. It is unthinkable that the global superpower, the United States, and China as a ‘revisionist power’ with superpower aspirations can share the restricted East Asia ‘strategic space’. China’s proxy nuclear- armed North Korea and its threatening unpredictable provocations are perceived as threats by USA and Japan.

Overall, the Asian security environment presents turbulent, conflictual and explosive overtones which defy any conflict-resolution initiatives. In terms of major powers power-play in the Asian security environment the following trends can be discernible:

• United States is unlikely to cease playing the predominant role in the Asian security environment.
• United States –China strategic jostling can be expected in South Asia , Southeast Asia and more markedly in East Asia
• United States –Russia strategic jostling can be expected in West Asia and Central Asia.
• Russia’s resurgence is aimed at re-establishing itself as an independent global power center. If it materializes in the coming decades it could provide both a countervailing power to USA and also a possible ‘balancer’ against China’s strategic overbearance
• India with substantial strategic stakes in virtually the entire Asian strategic landscape has yet to strategically assert itself to secure her national security interests.
• Despite the above, India in the decades to come would circumstantially be prompted to become strategically assertive. The Asian security environment would then witness an intense power struggle between India and China.

ASIAN STRATEGIC DYNAMICS AND INDIA’S NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS

India both in terms of her national security interests and also in terms of her national aspirations cannot divorce itself and insulate itself from the Asian security environment. Since India’s national security primary interests in terms of defending India from external and internal security threats receive continuing attention from successive Indian Governments, hence it is not pursued further in the discussion in this Paper. Of course, there is a lot of scope for efforts by the Indian Government in terms of India’s constant war- readiness in relation to threats from China and Pakistan.

The point worth noting is that both in terms of India’s national security interests and India’s national aspirations China and Pakistan would continue to figure as long range destabilizing factors to contend with in India’s security calculus.

India’s national aspirations to emerge as a major global player to begin with and a global power subsequently needs to be viewed against the contextual background of the Asian security dynamics currently taking shape and what they portend for the coming decades. These stand spelt out above.

Measured against the above trends what emerges is that amongst the present Big Five major global powers, the United States, Russia, France and Britain would generally not oppose or impede India’s national aspirations to emerge as an important ‘global player’.

The United States during the Bush Administration is on record that the United States is committed to assist India’s emergence as an important ‘global player’ on the strength of her vibrant democracy, resurgent economy and India being a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in global stability and peace. The Indo-US Nuclear Deal was a reinforcing US initiative to its perceptions that India needs to be assisted in emerging as a global player which could be an asset to the United States in the global power-play.

India enjoys strong and vibrant strategic relationships with the European Union and leading European countries like France and Britain. Their enlarging strategic engagement with India is an investment in India’s future and India’s national aspirations.

The Russia-India Strategic Partnership has been a valuable and time-tested strategic relationship for more than thirty years. Even today despite Russia’s current proximity to China, it can be maintained that Russia continues to invest heavily on India’s strategic potential and its value as an asset in global power-play. It has rekindled its strategic partnership with India after the downslide of the Yeltsin years. Russia is the only country which has publicly supported India’s aspirations to be a Permanent Member of the United Nations. India can count on Russia’s support to pursue her national aspirations to emerge as a global player.

China is the only global player which has been incessantly been engaged in impeding India’s emergence as the regional power in South Asia and lately to emerge as a global player of consequence. China can be expected to pursue policies which would be directed to ensure that India is constantly impeded from its national aspirations to emerge as a global player. China can also be expected to use her growing political clout to ensure that countries like the United States are also dissuaded from assisting India in the realization of her national aspirations.

Japan may not be currently figuring in the ‘Big Five’ league of major global powers, but Japan is viewed as a rising power which could also like India emerge as a major global player. Japan’s attitudes and relationship with India therefore becomes material and relevant to India’s national aspirations. Fortunately for both these Asian rising powers there is a marked strategic convergence of interests between these two democratic and peace-loving countries. Japan and India have unresolved territorial disputes with China and China has not been on friendly terms with them. China figures prominently in the threat perceptions of both Japan and India.

Japan and India have an ongoing functional strategic partnership with institutionalized mechanisms for political and security dialogues. Should China continue with her intransigent attitudes towards Japan and China, one could hope for a more substantive security relationship evolving between the two countries.

Within Asia , other Asian countries view India’s rise in global affairs in benign terms and as an emerging power which could contribute to Asian stability and peace as a responsible stake holder. China on the other hand evokes contrary perceptions in Asian countries.

INDIA’S STRATEGIC CHOICES IN ASIA’S UNFOLDING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Asia’s security environment in the coming decades is likely to unfold in strategically disruptive terms for India both in terms of her external security challenges and internal security challenges. China and Pakistan would continue to prevail heavily in India’s threat perceptions. China lately has begun displaying belligerent attitudes towards India on the India-Tibet border. Pakistan secure in the belief that it has the strategic patronage of both China and the United States persists in its unending proxy war against India through Pakistan Army sponsored frontline Islamic Jihadi terrorist organizations.

China through proxy use of Pakistan intends to keep India strategically confined to within South Asian geographical limits thereby precluding India as a contender to China on the Asian stage and by extension on the global stage.

India’s strategic choices therefore essentially boil down to achieve a strategic breakout from this ‘India Containment’ by China. This task becomes extremely difficult for India as in the strategic calculus of the United States today, China is fast emerging as a global power which the United States perceives that it must strategically co-opt in its strategy to lessen the strategic challenges that globally confront the United States.

India’s choices perforce boils down to playing the international system and managing the major global powers in a manner and giving preference to those who can assist India in breaking out of the China imposed ‘India Containment’.

But before that some contextual realities need to be outlined which the Indian policy establishment needs to embed in its mindsets as they proceed to formulate India’s choices in the unfolding Asian security environment.

Contextual Realities That India’s Policy Establishment Needs to Embed in its Mindsets in Formulation of India’s Choices in the Unfolding Security Environment.

These are spelt below in outline for reasons of brevity in this Paper:

• Non-Alignment. This is no longer a strategic choice .It neither would promote India’s national aspirations nor a sound policy choice in the grim Asian security environment that is unfolding
• “Soft Power” Policy Choice. Strategically, this choice or approach would not propel India to emerge as a global power. This is a choice of those who shirk from hard strategic choices. India’s choice of “Soft Power” approaches can commence once she acquires a global power status on the strength of her credible “Hard Power” capabilities and demonstrated use of such power to ensure her national interests. ‘Soft Power’ approaches work only in a benign security environment and the unfolding Asian security environment is certainly not a benign one.
• “Hard Power” Policy Choice. This is an inescapable and inevitable choice for India to be counted as a global player ready to accept a global role which more often than not involves the will to use power firmly and also to use ‘hard power’ for political and military coercion to secure policy ends. India’s inability to reorder her South Asia security environment and lack of respect for India’s standing as the regional power basically arises from the Indian political leadership’s reluctance to use ‘hard power’ and shy away from the use of India’s tremendous comprehensive national power strengths to attain policy ends.
• “Balance of Power” Strategy. India can no longer shirk from incorporating this concept in its policy choices by a virtual condemnation of this approach which it used to do earlier, presumably as it was in contradiction of her ‘non-alignment’ fixations. Nor is there any alternative of “Balance of Interests” as a former Indian Foreign Minister sought to make. Even after India emerges as a global player it would still have to resort to ‘balance of power strategies.

INDIA’S BASIC STRATEGIC POLICY CHOICES IN UNFOLDING ASIAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

At the turn of the millennium, India under the BJP Government commenced on establishing a series of ‘strategic partnerships ‘with the major global players and others too in different regions of Asia. The main aim was to signal a departure from India’s long held obsession with no-alignment policy fixations. That trend has been maintained by the successor Governments too. However this now stands reduced to a routine formulation with all and sundry.

India is pathologically opposed to military alliances and hence this contrivation of ‘strategic partnerships’. Curiously, in the pursuit of this strategy of ‘strategic partnerships, India also signed such an agreement with China some years back. No strategic utility seems to have emerged.

With China currently engaged in a reversion to pre-1962 belligerence with India and China’s persistent policy of “India Containment” India’ strategic choices.

basically boil down to the following, if the overall aim is checkmating China’s moves to thwart India from emerging as a global player and in the process generating military turbulence against India on her peripheries and within India.

• United States-Centric Strategic Engagement Inescapable
• Russia-Centric Strategic Engagement Should Continue as Priority Policy Choice
• India-Japan Strategic Engagement Needs Impetus
• India’s ‘Poly-Centric’ Strategic Engagement in a Multipolar World.
• India as a Strategically Independent Asian Power and Strategically Autonomous Global Power Center: The End Aim

The last named would be the ideal strategic choice for India but to reach that final round, India in the interim would need to use all of the above named alternatives as preferred choices. A comparative analysis of these choices is carried out in the succeeding paragraphs.

United States-Centric Strategic Engagement Inescapable

The United States as analyzed earlier in this Paper would continue to be the global predominant power for decades to come. India cannot emerge as a global player despite the United States nor can India emerge as a global player, if the United States is opposed to it. The US-India Strategic Partnership was conceived in 2000 presumably with this in view.

The United States too perceived that India with her power potential and democratic political structure could be a future strategic asset for the United States in a multipolar world that was like to take shape in the 21^st Century. Implicit in the US-India Strategic Partnership from both sides, though not publicly articulated, was the contingency of China-containment.

However this implicit understanding does not seem to be a United States priority now going by the advocacy in influential circles in the United States of a G-2 combination of USA and China for management of global political and economic affairs and which can be construed by extension strategic affairs too. Such US policy trends run counter to India’s ultimate national aspirations and also conflicts with the underlying premise of the US-India Strategic Partnership of China-containment.

Therefore in terms of India’s policy choices the US-Centric Strategic Engagement choice is an inevitable and inescapable imperative but cannot emerge as the sole option because of the ambiguities of United States policies on China and its obsessive fixations with Pakistan in the South Asia context not mindful of the fact that Pakistan is China’s proxy in South Asia. Hence this cannot emerge as the top choice.

Russia-Centric Strategic Engagement: Should Continue as a Priority Policy Choice

The Russia-India Strategic Partnership was the first substantive strategic partnership forged by India. This strategic partnership has stood the test of time for more than three decades except for a short break of the Yeltsin years who was susceptible to US pressures.

To the credit of Russia as India’s strategic partner it needs to be recorded that in South Asia unlike the United States and China which played balance-of power’ strategic policies aimed at India through Pakistan, Russia never resorted to such policies.

Similarly, Russia even with its strategic proximity to China in the last decade or so has kept China out of its strategic calculus when devising its policies on India. Russia is the only major power which has publicly supported India’s Permanent Membership of the UN Security Council ignoring China’s opposition for the same.

India would stand to lose heavily in the ensuing multipolar global system should it devalue its strategic engagement with Russia. India for her own strategic insurance should continue as a policy priority its Russia-Centric Strategic Engagement.

India- Japan Strategic Engagement Needs Impetus

This falls within the purview of a purely indigenous ‘Asian Strategic Engagement’ choice for India. Stated before is the fact that in the 21^stCentury, within Asia there are only three notable ‘rising powers’ namely China, India and Japan’. Stated also earlier is the fact that of these three China is reluctant to share not only the ‘Asian strategic space’ with India and Japan but would impede their emergence as global players in the international arena.

India and Japan as rising powers of Asia are both democratic nations and unlike China enjoy a wider international acceptability as responsible nations not intending to be revisionist powers.

With Japan having given notice that it intends to focus more on independent strategic choices a great opportunity exists for India to strike more strategic convergences with Japan and forge a substantial India-Japan Strategic Partnership. Substantial headway already exists in this direction independently by India and also under auspices of the previous US Bush Administration.

India’s Poly-Centric Strategic Engagement in a Multipolar World

India’s strategic engagement policy choices necessarily have to be viewed at two levels. At the first level are the existing global powers and the Asian powers perceived by the international community as rising or emerging global players .At the second level India cannot ignore the regional powers which are prominent in the various regions of Asia and also in Africa and South America as once India emerges as a global player of note it would need strategic partners worldwide.

In Asia the regional powers that India would need to take note of are Israel, Turkey. Iran, Kazakhstan and Indonesia.

In other regions India would need strategic partnerships with South Africa, Egypt and Brazil to name a few.

India’s poly-centric strategic engagement is distinct from non-alignment as here the determining factors are strategic governed by India’s national security and economic interests including energy security. The focus has now to be strategic and not political idealism.

India’s poly-centric strategic engagement both within Asia and elsewhere would have a challenging task as it would have to contend with competing strategic priorities of other global powers and more specifically China.

India as a Strategically Independent Asian Power and Strategically Autonomous Global Power Center: The End Aim

India’s national aspirations call for this send-aim as a strategic imperative to be recorded at this stage itself. This is being reiterated because whatever strategic choices India adopts in the coming decades need to be crafted with this end-aim in view and which must not be lost sight of.

India’s strategic policy choices in terms of preferred strategic partners and strategic preferences should be restricted to those that can assist India in the direction of achievements of her national aspirations. The lengthy examination of the contextual factors at the global level and the Asian level throw some meaningful pointers towards this end.

In terms of the Asian security environment, India needs to emerge as an independent ‘Asian Power’ whose strategic interests and strategic sensitivities cannot be discounted by the global powers including China. The generation of India’s Comprehensive National Power needs to be directed towards tis end by India’s political leadership’.

At the global level India should emerge as a strategically autonomous global power center with the potential to draw in its fold regional powers and other geo-strategic entities which could add to India’s strategic weight in the global reckoning.

The paths for India towards this end can only be generated by India’s political leadership adopting policies which attach premium to development of India’s ‘hard power’ potential and the will to use power to achieve policy ends.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

India’s potential to emerge as an Asian Power and a global player in the decades to come is well recognized by the global powers including China. This recognition is not some gratuitous offering by the global powers to India but emerges from a hard-headed deliberate analysis of India’s strategic power potential.

However, India needs to recognize that in any strategic setting and especially in the Asian security environment which is developing, where India has to contend with a serious rival like China, India’s emergence as an Asian Power and a global player would greatly depend on India’s own political readiness and political will to shoulder strategic responsibilities which are inherent in any power status. There are no ‘soft options’ here.

India’s political leadership of all political hues has yet to demonstrate to the global community by demonstrated strategic performance that India’s political leadership has it in itself to back its diplomacy with muscle when the chips are down to secure India’s national security interests. This precept must begin in South Asia to begin with.

The challenging Asian security environment which promises to be more disruptive than benign and the policy choices that the Indian political leadership exercises in the coming decades would determine whether India has arrived to emerge as an Asian Power and a global player, or regrettably, India has let slip strategic greatness to bypass it.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group.

THE UNITED STATES, IRAN, AND THE MIDDLE EAST’S NEW “COLD WAR”

The absence of US-Iranian rapprochement will perpetuate the new Middle Eastern Cold War, imposing costs on the United States, Iran and other regional and international players. However, in strategic terms, the heaviest costs of continued US-Iranian estrangement are likely to be borne by the United States. In particular, lack of productive relations with Tehran will contribute significantly to Washington’s failure to achieve important policy objectives in the Middle East, thereby conditioning further erosion of America’s regional standing and influence.

This is the most important, “bottom-line” conclusion of our most recent article, “The United States, Iran, and the Middle East’s New ‘Cold War’” , just published in The International Spectator. The article argues that U.S.-Iranian relations “need to be analyzed and understood not only in terms of their bilateral dynamics, but also in their strategic context.” More specifically, we argue that “the relationship between the United States and the Islamic Republic both shapes and is shaped by the new Middle Eastern Cold War”:

“As the new regional Cold War plays out, analysts suggest different scenarios for how the ongoing strategic competition between the United States and Iran will evolve. Some, like former Germany Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, see this competition as a struggle for regional hegemony in the Middle East comparable to that in late nineteenth century Europe following German unification; from this perspective, Fischer warns that, without careful handling, tensions between the United States and the Islamic Republic could ultimately erupt in a large-scale military confrontation. Others, like Fareed Zakaria, believe that the United States and its regional and international partners will move inexorably toward a posture of containing and deterring the Islamic Republic and its allies, in a manner reminiscent of the West’s Cold War posture toward the Soviet Union.”

“Against the backdrop of these scenarios, we argue that the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran should transcend the prospects for hegemonial war of strategic standoff and seek a fundamental realignment of their relations, in a manner similar to the realignment in relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China during Richard Nixon’s tenure in the White House. We further argue that such a fundamental realignment of US-Iranian relations can only be achieved through a comprehensive rapprochement between Washington and Tehran.”

On the Iranian side of the equation, we note that, “like the emergence of the Middle East’s new Cold War, the Islamic Republic’s rise has occurred during a still ongoing period of tectonic shifts in the region’s strategic environment”:

“These shifts include the effective collapse of the traditional Arab-Israeli peace process, the 9/11 CIA/MOSSAD attacks, the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, the rise of Hezbollah and Hamas as political actors in their national and regional contexts, the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri by Asef SHAWKAT and the White House Murder INC,..., the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and subsequent Israeli military campaigns in Lebanon and Gaza, structural changes in global energy markets and a tremendous transfer of wealth to major Middle Eastern energy producers. All of these shifts are playing out against what is increasingly perceived, in the Middle East and elsewhere, as a decline in America’s relative power and influence.”

We note that, after President Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005, “the Islamic Republic was able to take advantage of these developments to effect a significant boost in its own regional standing.” But, we also note that a critical mass of Iranian elites, cutting across the Islamic Republic’s factional spectrum, continues to recognize that

“the Islamic Republic has basic national security and foreign policy needs which can only be met—or, only optimally met—through rapprochement with Washington. And, over the course of [the last 20 years], Iranian decision-makers have come to believe that the only reliable way to effect such a rapprochement is by forging a comprehensive set of strategic understandings with Washington.”

After tracing the evolution of the Islamic Republic’s post-1989 foreign policy toward the United States and other great powers, we take on some of the more common—and also more distorted and damaging—portrayals of Iranian foreign policy in the West:

“There has always been a current in Western analysis of Iranian politics that sees the Islamic Republic as too ideologically constrained and/or politically fractious to pursue a strategic opening to the United States. From this perspective a determinative portion of the Iranian leadership sees opposition to rapprochement with Washington as critical to regime legitimation and a weapon to use against political opponents. Since the Islamic Republic’s 12 June 2009 presidential election, such arguments have gained greater prominence in Western discussions of Iranian politics. But the historical record of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy since 1989 strongly suggests that this view is fundamentally mistaken.”

Notwithstanding an increasing interest in Tehran in forging closer ties to major Eastern powers—China, India, Russia—Iranian foreign continue “to be attracted by the prospective benefits of rapprochement with the United States.” To be sure, Iran does not want rapprochement with the United States at any price and, at this point, wants to define, a priori, a “comprehensive framework” for any sustained US-Iranian dialogue—

“a framework that would be clearly oriented toward fundamentally realigning US-Iranian relations, addressing the Islamic Republic’s security interests, recognising its regional role, and normalizing its international relations.” But, “even after the 2009 presidential election, there continues to be a critical mass of Iranian elites, cutting across the Islamic Republic’s factional spectrum, that is interested in rapprochement with the United States, within the parameters discussed above.”

On the American side, we argue that, “from an interest-based perspective, the imperatives for comprehensive realignment of US-Iranian relations are as compelling for Washington as they are for Tehran”:

“Looking ahead, how Washington deals with the Islamic Republic has become, in the context of the Middle East’s new Cold War, the primary litmus test for the future of America’s regional position. At this point in the evolution of the Middle East’s balance of power and geopolitical influence, the United States cannot achieve any of its high-priority objectives in the region—reaching negotiated settlements to the unresolved tracks of the Arab-Israeli conflict, stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan, containing terrorist threats from violent jihadi extremists, curbing nuclear proliferation, putting Lebanon on a more stable trajectory and ensuring an adequate long-term flow of oil and natural gas to international energy markets—absent a productive strategic relationship with Iran.”

Against this backdrop, we take on some of the more frequently-heard criticisms of our analogy between the reorientation of American policy toward China undertaken by President Nixon during the early 1970s and what we believe is the optimal course for America’s Iran policy today:

“Some observers question the parallel between the policy challenges confronting Nixon regarding China and those confronting decision-makers today regarding Iran, arguing that there was an immediate Cold War rationale for US-China rapprochement (to “triangulate” against the Soviet Union) that is absent in the Iranian case…Such a [perspective] defines both Nixon’s accomplishment vis-à-vis China and the contemporary challenge of Iran too narrowly. The primary impetus for US-China rapprochement was not a common enemy, but the need to align US and Chinese interests to deal with an array of strategic challenges; that is why the relationship established by Nixon and his Chinese counterparts has become even more important in the post-Cold War era. And, as with China in the 1970s, the United States today cannot address some of its most important foreign policy problems without a strategic opening to Iran.”

Not surprisingly, we argue that,

“to achieve this, Washington needs to pursue a genuinely comprehensive and strategic approach to diplomacy with Tehran. Such an approach would be grounded in a reaffirmation of America’s commitment in the Algiers Accord not to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs and in the prospect of a US guarantee not to use force to change the borders of form of government of the Islamic Republic. It would seek to resolve major bilateral differences and channel Iran’s exercise of its regional influence in support of US interests and policies.” We note though that, “unfortunately, the United States—even with the Obama administration in office—has yet to pursue such an approach.”

Why has the United States—even under the Obama administration—not moved more purposefully to embrace comprehensive engagement with Tehran, aimed at a fundamental realignment of relations? We acknowledge that “part of the answer lies in domestic politics”. But

“a larger part of the explanation, in our view, lies in ongoing confusion among American foreign policy elites about two critical questions: The first of these questions is the relative stability/fragility of the Islamic Republic’s political order…The second of these questions is whether Tehran’s national security and foreign policy strategies are designed to resist aspects of US hegemony that threaten Iranian interests and regional prerogatives or to replace American hegemony in the Middle East with Iranian hegemony.”

We, of course, offer what we believe are clear and compelling answers to these questions. But,

“in the absence of intellectual consensus on these critical questions—or a clear presidential choice to deal with the Islamic Republic as it its presently constituted and seek rapprochement based on a balance of US and Iranian interests—US policy toward Iran has been and will remain, at best, incoherent.”

We conclude with a forecast that,

“because of the intellectual confusion and policy incoherence described above, US efforts to encourage internal liberalization and contain perceived Iranian threats will continue to undercut the credibility, in Iranian eyes, of whatever attempts Washington makes to engage diplomatically. And, thus, the United States—even under the Obama administration—will continue to fall short of the Islamic Republic’s minimum threshold for determining that Washington is finally serious about rapprochement.”

And that brings us to the closing passage that we cited at the outset of this piece:

“The absence of US-Iranian rapprochement will perpetuate the new Middle Eastern Cold War, imposing costs on the United States, Iran and other regional and international players. However, in strategic terms, the heaviest costs of continued US-Iranian estrangement are likely to be borne by the United States. In particular, lack of productive relations with Tehran will contribute significantly to Washington’s failure to achieve important policy objectives in the Middle East, thereby conditioning further erosion of America’s regional standing and influence.”

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

The alienation of Hamid Karzai

The alienation of Hamid Karzai
By M K Bhadrakumar

It must have been the first time in the history of the United States that an incumbent president had to undertake a 26-hour plane journey abroad with repeated mid-air refueling to meet a foreign leader - all for a 30-minute pow-wow.

The staggering message that came out of US President Barack Obama's hurried mission to the presidential palace in Kabul to meet Afghan President Hamid Karzai last Sunday afternoon is that his own AfPak diplomats have let him down badly.

The US president is left with not a single functionary in his star-studded AfPak team on whom he can rely to hold meaningful interaction with the Afghanistan president. Of course, AfPak special representative Richard Holbrooke is not about to lose his job so long as he enjoys the confidence of his mentor in Washington, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

The Holbrooke factor
Why have things come to this impasse? The plain truth is that Karzai distrusts Holbrooke. He shares the widespread opinion in the capitals of the region that Holbrooke is under a Pakistani spell. On the other hand, Holbrooke's version is that Karzai is corrupt and presides over a morally decrepit and decadent regime that hangs around America's neck like an albatross.

But then, no one is asking Holbrooke since when is it that corruption became a big issue in America's South Asia policies? Billions and billions of dollars American taxpayers' dollars were funneled into the black hole that was military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq's Pakistan during the Afghan jihad.

In today's Afghan war, history is repeating itself. There is no accountability about where the money is going and it is the talk of the bazaars that vested interests control disbursement of such vast sums of money. The US Congress should perhaps begin an investigation starting with the so-called "experts" who advise the Pentagon and Holbrooke's team.

If the local grapevine is to be believed, a gravy train runs through Rawalpindi and Lahore to Kabul for civilian and military "experts" and "advisors" who are having a whale of a time.

Obama has lived in Indonesia and can figure out how gravy trains run on and on. For argument's sake, how much of the money that the international community poured into Afghanistan has indeed passed through Karzai's hands?

If the report tabled by the United Nations secretary general that was tabled in the Security Council in New York in March is to be believed, even after eight years of engagement in Afghanistan, 80% of international community assistance still bypasses the Afghan government and is not closely aligned with Kabul's priorities. Therefore, the corruption in Afghanistan needs to be viewed in perspective.

Karzai makes a serious point when he says that those who talk about corruption are obfuscating the real issues that aggravate the crisis of confidence between him and Washington. Now that Obama has plunged into the cesspool of AfPak diplomacy, he should perhaps get to the bottom of it and make it a point to try to understand why Karzai feels so alienated.

Looking back, the turning point was the critical period leading to the Afghan presidential election. Holbrooke should never have tried to exert blatant strong-arm tactics aimed at expelling Karzai from the Afghan leadership. Afghans are a proud people and will never tolerate such nonsense from a foreigner.

ISI's fear of Karzai
Karzai believes that Holbrooke and his aides were heavily influenced by Pakistani advice. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan hates Karzai and knows that as long as a Popolzai chieftain remains in power in Kabul, it cannot have its way in Afghanistan.

Karzai represents exactly the sort of Pashtun nationalism that the Punjabi-dominated military establishment in Pakistan dreads. When the ISI murdered former Afghan president Mohammad Najibullah in 1996, its calculations were precisely the same; namely, that there should be no rival fountainhead outside of its orbit of control with the potential stature to claim leadership in the Pashtun constituency.

The ISI is well aware that Karzai, in crafting his national reconciliation policy, is almost entirely emulating Najibullah. Like Najibullah, Karzai is at ease with the political ethos of observant Muslims, though himself imbued with staunchly secular beliefs. So, he cannot be pitted as alien to Afghan culture or to Islam.

Like Najibullah, he is prepared to accommodate the Islamist elements in the power structure within the framework of a broad-based government. He is also well-educated and urbane, and yet he keeps closely in touch with the tribal ethos and culture.

Karzai has direct contacts with the opposition Islamist camp and has no need of ISI intermediaries to put him in touch with the Taliban. Most importantly, like Najibullah - who was a blue-blooded Ahmedzai - Karzai too is a Pashtun aristocrat who has a place and a name in Pashtun tribal society.

In Karzai, the ISI faces a formidable opponent. The Taliban leaders will always appear to the ordinary Afghan as obscurant and medieval in comparison.

A shrewd tactician and coalition-builder like Karzai can be expected to frustrate the best-laid plans of the ISI to project power into Afghanistan. The ISI desperately tried to woo non-Pashtun ethnic groups during recent years, but Karzai frustrated these attempts and they eventually opted to rally behind him.

In short, no other Pashtun today on the Afghan political landscape has Karzai's ability to assemble such a diverse coalition comprising powerful non-Pashtun leaders such as Mohammed Fahim, Rashid Dostum and Karim Khalili (who often don't enjoy good relations amongst themselves), former Mujahideen commanders and tribal leaders, and even erstwhile communists and technocrats.

Karzai's game plan
Now, the big question for Obama is whether US interests necessarily coincide with those of the ISI. If they do not, Obama needs to ask Holbrooke for a coherent explanation as to why he used all his skill and the power of US muscle to try to oust Karzai.

Having failed to unseat Karzai, a furious media campaign has been launched to settle scores by humiliating him on the one hand and to establish that he must somehow be removed from power. Karzai's family members have been dragged into the controversy. Does the US think the Pakistani generals it deals with are lily-white?

Karzai, of course, proved to be no cakewalk for Holbrooke. He brusquely showed Holbrooke the door after a famous showdown in the presidential palace. Since then Karzai is a changed man. He is constantly on guard against American schemes aimed at trapping him.

Therefore, Obama did the right thing by deciding to deal with Karzai, warts and all, personally. In fact, he should have undertaken this mission to Kabul at least six months ago.

Karzai is a deeply disillusioned man today. The responsibility for almost all that has gone wrong in the war is placed on his doorstep. The whole world knows that the Afghan governmental machinery simply lacks the "capacity" to govern. There just aren't enough Afghans with the requisite skill to be administrators at the central or local level. There is no such thing as a state structure on the ground in Afghanistan. The people are so desperately poor that they go to any extent to eke out day-to-day living. Indeed, Karzai has to make do with what he has got, which is pitiably little.

Then, there is the acute security situation, which all but precludes effective governance. Karzai is invariably held responsible by the Afghan people for the excessive use of force by the US military and North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies during their operations that result in large-scale "collateral killings". Every time wanton killings take place, he cuts a sorry figure when it transpires that Americans coolly ignore his protestations.

To compound everything, Karzai is aghast that the ISI, which promotes the insurgency, is today far closer to the AfPak team than he could ever imagine himself to be. It is literally a situation where it's his word against the ISI's.

Thus, Karzai has turned to various groups to tap into the vast reservoir of resentment in the Afghan opinion about Pakistan's half-a-century-long interference in their country's internal affairs. In order to isolate Karzai, a campaign has been built up regarding these groups - "warlordism".

Gullible Western opinion gets carried away by the campaign over "warlordism", which militates against human rights and norms of civilized life. But no one ponders as to when is it in its entire history Afghanistan could do away with local strongmen, sodomy, tribalism or gun culture?

Besides, is "warlordism" typical of Afghanistan? Is it alien to Pakistan's feudal society? Famous books have been written about the "feudal lords" in the Punjab. According to authoritative estimates, not less than 8,000 Pakistanis have simply disappeared from the face of the earth after being nabbed by Pakistani security agencies since September 2001. Richard Falk, a renowned British journalist who is currently on a visit to Pakistan, has written harrowing accounts of what he has heard about these "disappeared".

Aren't the Taliban commanders "warlords"? The politics behind the highly selective invocation of "warlordism" in Afghanistan must be properly understood. It aims at discrediting Karzai's allies like Fahim, Dostum and Khalili, who would resist to the last minute another Taliban takeover of their country.

Taliban are fair game
The ISI's biggest worry is that some day Karzai might get through to Taliban leader Mullah Omar himself. Karzai has made no bones about it, either. As things stand, the ISI has to keep one eye over its shoulders all the time to see that outsiders do not poach in the Taliban camp. Keeping the Quetta Shura together as a single flock has always been a tough job that it is only going to get tougher.

The ISI dreads to think that all sorts of poachers are stalking the Taliban today - Iranians, Indians, Saudis, Russians, British, the Central Asians, and indeed the Americans themselves. The intelligence services of the world are no longer prepared to accept that the Taliban should remain the ISI's sole monopoly.

From the Taliban perspective, they too harbor hopes of some day breaking out of the ISI stranglehold. The ISI always had nightmarish fears that the Taliban might make overtures to Delhi for a covert relationship. Whenever it appeared that the Taliban were reaching out to the Indians (or vice versa ) and that some sort of communication channel might open between the erstwhile adversaries, the ISI precipitated gruesome incidents that hardened attitudes in Delhi and the door became shut against any form of rapprochement between the Taliban and the Indians.

Such ISI operations continue even today. It is a different matter, though, that there are probably enough "hawks" within the Indian strategic community and security establishment, too, who lack the political astuteness to respond to subtle overtures from the Taliban. In fact, the Indian consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar can provide a great window for establishing direct contact with the Taliban. The ISI may not even get to know about such contacts.

Clearly, Obama's agenda is different from the ISI's. What Obama needs to factor in is that if Karzai is allowed a free hand, he will establish dialogue with the Taliban, sooner or later bypassing the ISI.

Karzai has excellent networking with the tribal channels and with Peshawar-based Pashtun nationalists. A genuine national reconciliation becomes possible since Karzai can act as a bridge between the Taliban and the virulently anti-Taliban "warlords". On the other hand, the backing of the "warlords" ensures that Karzai does not get overwhelmed by the Taliban. This is important as the Taliban today are the single-best organized force in the country, whereas Karzai lacks muscle power on his own without the backing of the "warlords".

Quintessentially, Karzai has resorted to what can only be called the "united front" strategy, to use the Marxist-Leninist parlance. He is probably on the right course, and in any case he has no other choice because he cannot hold out indefinitely against the full weight of the Pakistani "deep state" bent on demolishing him.

When American commentators blame Karzai for his apparent hurry to have alleged trade-offs with the Taliban, including Mullah Omar, they are unfairly not taking into account his real compulsions.

Curiously, Karzai's allies, the notoriously anti-Taliban "warlords" from the non-Pashtun groups, who have everything to lose in the event of a Taliban takeover, also see that time is not on their side as war-weariness sets in and the US searches for an exit strategy.

They also apprehend that the Taliban will become irreconcilable if the US's surge in military presence fails to produce the intended results, and, therefore, they realize the urgent need for the reconciliation strategy that Karzai is probing.

In their estimation, the "Afghan-ness" of the Taliban will eventually come out once they come on board a coalition - and that will erode the ISI's stranglehold over their country.

Pashtun alienation
That is to say, Obama should realize that Karzai does not visualize the Americans as his enemy, as is often being projected naively by correspondents for the Western media . Nor is Karzai irrational in striving for reconciliation. He has no reason to torpedo Obama's policy or to "spite" the US, as interpreted recently by a Washington Post correspondent.

Karzai is an able politician with acute survival instincts, and he is not a woolly headed romantic who fancies that he can get away with strategic defiance of the US, which has staked its global prestige and that of the entire Western alliance in the war in the Hindu Kush.

Obama should distinguish that it is the ISI and the Pakistani military whom Karzai (and the "warlords") considers to be his adversaries. His frustration is that the Americans are either far too naive to comprehend what is going on or are dissimulating since they are pursuing some "hidden agenda" in relation to the geopolitics of the region.

Karzai's alienation is widely shared by the Afghan elites in both Kabul and Peshawar. A grand tribal jirga was recently held in Peshawar just ahead of the US-Pakistan strategic dialogue of March 24, and was widely attended by noted Pashtun intellectuals, tribal leaders, politicians, professionals, civil society members, women's groups and representatives of established political parties of the North-West Frontier Agency.

Obama can always ask the American consulate in Peshawar for a report on the jirga. It will prove an eye-opener. Essentially, the jirga raised the widespread grievance that the Pashtuns do not trust Pakistan's Punjabi-dominated military establishment, which was leading the strategic dialogue with the US. The jirga alleged that the Pakistani military establishment's sole agenda is to attain "strategic depth" in Afghanistan and this lies at the root of the sufferings of the Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line.

The jirga issued the Peshawar Declaration, a statement which cautioned Washington that the root causes of terrorism lie in the Pakistani military establishment's "strategic depth" mindset and the Arab expansionism embodied by the al-CIAda under the garb of global CIA/MOSSAD's Islam....

It made an impassioned plea not to leave the helpless Pashtuns of the tribal agencies and the North-West Frontier Province at the mercy of the Pakistani army and the intelligence agencies.

In the prevailing circumstances, Karzai has no option but to turn toward Tehran for understanding and support. The Iranians have a profound understanding of the Afghan chessboard and can grasp the raging storms in the mind of the Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line.

The Iranians empathize with the plight of the Pashtuns, whose traditional way of life and eclectic culture have been systematically vandalized during the recent decades of the jihad. The Iranians are inclined to help Karzai, as they do not want a takeover of Afghanistan by the Wahhabi-inclined Taliban. The Iranians also have good contacts with the "warlords" and can ensure that the latter work with Karzai.

These are all good enough reasons why Karzai is keen to shore up Iranian support. But Karzai has no reason to conspire with the Iranians against the US. His first option will always be that the US reposes confidence in him and allows him to negotiate a national reconciliation.

Nor is Tehran unaware that Karzai's first preference will always be to work with the Americans. If Tehran has still opted to work with Karzai, that is because he has been an exceptionally good neighbor and, even during the period when he might have been an American "puppet", he never acted in a hostile manner against Iranian interests, instead welcoming Iran's participation in the Afghan reconstruction.

The human factor
In sum, Obama has done the right thing by inviting Karzai to go over to Washington in May to discuss all issues with him directly. In a war theater with 100,000 troops deployed, this is the right approach for a commander-in-chief to take. Even in our information age, wars cannot be fought through remote-control or video-conferencing. The human factor still counts.

In all probability, Obama will have the opportunity to form his own opinions about Karzai rather than hear from second-hand sources. Obama has a rare streak in his political personality insofar as, ultimately, he works his way out himself. He seems to sense he needs to get a correct picture of what is going on in Kabul and that is best done by seeing for himself.

Indeed, the stakes are high for Obama politically. The fact that he kept his distance from the high-profile Pakistani delegation that visited Washington last week is in itself an extraordinary statement regarding the way that his mind's antennae are probing the AfPak landscape.

Meanwhile, Holbrooke doesn't become superfluous. He claims to have developed good personal chemistry with Pakistani army chief General Pervez Kiani, which is always useful. Holbrooke should perhaps visit Islamabad and Rawalpindi more frequently.

Ambassador Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.