WASHINGTON — President Obama’s national security team is contemplating troop reductions in Afghanistan that would be steeper than those discussed even a few weeks ago, with some officials arguing that such a change is justified by the rising cost of the war and the death of Osama bin Laden, which they called new “strategic considerations.”
These new considerations, along with a desire to find new ways to press the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, to get more of his forces to take the lead, are combining to create a counterweight to an approach favored by the departing secretary of defense, Robert M. Gates, and top military commanders in the field. They want gradual cuts that would keep American forces at a much higher combat strength well into next year, senior administration officials said.
The cost of the war and Mr. Karzai’s uneven progress in getting his forces prepared have been latent issues since Mr. Obama took office. But in recent weeks they have gained greater political potency as Mr. Obama’s newly refashioned national security team takes up the crucial decision of the size and the pace of American troop cuts, administration and military officials said. Mr. Obama is expected to address these decisions in a speech to the nation this month, they said.
A sharp drawdown of troops is one of many options Mr. Obama is considering. The National Security Council is convening its monthly meeting on Afghanistan and Pakistan on Monday, and although the debate over troop levels is operating on a separate track, the assessments from that meeting are likely to inform the decisions about the size of the force.
In a range of interviews in the past few days, several senior Pentagon, military and administration officials said that many of these pivotal questions were still in flux and would be debated intensely over the next two weeks. They would not be quoted by name about an issue that Mr. Obama had yet to decide on.
Before the new thinking, American officials were anticipating an initial drawdown of 3,000 to 5,000 troops. Those advocating steeper troop reductions did not propose a withdrawal schedule.
Mr. Gates, on his 12th and final visit to Afghanistan as defense secretary, argued repeatedly on Sunday that pulling out too fast would threaten the gains the American-led coalition had made in the 18 months since Mr. Obama agreed to a “surge” of 30,000 troops.
“I would try to maximize my combat capability as long as this process goes on — I think that’s a no-brainer,” Mr. Gates told troops at Forward Operating Base Dwyer. “I’d opt to keep the shooters and take the support out first.”
But the latest strategy review is about far more than how many troops to take out in July, Mr. Gates and other senior officials said over the weekend. It is also about setting a final date by which all of the 30,000 surge troops will be withdrawn from Afghanistan.
A separate timetable would dictate the departure of all foreign troops by 2014, including about 70,000 troops who were there before the surge, as agreed to by NATO and the Afghan government.
Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top American commander in Afghanistan, sounded a cautious note about the state of the war in a telephone interview on Sunday. Although General Petraeus said there was “no question” that the Americans and the Afghans had made military progress in the crucial provinces of Helmand and Kandahar in the south, he said the Taliban were moving to reconstitute after the beating they took this past fall and winter.
“We’ve always said they would be compelled to try to come back,” General Petraeus said, adding that the Taliban would be trying to “regain the momentum they had a year ago.”
General Petraeus declined to discuss the withdrawal of American forces in July or the number he might recommend to the president. Late last week Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that General Petraeus had not yet submitted his recommended withdrawal number.
The decisions on force levels in Afghanistan could mirror how Mr. Obama handled the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq. Senior Pentagon officials noted that after Mr. Obama set a firm deadline for dropping to 50,000 troops in Iraq, he then let his commanders in Baghdad manage the specifics of which units to order home and when. The argument over where to set those “bookends” promises to be one of the most consequential and contentious of Mr. Obama’s presidency. It also has major implications for his re-election bid.
At one end of the debate is Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and, presumably, a range of Mr. Obama’s political advisers, who opposed the surge in 2009 and want a rapid exit, keeping in place a force focused on counterterrorism and training.
At the other end is Mr. Gates, who leaves office at the end of the month and who won the 2009 debate over the troop surge along with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and senior commanders on the ground.
It is not clear what Mrs. Clinton’s position is now as the internal debate is rejoined, and Mr. Obama’s team has changed considerably in the past 18 months. Thomas E. Donilon, appointed national security adviser last fall, was leery of the surge and is likely to lean toward a speedier withdrawal, colleagues say.
Leon E. Panetta, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, supports greater use of unmanned drone technology and will have a voice as Mr. Gates’s nominated successor. General Petraeus is leaving his post in Afghanistan shortly to head the C.I.A., assuming he is confirmed by the Senate this summer.
In the past, when administration officials were asked about the pace of withdrawal, they often said it would depend on “conditions on the ground” — in other words, assessments of the strength of the Taliban, the pace at which Afghan troops and police are prepared to take over and the progress of the economic and political rebuilding of the country. “Most of those would weigh in favor of staying longer,” one senior official said.
But the growing list of so-called strategic considerations amounts to countervailing factors, senior officials said. Mr. Obama has said his goal is to dismantle Al Qaeda so that it can never use Afghanistan again to initiate a Sept. 11-style attack.
With the killing of Bin Laden, and with other members of the terrorist group on the run as American officials pick up clues from data seized at the Bin Laden compound, Mr. Obama can argue that Al Qaeda is much diminished.
The pressure to show Democrats that the cost of the war is declining is intense — so intense that Mr. Gates, during his travels, warned against undercutting a decade-long investment by cutting budgets too rapidly.
The Penatagon says the war in Afghanistan costs about $6 billion a week....
Gates's farewell call on Afghans...
Gates' visit took place against a dramatic backdrop - killing of Osama bin Laden and Ilyas Kashmiri, Taliban-US direct contacts, Pak-Afghan bonhomie, and US drawdown in July. The press conference with Hamid Karzai threw up a few salients. One, neither Gates nor Karzai would be drawn into any criticism of Pakistan. Obviously, US is in 'damage control' mode and Karzai is preparing for his next visit to Islamabad. Pakistan is manifestly courting Karzai.
Two, Gates took a 'wait-and-see approach' when asked about the impact of the killing of bin Laden on Taliban. He spoke about a 'personal relationship' between bin Laden and Omar rather than an al-Qaeda-Taliban nexus. Karzai, on the contrary, was hopeful that Taliban would be more open to reconciliation.
Three, Gates repeatedly claimed that US operations have reversed Taliban momentum, but Karzai remained silent. On the other hand, Karzai forcefully complained about excesses of NATO operations. Karzai insisted that the transition should be through mutual consultations and it is not only a matter of transfer of security responsibility, but also an obligation to dismantle the parallel power structures the western powers created in the provinces bypassing Kabul's authority. A sharp observation, indeed.
Finally, it seems the draft strategic partnership agreement Kabul has handed over to Washington regarding long-term US presence would require more negotiations to meet US expectations. Karzai called it nicely as a 'mutual document of interests'. He justified its raison d'etre somewhat curiously as providing for Afghanistan protection from 'any far or close interferences'. But he didn't insist on seeking Afghan parliament's approval for it or on consultations with regional powers. He put his weight behind the strategic agreement and saw it as in the mutual interests of Afghanistan and US. Gates' silence was deafening....
SOCOM's planners are busy in Pakistan, prior to the Big Exit....???
A drone attack hit the last Wazir jirga, causing instant outrage from Gen. Kayani, of all people. The Ahmadzai Wazirs are taking new heat because of the alleged killing of Ilyas Kashmiri west of Wana, in a village called Laman. The US has openly called Pakistan's bluff on this one, claiming today that Kashmiri was not among those 9 bodies wrapped in white sheets, killed in the drone attack. The Ahmadzai Wazirs are the tribe of infamous Taliban warlord, Mullah Nazir, who was not at this latest jirga of his tribe, because he probably really is dead . The alleged 2007 agreement referred to in the following report, between Nazir and the govt., allows the Army to wash its hands of the Wana region, making the tribes responsible for keeping-out Uzbeks, Mehsuds, Al-Qaeda and other foreign militants, an impossible task for the outgunned tribes.
So the Pak Army claims that their most wanted militant, the terrorist blamed for the Mumbai attacks and implicated in the ongoing trial of David Headley in the US, has been killed in its most lawless region, one policed by tribal Lashkars. After killing the one reporter who allegedly interviewed both Mullah Nazir and Ilyas Kashmiri recently, before he blew the lid off military connections to "al-CIAda," the ISI needs to spread their disinformation stories, albeit without their most reliable reporter, Syed Saleem Shahzad . Pakistan dearly needs to reinforce the idea of another "Taliban split," providing proof of the so-called "good Taliban," in order to maintain their validity in the ongoing psyop, called the "war on terror."
All the Taliban are evil, just like their Wahhabi, Salafists, Takfiri, and Muslim Brotherhood cousins worldwide.... Dealing with any of them is dealing with Shaitan, even if they do cooperate with the Pak. Army, the hidden dictators of Pakistan. The closer we get to open warfare in Pakistan by American troops, the more these kind of bullshit disinformation tactics will be used. There are credible reports that US Jsoc units will sabotage Pakistan's nuclear facilities in order to justify direct control of those facilities soonest by the US criminal Pentagon planners, like Mike Vickers... If Pakistan is ever to be free, it must begin by freeing its aborted democracy from the military dictatorship.
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