Open Source Center of CIA classifies news as "For Official Use Only"

Open Source Center of CIA classifies news as "For Official Use Only"

The Open Source Center (OSC) is billed as a U.S. government agency that "monitors and collects news and information from thousands of non-U.S. media sources" and maintains liaison with the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), a component of the Department of Commerce. OSC was established on November 1, 2005, under the Director of National Intelligence. The OSC is staffed by analysts of the CIA.

OSC also classifies some reports as "FOUO," or "For Official Use Only."

We have obtained one of these FOUO reports on the reorganization of the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU.

Russian Special Forces Restructuring Suggests Shakeup in GRU OSC Analysis FOUO April 17, 2009 The March decisions by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to disband two of the ten special purpose (Spetsnaz) brigades of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) provoked speculation over wider plans to reform military intelligence. Observers postulated that the Spetsnaz as a whole could be removed from the GRU and that the GRU itself might be absorbed by the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). GRU chief Valentin Korabelnikov's absence at a 17 March MoD collegium meeting fueled media speculation that he had resigned in protet - something denied by MoD officials. Korabelnikov's absence and unusually extensive media coverage suggested some opposition to the restructuring. Starting in March, the MoD began reducing GRU Spetsnaz brigades. On 6 March, the MoD ordered the disbanding of the GRU's 67 th Spetsnaz Brigade and closure of its base in Berdsk - a small town outside of Novosibirsk (Kommersant, 6 March). (1) Later media reports indicated that the majority of the Berdsk brigade had been relocated to Irkutsk (Izvestiya, 23 March). (2) On 13 March, a Moscow-based website reported that following the closing of the 67 th Spetsnaz at Berdsk, "the 12 th brigade in Asbest (70 km north of Yekaterinburg), and the 3 rd in Samara" might also be disbanded and combined with other units" (Oreanda.ru). (3) On 31 March, Sverdlovsk Governor Eduard Rossel informed the public of the MoD's decision to "inactivate the GRU 12 th Spetsnaz Brigade, which has for many years been based in Asbest" (news.ru, 31 March )." (4) Some media suggested that the dissolution of the units was aimed at having only one Spetznaz unit per military district. Business daily Kommersant and the military-focused weekly Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye reported that, in accordance with the on-going military reform, there will be only "one GRU Spetsnaz brigade in each of the six military districts" (19 March, 20 March ). (5) (6) The elimination of the two brigades reduces the total number from ten to eight, but the fact that there are only six military districts suggests there will be further restructuring to reduce the number to six. Criticism of Restructuring The decision to disband the 67 th and 12 th GRU Spetsnaz Brigades received extensive national media coverage and drew opposition from both local residents and national observers. On 9 March, approximately 300 citizens of Berdsk and nearby Novosibirsk gathered to protest the base closure and demand the dismissal of Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov (RIA-Novosti). (7) At a smaller second rally on 21 March, local organizers characterized the base closing as an "anti-state action" and demanded that the "senseless reform of the army" be stopped (Ekho Moskvy). (8) Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov published an open letter to President Dmitriy Medvedev condemning the "reckless nature of this latest, but most destructive, reform of the army," and adding that, without a concrete blueprint for national security and the military doctrine of Russia, "the destruction of the Armed Forces could become irreversible" (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 12 March). (9) In an article highly critical of the ongoing military reform, chief editor of independent daily Novyye Izvestiya, Valeriy Yakov, opined that "today the GRU Spetsnaz brigades are of no use to some people in our ever-mistrustful upper strata" (20 March). (10) Fate of GRU Spetsnaz Other media suggested that Spetsnaz units would be removed from GRU jurisdiction and reorganized under the command of the military districts. Independent weekly Argumenty Nedeli reported that "Spetsnaz units will be resubordinated to the commanders of the military districts" and also asserted that "the director of the GRU, most likely, will no longer make weekly reports to the country's president" (12 March). (11) Prominent security services commentator Andrey Soldatov told business daily Kommersant that, in the "constant conflict" between the leadership of the Spetsnaz and the leaders of the signals espionage branch, Korabelnikov "always came down on the side of the latter. Thus it is highly unlikely that he would come to the rescue of the Special Forces at this time" (19 March). (12) However, other officials and media anticipated that the Spetsnaz might become part of the proposed Special Operations Forces (SSO) if organizational hurdles for the latter were resolved. Mikhail Babich, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, told analytical news website segodnya.ru that he favored a dual subordination scenario in which Spetsnaz would answer to both the GRU and the proposed SSO, but that before this happens, basic questions need to be answered: "What missions with SSO perform? Will they be intended only for defensive warfare? How will...they coordinate with the other Armed Forces?" (2 April) (13) Independent daily Moskovskiy Komsomolets questioned the MoD's decision to disband one of Russia's elite Spetsnaz brigades in the absence of "a military doctrine, which has to specifically outline outside threats facing our country," and argued that "in order to create the SSO we need a combat command agency...informational support...air, naval, and land-based means for mobilization and deployment of special subunits...and the SSO would need their own strike component as well" (24 March). (14) Speculation on GRU Merger With SVR Media reports on the GRU moved beyond the restructuring of the Spetsnaz to speculate that the GRU might be partially or even entirely incorporated into the SVR. Elite-oriented daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta asserted that "the Minister of Defense decided to get rid of this structure (GRU) since it was parallel to the Foreign Intelligence Service, which was performing practically the same missions," but added the "reform plans are not supported by public opinion and they are running into serious opposition" (13 March). (15) As early as January, Moskovskiy Komsomolets reported on "persistent rumors that the Main Intelligence Directorate could be demoted to the level of an ordinary directorate" and that the SVR would handle "strategic intelligence...leaving operational intelligence with the military." It concluded, however, that "the process has stalled" (23 January ). (16) Government daily Rossiyskaya Gazeta concluded that the cost of developing and maintaining high-tech intelligence "puts a considerable burden on the military budget" and "perhaps it makes sense to give it to colleagues at the SVR" (17 March). (17) According to most media descriptions of a possible GRU-SVR merger, the majority of the GRU leadership favored the realignment because they would earn more money under the SVR. A source in the MoD informed Kommersant that "in general, there was no opposition to the issue, because wages at SVR were much higher than at the GRU General Staff" (19 March). (18) Nezavisimaya Gazeta's sources in the GRU admitted that: "If a convergence does happen, this might even be useful for them as wages and housing in the SVR are much better than in the GRU" (13 March). (19) According to Rossiyskaya Gazeta, the "motivation (for reform) is simple: salaries at the SVR are much higher than the salaries of the military intelligence officers. The merger of the two intelligence services will objectively improve the financial situation of GRU officers" (17 March). (20) Korabelnikov's Future at the GRU Nonofficial media interpreted the conspicuous absence of GRU chief Korabelnikov from the 17 March Defense Ministry collegium as evidence that he had submitted his resignation in protest of the MoD's recent reform efforts. Kommersant, which claimed to have reported on Korabelnikov's resignation as early as November 2008, interpreted the general's absence as yet another sign he had vacated his post, adding that "the presence of the GRU chief at a meeting of the MoD Board is, according to protocol, absolutely mandatory"(18 March). (21) Moskovskiy Komsomolets remarked that Korabelnikov "didn't want to deal with reform earlier and he doesn't want to now." The paper also noted that "since December, Korabelnikov has rarely been seen at work" and "for some time, documents requiring official signature have been sent to GRU Deputy Chief Lieutenant General Soldatkin" (24 March). (22) According to Argumenty Nedeli, an anonymous source in the MoD General Staff reported that Korabelnikov "disagrees with such reforms" and "has written his retirement request. However, he has not yet signed it, since his deputy has rejected the proposal to occupy the position" (12 March). (23) The media speculation eventually elicited a response from high-ranking MoD officials, who denied rumors of Korabelnikov's resignation and informed the public that he would stay on to reform the GRU and select a successor before retiring. On 19 March, deputy head of the General Staff Colonel-General Vasiliy Smirnov denied media reports of Korabelnikov's resignation, calling them "utter nonsense" and adding that: "None of the leaders of the General Staff of the MoD has raised this issue. The GRU will continue to exist as a separate military body" (ITAR-TASS). (24) On 21 March, chief of the General Staff Nikolay Makarov denied that Korabelnikov had resigned and said that the GRU chief was not at the Defense Ministry collegium because "Korabelnikov is on scheduled vacation. When it is over, he will be back to work" (ITAR-TASS). (25) A statement on the MoD website from 21 March declared that: "Korabelnikov, who turned 63 on 4 January, said he is willing to change the structure of the GRU and retire after he finds a successor." The statement also pledged that "one of the main functions, which is space intelligence, will remain with the GRU" (mil.ru). (26) According to a Kommersant source in the MoD, "Vladimir Putin played the key role in ensuring that the GRU chief remained at his post for another year" (19 March). (27) Implications The unusual volume of media attention surrounding the highly secretive GRU may be a sign of opposition to efforts to reform military intelligence. The number of sources discussing a possible GRU-SVR merger suggests a possible struggle among the security services to control space and signals intelligence capabilities. Korabelnikov's absence at the Defense Ministry collegium may indicate that he either opposed reform efforts or was excluded from participating in reform decisions. (1) (OSC CEP20090309546002 6 March 2009 City Council in Berdsk Appeals to Medvedev Not To Disband Military Unit (U) (U) Moscow Kommersant in Russian -- Informative daily businessnewspaper owned by pro-Kremlin and Gazprom-linked businessman Alisher Usmanov, although it still criticizes the government) (2) (OSC CEP20090323358018 23 March 2009 Russia: Gen Makarov Tells State Duma That No Spetsnaz Personnel Will Be Released, Izvestiya (U) (U) Large-circulation daily owned by Gazprom that usually supports the Kremlin) (3) (OSC CEP20090316358009 13 March 2009 Russia: Retirement of GRU Chief Denied, Two GRU Brigades to be Disbanded (U) (U) Moscow RIA OREANDAin Russian - Moscow-based website with focus on economic news; URL: http://www.oreanda.ru) (4) (OSC CEP20090401358009 31 March 2009 Russia: Asbest Special Forces' Brigade Inactivated as Part of Military Reform (U) (U) Moscow Newsru.com in Russian -- Popular Internet news site associated with exiled media magnate Gusinskiy; URL: http://www.newsru.com) (5) (Open Source (Not OSC) 19 March 2009 Ivan Konavalov, They Refuse to Let General Korabelnikov Leave Military Intelligence, Kommersant (U) (U) Informative daily business newspaper owned by pro-Kremlin and Gazprom-linked businessman Usmanov, although it still criticizes the government) (6) (OSC 20 March 2009 The GRU Completes Its Historic Path, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (U) (U) Weekly military newspaper published by Remchukov's Nezavisimaya Gazeta) (7) (OSC CEP20090309950057 9 March 2009 Rally in Siberian town calls for defense minister's resignation (U) (U) Moscow RIA-Novosti in Russian -- Government information agency, part of the state media holding company; located at www.rian.ru) (8) (OSC CEP20090321950159 21 March 2009 Another Protest Held in Novosibirsk Region Against Army Brigade Being Disbanded, Ekho Moskvy (U) (U) Moscow Ekho Moskvy Radio in Russian -- influential station known for its news coverage and interviews of politicians; now owned by Gazprom but largely retains its independence) (9) (OSC CEP20090316358004 12 March 2009 Russia: Zyuganov Letter to President Deplores Disbandment of GRU Brigade (U) (U) Moscow Sovetskaya Rossiya in Russian -- Pro-communist and nationalist daily) (10) (OSC CEP20090323358013 20 March 2009 Valeriy Yakov, Russia: Inactivation of Celebrated GRU Brigade Queried, Novyye Izvestiya (U) (U) Moscow NovyyeIzvestiya in Russian -- Daily paper owned by Bazhayev's Alyans group; it is sometimes critical of the government) (11) (OSC CEP20090312348003 12 March 2009 Aleksandr Chuykov, "Military Intelligence Loses its Access to the President", Argumenty Nedeli (U) (U) Weekly paper founded by disgruntled journalists from Argumenty i Fakty ) (12) (Open Source (Not OSC) 19 March 2009 Ivan Konavalov, They Refuse to Let General Korabelnikov Leave Military Intelligence, Kommersant (U) (U) Informative daily business newspaper owned by pro-Kremlin and Gazprom-linked businessman Usmanov, although it still criticizes the government) (13) (OSC CEP20090403358004 2 April 2009 Russia: Duma Deputy Discusses GRU Reform, Highly Critical of Armed Forces Reform, Segodnya.ru (U) (U) Information-analytical website) (14) (Open Source (Not OSC) http://www.mk.ru/blogs/MK/2009/03/24/society/400997/ 24 March 2009 AlekseyMerniov, "Fitting the GRU With a Fifth Wheel", Moskovskiy Komsomolets (U) (U) Mass-circulation daily featuring political exposes and criticism of the government) (15) (OSC CEP20090316546001 13 March 2009 The Arbat-Berdsk Anomaly: The Public, Including the Army, Has Not Grasped the Logic of the Military Reforms", Nezavisimaya Gazeta (U) (U) Daily Moscow newspaper featuring varied independent political viewpoints and criticism of the government) (16) (OSC CEP20090123358004 23 January 2009 Russia: Proposal To Transfer GRU Special Forces to Infantry as Part of Reform, Moskovskiy Komsomolets (U) (U) Mass-circulation daily featuring political exposes and criticism of the government but support for Moscow Mayor Luzhkov) (17) (OSC CEP20090318358011 17 March 2009 Sergey Ptichkin, Russia: Personnel Changes to be Expected within Main Intelligence Directorate, Rossiyskaya Gazeta (U) (U) Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta in Russian -- government daily newspaper) (18) (Open Source (Not OSC) 19 March 2009 Ivan Konavalov, They Refuse to Let General Korabelnikov Leave Military Intelligence, Kommersant (U) (U) Informative daily business newspaper owned by pro-Kremlin and Gazprom-linked businessman Usmanov, although it still criticizes the government) (19) (OSC CEP20090316546001 13 March 2009 The Arbat-Berdsk Anomaly: The Public, Including the Army, Has Not Grasped the Logic of the Military Reforms", Nezavisimaya Gazeta (U) (U) Daily Moscow newspaper featuring varied independent political viewpoints and criticism of the government) (20) (OSC CEP20090318358011 17 March 2009 Sergey Ptichkin, Russia:Personnel Changes to be Expected within Main Intelligence Directorate, Rossiyskaya Gazeta (U) (U) Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta in Russian -- government daily newspaper) (21) (OSC CEP20090319358004 18 March 2009 Ivan Konovalov, "The Commander In Chief is Taking the Army Away From Repairs: The President Called on the Armed Forces to Rearm", Kommersant (U) (U) Informative daily business newspaper owned by pro-Kremlin and Gazprom-linked businessman Usmanov) (22) (Open Source (Not OSC) http://www.mk.ru/blogs/MK/2009/03/24/society/400997/ 24 March 2009 AlekseyMerniov, "Fitting the GRU With a Fifth Wheel", Moskovskiy Komsomolets (U) (U) Mass-circulation daily featuring political exposes and criticism of the government) (23) (OSC CEP20090312348003 12 March 2009 Aleksandr Chuykov, "Military Intelligence Loses its Access to the President", Argumenty Nedeli (U) (U) Weekly paper founded by disgruntled journalists from Argumenty i Fakty ) (24) (OSC CEP20090319950265 19 March 2009 Russian General Denies Merger Plans for Military, Foreign Intelligence Services, ITAR-TASS (U) (U) Main Government InformationAgency) (25) (OSC CEP20090320950332 21 March 2009 General Staff Denies Chief of GRU Intelligence Tenders Resignation, ITAR-TASS (U) (U) Main Government Information Agency) (26) (OSC 21 March 2009 Head of the GRUGeneral Korabelnikov Plans to Optimize the Number of Personnel in Military Intelligence (U) (U) Website of Russian Ministry of Defense ) (27) (Open Source (Not OSC) 19 March 2009 IvanKonavalov, They Refuse to Let General Korabelnikov Leave Military Intelligence, Kommersant (U) (U) Informative daily business newspaper owned by pro-Kremlin and Gazprom-linked businessman Usmanov, although it still criticizes the government)

We have also discovered a link between the U.S. Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM) Open Source Intelligence Branch (OSIB) and the Open Source Center's Americas Program (OSC/TAP) of DNI/CIA:

Intelligence Assessment: South America: Charting a New Defense Strategy? (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The Brazilian Government is promoting its proposal for the South American Defense Council (CSD), which regional leaders will vote on at the 23 May Union of South American Nations (Unasur) Summit in Brasilia. Despite a generally positive reception to the Brazilian proposal for a new South American military alliance, the South American Defense Council (CSD), its approval is not a foregone conclusion. (U//FOUO) ASSESSMENT: The creation of Latin American regional or sub-regional military alliances is not a new development. Previous proposals for such alliances have failed, including Chavez's 1999 idea for a South American NATO. This latest Brazilian proposal seems to have gained traction due in part to Defense Minister Jobim's aggressive lobbying around the region. Venezuelan President Chavez has endorsed the plan and sought to cast it in an anti-US light. Brazilian officials, in contrast, have emphasized that the alliance is not directed against the US, while some Brazilian defense experts and leading dailies have questioned its value. Colombia and Peru have said they are withholding judgment on whether to join, suggesting Brazil will have a difficult task in getting regional consensus on the council and its mission.