Russia, Turkey and the Great Game: Changing teams

Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s visit to Turkish last month shows that Turkey and Russia are rapidly developing close economic and political ties...

http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/us-missiles-and-troops-to-russian-border-1/

For all intents and purposes, Turkey has given up on the European Union, recognising it as a bastion of Islamophobia and captive to US diktat. As Switzerland bans minarets and France moves to outlaw the niqab, the popular Islamist government in Istanbul moves in the opposite direction -- supporting the freedom to wear headscarfs, boldly criticising Israel and building bridges with Syria. This is nothing less than a fundamental realignment of Turkish politics towards Turkey’s natural allies -- the Arabs ... and the Russians.

This new alignment with Russia began in 2001 when Turkish and Russian foreign ministers signed the Eurasia Cooperation Action Plan. It went into high gear in February 2009, when Turkish President Abdullah Gul made a state visit to Russia, including a visit to the Russian Federation’s thriving and energy-rich Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan, populated by a majority of Muslim Turks, with pipelines, nuclear energy and trade the focus of attention.

In the past, Russia had poor relations with Turkey, which since its founding as a republic in 1922 was firmly in the Western camp and seen by Moscow as a springboard for infiltration into the Caucasus and its Turkic southern republics. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Yeltsin’s Russia acquiesced to US hegemony in the region, and as part of this opening to the West, Turkish schools, construction firms and traders came in great numbers to the ex-Soviet “stans” (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan). 9/11 convinced Russian president Vladimir Putin to go so far as welcoming US military bases in the most strategic “stans”. The old Great Game appeared to be over, lost resoundingly by Russia.

But as the world tired of the US-sponsored “war on terrorism”, it seemed the Great Game was not over after all. A NATO member, Turkey was soon joined by Bulgaria and Romania, making the Black Sea a de facto NATO lake, alarming a now resurgent Russia.

Ukraine’s Western-backed “Orange Revolution” in 2004 further tilted the balance away from Russia, with Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko defiantly vowing to join NATO and kick the Russian fleet out of Crimea. He even armed Georgia in its war with Russia in 2008.

However, not only Russia was fed up with the new pax americana. Over 90 per cent of Turks had an unfavourable view of the US by 2007. It is no surprise that Turkey began to back away from unconditional support of NATO and the US, notably, during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, by its refusal in 2008 to allow US warships through the Bosphorus Strait to support Georgia, and by its outspoken criticism of Israel following the invasion of Gaza that year.

In contrast to the US-sponsored colour revolutions in the ex-socialist bloc, Turkey’s “Green Revolution” brought the religious-oriented Justice and Development Party to power in 2002. Its political direction has been in search of balance in the region and peaceful relations with its neighbours, including Armenia and the Kurds. In 2004 Russian president Vladimir Putin signed a joint declaration of cooperation in Ankara, updated in February 2009 by Gul and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in Moscow. Gul declared, “Russia and Turkey are neighbouring countries that are developing their relations on the basis of mutual confidence. I hope this visit will in turn give a new character to our relations.”

Key to this is Turkey’s proposal for the establishment of a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Following Gul’s visit, Turkish media even described Turkish-Russian relations as a “strategic partnership”, which no doubt set off alarm bells in Washington.

None of this would be taking place without solid economic interests. Turkish-Russian economic ties have greatly expanded over the past decade, with trade reaching $33 billion in 2008, much if it gas and oil, making Russia Turkey’s number one partner. They may soon use the Turkish lira and the Russian ruble in foreign trade.

This is the context of Medvedev’s visit 13 January to Ankara, which focussed primarily on energy cooperation. Russia’s AtomStroiExport had won the tender for the construction of Turkey’s first nuclear plant last year, and Medvedev was eager to get final approval on Turkish cooperation in Gazprom’s South Stream gas pipeline to Europe. Turkey will soon get up to 80 per cent of its gas from Russia, but this dependency is no longer viewed as a liability in light of the two countries’ new strategic relations.

Just what will happen to the West’s rival Nabucco pipeline, also intended to transit Turkey, is now a moot point. Nabucco hopes to bring gas from Iran and Azerbaijan to Europe through Turkey and Georgia. Given the standoff between the West and Iran and the instability of Georgia, this alternative to Russia’s plans looks increasingly unattractive. Azerbaijan, shrewdly, has already signed up with South Stream.

Kommersant quoted Gazprom officials as saying that Turkey could soon join Italy and Germany as Russia’s “strategic partner”. Italy’s ENI is co-funding the South Stream project. The other arm of Gazprom’s pincer move around Ukraine is Nord Stream, and Germany late last year gave its final approval for Nord Stream. A Polish minister compared the Russia-Germany Nord Stream project to the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentropp pact, because the pipeline allows Russia to deliver gas to Western Europe and “turn off the taps” to Ukraine in case it stops paying or starts stealing gas as happened several times under the Orange revolutionaries.

Turkey is very much a key player in this new Great Game, only it appears to have changed sides. The Russian and Turkish prime ministers voiced the hope that their trade would triple by 2015, and announced plans to for a visa-free regime by May this year. “In the end, without doubt, [a visa-free regime] will lead to activating cooperation between our countries,” said Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan.

The presidential elections now in progress in Ukraine could take some of the wind out of the sails of South Stream. Its rationale could be brought into question if the new Ukrainian president succeeds in convincing Moscow that s/he will make sure no further hanky-panky takes place. Ukraine, in dire economic straits, needs the transit fees, which would disappear if current plans go ahead. But the damage the Orange revolutionaries did to Ukraine’s economy and relations with Russia is already a fait accompli. Says Alexander Rahr at the German Council on Foreign Relations, “Under every leadership, Ukraine will try to make use of its geographical position and the Russians realised this some time ago. This is why they desperately need a way to circumvent Ukraine.”

Even if Ukraine, too, changes teams and rejects NATO expansion plans, it will still have to thrash out a new role, most likely minus its gas transit commissions. Contender Viktor Yanukovich has signalled he would sign up to an economic cooperation agreement with Russia and smooth over existing political problems like the question of the Russian fleet and possibly the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Turkey could well follow suit. “If any Western country is going to recognise the independence of Abkhazia, it will be Turkey because of a large Abkhazian diaspora there,” says Rahr.

There is no reason why Ukraine couldn’t join the budding Russian-Turkish alliance, founded on regional stability and peace, unlike the current NATO-led one of confrontation and enmity. This would leave only the mad Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili quixotically fighting his windmills, dictator of a rump state -- the very opposite of his intended role as NATO’s valiant knight leading its march eastward. Even inveterate Turkish foe Armenia seems eager to join the new line-up, as last year’s exchange of ambassadors demonstrated.

Russia, China and Iran harmonize their competing interests?

Russia, China and Iran harmonize their competing interests?

http://defensetech.org/2010/01/06/intel-us-shuts-down-arms-shipment-to-georgia/

The inauguration of the Dauletabad-Sarakhs-Khangiran pipeline on Wednesday connecting Iran's northern Caspian region with Turkmenistan's vast gas field may go unnoticed amid the Western media cacophony that it is "apocalypse now" for the Islamic regime in Tehran.

The event sends strong messages for regional security. Within the space of three weeks, Turkmenistan has committed its entire gas exports to China, Russia and Iran. It has no urgent need of the pipelines that the United States and the European Union have been advancing. Are we hearing the faint notes of a Russia-China-Iran symphony?

The 182-kilometer Turkmen-Iranian pipeline starts modestly with the pumping of 8 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Turkmen gas. But its annual capacity is 20bcm, and that would meet the energy requirements of Iran's Caspian region and enable Tehran to free its own gas production in the southern fields for export. The mutual interest is perfect: Ashgabat gets an assured market next door; northern Iran can consume without fear of winter shortages; Tehran can generate more surplus for exports; Turkmenistan can seek transportation routes to the world market via Iran; and Iran can aspire to take advantage of its excellent geographical location as a hub for the Turkmen exports...
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=4913

We are witnessing a new pattern of energy cooperation at the regional level that dispenses with Big Oil. Russia traditionally takes the lead. China and Iran follow the example. Russia, Iran and Turkmenistan hold respectively the world's largest, second-largest and fourth-largest gas reserves. And China will be consumer par excellence in this century. The matter is of profound consequence to the US global strategy.



The Turkmen-Iranian pipeline mocks the US's Iran policy. The US is threatening Iran with new sanctions and claims Tehran is "increasingly isolated". But Mahmud Ahmadinejad's presidential jet winds its way through a Central Asian tour and lands in Ashgabat for a red-carpet welcome by his Turkmen counterpart, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, and a new economic axis emerges. Washington's coercive diplomacy hasn't worked. Turkmenistan, with a gross domestic product of US$18.3 billion, defied the sole superpower (GDP of $14.2 trillion) - and, worse still, made it look routine..... http://digitaljournal.com/article/285718

There are subplots, too. Tehran claims to have a deal with Ankara to transport Turkmen gas to Turkey via the existing 2,577km pipeline connecting Tabriz in northwestern Iran with Ankara. Indeed, Turkish diplomacy has an independent foreign-policy orientation. Turkey also aspires to be a hub for Europe's energy supplies. Europe may be losing the battle for establishing direct access to the Caspian.

Second, Russia does not seem perturbed by China tapping into Central Asian energy. Europe's need for Russian energy imports has dropped and Central Asian energy-producing countries are tapping China's market. From the Russian point of view, China's imports should not deprive it of energy (for its domestic consumption or exports). Russia has established deep enough presence in the Central Asian and Caspian energy sector to ensure it faces no energy shortage.

What matters most to Russia is that its dominant role as Europe's No 1 energy provider is not eroded. So long as the Central Asian countries have no pressing need for new US-backed trans-Caspian pipelines, Russia is satisfied.

During his recent visit to Ashgabat, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev normalized Russian-Turkmen energy ties. The restoration of ties with Turkmenistan is a major breakthrough for both countries. One, a frozen relationship is being resumed substantially, whereby Turkmenistan will maintain an annual supply of 30bcm to Russia. Two, to quote Medvedev, "For the first time in the history of Russian-Turkmen relations, gas supplies will be carried out based on a price formula that is absolutely in line with European gas market conditions." Russian commentators say Gazprom will find it unprofitable to buy Turkmen gas and if Moscow has chosen to pay a high price, that is primarily because of its resolve not to leave gas that could be used in alternative pipelines, above all in the US-backed Nabucco project.




Third, contrary to Western propaganda, Ashgabat does not see the Chinese pipeline as a substitute for Gazprom. Russia's pricing policy ensures that Ashgabat views Gazprom as an irreplaceable customer. The export price of the Turkmen gas to be sold to China is still under negotiation and the agreed price simply cannot match the Russian offer.

Fourth, Russia and Turkmenistan reiterated their commitment to the Caspian Coastal Pipeline (which will run along the Caspian's east coast toward Russia) with a capacity of 30bcm. Evidently, Russia hopes to cluster additional Central Asian gas from Turkmenistan (and Kazakhstan).

Fifth, Moscow and Ashgabat agreed to build jointly an east-west pipeline connecting all Turkmen gas fields to a single network so that the pipelines leading toward Russia, Iran and China can draw from any of the fields.

Indeed, against the backdrop of the intensification of the US push toward Central Asia, Medvedev's visit to Ashgabat impacted on regional security. At the joint press conference with Medvedev, Berdymukhammedov said the views of Turkmenistan and Russia on the regional processes, particularly in Central Asia and the Caspian region, were generally the same. He underlined that the two countries were of the view that the security of one cannot be achieved at the expense of the other. Medvedev agreed that there was similarity or unanimity between the two countries on issues related to security and confirmed their readiness to work together.
The United States' pipeline diplomacy in the Caspian, which strove to bypass Russia, elbow out China and isolate Iran, has foundered. Russia is now planning to double its intake of Azerbaijani gas, which further cuts into the Western efforts to engage Baku as a supplier for Nabucco. In tandem with Russia, Iran is also emerging as a consumer of Azerbaijani gas. In December, Azerbaijan inked an agreement to deliver gas to Iran through the 1,400km Kazi-Magomed-Astara pipeline.

The "big picture" is that Russia's South Stream and North Stream, which will supply gas to northern and southern Europe, have gained irreversible momentum. The stumbling blocks for North Stream have been cleared as Denmark (in October), Finland and Sweden (in November) and Germany (in December) approved the project from the environmental angle. The pipeline's construction will commence in the spring.

The $12-billion pipeline built jointly by Gazprom, Germany's E.ON Ruhrgas and BASF-Wintershall, and the Dutch gas transportation firm Gasunie bypasses the Soviet-era transit routes via Ukraine, Poland and Belarus and runs from the northwestern Russian port of Vyborg to the German port of Greifswald along a 1,220km route under the Baltic Sea. The first leg of the project with a carrying capacity of 27.5bcm annually will be completed next year and the capacity will double by 2012. North Stream will profoundly affect the geopolitics of Eurasia, trans-Atlantic equations and Russia's ties with Europe.

To be sure, 2009 proved to be a momentous year for the "energy war". The Chinese pipeline inaugurated by President Hu Jintao on December 14; the oil terminal near the port city of Nakhodka in Russia's far east inaugurated by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on December 27 (which will be served by the mammoth $22-billion oil pipeline from the new fields in eastern Siberia leading to China and the Asia-Pacific markets); and the Iranian pipeline inaugurated by Ahmadinejad on January 6 - the energy map of Eurasia and the Caspian has been virtually redrawn.

The year 2010 begins on a fascinating new note: will Russia, China and Iran coordinate future moves or at least harmonize their competing interests?

Focus On CHINA proper.....

Every day that Taiwan remains independent and free is a state of affairs that the Chinese Central Government finds difficult to accept. The reason why is that China is not as unified as the international press and China's Government likes to portray.

Most Westerners view China as one large monolithic state with a billion plus citizens. The reality on the ground is different. China is a country made up of numerous territories and provinces who have always had a certain degree of autonomy ... and antipathy towards Beijing and the Central Government.

This is why the democracy protests at Tienanmen in 1989 had to be put down. The fear is that if the Central Government becomes weak, the provinces and outer regions of China would then ask for autonomy and (in some cases) independence from the Central Government. Even in the heartland of China .... there is a demand for less central power and more provincial responsibility.

Taiwan is just a victim of China's own internal politics, and the US with its military weapons is just a sideshow and excuse to what the Chinese authorities really fear .... the man on the Chinese street who wants more power to run (and be responsible for) his own governance....

Russia, China getting closer and closer

Russia, China getting closer and closer , while USA and its cohorts continue their hegemonic drive worldwide in a futile attempt at fracturing the world into thousands of tribes with flags to further their own desires at militarizing energy and controlling all trading routes , pipelines and sealanes/chokepoints....etc.


Westernism is giving way to Orientalism in Moscow's outlook, if the past week's happenings are any guide. As Russia's ties with the West deteriorate, an upswing in its strategic partnership with China becomes almost inevitable.

The resumption of Russia-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) dialogue has gone awry. And the nascent hopes regarding a "reset of the button" of the Russian-American relationship are belied. With Moscow under multiple pressures from the West, two top Chinese officials have arrived in the Russian capital to offer support - Defense Minister Liang Guanglie and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi.

Moscow angrily reacted to NATO's expulsion of two Russian diplomats on Wednesday. In exceptionally strong language, it called the NATO move a "crude provocation" and an "outrageous action". The Foreign Ministry alleged that certain "completely unscrupulous ... forces" in the West were "hectically" creating pretexts for obstructing Russia's dialogue with Europe.

The two diplomats to NATO headquarters in Brussels are the Russian mission's senior adviser and political desk chief Viktor Kochukov and mission attache and executive secretary Vasily Chizhov. They were accused of espionage "incompatible with the diplomatic status".

The Russian mission to NATO went a step further to allege an attempt to "disrupt a reset in relations between Russia and the US". In immediate terms, the scheduled Russia-NATO foreign minister-level meeting on May 19 in Brussels appears problematic. Hardliners have prevailed.

Unsurprisingly, Moscow has also ratcheted up its condemnation of NATO's 27-day military exercise in Georgia, due to start this coming Tuesday. President Dmitry Medvedev called the exercises "an open provocation" and warned that there could be "negative consequences for those who made the decision to hold them". He accused the alliance of encouraging Georgia's "re-militarization". Russia seems to estimate a larger plot to corner it in the Caucasus.

In a pre-emptive move, Moscow on Thursday signed five-year border defense agreements with Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia whereby the two regions will delegate their border security (including the maritime frontiers) to Russian forces.

Rivalries over control of Caspian oil provide the backdrop to these rapid developments involving Georgia. Conceivably, the hardliners would exploit the spiraling tensions to brand "revanchist" Russia at the summit meeting of the European Union (EU) in Prague this coming Thursday, which is expected to take a view on the two rival pipeline projects that aim to transport Caspian and Central Asian gas to Europe - South Stream, sponsored by Russia, and Nabucco, supported by the US.

At the Prague summit, Europe's dependence on Russia for its energy supplies will come under scrutiny. There is mounting frustration among the proponents of Nabucco that Moscow is steadily advancing South Stream. Yet, leading European countries like Germany, France and Italy are at ease with Russia. US attempts to stall South Stream have been of no avail.

Last Tuesday, Russia's Gazprom and the Bulgarian gas utility Bulgargaz initialed a cooperation agreement on a feasibility study for South Stream. But the Bulgarian side cannot formalize the South Stream agreement before the EU summit meeting of May 7. Washington hopes that the parliamentary elections in Bulgaria due in early July may postpone the agreement. It will be a close call.

All these factors are at work in the current tensions between NATO and Russia. But that isn't all. NATO, with active US support, is once again making a determined effort to pitch its tent in Central Asia. The latest Western attempt to establish a NATO regional centre on terrorism in Tajikistan comes on top of the US's agreement with Tajikistan regarding a basing facility for NATO operations in Afghanistan. The US has secured similar facilities in Uzbekistan and negotiations are underway with Turkmenistan.

However, no matter the criticality of the Afghan situation, the US is insisting that NATO should sidestep offers of help from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In effect, the US's containment strategy of the George W Bush era still remains intact at the operational level in Central Asia, no matter President Barack Obama's promise to revamp US regional policy.

Chinese newspaper the People's Daily recently featured a commentary broadly estimating that while Obama's diplomacy was characterized by "soft power", that was merely tactical, since "the US will not give up its dominant role in world affairs ... Wrapping a big stick in a layer of soft sponge or putting a carrot at the front and a big stick at the back, the US has never given up its powerful military force ... Diplomatic policy is also a kind of political game. One of its fundamental principles is to obtain the largest benefit at the least cost. The adjustment of Obama's diplomatic policy notably predicates a reduction of cost, without any change in their goal to obtain the most benefits."

The commentary likely had Central Asia in mind. Both Russia and China will take note that US regional policy cuts into their core interests. Russia's state television, Rossiya, showed a documentary last week accusing the US of using its air base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, for running intelligence operations. Rossiya showed clippings of a windowless two-storey building in the Manas base, which it said was the hub of a major US radio-intelligence unit. (Manas is close to China's missile sites in Xinjiang.) There are signs that Moscow and Beijing will invest the SCO as a key instrument to counter the US moves to expand NATO into the Central Asian region. The SCO conducted war games in Tajikistan recently, simulating an attack by al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, in which terrorists seized a chemical factory and took its workers hostage.

Medvedev has called for a stronger role for SCO in stabilizing Afghanistan. Arguably, by prevailing on Bishkek to evict the US from Manas, Moscow signaled that it was reviewing the rules of the game in Central Asia. A cat and mouse game is going on. Washington kept up an appearance for weeks as if it was reconciled with the closure of Manas, while Moscow (and Beijing) put on an air of indifference. But now it transpires the Pentagon is seeking a reversal of the decision by the Kyrgyz government. "We are still engaged with the Kyrgyz ... They have given us notification and they want to end the presence of the US basing abilities in Kyrgyzstan, but the story is not over there yet," a US official was quoted as saying.

On Wednesday, Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said, "I think there's actually progress in dealing with the Kyrgyz on Manas ... And I think we see reason for hope there, that that can be worked out ... We hope we're getting closer." On the other hand, Bishkek keeps affirming that its decision is irrevocable. Kyrgyz Prime Minister Igor Chudinov insisted, "Not a single government official has been authorized to hold such negotiations. No one. I have no information about such negotiations."

At any rate, Russia plans to increase the number of military aircraft at the Kant air base in Kyrgyzstan. "It is in line with the situation in Central Asia and Afghanistan," CSTO secretary general Nikolai Bordyuzha said. There is also a concerted attempt on the part of Moscow to rally the CSTO. Moscow will host a CSTO summit meeting on June 14, which is expected to formalize the creation of the alliance's new rapid reaction forces. To be sure, Moscow is reasserting its role as the guarantor of security for Central Asia.

But Moscow also regards the SCO as a forum within which it has the unique opportunity to coordinate with China. While receiving the SCO defense ministers who gathered in Moscow this week, Medvedev said, "Overall, the region in which the SCO operates is a complex one, and so we have to take into account the reality that surrounds us, and the need for our countries to jointly coordinate efforts on a wide range of issues, including security and the defense capability of our countries on a collective basis."

The defense ministers' meeting in Moscow on Wednesday saw a strong affirmation by China on enhanced SCO cooperation to confront regional challenges. In an oblique reference to the US, Liang called for the eschewal of "antagonism, clique politics and unilateralism" and underlined that the SCO has a role to play in the entire Eurasian region. Russia and China separately agreed on an intensified program of bilateral military cooperation that includes as many as 25 joint maneuvers in 2009 in a demonstration of the strengthening of strategic ties.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also expressed similar sentiments earlier in the week after his talks with his visiting Chinese counterpart. Lavrov said Moscow and Beijing favored the "comprehensive strengthening of the SCO as a key factor of the promotion of stability and security in the Central Asian region". Lavrov summed up that two chief principles lie at the core of the "dynamically evolving" Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation. One, the two countries share a common perspective on the contemporary world processes.

Two, the two countries will "always support each other on concrete issues" that directly affect their national interests. Carefully choosing his words, Lavrov added that Russia and China agreed during consultations in Moscow that "such comradely mutual assistance" is only going to be strengthened.

The US strategy in Europe, Russia, Turkey and by extension to the Caucasus will utterly fail in time.

The US strategy in Europe, Russia, Turkey and by extension to the Caucasus will utterly fail in time.... Turkey, Russia, Europe and Co. will come ahead.

Here is the CIA's disinformation to prove its utter ignorance....

The week-long extravaganza of meetings between the Group of 20 (G-20), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union, United States and Turkey has ended. The spin emerging from the meetings, echoed in most of the media, sought to portray the meetings as a success and as reflecting a re-emergence of trans-Atlantic unity....

The reality, however, is that the meetings ended in apparent unity because the United States accepted European unwillingness to compromise on key issues. United States President Barack CIA Obama wanted the week to appear successful, and therefore backed off on key issues; the Europeans did the same. Moreover, Obongo appears to have set a process in motion that bypasses Europe to focus on his last stop: Turkey.

Berlin, Washington and the G-20

Let's begin with the G-20 meeting, which focused on the global financial crisis. As we said last year, there were many European positions, but the United States was reacting to Germany's. Not only is Germany the largest economy in Europe, it is the largest exporter in the world. Any agreement that did not include Germany would be useless, whereas an agreement excluding the rest of Europe but including Germany would still be useful.

Two fundamental issues divided the United States and Germany. The first was whether Germany would match or come close to the US stimulus package. The United States wanted Germany to stimulate its own domestic demand. Obama feared that if the United States put a stimulus plan into place, Germany would use increased demand in the US market to expand its exports. The United States would wind up with massive deficits while the Germans took advantage of US spending, thus letting Berlin enjoy the best of both worlds. Washington felt it had to stimulate its economy, and that this would inevitably benefit the rest of the world. But Washington wanted burden sharing. Berlin, quite rationally, did not. Even before the meetings, the United States dropped the demand - Germany was not going to cooperate.

The second issue was the financing of the bailout of the Central European banking system, heavily controlled by Eurozone banks and part of the EU financial system. The Germans did not want an EU effort to bail out the banks. They wanted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to bail out a substantial part of the EU financial system instead. The reason was simple: The IMF receives loans from the United States, as well as China and Japan, meaning the Europeans would be joined by others in underwriting the bailout. The United States has signaled it would be willing to contribute $100 billion to the IMF, of which a substantial portion would go to Central Europe. (Of the current loans given by the IMF, roughly 80% have gone to the struggling economies in Central Europe.) The United States therefore essentially has agreed to the German position.

Later, at the NATO meeting, the Europeans - including Germany - declined to send substantial forces to Afghanistan. Instead, they designated a token force of 5,000, most of whom are scheduled to be in Afghanistan only until the August elections there, and few of whom actually would be engaged in combat operations. This is far below what Obama had been hoping for when he began his presidency.

Agreement was reached on collaboration in detecting international tax fraud and on further collaboration in managing the international crisis, however. But what that means remains extremely vague - as it was meant to be, since there was no consensus on what was to be done. In fact, the actual guidelines will still have to be hashed out at the G-20 finance ministers' meeting in Scotland in November. Intriguingly, after insisting on the creation of a global regulatory regime - and with the vague US assent - the European Union failed to agree on European regulations. In a meeting in Prague on April 4, the United Kingdom rejected the regulatory regime being proposed by Germany and France, saying it would leave the British banking system at a disadvantage.

Overall, the G-20 and the NATO meetings did not produce significant breakthroughs. Rather than pushing hard on issues or trading concessions - such as accepting Germany's unwillingness to increase its stimulus package in return for more troops in Afghanistan - the United States failed to press or bargain. It preferred to appear as part of a consensus rather than appear isolated. The United States systematically avoided any appearance of disagreement.

The reason there was no bargaining was fairly simple: the Germans were not prepared to bargain. They came to the meetings with prepared positions, and the United States had no levers with which to move them. The only option was to withhold funding for the IMF, and that would have been a political disaster (not to mention economically rather unwise). The United States would have been seen as unwilling to participate in multilateral solutions rather than Germany being seen as trying to foist its economic problems on others. Obama has positioned himself as a multilateralist and can't afford the political consequences of deviating from this perception. Contributing to the IMF, in these days of trillion-dollar bailouts, was the lower-cost alternative. Thus, the Germans have the US boxed in.

The political aspect of this should not be underestimated. George W Bush had extremely bad relations with the Europeans (in large part because he was prepared to confront them). This was Obama's first major international foray, and he could not let it end in acrimony or wind up being seen as unable to move the Europeans after running a campaign based on his ability to manage the Western coalition. It was important that he come home having reached consensus with the Europeans. Backing off on key economic and military demands gave him that "consensus".

Turkey and Obongo's CIA2 deeper games

But it was not simply a matter of domestic politics. It is becoming clear that Obama is playing a deeper game. A couple of weeks before the meetings, when it had become obvious that the Europeans were not going to bend on the issues that concerned the United States, Obama scheduled a trip to Turkey. During the EU meetings in Prague, Obama vigorously supported the Turkish application for EU membership, which several members are blocking on grounds of concerns over human rights and the role of the military in Turkey. But the real reason is that full membership would open European borders to Turkish migration, and the Europeans do not want free Turkish migration. The United States directly confronted the Europeans on this matter.

During the NATO meeting, a key item on the agenda was the selection of a new alliance secretary general. The favorite was former Danish prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Turkey opposed his candidacy because of his defense on grounds of free speech of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed published in a Danish magazine. NATO operates on consensus, so any one member can block just about anything. The Turks backed off the veto, but won two key positions in NATO, including that of deputy secretary general.

So while the Germans won their way at the meetings, it was the Turks who came back with the most. Not only did they boost their standing in NATO, they got Obama to come to a vigorous defense of the Turkish application for membership in the European Union, which of course the United States does not belong to. Obama then flew to Turkey for meetings and to attend a key international meeting that will allow him to further position the United States in relation to Islam.

The Russian dimension

Let's diverge to another dimension of these talks, which still concerns Turkey, but also concerns the Russians. While atmospherics after the last week's meetings might have improved, there was certainly no fundamental shift in US-Russian relations.

The Russians have rejected the idea of pressuring Iran over its nuclear program in return for the United States abandoning its planned ballistic missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. The United States simultaneously downplayed the importance of a Russian route to Afghanistan. Washington said there were sufficient supplies in Afghanistan and enough security on the Pakistani route such that the Russians weren't essential for supplying Western operations in Afghanistan.

At the same time, the United States reached an agreement with Ukraine for the trans-shipment of supplies - a mostly symbolic gesture, but one guaranteed to infuriate the Russians at both the United States and Ukraine. Moreover, the NATO communique did not abandon the idea of Ukraine and Georgia being admitted to NATO, although the German position on unspecified delays to such membership was there as well. When Obama looks at the chessboard, the key emerging challenge remains Russia.

The Germans are not going to be joining the United States in blocking Russia. Between dependence on Russia for energy supplies and little appetite for confronting a Russia that Berlin sees as no real immediate threat to Germany, the Germans are not going to address the Russian question. At the same time, the United States does not want to push the Germans toward Russia, particularly in confrontations ultimately of secondary importance and on which Germany has no give anyway. Obama is aware that the German left is viscerally anti-American, while Merkel is only pragmatically anti-American - a small distinction, but significant enough for Washington not to press Berlin.

At the same time, an extremely important event between Turkey and Armenia looks to be on the horizon. Armenians had long held Turkey responsible for the mass murder of Armenians during and after World War I, a charge the Turks have denied.

The US Congress for several years has threatened to pass a resolution condemning Turkish genocide against Armenians. The Turks are extraordinarily sensitive to this charge, and passage would have meant a break with the United States. Last week, they publicly began to discuss an agreement with the Armenians, including diplomatic recognition, which essentially disarms the danger from any US resolution on genocide. Although an actual agreement hasn't been signed just yet, anticipation is building on all sides.

The Turkish opening to Armenia has potentially significant implications for the balance of power in the Caucasus. The August 2008 Russo-Georgian war created an unstable situation in an area of vital importance to Russia. Russian troops remain deployed, and NATO has called for their withdrawal from the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. There are Russian troops in Armenia, meaning Russia has Georgia surrounded. In addition, there is talk of an alternative natural gas pipeline network from Azerbaijan to Europe.

Turkey is the key to all of this. If Ankara collaborates with Russia, Georgia's position is precarious and Azerbaijan's route to Europe is blocked. If it cooperates with the United States and also manages to reach a stable treaty with Armenia under US auspices, the Russian position in the Caucasus is weakened and an alternative route for natural gas to Europe opens up, decreasing Russian leverage against Europe.

From the American point of view, Europe is a lost cause since internally it cannot find a common position and its heavyweights are bound by their relationship with Russia. It cannot agree on economic policy, nor do its economic interests coincide with those of the United States, at least insofar as Germany is concerned. As far as Russia is concerned, Germany and Europe are locked in by their dependence on Russian natural gas. The US-European relationship thus is torn apart not by personalities, but by fundamental economic and military realities. No amount of talking will solve that problem.

The key to sustaining the US-German alliance is reducing Germany's dependence on Russian natural gas and putting Russia on the defensive rather than the offensive. The key to that now is Turkey, since it is one of the only routes energy from new sources can cross to get to Europe from the Middle East, Central Asia or the Caucasus. If Turkey - which has deep influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Ukraine, the Middle East and the Balkans - is prepared to ally with the United States, Russia is on the defensive and a long-term solution to Germany's energy problem can be found. On the other hand, if Turkey decides to take a defensive position and moves to cooperate with Russia instead, Russia retains the initiative and Germany is locked into Russian-controlled energy for a generation.

Therefore, having sat through fruitless meetings with the Europeans, Obama chose not to cause a pointless confrontation with a Europe that is out of options. Instead, Obama completed his trip by going to Turkey to discuss what the treaty with Armenia means and to try to convince the Turks to play for high stakes by challenging Russia in the Caucasus, rather than playing Russia's junior partner.

This is why Obama's most important speech in Europe was his last one, following Turkey's emergence as a major player in NATO's political structure. In that speech, he sided with the Turks against Europe, and extracted some minor concessions from the Europeans on the process for considering Turkey's accession to the European Union. Why Turkey wants to be an EU member is not always obvious to us, but they do want membership.

Obama is trying to show the Turks that he can deliver for them. He reiterated - if not laid it on even more heavily - all of this in his speech in Ankara. Obama laid out the US position as one that recognized the tough geopolitical position Turkey is in and the leader that Turkey is becoming, and also recognized the commonalities between Washington and Ankara. This was exactly what Turkey wanted to hear.

The Caucasus is far from the only area to discuss. Talks will be held about blocking Iran in Iraq, US relations with Syria and Syrian talks with Israel, and Central Asia, where both countries have interests. But the most important message to the Europeans will be that Europe is where you go for photo opportunities, but Turkey is where you go to do the business of geopolitics. It is unlikely that the Germans and French will get it. Their sense of what is happening in the world is utterly Eurocentric. But the Central Europeans, on the frontier with Russia and feeling quite put out by the German position on their banks, certainly do get it.

Obama gave the Europeans a pass for political reasons, and because arguing with the Europeans simply won't yield benefits. But the key to the trip is what he gets out of Turkey - and whether in his speech to the civilizations, he can draw some of the venom out of the Islamic world by showing alignment with the largest economy among Muslim states, Turkey.....?