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"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland, Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island, Who rules the World-Island and the various Choke points commands the world" "Force does not reveal to the victim the strength of his adversary,it invests the victims with patience" Honesty, integrity, ethics, morality, Truth just might be a more effective path to real Justice. USA is yet much too drunk of its own illusions to see the writings on the walls Worldwide.

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Implications of Iran going nuclear
Saudi, Pak moves need to be watched
by D. Suba Chandran
One of the CIA/WikiLeaks revelations presents the note which the American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia prepared for Hillary Clinton during her visit in February 2010. The note talks about the Saudi Arabian fear of the failure of dialogue with Iran on nuclear weapons, and the King’s nuclear ambitions to protect his own interests.
According to the note prepared by Ambassador James Smith for Ms Clinton, “The King is convinced that the current U.S. engagement efforts with Tehran will not succeed; he is likely to feel grimly vindicated in his view by Ahmadinejad’s February 11 boast that having successfully enriched uranium to a level of 20 per cent, Iran “is now a nuclear nation”...The King told General Jones that if Iran succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, everyone in the region would do the same, including Saudi Arabia.”
Will Saudi Arabia wait till Iran goes overtly nuclear, or will it have already started preparing for that eventuality? This is where one has to analyse Saudi Arabia’s options in terms of looking for nuclear deterrence. Clearly, the King has three options - to develop a nuclear weapons programme for Saudi Arabia; buy nuclear weapons and delivery systems from other countries (perhaps Pakistan); and to ask for a nuclear guarantee (either from the US or Pakistan).
There have been news reports detailing the linkages between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Saudi Arabia has already established a nuclear power programme. During April this year, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz through a royal decree created the “King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KACARE)” in Riyadh. Clearly, Saudi Arabia has started its march towards a nuclear programme.
The focus of this analysis, however, is not on Saudi Arabia’s nuclear programme, but on the nature of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence in case there is an understanding between Islamabad and Riyadh on a nuclear guarantee or umbrella. In this case, if Iran goes nuclear, or if Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are convinced that Iran has a nuclear weapons programme, will the primary objective of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence remain India-specific?
As of now, there is a widespread belief that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme -fissile materials, weapons, delivery mechanisms and the nuclear strategy/doctrine — is purely India-specific. Will it continue to remain India-specific if the Iran and Saudi factors need to be taken into account?
Will Pakistan be willing to extend its arsenal and doctrines to provide a nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia and perhaps some other countries in the Gulf which fear Iran? Reports have it that there is already a secret agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, reached sometime during 2003. Perhaps true; perhaps not.
What needs to be analysed in this context is, what if Pakistan decides to extend the nuclear deterrence to include Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Gulf against a nuclear Iran? Three specific issues need to be analysed here. First, political relations between Iran and Pakistan; it is an open secret that Islamabad and Tehran have their own differences vis-à-vis each other, which got exacerbated since the late 1970s. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 and Zia’s Islamisation (in reality “Sunnisation”) have created a Sunni-Shia rift within Pakistan, which has increased the tensions between the two countries. To make matters worse, since the 1980s there has been an additional vigour in the Saudi-Wahabi influence in Pakistan, further vitiating the anti-Shia campaign by the sectarian organisations in Pakistan. As a result, for the last three decades, despite efforts, the political relationship between the two countries remains strained. Thus, there is no incentive for Islamabad for remaining neutral in case of an open nuclear tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The lines are already drawn and Pakistan has chosen its sides.
The only exception was the A.Q. Khan network, which helped Iran’s nuclear programme. To be fair to A.Q. Khan, his network was completely secular and was beyond any national boundaries. It was purely an economic enterprise, which looked beyond Sunni-Shia, Iran-Pakistan and Iran-Saudi Arabia calculations! Hence, Khan’s assistance to Iran’s nuclear programme should not be considered as a factor in Islamabad’s nuclear decision-making process vis-à-vis Tehran.
Second, how is Pakistan’s relationship likely to build in the next couple of years vis-à-vis Iran in terms of Islamabad’s growing influence and presence in Afghanistan? Again, it is an open secret that Islamabad is backing the Taliban to reach some kind of an agreement with President Karzai to expand its influence in Afghanistan in a post-American exit environment. Pakistan has already signed a trade and transit agreement with Afghanistan, besides concluding another agreement on gas recently with Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. Clearly, Pakistan has well positioned itself now to impose its stooges in Kabul and convert Afghanistan into its strategic backyard. Will Iran remain a mute spectator? One is likely to see an increased hostility between Islamabad and Tehran as a result of their strategic rivalry in Afghanistan.
Third, as a result of the above two issues, Pakistan is unlikely to remain unaffected in the Iran-Saudi Arabia nuclear diad. This is bound to become a triangle relationship, creating an arch of nuclear instability in the entire Middle-East. It is a different question and issue altogether if Israel jumps into it; but for the purpose of this argument, the focus is only on the triangle. Pakistan has a history of proliferation; hence there is no reason to believe that Islamabad has not already made a deal with Saudi Arabia. In fact, there are also reports claiming the sale of Ghauri missiles to Saudi Arabia. Neither the Pakistan-Iran relations nor Islamabad’s past history of proliferation makes one feel confident that Pakistan is unlikely to work with Saudi Arabia and provide nuclear weapons or just an umbrella.
What needs to be analyzed here is how this will affect Pakistan’s calculations towards its fissile materials, nuclear weapons and delivery mechanisms. It is believed that Pakistan has an adequate fissile material stockpile today to make approximately 100-plus nuclear weapons. However, this is unlikely to remain at this level if the Iran-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan nuclear triangle needs to be taken into account. In this case, Pakistan’s deterrence will not be based only against the Indian stockpile and weapons. Therefore, Pakistan’s “minimum” is unlikely to remain minimum.
Now, what are the likely implications of the above scenario? First, Pakistan is unlikely to accept the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty for its stockpile is not likely to remain focused on India alone. Thus, Obama will see his vision for nuclear disarmament breaking into pieces, in his own life time. Second, the nature of Pakistan’s arsenal then will be dependent on Iran’s stockpile and Saudi Arabia’s requirement. And this will be anything but minimum. Therefore, one could visualize a different calculation of India’s “minimum” as well. Whatever may the nature of these calculations, it is easy to conclude that the credible deterrence in South Asia is unlikely to remain minimum.
Third, the above triangle will also result in Sunni and Shia nuclear bombs, infusing a different argument into the old concept of an Islamic bomb. This in turn, will further increase the distance between Islamabad and Tehran besides vitiating the minds of the Shias and Sunnis inside Pakistan.

Nations deserve the heroes they get..... A hero usually is one part the actuality of person and performance; three parts need of the observer for confirmation, reassurance, hope. Heroes are made more by the yearnings of others than by their own features and feats. Where the intensity of those needs stunts critical faculties, the powers of illusion and self-delusion grow. That holds for the object of hero worship as well - for the emotional currents flow both ways.
Heroes are enemies of truth. For they evoke powerful feelings that give distorted meanings to inchoate emotions. They provide the personified symbols of legendary dimension that inspire unjustified confidence and offer the comfort of a cult. Thoughtless loyalty follows.
Contemporary America’s craving is exceptional. It is diffuse yet at the same time self centered. Each one of us badly wishes to have the mythology of our collective identity and meaning restored. Abstract yet omnipresent, few can cope without it. The personal resources of our fabled individualism quickly run dry without the steady su...
Nations deserve the heroes they get. A hero usually is one part the actuality of person and performance; three parts need of the observer for confirmation, reassurance, hope. Heroes are made more by the yearnings of others than by their own features and feats. Where the intensity of those needs stunts critical faculties, the powers of illusion and self-delusion grow. That holds for the object of hero worship as well - for the emotional currents flow both ways.
Heroes are enemies of truth. For they evoke powerful feelings that give distorted meanings to inchoate emotions. They provide the personified symbols of legendary dimension that inspire unjustified confidence and offer the comfort of a cult. Thoughtless loyalty follows.
Contemporary America’s craving is exceptional. It is diffuse yet at the same time self centered. Each one of us badly wishes to have the mythology of our collective identity and meaning restored. Abstract yet omnipresent, few can cope without it. The personal resources of our fabled individualism quickly run dry without the steady sustenance provided by the blind belief in our exceptional virtue, competence and claim on the future. Suspicions that we may not be destiny’s child born under a providential star erodes the optimistic self confidence that is our lifeblood.
Those who have emerged as saviors offer no plan to resolve our tangible problems, no exciting doctrine of salvation, no fresh vision. Instead, they are amplifiers of our discontents with a gift for bolstering faith that restoration of the true and authentic America is within our grasp. It’s the eternal American story of self redemption and self-realization that admits of no flaw in our basic character. Whatever is out of kilter just has to be fixed.
There is one celebrity with the makings of a national hero, someone who has the qualities that might carry him right into the White House. It is David Petraeus. He is almost universally credited with the brilliant achievement of saving American honor and gaining an approximation of ‘victory’ in Iraq. President Obama himself is in awe of this warrior intellectual to whom he defers on all matters in the Greater Middle East. Petraeus’ mythic standing is a perfect example of how the compelling demand for a hero creates the illusion that indeed a savior has arrived. The so-called ‘surge’ for which Petraeus takes unabashed credit did not change anything fundamental in Iraq. The record is clear that the decline in violence, sectarian and anti-American, was due to three factors independent of our actions. They were: the emergence among the Sunni militants of the sawa’h movementthat turned on al-Qaeda in Iraq for their own tribal and cultural reasons; the Sunnis defeat by the Shi’ites in the civil war of 2005-2007; Iranian political intervention to persuade Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army to stand down so as to strengthen Prime Minister Maliki’s hand in the Iraqi-U.S. negotiations on a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Iran won its bet as Maliki indeed did turn the tables on Petraeus et al in Washington, severely restricting the American military’s presence in Iraq. All this was in the works well before the surge troops arrived, troops that never got beyond Baghdad. Moreover, Iraq today is an economic and political shambles, without a government for nine months, that teeters on the brink of a three-way civil war while Tehran’s influence mounts steadily.
Petraeus, the most political general America has seen since MacArthur, eagerly accepted the unearned laurels. He plays Presidents and public opinion with the deftness he describes in his counter insurgency writings as required to win the propaganda campaign against the native rebels. The doctrine has been far more effectively executed in Washington than in Afghanistan. In Fall 2004, he penned a series of articles lauding George Bush for his brilliant and bold leadership. In them, he proclaimed success in personally building an Iraqi army ready to take over responsibility for the country’s security. That was a complete fiction. In fact, Petraeus had made a series of blunders in recruiting a nearly 100% Shi’ite army composed mainly of party militia members. One of the very few capable units, the notorious Grey Wolves, took the lead in the bloody ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from Baghdad and surrounding districts. 6 years later, the Iraqi National Army of which their American general boasted is still a work in progress.
None of this is of interest to our leaders, to our media, to our public. Hero worship is blind – especially when there is a desperate emotional need to make the country feel good – or, at least, less bad – about its tragic, farcical intervention that tarnished every principle our Republic supposedly holds dear.
Petraeus understands all this. He plays his role skillfully. A shy half-smile for a people that prefers the boy next door variety of hero to the grim hard-edged military man we associate with the bad guys. A chest full of ribbons and medals that, to a few jaundiced eyes, makes him look like a caricatured Ruritanian Field Marshal. Army regulations on decorations say wear only 3 or wear them all. It is highly doubtful that Petraeus ever considered the former option. Modesty is not ‘in’ when it comes to American celebrity culture. Oddly, none of Petraeus’ decorations are for actions in combat. He never has seen combat; he never has been under fire. The very model of a modern hero-general. His big battles were won in the corridors of the Pentagon and the antechambers to presidential power. However confected Petraeus’ legendary triumphs are, they serve no less well as credentials that a sorely tried nation may take as signaling that here is the man who can set the country straight.
Audacity is the key to turning celebrity into hero status. Sarah Palin has it. So too does David Petraeus - in abundance. It took audacious nerve to throw himself into the 2004 presidential election while a serving officer, and do so by misrepresenting a key element in the Iraq debate - one for which he was individually responsible. It took audacity to maneuver to undercut two of his former commanding officers, General David McKiernan and Admiral William Fallon, whose careers met an untimely demise as a consequence. It took audacity to sideline Ambassador General Karl Eikenberry from last year's critical Afghanistan strategic review (with the backing of Robert Gates) because his views ran against the grain of Petraeus' own plans for being producer and director of SURGE II. It took audacity to qualify in public the White House's publicly stated commitment to begin a withdrawal of troops by July 1 2011 within days of its being made. It has taken even greater audacity to plant stories via his aides that he has the necessary 'moral authority' in effect to reset the mission's coordinates and resource needs as he deems fit. “Team Kabul,” as Petraeus refers to his Afghanistan staff, says openly that the July 2011 date is “meaningless.” It takes audacity to launch a campaign of village destruction in Kandahar province, cleansing the countryside of its civilian population, so as to chalk up a larger tally of enemy kills in time for the year end review - even if this means turning on its head the core precept of his own counterinsurgency doctrine. It takes audacity to spread word of a breakthrough success in the bringing of “a very high level Taliban leader,” Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, to Kabul for “promising” talks (literally as well as figuratively bringing him); and then when the ‘Taliban no. 2’ is exposed as an imposter, a Quetta shop keeper in fact, for Petraeus brazenly to offer the laconic comment that “I was not surprised.” And, to cap it all, to blame the British for the entire episode. That is the kind of audacity that points a general in the direction of the White House whose incumbent is your Commander-in-Chief.
By the way, the Editors of the TIMES have offered no comment on the ‘Taliban leader’ episode – a humiliation for Petraeus, a humiliation for America.... Americans may pay it little attention; others in Kabul, Islamabad and Teheran do.....
On AFPAK/INDIA......
Why does Pakistan continue to support the Taliban and its killing of US troops? It concerns India, Pakistan's arch-enemy, which is increasing its influence in Afghanistan.
from General McChrystal's Aug 2009 report:
"Indian political and economic influence is increasing in Afghanistan, including significant efforts and financial investment. In addition, the current Afghan government is perceived by Islamabad to be pro-Indian. While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India."
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf
Monster Holbrooke was no help:
"Holbrooke assured [India FM] Rao that he is in favor of Indian assistance programs in Afghanistan and is not influenced by what he hears in Islamabad." -- CIA/wikileaks
This conflict which is based upon Pakistan-India enmity will go on forever. Pakistan will not stand for an India-allied country on its western flank. You can't blame them. The current Kabul "government" is allied with the Northern Alliance which is allied with India.
Under these conditions there is no way US involvement will ever end. The US will continue to be caught between Pakistan and India.
It is not only AfPak, it is really AfPakIndia. But there is no mention of India in the report summary, and nobody asked about it. Why is this not a matter of concern?
Unfortunately, Foreign Policy has joined the ranks of the privileged who want to protect their privileges by slavishly following the government line, How can democracy function if the government is able to cover up its stupidity, utter criminality, utter corruption and screw-ups by merely classifying them?

By MARTIN FACKLERTOKYO — Japan announced a new defense policy on Friday that will respond to China’s rising military might by building more submarines and other mobile forces capable of defending Japan’s southernmost islands. The new National Defense Program Guidelines are the biggest step yet in a decade-long shift away from cold war-era deployments of heavy tank and artillery units on the northern island of Hokkaido — to counter a now-vanished Soviet threat — and toward bolstering Japanese forces in the southern islands around Okinawa, where China’s navy has become a growing presence. The new guidelines also used uncharacteristically strong language to warn of China’s rapidly modernizing military, calling it “a matter of concern for the region and the international community.” China’s growing naval capabilities have been a particular concern in Japan since Beijing and Tokyo clashed diplomatically three months ago over uninhabited islands claimed by both nations but controlled by Japan. The islands are called the Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese. In Beijing, the Foreign Ministry criticized the new policy as “irresponsible” and suggested that it was based on a misunderstanding of China’s intentions. “China adheres to the road of peaceful development and pursues a defensive national defense policy,” Jiang Yu, the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, said in a statement. “We have no intention to be a threat to anyone.” The new policy called for increasing the number of Japan’s submarines to 22 from the current 16, while reducing the number of tanks by a third to about 400. It also called for creating more mobile forces, which analysts have said could include creating new air and seaborne units that could quickly move to defend remote islands. The guidelines also called for increasing military cooperation with the United States, Japan’s postwar protector, and other democracies in the region including South Korea, Australia and India. It did not address recent requests from Washington for the Japanese military, known as the Self-Defense Forces, to join in three-way drills with the United States and South Korea that would be aimed at North Korea. Japan has long resisted American calls to increase its military role in the region because of the constraints of its pacifist postwar Constitution and the bitter memories of devastating defeat in World War II. The new guidelines seemed to indicate a willingness to slightly raise Japan’s military profile, but only in a defensive manner, and in conjunction with the United States. The guidelines also called for reconsidering Japan’s self-imposed ban on the export of weapons, a step that would make it easier for Japan to join other nations, and particularly the United States, in the joint development of expensive new weapons systems. Japan has already joined the United States in developing new anti-missile systems. Friday’s guidelines called for deploying more Patriot interceptor missiles to shoot down ballistic missiles from North Korea, which has been developing missiles and nuclear weapons. The new guidelines were to have been released last year but were delayed by the Democratic Party’s election victory that ended a half-century of virtual one-party rule in Japan. After initially disagreeing with Washington over an American air base on Okinawa, the left-leaning Democrats under Prime Minister Naoto Kan have moved closer to the United States, pushed by concerns over China’s increasing influence and North Korean provocations like last month’s shelling of a South Korean island. Japan Throws Aside its Pacifist Post WWII Military Doctrine | | |
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- The Japanese government encouraged by the United States round-the-clock show of military capabilities against global adversaries has just decided to switch its own long-held post WWII pacifism into a more confrontational one. Tokyo cited the rise of China’s military and its military presence around disputed islands as the reason behind change in its military doctrine. Japan’s claims on the Kuril Islands are also increasing tensions with Moscow. The Japanese economy experienced rapid growth after WWII devastations until a decade ago when the last Asian financial crisis seem to have permanently damaged its once innovative export-driven economy under the merci of China or even South Korea. On Friday the administration of Naoto Kan, decided to confront Chinese military buildup and North Korea’s progress in the field of nuclear technology. Tokyo plans almost 24 trillion yen defense spending for five years. Like most Western industrial nations’ blind pursuit of US-led casino capitalism, Japan today suffers under huge public debt that is at least twice the size of its GDP. Apparently, since it would be difficult to harness a behemoth like China, both Tokyo and Washington may be seeing the rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula as a lifetime opportunity. Elimination of South Korea’s industrial exports after a devastating war with powerful North Korea would ensure that both Japan and U.S. could have the chance to fill in after South Korean exports, thus giving themselves some temporary comforts. That might explain why recently Washington and Tokyo drew up joint military agreement to counter China, while at the same time US and South Korea separately conduct their joint military maneuvers near disputed areas. A newly published report by the Japanese military reflected the growing anxiety over China’s rising power, rapid modernization of its military and maritime activities. It noted, ‘These movements, coupled with the lack of transparency in its military and security matters, have become a matter of concern for the region and the international community’ The reported also viewed North Korea’s rapid development in the field of nuclear technology as a present and grave destabilizing factor to the security of our country and the region..... |

ITALY-RUSSIA RELATIONS: THE VIEW FROM the USA Embassy in ROMEhttp://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/01/09ROME97.html
SECRET SECTION 01 of 05 ROME 000097
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR INR/I
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG EPET RS IT
SUBJECT: ITALY-RUSSIA RELATIONS: THE VIEW FROM ROME
(C-RE8-02675)
REF: a) 08 STATE 134386 b) ROME 451
CLASSIFIED BY: Ronald P. Spogli, Ambassador, for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
¶1. (U) This is a joint Political and Economic Section cable.
¶2. (C/NF) Summary. Italy's relationship with Russia is
complex, encompassing historical ideological sympathies,
geostrategic calculations, commercial pressure, energy
dependence, and personal relationships between top leaders.
The combination of these factors creates a strong tendency
for Italy's foreign policy to be highly receptive to Russian
efforts to gain greater political influence in the EU and
to support Russia's efforts to dilute American security
interests in Europe. In its relationship with Russia, energy
is the most important bilateral issue and the quest for
stable energy supplies from Russia frequently forces
Italy to compromise on security and political issues.
A not insignificant concomitant factor is PM
Berlusconi's desire to be seen as an important
European player on foreign policy, leading him to
go where others dare not. End summary.
Roots of Italian Russophilia: Ideology on the Left, a Long-Standing Market Opportunity on the Right
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶3. (C/NF) Until the 2008 parliamentary elections, the Italian
Communist party and various leftist splinter groups were a
permanent fixture of the Italian political scene. Throughout the Cold
War members of the Italian communist movement maintained close
ties with the Soviet Union, other communist countries, and many
communist revolutionary movements. Unlike many other communist parties
around the world, the Italian communist movement remained
unapologetic in its continued belief in Marxism-Leninism as a viable
economic alternative to capitalism. While many European leftist
intellectuals recognize that -- aside from an authoritarian approach to
governing - - Putin's Russia bears little resemblance to Communist
ideals, this fact has not deterred Italian communists and other radical
left politicians from being openly pro-Russia on the basis of
ideological solidarity. This, combined with the advanced average age o
most high-level Italian politicians (65-70), prevents many in the
far left of Italy's political spectrum from moving beyond a worldview
developed (and apparently frozen) during the Cold War.
¶4. (C/NF) Throughout the Cold War, Italian business interests
frequently skirted the line of what was appropriate in their
pursuit of the Soviet market. After the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the explosion of consumer wealth in Russia created massive deman
for high-end and luxury Italian exports. From 1998 to 2007
Italian exports to Russia grew by 230 percent, from 2.7 billion Euros
to 9.5 Billion. Many of Italy's leading businessmen began to see
Russia as a limitless market that could substitute for loss of export
revenue from other parts of the world. These businessmen maintain
strong ties to the pro-business, free-market-oriented politicians on
the right, including the most visible patron of Italy's business
elite: PM Silvio Berlusconi.
Putin Most Influential Figure in Italy's Russia Policy
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - -
¶5. (C/NF) While Italy's political parties, the MFA and ENI
exert some influence on Italy's Russia policy, by far the most importan
factor is the personal attention Putin devotes to the relationship.
By our reckoning, Putin has held more bilateral meetings with
sitting Italian PMs in the recent past than any other world leader.
He was the first world leader to meet with Berlusconi after the 2008
elections, arriving in Sardegna to visit the PM designate
before the latter had even been sworn in. Berlusconi believes that
Putin is his close and personal friend and continues to have more
contact with Putin than with any other world leader. During the Georgi
crisis, Berlusconi spoke to Putin on a daily basis for a period of
almost a week. The basis of the friendship is hard to determine, but
many interlocutors have told us that Berlusconi believes that
Putin, a fellow 'tycoon', trusts Berlusconi more than other European
leader. (A contact in the PM's office told us that their frequent
meetings are accompanied by exchanges of lavish gifts). Berlusconi
admires Putin's macho, decisive, and authoritarian governing style,
which the Italian PM believes matches his own. From the Russian side,
it appears that Putin has devoted much energy to developing
Berlusconi's trust.
¶6. (S/NF) Contacts in both the opposition center-left PD
Rome 00000097 002 of 005
party and Berlusconi's own PdL party, however, have hinted at a more
nefarious connection. They believe that Berlusconi and his cronies are
profiting personally and handsomely from many of the energy
deals between Italy and Russia. The Georgian ambassador in Rome
has told us that the GOG believes Putin has promised Berlusconi a
percentage of profits from any pipelines developed by Gazprom in
coordination with ENI. Whenever we raise the issue of Russia and the P
with our contacts in PdL, Berlusconi's own party, they have usually
pointed us to Valentino Valentini, a member of parliament and somewhat
shadowy figure who operates as Berluscon's key man on Russia, albeit
with no staff or even a secretary. Valentini, a Russian-speaker who
travels to Russia several times per month, frequently appears at
Berlusconi's side when he meets other world leaders. What he does in
Moscow during his frequent visits is unclear but he is widely
rumored to be looking after Berlusconi's business interests in Russia.
Our contacts uniformly deem Valentini, a multilingual former
interpreter, close to Berlusconi with regard to Russia, but not a polic
person.
¶7. (C/NF) All of our interlocutors - xxxxxxxxxxxx - report that Berlusconi determines
Italy's policy on Russia single-handedly, neither seeking nor
accepting counsel. Virtually all are reluctant to confront the PM even
when he is at his worst on Russia. In November 2008, after a
disastrous press conference in which, inter alia, the PM described NATO
expansion, recognition of Kosovo's independence, and missile
defense as "U.S. provocations" of Russia, GOI officials did a classic
duck- and-cover. In response to our objections, MFA and PM staff
sheepishly directed us to the PM himself, rather than deliver
the unpleasant news to him that he had angered not only the
Americans but other members of the Contact Group for the Balkans, not t
mention the Czechs and Poles. Even FM Frattini admits to wielding no
influence on Berlusconi on Russia. During an early September
visit to Italy, former VP Cheney confronted Frattini on Italy's
very public and unhelpful stance on the Georgia conflict. A subdued
Frattini noted that, while he had strong opinions on the issue, he
nevertheless received his marching orders from the PM.
¶8. (C/NF) Distressingly, Berlusconi treats Russia policy as
he does his domestic political affairs - tactically and day-to-day.
His overwhelming desire is to remain in Putin's good graces, and
he has frequently voiced opinions and declarations that have been
passed to him directly by Putin. One such example: in the aftermath of
the Georgia crisis, Berlusconi began (and continues) to insist
that Georgia was the aggressor and that the GOG was responsible
for several hundred civilian deaths in South Ossetia.
No Institutional Leadership on Russia
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶9. (C/NF) Trying to determine who might have some influence
on Berlusconi's Russia policy is not an easy task. One thing is
certain, however - it is not the foreign policy institutions
of the GOI. FM Frattini is widely seen as only the messenger for PM
Berlusconi's Russia policy - indeed he termed himself as much
to VP Cheney during the latter's September 2008 visit to Rome.
Within the professional ranks, resources and expertise are scant.
Italy's MFA contains only one full-time diplomat assigned to cover
Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union: the Office
Director. The Deputy Office Director position and single Desk Officer
position assigned to cover all the countries of the FSU are vacant.
Italy's dire budget situation is likely to prevent the hiring of
additional staff at the MFA for at least two years, according to one MF
source. The Office Director's direct supervisor - the A/S equivalent
- is also responsible for the Balkans and the rest of Europe, but
she, like Frattini, appears to have little or no input to GOI
Russia policy. The PM's staff does not fare much better. The
Office of the Diplomatic Advisor is thinly staffed - with only one
officer assigned to each geographic region. The position covering
Russia is staffed by a midlevel diplomat who is in the process of being
transferred. No replacement is likely to be named. As a result, the
officer covering the Middle East (also the deputy for the office)
will be forced to take on those duties in addition to his already
overwhelming portfolio and management duties.
¶10. (C/NF) In 2008 the MFA undertook an effort to produce a
long-term foreign policy strategy for the GOI. In a paper entitled
"Rapporto 2020" the MFA outlined its strategic vision for the next
decade and a half. The document notes that geostrategic realities have
created the need for Italy to adapt its foreign policy with regard to
Russia and calls for Italy to seek 'a privileged relationship' with
Moscow in order to press its overwhelmingly preeminent bilateral
concern: energy.
Rome 00000097 003 of 005
Energy Becomes Key Bilateral Issue
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶11. (C/NF) With virtually no domestic energy reserves, no
domestic nuclear power, and an ambitious parastatal energy company,
Italy's key bilateral concern with Russia has become the quest for
long-term guarantees of energy supplies. The GOI has supported ENI and
other energy giants' efforts to create a unique partnership with
Russia and Gazprom for long-term cooperation. ENI, Italy's most
prominent energy parastatal, wields immense political power; its
business strategy has focused on complicated geopolitical environments
generally perceived as overly risky by many of its international
competitors. ENI's lobbying efforts vis-(-vis the GOI are better
funded than most government offices. It hosts one diplomatic
advisor assigned from the MFA. Going by press reports alone, we
would judge that PM Berlusconi grants its director, Paolo Scaroni, as
much access as he does his own FM.xxxxxxxxxxxx. Members of political
parties on both sides of the aisle have told us that ENI is
one of the leading financial contributors to Italy's many
think-tanks - many of which produce public diplomacy discussions and
events on the importance of Italy-Russia relations. At one such event
in 2007, a conference on Central Asia, representatives from ENI and
Edison were given 30 minutes each to speak, while the four Foreign
Ministers and Deputy Foreign Minister of five Central Asian former
Soviet states were all crammed into a single hour. There is even
suspicion that ENI maintains journalists on its payroll.
¶12. (C/NF) Members of political parties from both sides of
the aisle have told us that ENI does not limit its dialogue with the
government to energy issues. One member of the opposition center-left
PD party told poloffs that ENI's presence in Russia exceeds that of
Italy's understaffed embassy. While it is unclear how much policy
coordination occurs between ENI and the Russian political
structure, the same PD party members noted that ENI had as much contact
with Russian political and economic leaders as the embassy, if not
more, and political messages were frequently passed through such
commercial/economic channels. Back in Rome, ENI maintains
strong contacts with members of the Italian parliament - something
the MFA does not do (apart from requested briefings to members of the
foreign affairs committees).
An Energy Policy without the Policy
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶13. (C/NF) ENI and other energy giants have managed to press
their case quite effectively within the highest ranks of the GOI.
Italian leaders on both sides of the aisle seem strangely unconcerned
about dependence on Russian energy. They point out that Italy
depended on Russian coal during the darkest days of the Cold War with n
dire consequence. Italians are also lulled into complacency by
the fact that geographic proximity to North African resources means
that they are far less dependent on Russia than are the Germans or the
former Eastern bloc countries.
¶14. (C/NF) During a March 2008 visit to ENI Headquarters
embassy staff were given a briefing on ENI's Russian energy
operations (available on Embassy Rome's Classified web site). ENI's
view of the European energy situation was disturbingly similar to that
of GAZPROM and the Kremlin, and at times laced with rhetorical
flourishes reminiscent of Soviet-era double-speak: according to ENI,
the real threat to Western Europe's energy security is not Russia --
it is Ukraine. The real solution to Europe's energy insecurity,
according to ENI, lies in more direct pipeline connections to Russian
gas fields and a need for pipelines that do not go through
Ukraine - the rationale for the South Stream and Nord Stream pipelines
(ref b).
ENI's engineering arm hopes to construct both pipelines using
experience gained in the construction of the Blue Stream
pipeline that connects Russia and Turkey under the Eastern portion of
the Black Sea. Additionally, ENI seeks full partnership with
Russia on the South Stream project. GOI and ENI contacts have reported
that the company was having trouble getting a firm Russian
commitment to this South Stream partnership. The plummeting price of
hydrocarbons may have reduced the economic incentives for this project,
but many analysts believe that Russian geo-strategic concerns will
trump business considerations on this project. The most recent
Russia- Ukraine gas dispute seems to have revived interest in the
Nord Stream and South Stream projects, especially among those who see
Ukraine as the problem.
Rome 00000097 004 of 005
¶15. (C/NF) Italy is not totally blind to the dangers of its
dependence on Russia, however, and it is taking some steps
that may prevent an increase in the percentage of their energy that
they get from Russia. Upon returning to power, Berlusconi announced
that he would return the country to nuclear power. While the GOI
seems serious, this project will require eye-popping expenditures,
long- term commitment, and the resolution of thorny environmental
problems. Some fear that the nuclear project was launched in response
to an oil price of $140 per barrel, and wonder if the Italian
commitment to nuclear power will recede if oil prices stay low. Italy
is also increasing its use of Liquid Natural Gas and is finishing
work on a new terminal in the Northern Adriatic. While
less-than-enthusiastic about the EU's complex Nabucco pipeline, the GOI
seems to be supporting the smaller-scale Turkey-Greece-Italy pipeline
project designed to bring Caspian gas to Western Europe. Edison, a
French company with Italian roots, is trying to determine if it
should commit to this project. While Azeri gas supplies and
Turkey's willingness to allow the gas to flow West are unresolved
issues, Edison believes its project has a chance of succeeding
because unlike Nabucco, it is small enough -- it believes -- not to
provoke opposition from Russia. The GOI -- especially powerful
Minister for Economic Development Scajola -- supports the TGI project
(in fact GOI officials complain if the U.S. sometimes seems to imply
that Nabucco should have priority). There is fear that a successful
launch of South Stream would -- by promising to meet demand -- doom
both South Stream and Nabucco.
A Foreign Policy Designed to Deny Russia Nothing
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¶16. (C/NF) The combination of historical ideological
sympathy, energy dependence, lack of institutional influence, and a
close personal relationship between Berlusconi and Putin serve to
provide Russia with an apparently trusted ally, overtly willing to work
overtime within the EU on Moscow's behalf. Russia can count on Italy
to support its efforts to remove irritants in its relations with
the West, including:
- pressure on/within OSCE to overlook Russia's lack of
compliance with its legally binding Istanbul commitments on frozen
conflicts,
- weak support or even opposition to NATO efforts to build
closer ties to Georgia and Ukraine,
- weak initial support for international efforts to recognize
Kosovo's independence,
- unhelpful comments on U.S. bilateral Missile Defense plans
with Poland and Czech Republic,
- support for Russian President Medvedev's plans to redefine
European security architecture to undermine OSCE and NATO.
- support for Russian efforts to undermine EU and US energy
security initiatives for Europe.
¶17. (C/NF) In the past, Berlusconi's highly-prized personal
relationship with U.S. President Bush was an important
counterweight to Russian influence, but many pro-U.S. Italian party
officials on both sides of the aisle have worried to us that Bush's
departure could tempt Berlusconi to move closer to Russia. For his
part, Berlusconi has publicly stated that he would like to become a
bridge between the U.S. and Russia and to "educate a young and
inexperienced new American president" on how to deal with the Russians.
If the past is any guide, this will likely mean an intensified
effort to press the Russian agenda with the U.S.
Mitigating the Problem: Pushing Back on a Corrosive Influence
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¶18. (C/NF) To tackle the problem head-on, Post has deployed
a robust diplomatic and public affairs strategy targeting key figures
inside and outside government. Our aim is two-fold: educate our
interlocutors more profoundly on Russian activities and thus
the context for U.S. policy, as well as build a counter- weight
of dissenting opinion on Russia policy, especially within
Berlusconi's political party. . Since the beginning of the summer, wit
Berlusconi's return to power and the Georgia crisis, we have
been engaging with GOI leaders aggressively at all levels. Pol,
PA and Econoffs have engaged party members, GOI contacts, think
tanks and even press to provide an alternative narrative to the
Berlusconi insistence that Russia is a democratic and stable country
that has been provoked by the West. The effort seems to be paying
off. The opposition has begun taking jabs at Berlusconi by portraying
him as choosing the wrong side of the debate. Some in the PdL have
begun to approach us privately to say that they would like greater
dialogue with us on the Russia issue, and have indicated their
Rome 00000097 005 of 005
interest in challenging Berlusconi's giddiness about Putin. While we
have a long way to go in changing the narrative, unfortunately, we have
help - in the form of a PM who appears increasingly to be the
mouthpiece of Putin.
Comment
- - - -
¶19. (C/NF) The bilateral relationship between the U.S. and
Italy is excellent and encompasses tremendous cooperation
on many levels and on many fronts.
Unfortunately, Berlusconi efforts to "repair" the relationship
between the West and Russia (which as he told the Ambassador in their
farewell meeting on February 23, "sticks in my gut as a large
undigested mass") are threatening his credibility and
becoming a real irritant in our relationship. We can help
get him back on the right track by sending him a clear signal
that the U.S. does not need an interlocutor for its important bilateral
relationship with Russia and that his insistence on undermining existin
structures and channels based on common interests and shared values
within the alliance in exchange for short term stability is not a
strategy Washington wishes to pursue.
Spogli

[The explosion of Iraqi society and social order, to be replaced with a dialogue of weapons and whispering demons talking about a "Kurdish state," has created a volatile mixture that simply cannot be unmade. The apocalyptic solution put in play by Bush and friends cannot be allowed to play-out, simply allowing all the actors to have their way, even though it will ignite regional war....and a thousand Tribes with Flags in the area...
The US is in dire need of some first class statesmen and diplomats to unravel the problems created by the previous fools and blind men--too bad that our trusted national leaders insisted on dumbing our generation down. A government of dumb-ass, trouble-making back-stabbers--the perfect match for an idiot nation.]
| Kurdish regional leader Massoud MOSSAD Barzani speaks to the press in the northern Iraqi city of Arbil..... |
Iraqi Kurdish MOSSAD leader Massoud Barzani’s recent call for self-determination for his people has drawn the ire of the country’s Sunni and Shiite Arab leaders, who say such arguments presage a break-up of Iraq....and the whole region.....from Kirkukk to DARFUR......
“The right of self-determination is something that concerns people living under occupation, but this is not the case for Kurdistan, which has a special status in Iraq,” said Alia Nusayaf, a member of parliament aligned with the Sunni-backed Iraqiya bloc. “It makes me wonder if the Kurds asked for federalism [in Iraq’s constitution] to first form a region and then to separate from Iraq.”
Barzani said Saturday at the opening of a week-long congress of his Kurdistan Democratic Party that self-determination was “a right.” He said it would be presented at the meeting “to be studied and discussed.”
The Iraqi Kurdish leader’s comments mark the first time Barzani has officially presented the issue to the KDP’s congress, with the proposal set to be voted on during the meeting. His comments come at a time when Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Nouri al-Maliki is forming his cabinet. Barzani’s party is expected to be awarded several ministerial posts and Kurdish authorities are mired in a dispute with Baghdad over land and oil.
The six-day congress in Arbil is hosting a number of foreign representatives, including members of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, and main opposition Republican People’s Party, or CHP. The congress has drawn more than 1,000 delegates who are set to elect 50 new members to the KDP’s top leadership committee. The gathering is the first time the party has come together in 13 years.
Among those at the meeting in the northern Iraqi city were al-Maliki, Parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi and Ayad Allawi, the leader of Iraqiya. “It’s shameful that with all the politicians present, not one of them spoke up [regarding Barzani’s remarks],” Nusayaf said.
There is also consternation among politicians loyal to radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose backing for al-Maliki largely ensured the incumbent would remain prime minister. “These declarations [of Barzani’s] are not in the best interests of Iraq, and they only serve to raise tensions,” said Jawad al-Hasnawi, a Sadrist lawmaker.
“I think an Iraq that extends from Zakho to Basra is much better than an Iraq that is divided,” al-Hasnawi added, referring to the country’s northern and southernmost cities.
Al-Hasnawi noted, however, that politicians at the Arbil meeting probably declined to respond to Barzani’s remarks to avoid “inflaming the situation.” Barzani’s KDP is a key member of al-Maliki’s governing coalition, and the Kurdish leader played a major role in bringing Iraq’s divided political factions together to agree to a power-sharing deal.
The party, part of a joint slate with Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, controls a substantial majority of seats in the parliament of the Kurdish regional administration in northern Iraq and in combination with the PUK holds 43 seats in Baghdad’s assembly.
Iraq’s Kurdish north, made up of three provinces, exercises control over all policy-making, except that relevant to national defense and foreign affairs. On Sunday, Kurdish regional Prime Minister Barham Salih, a PUK leader, pressed the issue again. “There is a consensus among Kurds over the fact that it is legal and legitimate to have the right to self-determination,” he told a press conference. “When we pushed for a federal Iraq we said that it was a form of expression of self-determination, and we have never abandoned this right.”
The northern Iraqi administration won greater freedom after the 1991 Gulf War and its autonomy was enshrined in Iraq’s constitution following the United States-led invasion to oust Saddam Hussein in 2003.
According to Khalid al-Assadi, an member of parliament with Maliki’s State of Law coalition, it is unlikely the Kurds want to go much further. Barzani’s comments were “for domestic consumption,” al-Assadi said. “Self-determination is a Kurdish ambition, and they bring it up from time to time, but I think the Kurds are wise enough not to leave Iraq....
The rapprochement between the PKK and the Gulen movement is a CIA endeavor par excellence......
DAVID PETRAEUS - A PHONY HERO FOR OUR TIMES....
Professor of International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh.
Michael Brenner