The goals for India's anti-ballistic missile (ABM) and ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs may be shifting to accommodate an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon more quickly than previously planned, and this could radically alter the agenda of US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who is currently in the middle of a three-day visit to India.
"Memories in New Delhi run deep about how India's relative tardiness in developing strategic offensive systems [nuclear weapons] redounded in its relegation on 'judgment day' [when the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed in 1968] to the formal category of non-nuclear weapons state," said Sourabh Gupta, senior research associate at Samuels International Associates in Washington, DC.
"With its early support of the former US president George W Bush's ballistic missile defense program and its current drive to
develop anti-ballistic missile/anti-satellite capability, is determined not to make the same mistake twice," added Gupta. "If and when globally negotiated restraints are placed on such strategic defensive systems or technologies - perhaps restraints of some sort of ASAT testing/hit-to-kill technologies - India will already have crossed the technical threshold in that regard, and acknowledgement of such status [will be] grand-fathered into any such future ."
After watching China's moves since the highly controversial satellite shootdown which China undertook in January 2007, India has now openly declared its desire to match China.
"There is no reason to be surprised. India is anxious to be seen as not lagging behind China - ergo - if China has an ASAT , India can do it, too. That's all there is to it." said Uzi Rubin, a defense consultant and former head of Israel's organization.
China was not specifically mentioned by V K Saraswat, of India's Defense Organization (DRDO), when he announced at the 97th Indian Science Congress earlier this month that India had begun to develop an anti-satellite capability. He declared that India is "working to ensure space security and protect our . At the same time, we are also working on how to deny the enemy access to its space assets."
There is no doubt as to the identity of the "enemy" in question.
"The Indians are engaged in a major active missile defenseprogram which, because of the technological affinity betweenmissile defense and ASAT, could eventually grow up to the latter," said Rubin. "India, like all countries with their own space assets, is aware that ASAT is a double-edged sword and that if they embark on a program, they will legitimize the Chinese programand endanger their own national satellites."
As for Saraswat's statement - "India is putting together building blocks of technology that could be used to neutralize enemysatellites" - Rubin almost downplays it entirely.
"His is quite a tepid statement, I wouldn't make much of it," said Rubin.
On , Subrata Ghoshroy, research associate in the Working Group in the Science, Technology, and Global SecurityProgram at the , has met senior former India Space Research Organization (ISRO) officials who were eager to let it be known that India has the capacity to respond.
"There are growing ties between ISRO and the Indian and the two are beginning to feed off each other," said Ghoshroy.
What Saraswat did was, in effect, to inject a powerful destabilizing element into the South Asian strategic equation at a time when the US is determined to do everything in its power to bolster regional stability.
When US Defense Secretary Robert Gates planned his trip to India this week, the last thing Gates probably expected to contend with was the possibility that New Delhi might be accelerating its timetable for the development of an ASAT weapon. Writing in in advance of his visit, Gates made no mention whatsoever of space, anti-missile activities or ASAT weapons in particular, although there are certainly space-related items on the agenda.
What Gates avoided entirely was any mention of the US acting as a solid partner and supporter of India's ASAT program. While that might well be the case, it could be argued that in the interest of regional stability, the US might at least be rethinking how it will proceed in these matters in light of mounting concerns over the situation in Pakistan where China obviously enjoys significant leverage.
China's decision this month to proceed with a well-publicized test of its midcourse missile interceptor technology - just a few days after Pradeep Kumar, India's Defense Secretary, departed from Beijing - certainly has sent a strong message, while doing the US a favor in terms of providing the US with a timely excuse for allowing India to go ahead with its plans.
However, the US cannot have it both ways in the end. Courting India as a favored client for major arms purchases one moment, and as a strategic hedge against China, and then trying to promote regional stability the next moment is not a very coherent way to make meaningful progress in South Asia. The dilemma for the US is considerable.
Saraswat was quite careful in his choice of words, and went out of his way this time to assure any interested parties, including Gates, that no actual ASAT tests were now planned by India.
Saraswat has good reason to be very careful about his choice of words. A day after the US Navy cruiser USS Lake Erie shot down an errant US spy satellite in February 2008, for example, former Indian president APJ Abdul Kalam - one of the key players in India's nuclear and missile programs - told reporters at a DRDO-sponsored International Conference on Avionics Systems in Hyderabad that India has, "the ability to intercept and destroy any spatial object or debris in a radius of 200 kilometers. We will definitely do that if it endangers Indian territory".
Saraswat, on the other hand, was less specific at the time. And while seeming to agree with Kalam's statement, he did not do so with absolute certainty.
"It is just a matter of time before we could place the necessary wherewithal to meet such requirements," Saraswat said. "We can predict and can always tackle such challenges."
India's position at the time of the China's ASAT test in January 2007 is hard to ignore. Pranab Mukherjee, India's external affairs minister, appealed for a more reasoned and less destabilizing approach by all nations as their military activities in space intensified.
"The security and safety of assets in outer space is of crucial importance," said Mukherjee. "We call upon all states to redouble efforts to strengthen the international legal regime for peaceful uses of outer space. Recent developments show that we are treading a thin line between current defense-related uses of space and its actual weaponization."
The same theme surfaced in a speech last year about the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement given by Shyam Saran, special envoy to the prime minister on climate change, at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC last March, when Saran briefly mentioned ASAT weapons.
"India is one of a handful of countries with significant space capabilities. We have a large number of communications and resource survey satellites currently in orbit. Although this does not fall strictly within the nuclear domain, the need to ensure the peaceful uses of outer space, is important for nuclear stability and international security," said Saran.
"We welcome [US President Barack Obama's] intention to join multilateral efforts to prevent military conflict in space and to negotiate an agreement to prohibit the testing of anti-satellite weapons. This is an area of convergence on which we would be happy to work together with the US and contribute to a multilateralagreement."
In early 2010, India's objectives are very clear.
"From a political/diplomatic angle, the guiding principle of India'smissile defense/ASAT policy is not much different from China's - ie, maintain a basic political commitment to the non-weaponization of space, or, at minimum, the non-deployment of space-based offensive capabilities in global disarmament talks while assiduously cultivating the domestic technical capability to use space-based resources for strategic missile defensepurposes," said Gupta.
At this point, nobody believes that some sort of magic firewall separates ongoing work on ABM and ASAT systems in a growing number of countries around the world.
"As for the linkage between BMD and ASAT, the linkage is very obvious - many Low Earth Orbit satellites orbit no higher than the ceiling of large BMD interceptors (like the US-built SM3, which was used by the US to shoot down a satellite in February, 2008) which are designed to take out very fast targets with km/sec closing speeds. Some modifications are necessary of course to take into account the greater closing speeds, but nothing drastic," said Rubin.
Saraswat knew this all too well back in 2008 when he admitted that India's efforts to deploy a missile defense system had been given a substantial boost by radar technology for tracking and fire control which the DRDO developed jointly with Israel and France. (See China can't stop India's missile system, Asia Times Online, Jan 16, 2009.)
"Israel is playing a major role in the ABM program. One can read from the open literature that they are helping India upgrade the Green Pine radar to act as the so-called Long-Range Tracking Radar (LRTR) that India has deployed and used during its ABM system tests," said Ghoshroy. "The Israelis are also reportedly providing UAV-type [unmanned aerial vehicles] platforms for forward-deployment of radars. I would not be surprised if BMC3 [battle management, command, control, and communications] expertise for the ABM system is also shared with India."
Rubin disagrees with this assessment.
"As for the question of an Israeli-Indian link in missile defense, I'm not aware of such a link since the US banned the sale of [the] Arrow [missile interceptor]," said Rubin. "If the US lifts the ban then [US defense contractors] Lockheed Martin and Raytheon will see to it that Israel is squeezed out. Anyway, the Indians have embarked on their own program."
According to Gupta, Israel's primary role is two-fold: sale of off-the-shelf defensive platforms at the present time to cover gaps in India's defense preparedness, such as the "Phalcon" phased array radar system slowly giving way to joint research and development projects in the future, such as the short-range naval anti-missile system.
"Other point radar and anti-missile defenses currently in the pipeline include aerostat (blimp/balloon-based) radars to provide coverage in sparse border areas as well as a medium-range anti-aircraft system,' said Gupta. "India's government sector defense research and development unit has a particularly poor track record in developing air-defense systems. Given Israel's immense defense-industrial sophistication in radars and avionics, the relationship between the two parties is likely to remain more in the supplier-purchaser mode rather than the joint collaborator mode."
For India, Israel is all about access to cutting-edge platforms and technologies without the unpleasant compromises to India's much cherished strategic autonomy that similar systems from the US entail.
"Though Israel with US co-development assistance has made immense strides in its strategic anti-missile capabilities, the Israeli-Indian anti-missile defense conversation has mostly concentrated on plugging gaps in the area of point defenses. Theater and strategic defenses particularly have been a lesser focus," said Gupta. "Also, the conversation has mostly been a bilateral one, and not a [trilateral] one, except [when] US technologies are embedded within Israeli systems."
More than anything else, the US is trying to open doors, not close them, as far as defense sales to India are concerned. However, India has enjoyed a long-term and relatively stable relationship with the Russians, and while that relationship has been a bit rocky of late, India may see the Russians as more reliable - and perhaps more affordable - than others standing in line.
"The Russians will come in much cheaper than the US and possibly, also the Israeli systems. For example, the Russian ABM system S-300-PMU2 is much less expensive and better performing than the US's PAC-3 or THAAD systems," said Ghoshroy.
According to Gupta, while India is increasingly open to distributing its near-term procurement needs according to the quality of the bids, India remains reticent to the extreme in broadening its procurement of strategically salient items beyond its trusted Russian sales partner.
"This calculation will change only slowly even as US defense suppliers slowly build up a relationship of trust starting with sales of platforms and moving gradually perhaps thereafter towards co-licensing/development with its Indian private defense sector partners," said Gupta.
What India really wants is for its ASAT-related technology to evolve quite quickly because India senses that China's lead is steadily increasing.
"India's anti-missile system is still embryonic. They do not yet have an infrared sensor that will be absolutely necessary for tracking and final homing," said Ghoshroy. "The Chinese obviously got that technology since they were able to track and hit their satellite."
On a side not about India...:
The United States, still by far the strongest military, economic, technological and cultural power, has begun to face the reality of limitations of military power and that the taller the rhetoric, the harder the fall. There is a realization and sotto voce admission among America’s leaders that they can no longer act unilaterally. China, possibly acting under premature hubris, seeks space for itself while the US finds it is unable to have the kind of free run it had earlier. It is this assessment that may have led to Zbigniew Brzezinski’s formulation of the Group of Two (China and US) as global arbiters. US President Barack Obama had leant backwards while in Beijing when he accommodated China in South Asia. Taking a cue from this, influential US thinktanks have now suggested that for US policies to succeed in Afghanistan, it is essential to solve the India-Pakistan tangle of Kashmir and for that it is necessary to involve China in a tripartite arrangement.
A significant power shift is likely to take place in Asia in the next few years. Whether or not India can make the triangle of US-Russia-China from Lisbon to Vladivostok into a rectangle that includes India will depend on India as much as the other players. There is a great churning of the oceans that has begun in Asia with the rise of China, the emergence of India and reawakening in Japan. The next few years will see continued struggle and competition for markets and vital resources that will shape military policies of nations and choke points will remain unstable.
The Indian Ocean has been an attraction for most empires in the past and the Czarist thrust for warm waters, or the later Soviet thrust into Afghanistan reflected this. Today the Indian Ocean acquires another strategic importance as it provides vital sea lanes to China and the rest of East Asia. China, despite the vastness of the Pacific, feels landlocked without control over the Indian Ocean. Its deep pockets have helped it acquire vital energy sources and routes that take gas through the Central Asian land mass into China, but the vast majority of energy-producing countries — Russia and West Asia — still look to the West as their main buyers. India ranks a poor third in this race.
Our own neighborhood is likely to remain unstable and Afghanistan will not get sorted out in the foreseeable future, much less by mid-2011. It is not known how many and for how long will the Western forces remain in Afghanistan. Talks with elements of the Taliban have begun at some level. Pakistan’s quest for "strategic depth" — which at best means control over the Pushtun on both sides of the Durand Line — will keep the region unsettled and increasingly Talibanised. Consequently, Pakistan will, in the next few years, become increasingly irrational in its attitude, and flail before it threatens to fail.
Handling our new-found relationship with the United States and our old friendship with Russia is going to be a challenge and an opportunity. We must accept that the US, whatever its level of desire of friendship with India, will overlook Pakistan’s India-specific delinquencies and will not even remotely jeopardize its own interests in and with China. In fact, on Pakistan, there seems to be a strong level of understanding between the two even though this may become the next battleground between both of them in the unfolding Great Game. The US has concluded that the only points of departure between the US and India are on trade, climate change and Iran. They do not think that India’s sensitivities on Pakistan’s continued support to terrorism in India and the US continuously soft-pedaling this is a serious point of departure. Behind all the conviviality and bonhomie with the US, there lurk suspicions about the various defense-related acronyms like CISMOA (Communications Interoperability Security Memorandum of Agreement), EUMA (End-Use Monitoring Agreement), Logistical Services Agreement (LSA) and Basic Exchange Cooperation Agreement (BECA), and their small print.
Pakistan is unlikely to give up its policy of using terrorism as a force multiplier as long as its leadership does not have to pay a price for this. The tactics of terrorism will become more complicated where attacks will be planned in one country, financed from another, terrorists recruited elsewhere in another country and targeted somewhere else; they will be more sophisticated and lethal in the next few years; cyber-terror by terrorists and cyberwarfare by states will be more common. There are many players in the field today — the fanatics, criminals, drug traffickers and human traffickers — which complicates even further the task of intelligence agencies.
Other global and regional issues will impact India’s security. Issues like climate change, terrorism, energy security, water shortages, food security, migration, and some purely our own — our abysmal law and order, leading to insurgencies in many cases, health, education and infrastructure issues — will ultimately create security problems. Rapid economic growth will create socio-economic pressures arising from exploding expectations and demographic pressures on urban areas.
In a tangled and shrinking world, where various — and at times — contradictory interests coalesce, with different triangular or quadrilateral groupings overlapping, the new NSA will have to have the nimbleness of a Mizo Cheraw dancer, but one is sure he is surefooted enough for these intricacies. It will be useful to remember that the job is about advising the Prime Minister on national security in its widest connotation, which includes internal as well as external security matters. The NSA’s job requirement should not include running the security and intelligence apparatus. The NSA is the ultimate consumer of intelligence, not its producer. If the NSA inadvertently becomes the man responsible for the product, then he ends up being its salesman, however shoddy the product. Instead, he should be looking for the finished product and customizing his requirements.