Friday, November 4, 2011

US’s post-2014 Afghan and World agendas falter....


US’s post-2014 Afghan and World agendas falter....

[We must learn from our government's "cry wolf" foreign policy, that whomever they are screaming the loudest against is the greatest "straw man," an individual put into power to be taken-down at some later point. When they were useful to Imperial planners, people like the Shah of Iran, Saddam Hussein, even the Taliban received various forms of covert Western support, even though America's secret agencies always planned to take them all down in violent confrontations after their useful status changed. The best way to lay out elements of future scenarios of planned violence is to support those "rogue" elements in their early stages. Khomeini was the first change agent used to introduce the radical "Islamist" ideologies to the Muslim masses, although he only preached to the minority Shiites of the Persian Arabs. The lack of a central authority within the much larger Sunni masses turned their radicalization program there into a longer process that is ongoing still. Much of the evidence given is correct, but the same plot could be recounted in a hundred instances throughout the Sunni dispensation. The CIA has had to create charismatic Sunni leaders of a dozen different nationalities, then equip them with an army of specially groomed true believers. The Saudis and their Persian Gulf buddies made all of this possible with generous donations and radical Islamist evangelization programs to spread the Wahhabi crazies doctrine throughout Asia and Africa. The scale of this long-running deception is nearly unimaginable, no doubt justifying the enormity of the CIA budget and staff size. Today, both pawn-states in the CIA scheme, Iran and Saudi Arabia, are threatening to introduce a new form of regional religious civil war to the Middle East. All that is missing is the American "green-light."

The Islamist PsyOp... goes all the way back to government studies made to predict the future in the sixties and seventies; the army of Islamists were the solution to Americans losing control of the world. They knew that the Soviet Union would soon self-destruct, leaving a great void, to be filled--by what? Violent Muslim anarchists. Since the area projected to become a power vacuum was predominately Muslim space, then the change agents would have to be "Islamist" ones, although Islamist in name only. They would have to promote violence in the name of The Prophet (PBUH), even though True Islam is a religion of Peace (despite its early bloody Arabian history). The weaponization of Islam by the CIA mind-fuckers in Western Pakistan and in Eastern Afghanistan is a true crime against a whole religion, an entire people, against humanity itself. This is perhaps the greatest crime of the dark agency, if only because of the scale of the endeavor.]


http://www.rediff.com/news/report/pakistan-is-taking-advantage-of-us-stupidity/20111104.htm

By M K Bhadrakumar

There couldn’t have been a more appropriate venue than the old Byzantine capital on the Bosphorus to hold a regional conference on Afghanistan at the present juncture. The conference at Istanbul on Thursday carried an impressive title – “Security and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia”. The “heart” had 14 chambers – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

The conference was packed with high drama, which was unsurprising, since its “brain” – the United States – acted almost imperviously to the beatings of the heart.

Intrigue and counter-intrigue dogged the conference from the outset to such an extent that its eventual failure was a forgone conclusion.

The US and its Western allies began with high hopes that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partner Turkey would secure from the conference a declaration – preferably signed by the “14 heartland” states – that would prepare the ground for establishing a regional security and integration mechanism on the pattern of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In turn, this declaration would take wing at the forthcoming Bonn II conference in December (to which Germany has invited 90 countries and 15 international organizations).

In the event, Thursday ended on a somewhat miserable note in Istanbul, the heart of Asia having suffered even a minor rupture. Uzbekistan broke loose and stayed away at the last minute, with the remaining 13 countries finally settling for an anodyne joint statement that will become the latest in a series of platitudes and good intentions since the US invaded Afghanistan.

Bound to crash-land
The conference agenda was lop-sided in the first instance. Instead of focusing on the pivotal issue of a viable Afghan national reconciliation, how to set up such a process and how to secure it as “Afghan-led” and genuinely “Afghan-owned”, the masterminds of the conference – the United States in particular – loaded it with geopolitics.

The conference was burdened with an ambitious agenda of imposing on the region under Western leadership a mechanism to mediate in a host of intra-regional disputes and differences which are, arguably, tangential issues that could have a bearing on Afghanistan’s stabilization but are not the greatest concern today.
This was, to put mildly, like putting the cart before the horse. The Western masterminds needlessly introduced a controversial template for a new security architecture for Central and South Asia, complete with an institutional mechanism and a “contact group” for monitoring the implementation of a matrix of “confidence-building measures”.

This was an idea that was bound to crash-land, given the deep suspicions about the US’s intentions in the “war on terror” in Afghanistan and the unwillingness of the regional states to accept the permanent habitation of the West as the arbiter-cum-moderator-cum-mediator in their region.

During the preparatory stages at official meetings in Oslo, Norway and Kabul through September and October, it became evident that there were no takers in the region for a new regional security organization presided over by the West. Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan and most of the Central Asian countries demurred on the US proposal for a new regional security architecture. India, which resents outside mediation on its disputes, kept quiet so as not to offend the US, while probably remaining confident that Pakistan would do its job anyway.

Moscow came up with its own counterproposal in the shape of a statement of principles of regional cooperation listing political, economic and other measures to build confidence and encourage cooperation among the countries neighboring Afghanistan. The Russian approach found favor with China, Pakistan and Iran, and being unexceptional in any case, it gained traction and ultimately seems to have paved the way for Thursday’s joint statement at Istanbul.

However, Washington (and Ankara) continued efforts until the last minute to somehow institutionalize a regional process through “working groups” and a “structured” form of consultations. But Pakistan would appear to have put its foot firmly down on these ideas, pointing out that an OSCE-type security related conference or a full-fledged security apparatus would be completely unacceptable since there was a world of difference between the Cold-War compulsions which initiated the Helsinki process and the prevailing Afghan situation.

Pakistan’s contention is that Afghanistan’s neighboring countries could at best have a supportive role in ensuring the peace, security and territorial integrity of that country and instead of proposing new mechanisms, the focus should be on implementation of the existing mechanisms for peace, security and development.

The US game plan served four objectives. One, Washington hoped to “shackle” Pakistan within the four walls of a regional security mechanism dominated by the West so that it becomes one protagonist among equals and its claim to an eminent status in any Afghan peace process gets diluted.

Two, the regional mechanism would give the US and its allies a handle to retain the lead role in the search for an Afghan settlement and also beyond during the post 2014 period. Three, Washington estimated that the regional security apparatus would inevitably come to overshadow the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as the number one regional security process in Central Asia and South Asia which, in turn, would erode the dominant influence of Russia and China in Central Asia.

Finally, the US envisaged the regional mechanism to provide the security underpinning for its “New Silk Road” project, which is running on a parallel track – quintessentially a modern version of its “Greater Central Asia strategy” dating back to the George W Bush presidency. The New Silk Road proposes Afghanistan as a regional hub to bring Central Asia and South Asia closer together under the garb of regional development and integration.

Its real intent, however, is to roll back the pre-eminent position of Russia and China in Central Asia and to gain direct access to the vast mineral resources of the region through communication links that bypass Russia and Iran. The US’s agenda included gaining for NATO some sort of formal, institutional role in regional security in Central Asia. (Safeguarding the energy pipelines is a newfound 21st century “challenge” that NATO proposes to assume.)

Conceivably, Moscow and Beijing spotted a red herring from day one. The most significant outcome of the Istanbul Conference, therefore, might turn out to be that the SCO will hasten its decision-making process and swiftly steer through the applications of Pakistan and India for membership of that organization.

A Russian statement issued on Monday following Foreign Ministry-level political consultations with China in Moscow stated that the two countries discussed the modalities of finalization of the membership of the two South Asian countries in SCO and “spoke of expediting the process” of membership of India and Pakistan (and Afghanistan’s status as an SCO “Observer”). The likelihood is that a decision in this regard might even be formalized at the SCO Heads of Governments meeting due in St Petersburg on Monday.

Note of triumphalism
Underlying all this high drama has been the realization in Washington (and the regional capitals) that the political-military situation in Afghanistan is decisively shifting in Pakistan’s favor, prompting a desperate Western attempt to ensure the US and NATO’s permanent military presence in the strategic Hindu Kush.

Without doubt, a dangerous period lies ahead for the US and its NATO allies with the strong possibility of Mullah Omar’s forces and the Haqqani network openly collaborating with a view to intensifying the insurgent activities.

The devastating suicide car bomb attack in Kabul killing 13 American and 3 Australian soldiers may well be the harbinger of a new offensive. Its timing – on the eve of the Istanbul conference – carried a barely-disguised message to the US administration that crunch time has come and the US strategy to degrade the Taliban and force them to come to the negotiating has not only failed, but the Taliban seem more than ever convinced that they are inching toward conclusive victory.

Clearly, US secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s visit to Islamabad 10 days ago has not helped reduce the huge trust deficit in the US-Pakistan relationship. The Pakistani military seems amused that Clinton made a virtue out of dire necessity by graciously “offering” to Islamabad the “primacy” to “squeeze” the Haqqanis and bring them to the negotiating table.

Whereas, the heart of the matter is that the US’s covert attempts in the recent months to gain direct access to the Taliban leadership and to suo moto initiate a peace process from a position of strength lie in shambles today.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s estimation is that US President Barack Obama is going to find himself more and more on the defensive as next year’s election approaches, lessening even further the US’s capacity to pressure Islamabad. A tone of triumphalism is appearing in the Pakistani discourses.

Indeed, the Obama administration, too, would sense that the factors of advantage are incrementally tilting in Pakistan’s favor and that the US lacks any real leverage to influence the Pakistani military. The US roped in Turkey to push the agenda of the Istanbul Conference, given its traditionally warm and friendly relations with Pakistan. The Saudi and United Arab Emirates presence in Istanbul was also expected to influence Pakistan. But the Istanbul Conference may have resulted in causing some injury to Turkish-Pakistani ties. A Turkish observer wrote:

Cold winds have started to blow between the two [Turkey and Pakistan] due to the Afghan problem … Islamabad is quite annoyed at Turkey for its role in the conference … Basically, Pakistan is angry at Turkey and the US, which want a result oriented conference. For the conference to bear fruit an institutionalization of the process is a must. In other words in the absence of some kind of a mechanism, to monitor the process that might include implementing confidence-building measures, everything said in Istanbul will stay on paper.

Turkish diplomacy has tried to calm down the Pakistanis, telling them that the presence of Turkey in the regional framework should alleviate the concerns of Pakistanis vis-a-vis other players. After all the Turks do not have a secret agenda of strengthening the hands of India at the expense of Pakistan but I am doubtful that they succeeded in reassuring Pakistan.

All in all, from the Russian and Chinese point of view, it becomes desirable – almost imperative – from now onward while looking ahead, that Pakistan is enabled to have strategic autonomy to withstand the US pressure. Most certainly, they would appreciate Pakistan’s steadfast role in frustrating the US design to install a regional security mechanism for continued interference in the Central Asian region.

On balance, the petering out of the Istanbul Conference constitutes a grave setback for the upcoming Bonn Conference II in December. With the Istanbul Conference failing to erect an institutionalized framework of regional cooperation, Bonn Conference II lacks a viable agenda except that 2011 happens to provide a great photo-op, being the 10th anniversary of the first conference in December 2001.

The original intent was to ensure that the Taliban representatives attended the Bonn Conference. But short of a miracle, that is not going to happen. That leaves the US and its NATO allies to work out the planned transition in Afghanistan in 2014 in isolation, as they gather for the alliance’s summit in May in Chicago.

In sum, the regional powers are unwilling to collaborate with the US and its allies to choreograph the post-2014 regional security scenario. Russia and China insist that the central role of the international community in Afghanistan should be of the United Nations once the US and NATO’s transition is completed in 2014.

Evidently, they would hope for the SCO to take a lead role in the stabilization of Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s expeditious admission as an SCO observer alongside Pakistan’s induction as a full member conveys a loud message that regional security is best handled by the countries of the region, while extra-regional powers can act as facilitators. That is also the final message of the Istanbul conference....


Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.


Wednesday, November 2, 2011

INDIA must Prepare long-term against China....


INDIA must Prepare long-term against China...., exhorts N.V.Subramanian.




31 October 2011: It is never easy to grade the importance of political will versus military strength. But they are perhaps equally consequential. India's political will must match military strength if it is to continue to rise peacefully. This is most essential in its fraught engagements with China.
The fiftieth anniversary of the 1962 Chinese aggression against India has just passed. Despite an outward calm in Sino-Indian relations, strategists are warning of another Chinese aggression. The latest to say that is the government think-tank, the New Delhi-based IDSA.
What IDSA says is not new. That China will set out to "teach India a lesson" again has been argued before, including by this writer. That it will do so before India has entirely risen, and thereby psychologically scar it, as it happened in the post-1962 period, has been analyzed previously.
This writer took the analysis further in a piece called "China syndrome" (16 September 2011) where he argued for India to open a second front in case of a Chinese aggression. Since it entered the realm of military planning, the details were deliberately concealed.
But the broad idea was spelt out.
The only way to deter China is to have a credible non-nuclear strategic second-strike option (the nuclear plans could be pursued independently).
There is no running away from this.
It is here that political will plays up more importantly than military capacity, and perhaps the first drives the second. How it works is rather simple. First, there ought to be the political will to win against China should it first aggress. This is not only critical to the long-term peaceful rise of India, removing China as a threat. But it is important as well for exorcising the ghost of the 1962 defeat.
To talk of peace from a position of strength is not the same as a puny state preaching the merits of pacifism.
India's China problem is that China keeps India forever on tenterhooks, whether it is by adding to Pakistani military capacities in PoK and legitimizing its occupation of that territory; or damming the rivers that flow into India; or making military incursions into Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh to contest their Indianness; or preventing UN proscription of Pak terror entities attacking India. This is over and above its policy of encircling and containing India with a nuclearized Pakistan and an Indian Ocean string-of-pearls strategy.
What India needs more than ever is a bold strategic plan to break out of Chinese containment and counter China at the heart of its central power, prestige and glory, and not necessarily at the peripheries. The IDSA speaks of a Kargil-like war very likely on the Indo-Tibet land border. This writer believes innovative China will attempt a skirmish at another place, perhaps at sea, simply in order to do something different, and to achieve bigger strategic goals than in 1962.
Which is why this writer has argued earlier that the Chinese skirmish may come in the Indian Ocean, both to rebuff India's claims in the region, and to warn off India's friend if not ally, the declining United States. Equally, the attack may come in the South China Sea, riding on China's resentment of the Indo-Vietnamese joint oil-and-gas exploration venture.
The point is, while it is important to know where all China may seek to "punish" India (and not just confine to a Kargil-type attack), it is equally necessary to prepare a counter-strategy. You could be bogged down in the semantics of whether or not China will attack, with there being equally plausible reasons to argue in favour of or against a prospective Chinese aggression. The sane way is to prepare a counter-attack strategy anyhow, and to make a plan that will so grievously hurt China that it will baulk from even thinking about "teaching India a lesson".
A counter-attack strategy is important for another reason. While deterring China in the short-to-medium term (and even long-term, why not?), it will permit India in the interim to build military capacities to put down Chinese aggression anytime, anywhere, without necessarily resorting to a strategic counter-strike. That may be reserved for further conflict escalation.
All of this requires long-term military thinking and planning, which inter-services rivalries may not permit. But political will is the primary requirement. The political establishment (which means the ruling dispensation, the opposition, the bureaucracy, etc) must come to terms with the fact that the present piecemeal way of dealing with China is perilous.
China only understands the grammar of force. Once it knows India won't permit another 1962, and will give as good as it gets, it will back off. At the least, this is a ten-year project.
But do we have the necessary political will for it?
More than fifty years after the humiliation of 1962, the answer is no.


N.V.Subramanian is Editor, www.NewsInsight.net, and writes internationally on strategic affairs.



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NATIONALIST’ ULEMA OF INDIA – Importing crooked/Zioconned Wahhabism?


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By R. Upadhyay

Syed Babar Ashraf Kachochavi, the spokesperson of All India Ulema and Masheikh Board (AIUMB) in its Mahapanchayat (Conference) held in Moradabad (Uttar Pradesh) on October 16, 2011called upon the Indian Muslims to reject the Ulema associated with Islamic institutions and organizations like Darul Uloom Deoband, Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind (JUH) and Ahale Hadees as they are importing a “foreign ideology” of Wahhabism in India. He said, “they are funded by petro-dollars and aim to grab political power” (Times of India dated October 18, 2011).

Of the three organizations which are accused of importing Wahhabism in India, the Ulema of Darul Uloom Deoband and its political front the JUH were projected as ‘nationalist’ Muslims by the Indian National Congress (INC) when the Muslim leaders of these two organizations supported the national freedom movement against the British. Since Ahle Hadees is a known Wahhabi version of Indian Islam, the accusation for importing Wahhabism hardly need any discussion. These three organizations belonging to the Sunni sect of Muslims believe in Islamic extremism and have strong differences with another sect of Sunni Muslims known as Barelvis. AIUMB is an organization representing Barelvis who make about 80% of Muslim population in India and are the followers of the Sufi tradition of Sunni Islam with tomb worship of Islamic mystics.

In view of the sectarian differences, it has been a routine war of words between them but the allegation against the ‘nationalist’ Muslims for importing Wahhabism, a militant interpretation of Sunni Islam which was propounded by an eighteenth century Jehadi, Mawlana Mohammad Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab for restoration of true Islamic government is shockingly a matter of concern particularly when it is known as ideological mother of the on going Islamic terrorism all over the world.

The first Saudi king had an agreement with Wahhab in 1744 and they had jointly conquered some areas of Arabian Peninsula. Later, the House of Saud established the kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932 with the support of the British and continued Wahhabism as its political ideology.

Before discussing the merit of the allegation against the Deobandis, we may like to have a peep in the historical background of the Deobandi Ulema.

It is a known fact of the Islamic history that its Ulema establishment in India made the Muslim sociology so complex that the spiritual aspect of the medieval faith became subservient to political power. Factually, Ulema (Islamic scholars) did not constitute a distinct class of men during the life time of the Prophet and his successive four companions but by the eighth century they intertwined the religion and politics befitting to self-seeking interest that led to the split of Muslim society in various sectarian groups and in fight amongst them.

Usually, Ulema operates within close proximity of Muslim society, head various Islamic institutions and social groups and are capable of mobilizing the Muslim population in favor or against the ruler. Their services were also utilised by the Islamist warriors in their conquests in different parts of non-Islamic world. Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran endorsed the importance of Ulema and said, “Only the mullahs (synonymous to Ulema) can bring the people into the streets and make them die for Islam—begging to have their blood shed for Islam” (www.indianmuslimobserver.com) With the establishment of Muslim rule in the Indian sub-continent, a large number of Ulema from various Central Asian countries migrated to this land and settled here under the royal patronage. Claiming themselves as the inheritors of the traditions of Prophet Mohammad, their main job was to advise the ruling class on the principles of Islamic governance and guide the converted Muslim society in India on various rituals based on Arab traditions.

The most unfortunate part of the role of the Islamic priestly class was that they did not hesitate in justifying even the oppressive actions of the ruling class in lieu of royal perks and privileges and thereby strayed from spiritual path. Interpreting the Islamic scriptures according to the likings of the kings, they acquired huge wealth and emerged as an elite land owning affluent Muslim social group in course of the centuries of Islamic rule. They often interpret Islam as a religion of peace but never objected the killings of innocent people by the Islamic marauders.

So long India was under Muslim rule; Ulema had rarely had any confrontation with political power but after the end of Mogul Empire, their intolerance against non-Islamic government showed up and never tried to interpret Islamic scriptures recommending co-existence of Muslims in the government under a democratic and secular constitution.

After the 1857 uprising, the British that brought the entire Indian society including the Muslims under the purview of new criminal laws. Though the Ulema was not prevented from carrying out the task of dealing with Islamic Civil Code and other Islamic rituals, the British interference with Shariat (Islamic laws) on criminal offences and substitution by the new penal codes upset them as this led to the curtailment of their judicial hegemony over the Muslim society.

Since the Ulema lost all hopes to restore Islamic power in the sub- continent, a number of them migrated to Mecca considering India under British rule as Darul Harb (Land of War). But a larger section of them who were the land owning affluent class and living in the most fertile region between river Ganga and Yamuna stayed back and launched the movement for revival of Islamic fundamentalism through institutions. Their movement was focussed more on creating a cultural and an emotional separation of Indian Muslims to have a separate identity of their own and away from other ethnic identities.

Drawing ideological inspiration from hate- Hindu Islamists like Sheikh Ahmad Sarhindi (1564-1624), Shah Waliullah (1703-1762) and Syed Ahmad Barelvi (1786–1831) the Ulema believing in Islamic extremism established a madrasa in Deoband in 1866 which was later known as Darul Uloom Deoband. Since Mawlana Mohammad Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab (1703-1792) and Waliullah had studied together for some time in Medina they also had ideological similarity except for some tactical differences.

Overawed by the British power the Ulema kept away from political activities and started re-organising the Muslim masses by teaching the fundamentalist version of political Islam. Exercising their intellectual power on preventing the Muslims from modern education as initiated by a British loyal Muslim Sir Syed Ahmad, they also remained indifferent to the Indian National Congress for over three decades since its formation in 1885.

The political activities of Deobandi Ulema started only in late 1919 when Mawlana Abdal Bari of Farangi Mahal Islamic institution in Lucknow in association with the Ulema of Darul Uloom Deoband set up Khitlafat Conference to organize the Muslim masses against the British which were instrumental for the end of Ottoman Empire and the institution of the Caliphate. In the same meeting a political association namely Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind was also formed to protect the Islamic identity of Muslims, prevent them from modern education and to fight the battle for political space for Muslims in the region.

Contrary to the concept of Ummah (Entire Muslim community) as one nation, the JUH extended cooperation to the Indian National Congress in freedom struggle on its own terms and conditions. Accordingly, they could successfully mobilize the Muslim masses with the support of the Hindus under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and launched the Khilafat Movement against the British which “was not only based on a wrong and romantic ideology, but was also a landmark in the evolution of a separate Muslim identity” (Mushirul Hasan in ‘Economic and Political weekly’ May 16, 1981).

Since Darul Uloom Deoband and its political front JUH had supported the freedom movement led by the INC and had opposed the two-nation theory of the Muslim League, the Deobandi Ulema were viewed by the Congress as ‘nationalist’ Muslims.

Restoration of the Caliphate, the term which refers to the system of government in Islam with Caliph as the head of the state representing the political unity of the entire Muslim community has been the cherished dream of the JUH ever since the end of this institution in early twenties of the last century. Accordingly, they entrapped the Indian National Congress in Khilafat movement in the name of Hindu-Muslim unity against the British.

The Congress had not then understood the communal game plan of the JUH as the movement it launched was not only against the British but also against the liberal and democratic version of Islam as propagated by Kemal Ataturk of Turkey who led a revolution against the Caliph and his Ottoman Empire. The JUH took the elimination of the role of Ulema in advancement of Turks as a danger signal for them and therefore raised their voice against the first attempt in Islamic history to democratize Islam.

The understanding of the JUH joining hands with the Indian National Congress was never unconditional as it chose its independent path whenever they felt that some issue was not in conformity with the ideology befitting their version of political Islam.

When the JUH failed to save the institution of Caliphate, they started maintaining reservation against the INC on the suspicion that it was an organization of the Hindus. They took the support of the Congress in Khilafat movement but boycotted even issues of national interest like Nehru report in 1926 and agitated against Child Marriage Restraint Act 1929 popularly known as Sharda Act on the plea that they were anti-Muslim.

They were cold in countering the growing influence of the Muslim League and adopted a “look the other way policy” when the League exploited the tide of popular uprising based on pan-Islamic ideology of political and religious unity of all Muslims that led to a mass upsurge in partitioning the sub continent.

They opposed the Pakistan movement but were unable to counter the arguments of Jinnah which were based on the same separatist Islamic ideology which was aggressively propagated by them to mobilize the Muslim masses for revival of radical Islamism. Their opposition to Muslim League was a tactical move to prevent the division in the numerical strength of Muslims in the sub-continent which they felt would weaken the main objective of the Deoband to restore the Islamic power and Islamise the region.

The views expressed by Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957), the chief spokesman of JUH in the turbulent years preceding partition belied the nationalist claim of Deobandi Ulema when he said, “If Dara had triumphed, Muslims would have stayed in India but not Islam. Since Aurangzeb triumphed, both Muslims and Islam were here to stay….According to Maulana, the faith Dara followed was not genuine Islam because Dara wanted to tolerate Hindus. He (Dara) did not insist on the rule of the Shariat”. (Muslim politics in India by Hamid Dalwai 11969 page 71). "For Madani all non-Muslims are the enemies of Islam and Muslims" (Muslim Nationhood in India - Safia Amir, 2000, page 179). Readers can draw their own conclusion on what kind of Islam the ‘Nationalist Muslims’ subscribed to as stated by Madani whose successors have turned both Darul Ulum and the JUH as dynastic organizations.

In 1945 the group which had reservations against INC and its opposition to Pakistan finally broke away and formed a separate organization known as Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and mobilized support in favour of partition.

Had the JUH launched an aggressive campaign against Muslim League in the election held in early 1946, the party could not have secured 425 of 492 seats reserved for Muslims which proved that the Muslims were overwhelmingly in favour of partition and emboldened Jinnah for giving a call for Direct Action which forced the INC to accept partition.

Factually, the uncompromising stand of the JUH on the movement for creating cultural and emotional separation of Indian Muslims from its ethnic identity suggests that their ‘nationalist’ mask was only for managing a political space once the British was ousted.

Mushirl Hassan former Vice-Cancellor of Jamia Milia Delhi and a noted writer in his book (‘Nationalism and common politics in India’ page 35) quoted Peter Hardy, “ the Ulema in JUH expected the Muslim community in independent India to be headed by its appointee Amir-i-Hind who would deal with the leaders of non-Muslims in India as equal partner of a Muslim imperium in India and it would be mandatory for the Muslims to obey him”. Sharing the apprehension of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan that the Congress was striving to establish Hindu rule in India, the JUH leaders also believed that unconditional support to freedom movement was surrender to Hindu-dominated Congress (Ibid. page 160).

A number of Muslim organisations before 1947 vanished after independence in 1947 but the Deobandi Ulema who stayed back in India aligned with the vote-greedy political classes and continued their politics of Islamic revivalism by creating communal conflict by maintaining the same communal policy of Muslim separatism in the name of Muslim identity which was the ideology behind Pakistan movement..

The oil- rich Saudi Arabia is always scared of its stability due to the incredible history of its founder king becoming custodian of the two holiest shrines of Islam which used to be under the care of the Caliph. Accordingly, with a view to export Wahhabism and manage hegemony over the Indian Muslims that constitute the second largest Islamic population in the world it has been alluring Indian Ulema through oil-earned money power. It has been a part of its political strategy to export Wahhabism in India which was possible only through Indian Ulema particularly through those who have been close to the ruling political parties.

Initially, the JUH did not like the role of the Saudi King in the abolition of the Caliphate and becoming the custodian of the two holiest shrines of Islam with the support of the British. But over the years when Saudi Arabia emerged as oil power, its Ulema ignored the Saudi’s anti-Caliphate role and fell in line on the command of the Wahhabi outfits like World Muslim League and Muslim Brotherhood which were basically working as Saudi agents to counter the modernizing zeal of Kamal Ataturk among the Muslims in democratic countries by preaching dogmatic Islam. Ironically, the JUH even ignored the pro-British role of Saudi Monarchy in t ending the Ottoman Empire and abolition of Caliphate and facilitated the import of Wahhabism.

The re-emergence of Ulema-power in the successful revolution in Iran in late seventies of the last century and the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan in its last decade generated a new spirit of anti-modern phenomenon among the Indian Ulema particularly the Deobandis. While following the radical path of Islamism they have even proven to the Islamist world that like their Arab counterparts who are under the process of transforming the ‘Arab spring’ into a sultry summer of their pristine root, they will also not allow the Indian Muslims to integrate in Indian society and continue their movement for a separate identity for the Muslims.

Conclusion

Deviating from the spiritual part of Islam, the Ulema associated with institutions and Islamic organizations like Darul Uloom Deoband, Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, Ahle Hadees, Jamaat-e-Islami Hind and others have surrendered to Saudi-sponsored hard-line Wahhabi Islam for the lure of oil earned wealth and thereby misguiding the Indian Muslims to follow the extreme path of the faith and destroying the ethnic identity of the majority of Indian Muslims. Due to their self-seeking interest they do not want the Muslim society to accept modernism as it will adversely affect their commanding influence over the community. So long the contemporary Muslim society in India does not block the political role of Ulema, the future of this second largest religious group in the country would remain chaotic.

AIUMB, though the representative body of the largest majority of Muslim population in India, in absence of any political support, its appeal to the Muslims to reject the Deobandi Ulema may be a futile exercise. Unfortunately, no political party in the country has made any sincere effort with aggressive challenge to counter the so called ‘nationalist’ Ulema of Deoband for facilitating the import of Wahhabism with the sole agenda to restore a theocratic government and commitment to abide strictly by Saudi interpretation of Quranic code even in this modern age of liberalism.


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B.RAMAN

The unrest of Tibetan monks, which has so far led to 10 attempts to commit self-immolation ---seven of them successful resulting in deaths--- in Western Sichuan, is now showing signs of spreading to Tibet. However, there are no reports so far of any attempted self-immolation in Tibet.

2. The unrest in Tibet is showing signs of taking a more violent form directed against Han targets instead of self-immolation.The Chinese authorities have banned all religious activities at the historic Karma monastery in Tibet's Chamdo prefecture following a bomb explosion at a government building there on October 26,2011. It has been reported that nearly all the monks at the monastery in the Dzagyu Karma township where the blast occurred have fled from the area, fearing that they might be arrested and detained in a military detention camp as the Chinese have done to a large number of monks of the Kirti monastery in Western Sichuan following the first incident of self-immolation of a young monk in March last.

3.For some week now, there have been reports of anger among the Tibetans in the Dzagyu Karma area over the re-settlement of a large number of Hans from other provinces in the rural areas under the pretext of undertaking development projects for the Tibetans. Before the blast, anonymous leaflets circulating in the area had warned as follows:"Anyone who settles in the rural area should speak Tibetan. Otherwise, we will not accept them.If this policy of settling Chinese in Tibetan rural areas is not stopped, we will protest and may be forced to resort to violence."

4. After the blast, Chinese security forces surrounded the Karma monastery, located on the eastern bank of the Dzachu River in Chamdo (in Chinese, Changdu) prefecture and founded in the 12th century. They allegedly suspected that monks in the monastery were behind the blast, which badly damaged the building but caused no casualties. The Chinese security forces claimed to have found in the area of the blast posters and leaflets calling for Tibetan independence.

5.Fearing that the Tibetan refugees in Nepal ( about 20,000) may play a role in spreading the unrest to Tibet from Nepalese territory, the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu is reported to have stepped up pressure on the Nepalese Government to arrest what the Embassy described as the splittist elements in the local Tibetan refugee community.Chinese concerns have increased following an attempt bysome members of the Tibetan refugee community in Nepal to hold a prayer meeting in memory of those who committed self-immolation in Sichuan. Following pressure from the Chinese Embassy, the Nepalese authorities are reported to have arrested about 100 refugees who participated in the prayer meeting.

6.In the meanwhile, Lobsang Sangay, the newly-elected head of the Tibetan Government-in-exile in Dharamshala, has arrived in Washington DC to testify before a Congressional Committee on the human rights situation in the Tibetan areas of China.While expressing his readiness for talks with the Chinese authorities, he blamed the Chinese refusal to accept the reality of the ground situation in the Tibetan areas for the continuing unrest.He added: “The actions of Tibetans who pour gasoline over themselves are clear indications of their desperation and frustration and of the urgency of the situation inside Tibet.”( 2-11-11)





India plans 'world's most dangerous railroad' from Afghanistan to Iran....


India plans 'world's most dangerous railroad' from Afghanistan to Iran....


India is planning to build what could be the world's most dangerous railroad from Afghanistan's mineral-rich heartland to an Iranian port on the Arabian Sea in attempt to open a new trade route and reduce Kabul's dependence on Pakistan....

[India is playing a bold hand, forcing the lone superpower to bow to the Hindu state's will, bringing the pariah state of Iran into the formula for Afghanistan. With one stroke, the US could have an operational "SDN" (southern distribution network), if it wasn't so intent upon playing the Zionist hand in the Middle East and punishing Iran for refusing to bow. Iran had a seat at the Istanbul conference, as it should have, but any regional solution demands that Iran be given a say in decisions made, as well as the opportunity to lend a neighbor a hand in solving the problem of pacifying Afghanistan. In all fairness, perhaps it should be America that is locked out of Afghanistan in the future, as well as Iraq, since it was America's foul plans that decimated both countries. The modern port at Chahabar, Iran, which India and Iran have together labored hard to build, is the answer to all of NATO's problems if our military geniuses only had enough sense to realize that. American insistence upon having the arbitrary "right" to shape the post-war environments is a stumbling block that prevents regional solutions from ever taking shape.

India is saying that it is time that all of this changed.]


Details of the new plan emerged on the eve of the Istanbul conference on security and economic development in Afghanistan in the run-up to the planned withdrawal of American troops in 2014.

Washington has urged India, Pakistan and Afghanistan to co-operate in creating a new 'Silk Road' of trade ties to break the current suspicion which mars political relations and restricts potential trade.

India expects American hostility to its plan, however, because it will bolster Iran's sea capability by developing a major port at Chabahar on the southern tip of the country facing out over the Gulf of Oman.

For India, the prize is a potentially highly lucrative contract to mine Afghanistan's iron reserves, which are estimated to be worth up to $3 trillion – several times the size of India's growing economy – and the strategic advantage of a new trade and logistics route to Afghanistan which bypasses Pakistan.

Despite recent improvements in diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan, trade is still highly restricted and while Afghan imports trickle slowly through Pakistan into India at the Wagah border, between Amritsar and Lahore, Indian exports to Afghanistan through Pakistan are almost non-existent.

Sources close to the project said an Indian delegation from its foreign, railways, shipping and commerce ministries, will visit Iran next month to continue negotiations on the plan which are understood to have been discussed between the two countries when Indian prime minister Dr Manmohan Singh and Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad met in New York in September.

The plan is a revival of an idea which has been discussed infrequently between the two countries since 2003, but it has regained momentum following the discovery of vast reserves of iron ore and other coveted minerals in Afghanistan in the last few years.

While earlier plans extended the current Iranian rail network to the Afghan border in the north and linked to Chabahar via a spur from Bam and Faraj in the south, the new plan extends the rail link to Hajigak in the heart of Afghanistan's Bamiyan province, 80 miles north-west of Kabul.

India accounts for more than half the 22 companies bidding for iron ore mining contracts in the region.

A leaked memo from India's Ministry of External Affairs to its Railways ministry said the economic potential of the mineral reserves called for a new approach. "To coordinate the strategy for investment in Hajigak in the backdrop of the security, infrastructure, financial and regional challenges involved, there is a need to plan and craft our strategy to address these challenges," the memo stated.

The plan appears to have Afghanistan's backing. An Afghan official last night told The Telegraph:"Whenever it suits them, Pakistan can close the border. We don't want to be dependent on them."

One figure close to the project said although India's plans look to exploit Afghanistan's mineral reserves, the threat to any rail development from the Taliban and other militant groups would be so great that it would have to be regarded as a strategic rather than commercial project. "They could blow it up at any time," he said.....


Most analysts seem to agree that the antiquity-era trade route is never coming back, so why is it America’s new favorite idea for Central Asia?
kucera nov2 p.jpg

Afghan President Karzai and U.S. Secretary of State Clinton meet in Washington / Reuters

When foreign ministers from Afghanistan, its neighbors, and several European countries meet today in Istanbul, U.S. diplomats will be pushing them to sign on to an ambitious plan for the future of Central Asia. The “New Silk Road,” as the State Department is calling their strategy, would link the infrastructure — roads, railways, power lines — of the ‘Stans of post-Soviet Central Asia southward through Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. At the same time, they would work with the governments to reduce legal and bureaucratic impediments to trade, like corrupt border crossings.

The hope is that this would produce a flowering of East-West overland trade akin to the original Silk Road, by which China traded with the Middle East via Central Asian trade centers like Kashgar, Bukhara, and Samarkand. “Turkmen gas fields could help meet both Pakistan’s and India’s growing energy needs and provide significant transit revenues for both Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in a speech outlining the vision. “Tajik cotton could be turned into Indian linens. Furniture and fruit from Afghanistan could find its way to the markets of Astana or Mumbai and beyond.” (Clinton was originally scheduled to pitch her counterparts in Istanbul, but the death of her mother forced her to cancel the trip.)

If this is the best Washington can come up with, the future for Afghanistan looks bleak

But hope may be the only thing driving on the New Silk Road. The State Department has few good options in Afghanistan, and the U.S. doesn’t want to leave (or at least wants to seem like they won’t leave) a disaster behind once it starts pulling troops out in 2014. So it cast about for ideas and found the New Silk Road proposal, which had been bouncing around the post-Soviet think tank circuit in Washington since the mid-oughts.

The plan’s architect is Fred Starr, the chair of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, a small Washington, D.C. think tank, with the backing of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. State Department officials have long been wary of the plan, initially dismissing it as unworkable. But it began to gain favor last year at U.S. Central Command, and with its commander at the time, General David Petraeus. Since Marc Grossman became President Obama’s special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan earlier this year, replacing the late Richard Holbrooke, the State Department has come around to support the strategy. And Clinton has appeared to embrace it as the economic foundation of the U.S.’s post-2014 strategy for Afghanistan, promoting it in her meetings last month with the presidents of three of Afghanistan’s neighbors: Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

The origins of the plan, however, lie in geopolitics rather than economics. In the mid-oughts, there were a variety of programs by which the U.S. tried to unite South and Central Asia, including an effort to tie together the electrical grids of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with those of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Authority for the Central Asian countries were also moved under a new State Department bureau, taking them out of the European bureau with the rest of the post-Soviet republics and connecting them with South Asia. What these schemes all have in common is that they attempt to weaken the economic (and as a result, political) monopoly that Russia, by dint of the centralized Soviet infrastructure, has on these countries.

As Marlene Laruelle writes in a new book, Mapping Central Asia, which includes a great chapter on the revived metaphor of the New Silk Road: “The underlying Geo-economic rationales of these Roads is to exclude Moscow from new geopolitical configurations.”

The State Department doesn’t say this, of course, and it’s possible (even likely) that the people now implementing the strategy don’t think of it as such. Clinton even implied that there could be some sort of connection with the Russia-led Customs Union with Kazakhstan and Belarus, which is the basis for Vladimir Putin’s notorious Eurasian Union.

But this geopolitical vestige lives on in the current iteration of the New Silk Road. Look at a map of South and Central Asia — ideally, one where you can see topography and the quality of roads — and it’s apparent that the most sensible way to ship goods from India west is not the northern route over the massive mountain passes and crumbling roads of Central Asia. It’s the southern route, through Iran and Turkey. But, obviously, a U.S.-backed plan can’t include Iran.

There are also political barriers to inter-Central Asian trade. George Gavrilis, an expert on Central Asia and borders, described them in a recent piece in Foreign Affairs. Many of the countries in the region, he notes, have persistent problems with their neighbors: Pakistan with Afghanistan and India, Uzbekistan with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Trade agreements are fragile and susceptible to political difficulties; the border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was closed for 18 months following last summer’s violence in southern Kyrgyzstan. More fundamentally, a region-wide strategy would be unlikely to work because the countries that surround Afghanistan — China, Pakistan, Iran and the ‘stans — all have very different interests and little desire to cooperate with one another. “I love the idea,” Gavrilis told me when I asked about the New Silk Road. “But I just don’t see how it can be implemented,”

Notwithstanding the romance of the original Silk Road, Laruelle notes in her book, the geopolitical situation has changed quite a bit in the centuries since. “The border divisions of the 20th century have transformed these ancient trans-continental routes into cul-de-sacs of nation-states and no simple political will to declare a zone a ‘crossroads’ can suffice to influence the reality of being in the margins,” she writes.

And the reason the first Silk Road died out? Sea transport became much cheaper, which is still true today. So plans, she continues, “to modify in depth the status quo of global trade, three-quarters of which is carried out by sea, by replacing it with continental trade on the pretext that, once upon a time, caravans used to travel along these routes, can not be taken seriously.”

The State Department, in its public statements on the plan, highlights a handful of existing or proposed projects on which the New Silk Road could be modeled, including a free-trade agreement signed last year between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline. But they give little reason for optimism. The Pakistan-Afghanistan agreement was laboriously, personally brokered by Holbrooke but has yet to be implemented, and with relations between the two countries suffering, may never actually happen.

The TAPI pipeline has been discussed since the 1990s, but as with similar schemes, insecurity in Afghanistan has scared away companies that might have the capital to build such a pipeline. With U.S. and NATO troops departing, the security situation is likely to decline even further, a problem that the plan’s boosters acknowledge. “We have continued insecurity and instability in Afghanistan,” Sham Bathija, senior economic adviser to President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, said at a recent conference in Washington on the strategy. “Yet we have no choice but to forge ahead.”

It’s not clear what eventually convinced the State Department to embrace the New Silk Road. Starr is an eloquent proponent, and his enthusiasm can be infectious. But more than anything, the adoption of the plan speaks, as Bathija suggests, to the lack of good options for post-2014 Afghanistan. If this is the best Washington can come up with, the future for Afghanistan looks bleak.

But that’s not to say that there are no other choices. Instead of pushing an ambitious multilateral plan for Afghanistan, Gavrilis’ article suggests the U.S. should work with the countries it can actually do something with, tailoring individual strategies to each particular country’s interest: “Resuscitating region-wide approaches is a fool’s errand that will not save Afghanistan. It is time for the international community to dump diplomatic niceties and work with those neighbors whose policies could be molded to Afghanistan’s benefit.”

This lacks the romance of the Silk Road and the ambitious vision of a thriving Europe-Asia trade corridor. But it has a lot better chance of succeeding...

Why Are Both US and Russia Building Counter-Terrorism Centers In Kyrgyzstan?


Why Are Both US and Russia Building Counter-Terrorism Centers In Kyrgyzstan?

[It is not so much that the US and NATO are being sucked into Central Asia, as it is an intentional outcome of careful planning and subversive techniques. None of the Central Asian countries, with perhaps Uzbekistan as an exception, really have indigenous terrorist problems. Whatever random terror acts do occur are usually attributed to anonymous sources, implying that they could be the covert actions of foreign governments seeking to use controlled "Islamist" assets to destabilize the region (SEE: America’s “Islamists” Go Where Oilmen Fear to Tread ). The fact that there are two counter-terror centers being built in Kyrgyzstan suggests that the two opposing govts. have interests which temporarily coincide in the Fergana Valley. The fact that the two efforts are not billed as "joint" efforts reflects the two opposing strategies that, for a time, run parallel there. The close proximity of the two tracks could just as easily bring the opposing tracks together in a violent head-on collision.

Fergana is the battlefield that the US has chosen for the planned US/Russian conflict, with Uzbekistan serving as rear base. Russia will set astride Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in any conflict with Uzbekistan and its Imperial backers. Mutual cooperation over Afghanistan is set to end, whenever withdrawal or repositioning of US forces shifts the drug war away from Afghanistan. When it becomes clear that the US has washed its hands of any drug-eradication efforts there, the space between the two sides will become clear whenever Russian scorched-earth tactics put Afghanistan out of the narco-state business.]

Russia and the US are set to help build counter-terrorism centres in Kyrgyzstan. Will they get sucked into regional disputes?

When Kyrgyzstan President Roza Otunbayeva announced last month that the country would be building two ‘counter-terror training centres’ in the south of the country – one with US help, and the other with Russian assistance – there were few details available. One thing that was clear, though, was that the delicate position that the country occupies, both geographically and geopolitically, has forced the United States into a careful balancing act between its two closest military allies in Central Asia – Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

The purported need for such centers is the threat of Islamist terrorists entering the region from Afghanistan, via Tajikistan. But so far, there’s scant evidence that even Tajikistan – which borders Afghanistan – has seen such an influx, let alone Kyrgyzstan.

Yet some in the government genuinely fear that southern Kyrgyzstan is a potential breeding ground for Islamist radicalism, in particular among the ethnic Uzbek population in the south. More than 10 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s population is ethnic Uzbek, and they are concentrated in the southern part of the country. There have been two episodes of massive inter-ethnic violence between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, in 1990 and 2010. The death toll from last year’s pogroms is still unknown, but is estimated at more than 2,000.

The recent spate of violence has prompted speculation that disaffected Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan could be ripe targets for recruitment by Islamist organizations like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The Ferghana Valley, which includes southern Kyrgyzstan and parts of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, is conservative and religious, and has been the site of most of Central Asia’s radical Islamist activity. That activity, while relatively small in scale, has frequently been seized upon by the region’s governments to justify extreme security measures.

And, while the spectre of instability spilling over from Afghanistan may well be part of the motivation for setting up the centres, the fear of neighboring Uzbekistan also weighs heavily in Bishkek’s considerations. In fact, some observers believe it’s foremost in the minds of Kyrgyzstan’s leaders.

Relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have, after all, been difficult since the two republics gained independence from the Soviet Union two decades ago. Kyrgyzstan’s leaders have long suspected Uzbekistan of having designs on their territory, and in one notorious episode in 2000, Uzbekistan’s military carried out military exercises aimed at taking over a reservoir across the border in Kyrgyzstan.

Such fears have grown over the last year as a result of the inter-ethnic violence. Kyrgyzstan was concerned that Uzbekistan might use the violence as a pretext to invade. And while Uzbekistan’s president, Islam Karimov, got rare international acclaim for his measured handling of the crisis, the situation in southern Kyrgyzstan has nevertheless roused Uzbek nationalism. Karimov has tried hard to prevent that anger from boiling over, including by closing the border between the two countries. But that in turn has angered residents of southern Kyrgyzstan, who rely heavily on trade with Uzbekistan, further heightening tensions.

The two proposed training centres would be close to the Uzbekistan border – the US-built centre would be in the village of Kyzyl-Kiya, in the far south-western Batken region, while the Russian one would be located in Osh, the main city of southern Kyrgyzstan. And their location near Uzbekistan isn’t an accident, says Alisher Khamidov, an expert on southern Kyrgyzstan.

‘Unresolved border disputes make the risk of interstate conflict real,’ Khamidov says. ‘Otunbayeva is hoping that the centre will deter potential military action by Uzbek security services or border troops against Kyrgyz forces deployed in Batken.’

Bishkek, however, has taken pains to dispute such contentions. Its defence ministry, for example, released a statement saying that ‘the bilateral Kyrgyz-American project against international terrorism and religious extremism, transnational organized crime, prevention of drug smuggling, is not oriented against third countries.’

Kyrgyzstan is also treading carefully around the geopolitical implications of the training centres. The country is already the only one in the world to host both US and Russian air bases, and the fact that Otunbayeva has rhetorically linked the two new training centres suggests that she’s trying to maintain that balance. Those familiar with her thinking believe that she’s particularly interested in using the United States as a bulwark against Uzbekistan incursions, but can’t run the risk of antagonizing Moscow by appearing to favour Washington too heavily.

‘I don’t think Otunbayeva considers potential Russian and US training centres equally important,’ Khamidov says. ‘The US training centre is more important for practical reasons, whereas the Russian one is for symbolic/geopolitical ends, to soothe Russian officials’ suspicions about the Kyrgyz government.’

US officials haven’t discussed many of the details of their plans for their training base, but the United States has an obvious interest in shoring up its defence relationship with Kyrgyzstan: its Manas air base, near Bishkek, is a key transit and refuelling hub for operations in Afghanistan, and has been the subject of controversy in Kyrgyzstan, and there have been many calls to evict the base. By building a counter-terror training centre in the south, the Pentagon likely hopes to solidify its ties with Kyrgyzstan, decreasing the chances US forces will be kicked out of Manas.

But the United States is perhaps even more invested in the military relationship with Uzbekistan, which is the key node of the Northern Distribution Network, the supply line that carries military cargo to Afghanistan through the former Soviet Union.

Russia has been involving itself in local conflicts in the post-Soviet space since 1991, and Moscow has an interest in checking the influence of Uzbekistan, whose leaders are considerably more wary of Moscow than those in Kyrgyzstan. The chances of an interstate conflict would likely not be large even without a United States or Russian military presence in the area. Still, Russia would probably take the side of Kyrgyzstan if one did occur.

But in disputes between the two countries, the United States will certainly be forced into a difficult juggling act to maintain its relations with both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. All this begs the question of whether a US presence in southern Kyrgyzstan will help prevent such conflicts, or draw the United States more clearly into them....

Central Asia: Potholes in the New Silk Road....

Competition deepens in the South China Sea....


Competition deepens in the South China Sea....
By Roberto Tofani


HANOI - In the run-up to this year's East Asia Summit (EAS), the Philippines and Vietnam have sent a preemptive joint message: they are not willing to yield to rising Chinese pressure on unresolved South China Sea territorial issues.

The new loose alliance between the two Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) members aims to enhance their strategic cooperation and has effectively invited other regional powers to help counterbalance China's claims in the brewing multilateral dispute.

The EAS will take place in mid-November in Bali, Indonesia, and for the first time will also include the United States and Russia. South China Sea tensions are expected to feature prominently at the multilateral meeting, which will see several world leaders, including United States President Barack Obama, in attendance.

In recent months, the Philippines and Vietnam have taken a similar two-way diplomatic approach by strengthening relations with China's traditional regional competitors, including Japan and India, while at the same time maintaining dialogue and growing commercial ties with Beijing.

At the same time, the ASEAN neighbors have strengthened their bilateral security ties in an apparent bid to counterbalance China's rising naval power. On October 27, Philippine President Benigno Aquino signed several maritime pacts with his Vietnamese counterpart Truong Tan Sang, including naval agreements to share information, respond to natural disasters, prevent smuggling and piracy, and protect marine resources in the South China Sea.

Sovereignty over areas of the South China Sea is contested by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei. In the past six months, tensions have spiked through incidents at sea while at the same time claimants have released a series of joint statements aimed at finding a common and peaceful solution to their overlapping territorial claims. Many areas of the South China Sea are believed to be rich in fossil fuels and are important to regional navigation and trade.

By joining forces, the Philippines and Vietnam aim to enhance their negotiating leverage vis-a-vis China. Beijing has repeatedly stated its preference to pursue bilateral agreements with smaller claimant countries while the latter have pushed for a binding agreement through multilateral channels led by the 10-member ASEAN.

During the 18th ASEAN Regional Forum held in July, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and his ASEAN counterparts signed a document setting out agreed measures to make the 2002 Declaration of Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea more binding. The new eight-point document laid out guidelines for the implementation and agreement by consensus of future joint cooperation activities that lead to the "eventual realization" of a formal code of conduct in the maritime area.

The agreement received mixed reviews. Philippine officials said that the new DOC guidelines won't do enough to alleviate tensions. Vietnamese officials highlighted their coordination with the meeting's host, Indonesia, and spoke about the "success" of the multilateral forum.

Tong Xiaoling, China's ambassador to ASEAN, asserted that the grouping is not a party to the territorial conflict "so a document reached by the two sides cannot solve the disputes". He stressed that the issue could be resolved only through a "bilateral framework".

Strategic hedging
Amid these divergent views, Philippine President Aquino traveled to Beijing in early September for a meeting with his counterpart Hu Jintao. The five-day visit was dogged by South China Sea tensions, but the two leaders reiterated their commitment "to addressing the disputes through peaceful dialogue, to maintain continued regional peace, security, stability and an environment conducive to economic progress".

Later that same month, during a September 27 meeting in Tokyo, Aquino demonstrated lack of faith in that cooperative rhetoric by boosting naval ties with Japan - also in the name of upholding peace and stability in the South China Sea. The day after the announcement, Japan and ASEAN defense officials held a high-profile meeting on South China Sea cooperation and consultation. Relations between Japan and ASEAN have "matured from dialogue to one where Japan plays a more specific cooperative role", said Kimito Nakae, Japan's vice minister of defense, after the meeting.

Nakae was also cited in press reports saying that tensions over oil exploration and military outposts in the South China Sea would require more cooperation from the US and India to manage. On that cue, Vietnamese President Sang met Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met on October 12 and signed an oil and gas exploration agreement between India's ONGC Videsh and PetroVietnam in a South China Sea area claimed by Hanoi but contested by China.

Predictably, the agreement was not welcomed in Beijing. "India's energy strategy is slipping into an extremely dangerous whirlpool," said a front-page commentary in the state-owned newspaper China Energy News, published by the Communist Party's mouthpiece People's Daily, in response to the joint exploration announcement.

The energy deal was concluded one day after Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong arrived in Beijing for bilateral discussions. Trong concluded a bilateral agreement seeking to contain South China Sea-related disputes. At the same time, at the end of October, Vietnamese Defense Minister Gen Phung Quang Thanh and his Japanese counterpart Yasuo Ichikawa signed a new memorandum enhancing bilateral defense cooperation.

While Manila's hardening policy towards China is backed by its historical alliance with the US, Hanoi has been somewhat more ambiguous in its position. On one hand, Vietnam's foreign policy is based on the so-called "friends to all" principle; on the other, the ambiguity reflects internal divisions inside the ruling CPV and government, according to a well-placed CPV source who spoke with Asia Times Online on condition of anonymity.

While CPV chief Trong is viewed as pro-Chinese, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung is thought to be more pro-West in outlook and keen to improve relations and strategic cooperation with the US. Sang is seen to hold the balance of power and recent moves indicate that he too is leaning towards the West, the CPV source added.

The US is responding - at least rhetorically - to those strategic calls. During his first tour in Asia, newly appointed US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta reaffirmed the US's strategic role in the region at an annual meeting of ASEAN defense ministers held in late October. "I told them that I would do everything possible ... to develop a relationship in which the security of this region will be strengthened for the future," Panetta said.

His statement echoed a policy concept developed by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton calling for more US strategic involvement outlined in a recent essay published in Foreign Policy. In that report, Clinton wrote, "The United States has moved to fully engage the region's multilateral institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)." Similar statements promoting more multilateralism to solve the dispute are expected during Obama's visit to the EAS on November 19.

The Philippines and Vietnam are in their own ways promoting more US and regional power involvement in the South China Sea dispute. They will need to tread carefully to avoid deepening the dispute: China is now able to exercise influence, including through trade and investment, over the Asia-Pacific region in ways that an economically weakened US can no longer match.

The bilateral agreement between the Philippines and Vietnam, and Japan's and India's new strategic and commercial commitments to the South China Sea will likely embolden ASEAN country claimants. But any indication that the US is orchestrating intra-ASEAN bilateral alliances and more Japanese and Indian involvement specifically to contain China's power risks a backlash to which Washington will be expected by its ASEAN allies to respond in kind.... LOL




ZIOCONNED-elites carefully creating a Muslim army in preparation for barbaric event in Europe, MENA and way beyond....?


ZIO-elites carefully creating a Muslim army with radical elements to do the dirty bidding for them in preparation for some event in Europe, MENA and way beyond....?

Thousands of Tribes with Flags on the March worldwide, courtesy of the ZIOCONS' dirty deeds...


http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/02/suicide_n_1070491.html




Here is a video of our Balkans' own Effendi Mufti Muamer Zukorlic of Sandzak - a (link) mufti is a religious governor under Sharia law...this guy and his group DO NOT obey Serbian law and are at loggerheads with Serbia - Serbia long identifies this Sandzak pocket as a crime, mob and terrorist nest but cannot do anything about them without Soros screaming about human rights of the radical groups - by design, Soros always holds governments hostage so that radical elements can deploy their missions.

This guy in the video is not imported from the Arab world as imam but is part of Wahhabi who have been there since the ottoman Turks...he is speaking Bosnian and is a native. He is the top leader of the Wahabi in Sandzak...these guys are Donmeh-descendant crypto-Jews under radical Sharia Muslim cover and they carry out anything CIA wants carried out there...I put a pic of their mosque in Off Topic - it has a Star of David on the mosque...imagine a sharia-based radical Islam group with a Star of David! This mufti Muamer Zukorlic in this
video here is the Sandzak-Serbian mufti who is head of the group which shot up the US embassy - in the video, that is Bosnian language he is screaming and it gives me Goosebumps to listen to this unrelenting hate rhetoric against all infidels - just forward into it and listen to him scream...this man spreads dangerous hate and stirs Muslims against infidels right in Europe and is weaponizing Islam.

When I see this, I want Marshall Tito back. He was not good but he was far better than what has happened since his death. He told us we were all to be communist atheists and had a way of getting guys like this mufti in the video to STFU or go to jail if they sowed this kind of hatred but it prevented the kinds of runaway problems Zionists are creating with this. This is social engineering created by Zio elites. Now these various pockets of old radical Islam groups throughout the Balkans are being radicalized with Saudi-Arabian funding and al CIAda-imported ideological radicalization (see my other comments in Off Topic) while our formerly utterly mellow and non-radical mainstream Muslims are being educated on radical Islam....this is a slow-growing but deadly cancer in Europe. NOT Islam - but this Zionist-controlled radical Islam such as this brand here coming out of Sarajevo and Sandzak carrying out terror attacks.

It is not about faith or religion. Just listen to this guy in the video scream. They weaponized Islam and are ready to go into the next round of Muslim wars in Europe...Talk about a giant Zio-controlled radical Islam sleeper cell...there are millions of followers of this stuff in Europe...

Here is another stunning view:
video. The whole video is done in Serbian and talks about the Islamification of Sarajevo which was once a multi-cultural melting pot of all cultures and is now ethnically cleansed by Zio orders and is almost exclusively Muslim with elements of radical Islam. At minute 2:20 of the video, this is a must-see - this is the second generation of mujahedin in Bosnia. The first generation was imported (see the videos I put in Off Topic) via al Qaeda. They stayed nearly 20 years now since the war began and raised the next generation of mujahedin - these are now Bosnian Muslim natives. It is an example of the Zio-driven radicalization of the Balkans and Europe at large. This picture at minute 2:20 are not only Bosnian mujahedin trained under Sharia law but they are also PART OF THE BOSNIAN formal Army!

I am far from joining the American hype about dangerous Muslims. I come from a country which had many Muslim elements along with catholic and orthodoxy. We got along under communism. Actually, I loved Sarajevo and its quaint Muslim culture and really liked our native Muslims. But this is something else. Dangerous fanatics are being radicalized in Europe and anyone who says anything about it is being cursed as xenophobe and silenced by Reuters/Rothschild propaganda. It is not about ANY religion. Such militant polarization is socially and geopolitically very dangerous. Yes, Soros/CIA is in the middle of this brand of social engineering by protecting the ongoing radicalization (Soros/CIA is gatekeeper of "human rights" under the name of Helsinki Watch in the Balkans - and the Soros groups will scream discrimination if ANYONE objects to this systematic social, cultural and ethnic radicalization), so are the Saudi groups who fund this brand of Islam in Europe. They work together on a greater Zio goal to create this by design.

What started as a Saudi-financed import of radical Islam from the outside during the 90s war has been internalized into Bosnian Muslim culture and has turned into an Islamic Army with strong Sharia factions via the Wahhabi. Not some radical sleeper cell - but an army in Europe is being quietly transformed to radical Islam - just look at the mujahedin elements in the Bosnian formal military in the video above - by the Zio-influence of the Saudis, the influence of NATO and the US who are the occupiers of Bosnia under whose noses this is happening. Why? Are our elites carefully creating a Muslim army with radical elements to do the dirty bidding for them in preparation for some event in Europe, MENA and way beyond....?





Tuesday, November 1, 2011

Iran demands compensation for U.S. "scenario-making"....


Iran demands compensation for U.S. "scenario-making"....


October , 2011 -- Iranian government letter to the United States...


We have obtained a news release from the Iranian government concerning a letter Tehran has sent to the United States concerning the terrorism charges leveled against an Iranian national and a dual Iranian-U.S. citizen.

"In a letter to the United States government, the Iranian government has called on the United States to officially apologize for making baseless accusations against Iran. A diplomatic source said that, in response to the recent American accusations that the United States has a responsibility to apologize to the government of Iran and to the Iranian citizens it has accused. Iran also called on the United States to pay compensation for the physical and psychological damages caused to these people. This source added that Iran, in its letter, stated that the 'scenario' advanced by the United States is based on dishonest information. Behavior that runs against international law imposes heavy costs, both material and spiritual, on innocent people in countries throughout the world, including the American people.

This has become a standard procedure for American officials....and their infamous White House Murder INC, in the Levant and Worldwide... A clear example of that is the barbaric inside Job of 9/11 and the cowardly assassination of Mr. Elie HOBEIKA, January 24th 2002 in Beirut and the attack on Iraq, which were both also based on dishonest information.... According to this source, in its response to the United States government Iran stressed that the results of its 'scenario-making' there is that, after killing hundreds of thousands of innocent people and imposing thousands of billions of dollars of expenditures and damages on the American people, the United States has been forced to withdraw completely from Iraq and Lebanon, in helpless defeat." ...