After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, U.S. troops in Central Asia conflicts may occur, which can develop into large-scale war, declared November 17 Russian chief of staff Gen. Nikolai Makarov, speaking at the Public Chamber.
“The conflict that there could potentially occur in connection with the withdrawal [from Afghanistan] U.S. troops or the [troops] the world community, can cause any conflict of any intensity. And we must be ready for it. This can be local, regional, [conflict], and can grow in the large-scale war “- quoted Makarov “Views” .
Makarov said that after the collapse of the Soviet Union the possibility of local armed conflicts around the perimeter of Russia has increased, and under certain circumstances they can grow into large-scale war involving nuclear weapons, reports Interfax. At the same time chief of staff said that “almost all the former Warsaw Pact joined NATO, the Baltic states that were included in the former Soviet Union also entered into the alliance.”
Meanwhile, at a press conference in Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Russia is concerned about U.S. plans for anti-terrorist bases in Afghanistan and expanding its presence in Central Asia.
“It is unclear how interfaces withdrawal of U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2014 with the completion of the antiterrorist operation – on the one hand, with the creation of large-scale anti-terrorist U.S. bases – the other” – quoted Minister of ITAR-TASS .
“Ask these questions to our American partners, but there are more questions than answers” – said Lavrov, adding that “periodically receive information that our American colleagues want to expand its presence in Central Asia.”
The Minister noted that the Russian side is always since the beginning of NATO’s operations against “al Qaeda” and “Taliban” say that the foreign presence in Afghanistan and the use of transit facilities in Central Asia is only required to address a specific terrorist threat, which emerged September 11, 2001 years, reports RIA Novosti .
“It was said that this will not be any long-term geopolitical calculation. We will firmly bear in mind that these principles must be respected fully, the principles mentioned, when the operation began, “- concluded Lavrov....
"... Turkey may have more leverage than all others with skin in the game. But Ankara is using its leverage cautiously. The truth is that Syria buys very little electricity from Turkey, and until now, Turkey hasn't halted most of the $2.5 billion a year in trade between the two countries. Perhaps the most dramatic Turkish shot across Assad's bows has been Ankara's hosting, not only of the opposition Syrian National Council, but also of the leadership of the insurgent Free Syrian Army. But at the same time, it has imposed limits on FSA activities on its soil. "Turkey has never offered us even one bullet and has even completely banned operations on the border, or on the road to the border," the FSA's Turkey-based commander Ryad al-Asa'ad told the BBC. "On the other hand, we are from inside Syria, we work inside Syria and the weapons are from Syria."
Turkey's increasingly apocalyptic language nonetheless suggests that Assad might turn back from the abyss.
To the extent that the positions of outside players determine Syria's outcome, it becomes yet another theater of an increasingly complex regional power game. The Arab monarchies have been rallied by the Saudis to mount an aggressive counter-revolutionary campaign, sensing U.S. paralysis in the face of the region-wide democratic rebellion. Riyadh has viewed events in the region through the prism of their (anti-Shi'ite) sectarian outlook and strategic rivalry with Iran, orchestrating the repression of the democratic protest movement in Shi'ite-majority Bahrain. But Assad is an Iranian ally, his regime dominated by the crypto-Shi'ite Allawite sect lording it over the Sunni majority. So the Arab counter-revolutionaries find themselves moving to the side of Syria's Sunni revolutionaries, although a Muslim Brotherhood victory there wouldn't necessarily be Riyadh's optimal outcome.
The U.S. and other Western powers have long loathed the Assad regime over its interventions in Lebanon, its support for Hamas and enabling of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. But they have also worked with it -- Syria fought alongside the U.S. in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, and Syrian intelligence played an important role in hunting al-Qaeda after 9/11...But the U.S. no longer calls the shots in the region, even among those traditionally in its camp. The Saudis are doing their own thing, Qatar is flexing muscles nobody knew it had, and then there's Turkey, whose break with the U.S. on Iran and on Israel had many hawks in Washington proclaiming that Ankara had gone over to the dark side ...But America and Israel's loss was not Iran's gain: In the same week Turkey expelled Israel's ambassador, it also agreed to house a NATO radar system deployed to counter Iran's missile threat. Syria was the last straw, however, with Tehran making it clear it deemed action against Assad a "red line"...., Turkey simply ignored Tehran's objections and began piling on pressure.
Despite their common interest in tackling Assad, many of those Arab regimes don't much like the idea of Turkish influence spreading much more than they like the idea of Iranian influence spreading -- except that in this instance, Iran concurs!... should Syria maintain its current course, it could become a hard-power challenge to Turkey, and others, obliging them to adopt an end-game that could resolve the crisis without setting the region ablaze. At least on that score, they're all in agreement."
"... Qatar’s rise to diplomatic prominence is not uncontroversial. The Wahhabi emirate has close links to Islamist groups. And a size able chunk of its aid to the Libyan rebels ended up in the hands of Islamic radicals. Qatar also backed the Saudi Arabian crackdown on unrest in Bahrain.
The intervention in Bahrain was a serious black mark. But fears of Qatar’s links to Islamist groups should not be overplayed.... Indeed, Qatar is in many ways a more appealing ally than Saudi Arabia, the west’s main friend in the region. True, it remains an autocracy, and as such, its policies depend on the whims of its ruler. But it is edging in the direction of reform.... The emirate hosts two American bases and more than 13,000 service personnel....and the infamous White House Murder INC, in the Levant, MENA and Central Asia... That Qatar can do this while also maintaining relations with the likes of Iran is not a reason for the west to be concerned. It is a feat to be admired. Such juggling is the nature of diplomacy...."